# my BATSFORD CHESS Memorable

#### MY 60 MEMORABLE GAMES

# My 60 Memorable Games

Selected and fully annotated by Bobby Fischer

with Introductions to the games

by International Grandmaster Larry Evans



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(B and W refer to Black and White)

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## Author's Preface

The 60 games annotated in this volume were all played during 1957 through '67 and, with the exception of nos. 44 and 50, under strict tournament conditions. The notes frequently include references to additional games, occasionally presenting them in full. An interested reader will find 34 of my earlier efforts in Bobby Fischer's Games of Chess (Simon and Schuster, 1959).

All of the 60 here offered contain, for me, something memorable and exciting – even the 3 losses. I have tried to be both candid and precise in my elucidations in the hope that they would offer insights into chess that will lead to fuller understanding and better play.

Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to Larry Evans, friend and colleague, for his invaluable aid in the preparation of the text as well as for his lucid introductions.

ROBERT J. FISCHER

New York City

On the chessboard lies and hypocrisy do not survive long.

The creative combination lays bare the presumption of a lie;
the merciless fact, culminating in a checkmate, contradicts the hypocrite.

- EMANUEL LASKER

# **1** Fischer - Sherwin [U.S.A.]

### NEW JERSEY OPEN CHAMPIONSHIP 1957 SICILIAN DEFENSE

#### Too little, too late

Although Sherwin makes no serious errors in the opening, he misses several equalizing opportunities. Demonstrating the technical virtuosity that is to become his hallmark, Fischer, with astonishing maturity, gradually strengthens his grip by accumulating small advantages: the better center and the two Bishops. Sherwin, meanwhile, attempts to consolidate his position — only to see his 14-year-old opponent shatter it with a thunderbolt (18 \$\omega\$xh7). It brings to mind Alekhine's combinations, which also seemed to spring from nowhere. Sherwin, lashing back, refuses to fall. However, his defense finally disintegrates under a series of acute blows to his wobbly King.

| 1 | e4           | c5  |
|---|--------------|-----|
| 2 | <b>€</b> )f3 | e6  |
| 3 | d3           | *** |

This used to be my favorite. I thought it led to a favorable variation of the King's Indian reversed, particularly after Black has committed himself with ...e6.

| 3 | •••        | €)c6          |
|---|------------|---------------|
| 4 | <b>g</b> 3 | €) <b>f</b> 6 |

Fischer-Ivkov, Santa Monica 1966 continued 4...d5 5 \(\Delta\)bd2 \(\delta\)d6 \(\delta\)ge7 7 0-0 0-0 8 \(\Delta\)h4! with chances for initiative.

| 5 | <u></u> <b>⊈</b> g2 | <b>≜e7</b> |
|---|---------------------|------------|
| 6 | 0-0                 | 0-0        |

More usual is 6...d5; but Black has purposely delayed placing his center Pawns. Has he a new idea in mind?


After 7 e5 6 d5 8 bd2 f6 9 exf6 2 xf6 10 Ee1 gives White an edge.

7 ... \(\mathbb{Z}\)b8

Sherwin slid the Rook here with his pinky, as if to emphasize the cunning of this mysterious move. 7...d5 8 \( \beta e1 \) b5 9 e5 \( \beta d7 \) 10 \( \beta f1 \) b4 11 h4 a5 12 \( \beta f4 \) a4 13 a3! Fischer-Mjagmasuren, Sousse Interzonal 1967, leads to double-edged play where Black's chances on the Q-side countervail White's K-side attack – but White usually comes first.

8 **Ee1** d6 9 c3 b6

Not bad. But I had expected 9...b5 10 d4 cxd4! (if 10...b4 11 e5! bxc3? [11...dxe5 12 dxe5 2d7 13 c4 holds the advantage] 12 exf6 cxd2 13 2dxd2! wins a piece) 11 cxd4 d5 with equality.



**SHERWIN** 

Position after 9...b6

**FISCHER** 

*10* **d4** 

**營c7?** 

This leads to trouble. Black should strive for counterplay by opening the c-file: 10...cxd4 11 cxd4 d5 12 e5 2d7, etc.

11 e5!

②d5

Worse is 11...②d7 12 exd6 Qxd6 13 ②e4 cxd4 14 ②xd6 營xd6 15 Qf4 e5 16 ②xe5! ②dxe5 17 cxd4 winning a Pawn. The best try is 11...dxe5 12 dxe5 ②d7 13 營e2 Qb7 14 h4 with a bind, but Black's game may be tenable.

12 exd6

&xd6

#### *13* **②e4!**

c4

An unpleasant choice, since it releases the pressure in the center and gives White a free hand to start operations on the K-side. However, other moves lose material:

A] 13... 鱼e7 14 c4 ②f6 15 鱼f4, etc.

B] 13...cxd4 14 ②xd6 營xd6 15 c4! ②f6 16 急f4 and again the lineup on this diagonal is unfortunate.


| 14 | ©xd6 | ₩xd6  |
|----|------|-------|
| 15 | ②g5! | ©ce7? |

A bad mistake. Black's game is still tenable after 15...h6 16 ②e4 營d8.

#### 16 **₩c2! ②g6**

On 16...f5? 17 營e2 picks off a Pawn. Had Sherwin seen what was coming, however, he might have chosen 16...g6 17 包e4 營c7 18 彙h6 墨d8, though 19 營d2 prepares to exploit his weakened dark squares.

#### *17* **h4** ∅**f6**



SHERWIN

Position after 17...\Df6

**FISCHER** 

Throwing a monkey wrench into Black's carefully contrived setup! As usual, tactics flow from a positionally superior game.

18 ...

②xh7

Not 18... \$\delta xh7? 19 \$\delta f4.

19

h5

€\h4!

The best fighting chance. Not 19... De7 20 £f4 wins a clear exchange.

*20* **≜f4** 

**營d8** 

21 gxh4

...

21 &xb8? 如xg2 22 含xg2 &b7+ 23 f3 響xb8.

21

罩b7!

22 h6!

He's hoping for 22 \(\mathbb{L}\xb7\) \(\mathbb{L}\xb7\) and, suddenly, the initiative passes to Black despite his material deficit.

22 ...


**豐xh4** 

Once again, time-pressure had Sherwin burying his thumbs in his ears. Instead of trying to mix it up, Black should keep his King sheltered as long as possible with 22...g6 23 h5! g5 (if 23...gxh5 24 \(\mathbb{U}\)e2), but 24 \(\mathbb{L}\)e5 stays a Pawn ahead with two Bishops. It might still be a fight, though.

23 hxg7

**\$xg7?** 

Suicidal. The last hope would have been 23... 2d8 24 皇g3 營h6, though 25 營e2 is hard to meet (if 25...b5 26 a4 a6 27 axb5 axb5 28 富a8).



**SHERWIN** 

Position after 23...\$xg7?

**FISCHER** 

24 罩e4!

Threatening 25 \(\hat{2}\)e5+.

24 ... Wh5
25 Ee3! ...

Now the Rook joins the King hunt – and it's murder. The immediate threat is  $26 \ \text{Zh} 3 \ \text{Wg} 6 \ 27 \ \text{Zg} 3$ .

25 ... f5 26 罩h3 豐e8

26... 學g6? 27 罩g3.

27 **ge5**+ ...

White can pick off a couple of exchanges with 27 总h6+ 含g8 28 总xf8 營xf8 29 总xb7, etc. But by now I felt there was more in the offing.


27 ... ②f6

27... 會g8? 28 罩g3+ 會f7 29 罩g7 mate.

On 29... 含e7 30 罩h7+ is devastating.

On 32... \( \) xf6 33 \( \) xb7 nets a whole Rook.

33 **gc6**+ Black resigns



**SHERWIN** 

Final Position after 33 \(\mathbb{2}c6+\)

**FISCHER** 

# 2 Fischer - Larsen [Denmark]

PORTOROZ 1958
SICILIAN DEFENSE

## Slaying the dragon

Although the Sicilian, as a whole, is still the best fighting defense at Black's disposal, much of the steam has been taken out of the time-honored Dragon Variation. This is one of the key games which helped to batter its reputation.

In a laudable attempt to create complications, Larsen deviates from the book on move 15. That proves to be disastrous, since his counterattack never gets started. Mechanically, routinely, Fischer pries open the h-file, sacrificing first a Pawn and then the exchange. There is an aura of the inevitable about the outcome. Here the notes are as instructive and lucid as the text, which is an object lesson in how to mount an assault against the fianchettoed King.

| 1 | e4          | <b>c5</b>   |
|---|-------------|-------------|
| 2 | <b>⊕</b> f3 | d6          |
| 3 | d4          | cxd4        |
| 4 | ☑xd4        | <b>₫</b> 16 |
| 5 | ©c3         | <b>g6</b>   |


Larsen was one of the diehards who refused to abandon the Dragon until recently. White's attack almost plays itself ... weak players even beat Grandmasters with it. I once thumbed through several issues of *Shakhmatny Bulletin*, when the Yugoslav Attack was making its debut, and found the ratio was something like nine wins out of ten in White's favor. Will Black succeed in reinforcing the variation? Time will tell.

| 6                  | ф̂e3               | <b>≜</b> g7          |  |
|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--|
| 6මුg4? still loses | to 7 <b>2</b> b5+. |                      |  |
| 7                  | f3                 | 0-0                  |  |
| 8                  | ₩d2                | <b>€</b> 2 <b>c6</b> |  |
| 9                  | ₫c4                | ***                  |  |

This refinement supersedes the old 0-0-0. The idea is to prevent ...d5.



Just how Black can attempt to thread his way to equality is not clear. Interesting is Donald Byrne's 9...a5. The strongest reply is 10 g4 and if 10... © e5 11 \( \) e2 d5? 12 g5! wins a Pawn.



After 12... 2xb3 13 cxb3! Black cannot make any attacking headway against this particular Pawn configuration. White is lost in the King and Pawn ending, it's true, but Black usually gets mated long before then. As Tarrasch put it: "Before the endgame the gods have placed the middle game."

Weaker is 14 ②e2 &xb3 15 cxb3 罩fd8.

Bad judgment is 14...公xd5? 15 皇xg7 堂xg7 16 exd5 皇d7 17 罩de1 with a crushing bind. (Suetin-Korchnoi, USSR Championship prelims 1953.)

Stronger is 15 exd5! \$\square\$b5 16 \$\square\$he1 a5 17 \$\square\$e2! (Tal-Larsen, Zurich 1959) where White abandons the attack and plays for pressure along the e-file instead.

15 ...

\aac8?

The losing move. After the game Larsen explained he was playing for a win, and therefore rejected the forced draw with 15...公xd5 16 毫xg7 公c3+17 bxc3 (17 毫xc3 bxc3 18 營xc3 營xc3 19 bxc3 宣fc8 renders White's extra Pawn useless.) 17...宣ab8! 18 cxb4 營xb4+! 19 營xb4 宣xb4+ 20 兔b2 宣fb8, etc. After 15...公xd5, however, I intended simply 16 exd5 營xd5 17 營xb4, keeping the game alive.

*16* **≜b3!** 


He won't get a second chance to snap off the Bishop! Now I felt the game was in the bag if I didn't botch it. I'd won dozens of skittles games in analogous positions and had it down to a science: pry open the h-file, sac, sac ... mate!

16 ... \(\begin{align\*}
\text{\subseteq} \text{\$\text{\$\subset}\$} \text{\$\text{\$\subseteq}\$} \\ \text{\$\exitt{\$\exit{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\e

This loss of time is unfortunately necessary if Black is ever to advance his a-Pawn. 16... \$\vec{\psi}\$b5? is refuted by 17 \$\ddots xa7\$.

17 h4 營b5

There's no satisfactory way to impede White's attack. If 17...h5 18 g4! hxg4 (18...宣fc8 19 宣dg1 hxg4 20 h5! gxh5 21 fxg4 ②xe4 22 營f4 e5 23 營xe4 exd4 24 gxh5 含h8 25 h6 急f6 26 宣g7! wins) 19 h5! gxh5 (on 19...②xh5 20 食xg7 含xg7 21 fxg4 ②f6 22 營h6+ mates) 20 fxg4 ②xe4 (on 20...hxg4 21 宣dg1 e5 22 食e3 宣d8 23 食h6; or 20...②xg4 21 宣dg1 食xd4 22 疍xg4+! hxg4 23 營h6 leads to mate) 21 營e3 ②f6 (21...食xd4 22 營xe4 食g7 23 冨xh5) 22 gxh5 e5 23 h6 wins.



LARSEN

Position after 17... ₩b5

**FISCHER** 

Now Black is threatening to get some counterplay with ... a5-a4.

18 h5! ...

There's no need to lose a tempo with the old-fashioned g4.

18 ... \( \begin{align\*} \begin{alig

On 18...gxh5 19 g4! hxg4 20 fxg4! ②xe4 21 營h2 ②g5 22 拿xg7 含xg7 23 罩d5 罩c5 24 營h6+ 含g8 25 罩xg5+ 罩xg5 26 營xh7 mate.


19 hxg6 hxg6 20 g4 ...

20 ... a5

Now Black needs just one more move to get his counterattack moving. But for the want of a nail the battle was lost...

21 g5 **②h5** 

Vasiukov suggests 21... ②e8 as a possible defense (not 21...a4? 22 gxf6 axb3 23 fxg7! bxc2+ 24 @xc2! e5 25 @h2 wins); but White crashes through with 22 &xg7 @xg7 (22... exg7? 23 @h2) 23 @h6! e6 (if 23...a4  $24 \text{ @h2 } \text{ @h5 } 25 \text{ <math>\text{ \&xg6+}$ })  $24 \text{ @h2 } \text{ @h5 } 25 \text{ <math>\text{ \&xe6! fxe6}}$  (25... @xg5  $26 \text{ <math>\text{ \&xg6+}$ }! @xg6 27 &xc8, threatening  $\text{ \ensuremath{\mathbb{Z}}}$ g1)  $26 \text{ \ensuremath{\mathbb{Z}}}$ xg6+  $\text{ \ensuremath{\mathbb{Z}}}$ g7  $27 \text{ \ensuremath{\mathbb{Z}}}$ h1, etc.



LARSEN

Position after 21...4\(\Delta\)h5

**FISCHER** 

Fine wrote: "In such positions, combinations are as natural as a baby's smile."

22 ... gxh5

23 g6 e5

On 23...e6 24 gxf7+ 含xf7 (if 24... 萬xf7 25 兔xe6) 25 兔xg7 含xg7 26 萬g1+含h7 27 營g2 營e5 28 營g6+含h8 29 萬g5 萬g7 30 萬xh5+含g8 31 兔xe6+含f8 32 萬f5+含e7 33 萬f7+ wins.

A desperate bid for freedom. On 25...a4 (if 25...罩d8 26 总h6) 26 營xd6+ 罩e7 27 營d8+! 罩xd8 28 罩xd8+ 罩e8 29 总c5+ mates.

26 exd5! ...

Not 26 &xd5 罩xc2!

26 ... \( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} \precenter \text{xf7} \end{align\*} \)

On 26...a4 27 d6! axb3 28 dxc7 wins.

27 d6 \(\mathbb{I}\)f6

28 **≜g5 ≝b7** 

On 28... 營d7 29 營d5! 營f7 (if 29... 富f7 30 食e7+!) 30 食xf6 wins material.

31 ... Black resigns

# **3** Petrosian [U.S.S.R.] - Fischer

PORTOROZ 1958

KING'S INDIAN DEFENSE

## Bear hug

In what appear to be perfectly equal positions, Petrosian consistently finds seemingly innocuous moves which gradually overwhelm his opponent. He accomplishes his objective simply by exchanging pieces and maneuvering for victory without taking unnecessary risks. This essentially defensive technique has the virtue, when it doesn't utterly succeed, of producing a draw. Fischer, by contrast, generally chooses the sharpest course, however precipitous it may become. Occasionally he overreaches himself, but it makes for interesting chess.

In this game, replete with errors on both sides, Petrosian succeeds in pinning his opponent for a time to a static endgame. But Fischer manages to burst his bonds, only to blunder on the very next move (51...\$\displank{\text{d}}6\). Petrosian, however, by blundering in his turn, restores the balance. The ensuing Rook and Pawn ending produces a thrilling draw.

| 1 | c4           | €)f6       |
|---|--------------|------------|
| 2 | ©c3          | g6         |
| 3 | g3           | <b>皇g7</b> |
| 4 | <u>\$g</u> 2 | 0-0        |
| 5 | <b>5</b> 13  | d6         |
| 6 | 0-0          | ©c6        |
| 7 | d3           | •••        |


On 7 d4 I intended 7...e5. Petrosian is striving for an English Opening formation, a slow system for which he is temperamentally suited.

Reckoning he can afford this loss of time in view of Black's misplaced KN. On 8 \( \text{\subset}b1 \) f5! 9 \( \text{\subset}c2 \) a5 10 a3 f4 (Petrosian-Vasiukov, Moscow 1956) Black obtains an excellent aggressive setup. I was as impressed by that game as Petrosian must have been, since he got crushed.

| 8 | •••       | e5  |
|---|-----------|-----|
| 9 | <b>d5</b> | ••• |

9 dxe5 dxe5 10 營xd8 冨xd8 11 公d5 冨d7 12 魚h3 f5 13 g4 公f6! If 14 gxf5 (14 公xf6+ 魚xf6 15 gxf5 gxf5 16 兔xf5?? 冨g7+ wins) 14...公xd5 15 cxd5 冨xd5.





**FISCHER** 

Position after 10 e4

PETROSIAN

This is the right time to get in 10...c5! Petrosian-Boleslavsky, USSR Championship prelims 1957, continued: 11 包e1 會h8 12 包d3 f5 13 罩b1 包f6=.

Tempting but unsound is 11...②xf5 12 g4 ②d4 13 gxh5 皇g4 14 ②xd4! 皇xd1 15 ②e6, etc. And on 11...皇xf5 12 ②g5 營d7 13 ②e6! 皇xe6 14 dxe6 營xe6 15 皇xb7 墨ab8 16 皇g2 營xc4 17 ②d5! White comes out on top.

A "desperado" combination: this Knight (which is doomed anyway) sells its life as dearly as possible.

Simple and good. I had expected 13 fxg3, but Petrosian eschews the K-side attack and plays for control of the center squares instead. His judgment turns out to be right.


13...dxe5, keeping a fluid Pawn center, offers more play. I was unduly worried about White's passed d-Pawn after 14 c5.

| 14 | f4!          | <u></u> ĝg7 |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 15 | <u></u> \$e3 | <b>≜d7</b>  |
| 16 | <b>≜d4</b>   |             |

Forcing the trade of Black's most active piece. White soon obtains a firm grip on the position.

A careless transposition. Now by 17... \(\hat{2}\)xd4+ 18 \(\begin{align\*} \text{xd4} \text{ h5! followed} \) by ...h4, Black could exchange his isolated h-Pawn for White's g-Pawn and the game would be dead equal. Correct was 17 \(\hat{2}\)f3.

Black doesn't get a second chance.



FISCHER

Position after 18 \(\mathbb{L}f3!\)

**PETROSIAN** 

| 18 |                | <b>₩f8</b>  |
|----|----------------|-------------|
| 19 | <b>\$f2</b>    | <b>≣e8</b>  |
| 20 | <b>ℤxe8</b>    | ₩xe8        |
| 21 | <u></u> \$ xg7 | <b>≝xg7</b> |
| 22 | ₩d4            | <b>b</b> 6  |
| 23 | ≌h1            | •••         |

White has effortlessly achieved a plus and now he wants to improve his position before embarking on a committal course. 23 b4!, threatening c5, is much sharper, and poses more immediate problems.

23 ... a5

My first free breath!

| 24 | <b>⊘d1</b> | ₩f8 |
|----|------------|-----|
| 25 | ©e3        | ••• |


Petrosian keeps building without getting sidetracked – even by good moves. I was more afraid of 25 \hat{2}h5! tying me up completely. Then the Rook can't move because of \hat{2}xg6 followed by a check on h8.

The exchange of Queens eases the cramp. White can't afford to retreat and cede this important diagonal.

| 27 | ₩ <b>xg7</b> + | ⊈xg7       |
|----|----------------|------------|
| 28 | a3             | <b>ℤf8</b> |
| 29 | <u> </u>       | •••        |

White constantly finds ways to improve his position. Not 29 b4 axb4 30 axb4 \( \mathbb{Z}\) a8 and Black seizes the open file.

| 29 | •••        | ©e7  |
|----|------------|------|
| 30 | <b>≜d3</b> | h6   |
| 31 | ≌h5        | ı≜e8 |



**FISCHER** 

Position after 31...\\ 2e8

PETROSIAN

*32* **□h2** 

Avoiding a little trap: 32 🖾xf5+? (or 32 🖾xf5? 🖺h8!) 32...⑤xf5 33 🗒xf5 🖺h8! followed by ...⑤g6 winning the exchange.

| 32 | •••  | <b>≜d7</b> |
|----|------|------------|
| 33 | ãh1  | ≌h8        |
| 34 | ©c2! | ***        |

Headed for an even stronger post on d4. I was amazed during the game. Each time Petrosian achieved a good position, he managed to maneuver into a better one.


| 34 | •••           | <b>\$</b> f6 |
|----|---------------|--------------|
| 35 | <b>⊘d4</b>    | <b>⊈g7</b>   |
| 36 | <u></u> \$_e2 | •••          |

Feigning an invasion with 2h5 and 2e1 and 2e6. White has two wings to operate on: Black must be flexed to react appropriately, and this requires alertness.

Panicking and giving him the opportunity he's been waiting for to sneak b4 in at a moment when Black can't counter with ...axb4 and ...\subseteq a8. Petrosian likes to play cat-and-mouse, hoping that his opponents will go wrong in the absence of a direct threat. The amazing thing is – they usually do! Witness a case in point. I should just have ignored his "threat" with, say, 36...\subseteq a8 37 \subseteq h5 \subseteq c8 38 \subseteq e1 \subseteq f6 and if 39 \subseteq e6 c6.

| 37 | b4!         | ©f6 |
|----|-------------|-----|
| 38 | <b>≜d3!</b> | *** |

38 bxa5 ②e4+ 39 🕏g2 bxa5 40 ፮b1 ②c5 holds.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 38 \(\mathbb{L}\)d3!

**PETROSIAN** 

| 38 |     | axb4 |
|----|-----|------|
| 20 | *** | 4AU4 |

38...②e4+? 39 এxe4 fxe4 40 bxa5 bxa5 (if 40...罩a8 41 axb6 cxb6 42 罩b1) 41 罩b1 followed by 罩b7 wins easily. White also invades after 38...當g6 39 bxa5 bxa5 40 罩b1.

| 39 | axb4        | <b>\$</b> g6 |
|----|-------------|--------------|
| 40 | <b>⊑a1!</b> |              |

White has finally achieved his ideal setup, but Black's game is still tenable.

43 \( \begin{aligned} 43 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \alpha \\ \ & \ext{sansposes} \\ & \ext{transposes} \\ & \ext{transposes

| 43 | •••         | <b>≌b8</b> |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 44 | <b>ℤa</b> 7 | <b>ℤc8</b> |
| 45 | e5!         | •••        |


This Pawn sac caught me completely by surprise. It's the only line that gives Black any trouble.

45 ... bxc5

Not 45...\(\sum\_x\)d5? 46 c6.

| 46 | bxc5 | dxc5         |
|----|------|--------------|
| 47 | ᡚf3! | <b>ģ</b> f7! |

47...@xd5 loses to 48 @e5+.



FISCHER

Position after 51 g4

PETROSIAN

51 ...


ġd6?

Should be the losing move! Correct is 51... 16! 52 \( \) 60 \( \) 53 \( \) xd5! \( \) 53 \( \) xd5 \( \) x

On 53...c4 54 \( \begin{aligned} \Bar{A} \) wins. The idea is to force his King to the K-side, away from the passed c-Pawn.

54 **\$13** 

Not 54 曾d3 罩g8.



FISCHER

Position after 56...c4

**PETROSIAN** 

57 罩h1?

As Petrosian points out in the Russian bulletins of the tournament, White can win with the following line: "57 罩h7! c6 58 罩d7+ 堂c5 59 罩d1 c3 60 g5 堂c4 61 g6 c2 62 罩c1 堂c3 63 f5 罩g8 64 堂f4 堂d2 65 罩xc2+ 堂xc2 66 堂g5 c5 67 f6 c4 68 f7 罩xg6+ 69 堂xg6 c3 70 f8=豐." White is a tempo ahead of the game, where Black's Pawn succeeds in reaching c2, instead of c3 (as here).

What if Black tries to improve? For example, after 57 \( \bar{2}\)h7 c5 \( 58 \)\( \bar{2}\)d7+\( \bar{2}\)e6 59 \( \bar{2}\)d1 \( \bar{2}\)b8. Now there are two main lines:

A] 60 g5? c3 61 曾g4 (if 61 罩c1 曾f5 62 罩xc3 c4! 63 罩xc4 罩b3+ with a draw by blockade although two Pawns down) 61... 罩b4! 62 罩e1+ 曾f7 63 曾f5 c2 64 罩c1 罩c4 65 g6+ 曾g7 66 曾g5 罩c3 draws.

B] 60 f5+! 當e5 61 罩e1+ 當d4 (after 61...當f6 62 當f4 c3 63 g5+當g7 64 g6 c2 65 當g5 罩b1 66 f6+ wins) 62 g5 c3 63 f6 c2 64 罩c1! (64 f7? 罩b1! draws) 64...當e5 65 當g4! snuffs out Black's resistance.

| 57 | •••          | c3  |
|----|--------------|-----|
| 58 | g5           | c5  |
| 59 | <b>ℤd1</b> + | ••• |


It's tough right down the line. After 59 g6 罩g8 60 f5 堂e5! 61 堂g4 堂f6 62 罩c1 c4! 63 罩xc3 罩c8! White can make no headway. Or on 59 堂g4 罩e2! 60 g6 堂e4! 61 堂g5 罩g2+ 62 堂f6 堂xf4, etc., as the Russian bulletins also point out.

| 59 | ••• | <b>堂c4</b> |
|----|-----|------------|
| 60 | g6  | c2         |
| 61 | ℤc1 | •••        |

On 61 \( \begin{align} \begin{

| 61 | ***           | <b>ġd3</b>  |
|----|---------------|-------------|
| 62 | f5            | <b>≝g8!</b> |
| 63 | <b>⊈f4</b>    | <b>Ġd2</b>  |
| 64 | <b>ℤ</b> xc2+ | \$xc2       |
| 65 | <b>⊈g</b> 5   | c4          |
| 66 | f6            | c3          |
| 67 | <b>f</b> 7    |             |

Drawn



**FISCHER** 

Final Position after 67 f7

PETROSIAN

I offered the draw, not realizing it was bad etiquette. It was Petrosian's place to extend the offer after 67... 基xg6+ (if Black wants to get melodramatic 67... 基c8 68 g7 含b1 69 f8=營 基xf8 70 gxf8=營 c2 reaches the same position); 68 含xg6 含b1 69 f8=營 c2 with a book draw.

# 4 Pilnik [Argentina] - Fischer

## MAR DEL PLATA 1959 SICILIAN DEFENSE

#### Tact and tactics

The presence in Argentina of Pilnik, Najdorf, and Eliskases, who chose to remain there after participating in the Buenos Aires chess Olympic of 1939, created a chess renaissance, as attested by the annual event at Mar del Plata which, though not lavish with prizes, offers an exotic vacation and attracts the world's best. Fischer tied for 3-4 with lvkov, a mere half point behind Pachman and Najdorf in a strong field of fifteen.

After a lackluster opening by both sides, and a middle game that, with the exception of 26...bxa3 can scarcely be described as more than routine, Fischer pilots the game into an even ending. Both he and Pilnik then proceed to complicate; but the latter is drawn into making a false lead, which Fischer exploits by obtaining a passed center Pawn. From this point on, although Pilnik does all that can be done to stave off the inevitable, Fischer is not gulled into making a single wrong step.

| 1 | e4                   | <b>c</b> 5 |
|---|----------------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>D</b> f3          | d6         |
| 3 | <b>d4</b>            | cxd4       |
| 4 | ©xd4                 | <b>∅f6</b> |
| 5 | ©c3                  | <b>a6</b>  |
| 6 | <u></u> <b>ê e</b> 2 | •••        |

For 6 h3 see games 35, 40, 43. For 6 \(\preceq\)c4 see games 17, 55, 58.

| 6 | *** | e5         |
|---|-----|------------|
| 7 | ∅h3 | <b>≜e7</b> |


For 7... <u>\$e6</u> see game 42.

8 **0-0** 

| 8  | ***  | 0-0         |
|----|------|-------------|
| 9  | ҈≜e3 | <u></u> ≜e6 |
| 10 | f3   | ***         |

A sharper alternative is 10 a4 營c7 11 a5 ②bd7 12 ②d5 ②xd5 13 exd5 急f5 14 c4 急g6 15 含h1 罩ac8 16 營d2 營d8 17 罩ac1 h6 18 f4 exf4 19 急xf4 急g5=. (Smyslov-Gligorich, Havana 1962.)

Premature is 10...d5 11 exd5 ②xd5 12 ②xd5 豐xd5 13 豐xd5 盒xd5 14 罩fd1 with a slight edge in the ending.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 10…豐c7

**PILNIK** 

*11* **₩e1** 

Once popular, this whole system is now known to give White nothing. It hinders neither Black's development nor his Q-side expansion.

On 12 a4, ...d5 is strong.

#### *13* **□d2**

13 ... \( \bar{2}\) **b6** 

More direct is 13...b4 14 公d5 公xd5 15 exd5 皇f5 16 豐f2 a5 with good play against White's backward c-Pawn.

14 **營f2?** 

Careless. 14 2xb6 is necessary.

I figured if he didn't take it off last move he wouldn't take it now; so I wanted to build a little more and keep the option of moving the Knight to a4 as well as c4. But Black should pounce on the chance to play 14...心c4! 15 兔xc4 bxc4 16 兔b6 (if 16 心a1 罩ab8 17 罩b1 罩b7 is strong; or 16 心c1 罩ab8 17 心a4 c3! 18 bxc3? 營c6 19 心b6 兔d8) 16...營c8 17 心a5 心d7! and White's in trouble. E.g., 18 心d5 (or if 18 兔e3 兔d8 19 心d5 兔xd5 20 罩xd5 心f6 winning at least the exchange) 18...兔xd5 19 罩xd5 (if 19 exd5 心xb6 20 營xb6 兔d8 21 營b4 罩b8 22 營a3 兔xa5 23 營xa5 罩xb2) 19...罩b8 winning at least a Pawn.

15 **kxb6!** ...

Pilnik hastens to make amends for his omission. Not 15 🖾 a5? d5! wins material. (STAHLBERG)

| 15 | •••        | <b>≅xb6</b>          |
|----|------------|----------------------|
| 16 | <b>⊘d5</b> | <a href="#">♠xd5</a> |
| 17 | exd5       | <b>≜d7</b>           |
| 18 | f4         | <b>≜f6</b>           |

I didn't want to weaken my e6 square with 18...f5 19 c3 £f6 20 fxe5 dxe5 (if 20...£xe5 21 20d4) 21 20c5=.


On 20...dxe5 21 d6 gives White active play. Black's advantage of the Bishop pair is neutralized by the weakness of his c6, which White can later occupy with his Knight.

More to the point was 22 皇f3 b4 23 cxb4 罩xb4 24 ②c6=.

23 &f3 should again be played. White starts drifting.

On 24 axb4 axb4 25 c4 b3! holds the initiative.

On 25 \( \hat{2}\)f3 bxa3 26 bxa3 \( \hat{2}\)a8 presents its problems.



This is the position White was playing for. A draw now looks secure.

| 26 | •••         | bxa3! |
|----|-------------|-------|
| 27 | <b>≝xb6</b> | •••   |

27 bxa3 is also adequate. But not 27 公xb8? 營xf2 28 罩xf2 a2 29 罩f1 (if 29 罩c1 鱼xb2) 29...鱼f5 30 罩cc1 罩xb8 wins.

| 27 | 0 0 0 | <b></b> ℤxb6 |
|----|-------|--------------|
| 28 | bxa3  | <b>⊒a8</b>   |
| 29 | ∅xe5? | •••          |


This gives Black a strong passed e-Pawn. Correct is  $29 \stackrel{?}{=} a2 \stackrel{?}{=} b2$   $30 \stackrel{?}{=} xb2 \stackrel{?}{=} xb2 \stackrel{?}{=} 51 \stackrel{?}{=} b5! \stackrel{?}{=} xa3$  (otherwise a4)  $32 \stackrel{?}{\sim} e7 + \stackrel{?}{\simeq} f8 \stackrel{?}{=} 33 \stackrel{?}{\sim} xg6 +$  with a draw in view. On  $33...hxg6 \stackrel{?}{=} 34 \stackrel{?}{=} e1 + ! (34 \stackrel{?}{=} xd7 + \stackrel{?}{\simeq} xd7 \stackrel{?}{=} xd7 \stackrel{$ 

| 29 | ••• | dxe5 |
|----|-----|------|
| 30 | ≣c3 | •••  |

30  $\equiv$ c7 gets nowhere after 30... $\equiv$ d6; and the sacrifice 31 2b5?! is refuted by 31...2xb5 32  $\equiv$ fxf7  $\equiv$ c8! Or on 30  $\equiv$ a2 (30  $\equiv$ a1?  $\equiv$ xa3) 30... $\equiv$ a5 31 2c4 (if 31  $\equiv$ d1 2a4) 31... $\equiv$ c5 and the d-Pawn falls.

| <i>30</i> | 400        | <b>基b2!</b> |
|-----------|------------|-------------|
| 31        | <b>≝c7</b> | •••         |

Desperately striving for counterplay. On 31 &c4 (to prevent ... a2) 31... 會g7 32 d6 f5 33 &d5 again wins the d-Pawn. Or 31 &f3 f5 32 ac7 &b5 33 ac1 e4 squelches White's play.



A wild hope. Hopeless is 32 奠c4 罩c2! 33 d6 罩xc4! 34 罩xc4 奠d3 35 罩fc1 奠xc4 36 罩xc4 罩xa3 37 當g1 當g7! Black soon picks off the d-Pawn and wins easily.

| <i>32</i> | ***        | <u> </u>   |
|-----------|------------|------------|
| 33        | <b>A</b> B | <b>≜d3</b> |
| 34        | d6         | ***        |

Or 34 罩e1 e4! 35 奠g2 (if 35 逸xe4 罩e8 wins) 35... 罩d8 36 罩c5 鸷g7! 37 鸷g1 (if 37 g5 h6 38 h4 hxg5 39 hxg5 罩h8+ 40 鸷g1 罩h4! wins) 37... f5 38 gxf5 gxf5 and the two passed center Pawns should win (if 39 d6 鸷f6!).

| 34 | •••        | <b>≝d8</b>  |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 35 | <b>ℤe1</b> | <b>ℤxd6</b> |

Falling into the trap. 36 罩e7 holds out longer, but 36... 罩f6 37 单d5 e4 38 单xe4 单xe4+ 39 罩7xe4 罩ff2 wins.

| 36 | ••• | <b>≝f6!</b> |
|----|-----|-------------|
| 37 | ≌e3 | •••         |

Forced. On 37 \( \pm g2 \) \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}

| 37 | ***           | ≅xf3!      |
|----|---------------|------------|
| 38 | ℤxf3          | <b>≜e4</b> |
| 39 | <b>⊑cxf7</b>  | <b>Zf2</b> |
| 40 | <b>⊑f8</b> +  | <b>∲g7</b> |
|    | White resigns |            |

# 5 Fischer - Rossetto [Argentina]

MAR DEL PLATA 1959 SICILIAN DEFENSE

### The unpleasant obligation

This game exemplifies most dramatically the German expression zugzwang.

Unable to achieve any workable advantage from the opening or mid-game, Fischer embarks on an equally unpromising ending. He manages, however, after 19 \( \frac{19}{2} \) d5, to acquire a Bishop against a Knight. Subsequently he employs an unusual Rook maneuver along the third rank (24 \( \frac{12}{2} \) a3) in order to make spatial inroads. Rossetto unwittingly co-operates and soon is faced by a rare predicament: although material is equal, any move he makes must disturb the precarious balance and hasten his own disaster. That is zugzwang — and, appropriately, Rossetto resigns.

| 1 | e4                   | <b>c5</b>  |
|---|----------------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>2</b> f3          | <b>e</b> 6 |
| 3 | d4                   | cxd4       |
| 4 | <a href="#">∅xd4</a> | a6         |
| 5 | c4                   | <b>≝c7</b> |

Stronger is 5... \$\alpha\$ f6 6 \$\alpha\$c3 \(\mathbb{L}\$b4 which theory gives as equal for Black.

Misplacing the Bishop. Right is 7 a3! and if 7...公c6 8 皇e3, etc. (if 8...公e5 9 皇e2! 公xc4? 10 皇xc4 營xc4 11 冨c1 wins).

7 a3!, by preventing .... \$\delta\$b4 once and for all, forces Black to adopt a kind of Scheveningen formation that keeps him desperately cramped. A Spielmann-Tartakover game proceeded: 7.... \$\delta\$e7 8 \$\delta\$e2 0-0 9 0-0 d6 10 \$\delta\$e3 \$\overline{\Omega}\$bd7 11 \$\overline{\Omega}\$c1 b6 12 b4! \$\delta\$b7 13 f3 \$\overline{\Omega}\$ac8 14 \$\overline{\Omega}\$e1 \$\overline{\Omega}\$b8 15 \$\overline{\Omega}\$f2 "with a beautiful position for White." (From More Chess Questions Answered.)

| 7 | •••         | €)c6         |
|---|-------------|--------------|
| 8 | <u></u> ≗e3 | <b>②xd4?</b> |

| 9  | <b>≜xd4</b> | ≜c5        |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 10 | <b>≜c2</b>  | <b>d6</b>  |
| 11 | 0-0         | <b>≜d7</b> |
| 12 | <b>∅a4</b>  | •••        |

Forcing a series of exchanges which give White a microscopic edge, at best.

| <i>12</i> | •••         | <b>≜xd4</b> |
|-----------|-------------|-------------|
| 13        | <b>豐xd4</b> | <b>ℤd8</b>  |
| 14        | <b>罩fd1</b> | 0-0         |
| 15        | <b>≝ac1</b> | •••         |

On 15 \widetilde{\text{w}}xd6 \widetilde{\text{w}}xd6 \widetilde{\text{Z}}xd6 \widetilde{\text{g}}xa4 \widetilde{\text{Z}}xa4 \widetilde{\text{Z}}xe4=.

15 ... ₩a5

15...b5? 16 cxb5 axb5 17  $\bigcirc$  c3 (not 17 e5? dxe5 18  $\bigcirc$  xh7+  $\bigcirc$  xh7) and Black's b-Pawn is weak. 15... $\bigcirc$  c6 is solid but cramped.


16 **營b6 營xb6** 

Unsound is 16... 營e5 17 罩xd6 ②g4 18 g3 營h5 19 h4.

Black had relied on this move to get him out of trouble. Now 19 公xd7 (or 19 公a4 公e5 20 食b3 g5! holds the balance) 19...罩xd7 20 罩d2 罩fd8 21 罩cd1 當f8 is dead equal.

#### *19* ∅**d5!**

An unexpected reply which throws Black, unjustifiably, into a state of confusion.



ROSSETTO

Position after 19 🖒 d5!

FISCHER

19 ... \&xd5

Caught by surprise. Rossetto fails to find the most accurate reply: 19... @e5! (also tenable is 19...exd5 20 exd5 @e5 21 dxc6 bxc6 22 b3 c5 23 @e4 26 e8 20 @e7+ (if 20 @e3 g5!) 20...eh8 21 @xc6 bxc6 22 @a4 g5! followed by ... eg7-f6-e7=.

20 exd5 e5

Safer is 20... De5 21 \( \) e4 b6 (not 21...f5? 22 dxe6!).

21 **b4** ...

Playing for the big breakthrough on c5.

21 ... g6

On 21...a5 22 a3 axb4 23 axb4 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \alpha & \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \alpha & \begin{aligned} \begin{alig

22 **\( \frac{1}{2} a4** \) b6

On 22...4b6 23 \( \mathbb{\text{b}}\)b3 followed by c5.

23 **\(\beta\)d3** f5?

Oblivious to the danger! The best defense is 23...a5 24 a3 (Black should hold after 24 \(\hat{2}x\)d7 \(\beta\)xd7 \(\beta\)xd7 \(\beta\)xd5 bxa5 bxa5 26 c5 dxc5 27 \(\beta\)xc5 a4)

24...f5 and it's hard for White to make progress. Black should never allow c5 without first forcing White to make the concession of exchanging the Bishop for the Knight.

24 **\Za3!** 

The threat is simply 25 \(\exists xd7\). The veiled and seemingly insignificant attack on Black's a-Pawn is the means of forcing him to drop the protection of his c5 square.

24 ... \(\beta\) b8

Forced. On 24...  $\bigcirc$  f6 25  $\bigcirc$  c6 wins a Pawn. The only other try is 24... a5 25 bxa5 bxa5 26  $\bigcirc$  c6!  $\bigcirc$  c5 (on 26...  $\bigcirc$  b8 27  $\bigcirc$  b5! or 26...  $\bigcirc$  b6 27  $\bigcirc$  b1!  $\bigcirc$  xc4? 28  $\bigcirc$  c3  $\bigcirc$  d2 29  $\bigcirc$  b2 traps the Knight) 27  $\bigcirc$  xa5 and White should win.

25 c5! bxc5

On 25...b5 26 **\$b3 \$\begin{align} 27** c6 **\$\begin{align} 26** c6 **\$\begin{align} 27** c6 **\$\begin{align} 27** c6 **\$\begin{align} 28 \$\begin{align} 29** a4 bxa4 30 **\$\begin{align} xa4 \$\begin{align} \begin{align} 29 a4 bxa4 30 <b>\$\begin{align} xa4 \$\begin{align} \begin{align} 29 a4 bxa4 30 <b>\$\begin{align} xa4 \$\begin{align} \begin{align} \begin{align} \begin{align} 29 a4 bxa4 30 <b>\$\begin{align} xa4 \$\begin{align} \begin{align} \begin{align** 

 $\begin{array}{ccc} 26 & \text{bxc5} & \text{dxc5} \\ 27 & \text{\exists} & \text{\exists} & \text{\exists} & \text{\exists} \\ \end{array}$ 

On 27...②d7 (if 27...罩c8 28 罩ac3 keeps the bind) 28 罩c7 ②f6 29 象b3 含h8 30 罩xa6 ②xd5 31 象xd5 罩xd5 32 罩aa7 wins. Black's game collapses once the heavy guns penetrate.

The Pawn is obviously immune. So Black attempts to revive his Knight.


30 **罩c7 包f8** 

Also hopeless is 30...公f6 31 罩bb7 罩xc7 32 dxc7 罩c8 33 兔b3 公e8 34 罩b8 公d6 35 罩xc8 公xc8 36 兔e6, etc.

| 31 | ≌bb7        | ≅xc7 |
|----|-------------|------|
| 32 | dxc7        | ≌c8  |
| 33 | <b>≜b3!</b> | •••  |

Completely immobilizing Black. He is reduced to Pawn moves.

| 33        | •••       | a5            |
|-----------|-----------|---------------|
| 34        | a4        | h6            |
| 35        | h3        | <b>g</b> 5    |
| 36        | <b>g4</b> | fxg4          |
| <i>37</i> | hxg4      | Black resigns |



**ROSSETTO** 

Final Position after 37 hxg4

**FISCHER** 

Zugzwang! Black has run out of satisfactory Pawn moves. On 37...當f6 38 罩b8 wins a piece. On 37...包g6 38 ②ge6 wins. Or on any Rook move, say 37... ②ge8, 38 c8=營+.

# 6 Fischer - Shocron [Argentina]

MAR DEL PLATA 1959 RUY LOPEZ

### A small oversight

Fischer's opening repertoire has been less extensive than most practicing Grandmasters', yet his contributions to theory have been numerous. 20 g5!? is one of his innovations. However, it is not responsible for Shocron's defeat. Neither is Shocron's response; in retrospect, his system of defense seems surprisingly adequate. Nevertheless, after defending sensibly, Shocron outfoxes himself. Thinking he has seen one move further than his adversary, he provokes a combination. But his vision is one move short. In consequence, though otherwise it had withstood all of Fischer's assaults, his game crumbles.

| 1 | e4                  | e5          |
|---|---------------------|-------------|
| 2 | <b>Df3</b>          | €)c6        |
| 3 | <b>≜b</b> 5         | <b>a6</b>   |
| 4 | <u></u> <b>≜</b> a4 | <b>₫</b> f6 |
| 5 | 0-0                 | ı⊈e7        |
| 6 | 罩e1                 | <b>b</b> 5  |
| 7 | <b>≜b3</b>          | d6          |
| 8 | c3                  | 0-0         |
| 9 | h3                  | •••         |

For an immediate 9 d4!? see game 36.


| 9  | •••        | <b>⊘a</b> 5 |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 10 | <b>≜c2</b> | <b>c</b> 5  |
| 11 | d4         | ₩c7         |

For Keres' 11... 2d7 see game 38.

*12* **∅bd2 ≜d7** 

13 **2**f1 **2**fe8
14 **2**e3 **g**6

The Yugoslav System, popularized by Gligorich and Matanovich. The idea is to strengthen the position, and transfer the Bishop to f8 while awaiting further developments. Black will undertake specific counteraction only after White commits himself.



**SHOCRON** 

Position after 14...g6

**FISCHER** 

15 dxe5

This positional approach bares the hole on d5, so that White may gain access to it with his Knight. Alternate plans ensue after 15 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d2 \(\frac{1}{2}\)f8 and now:

A] The quiet  $16 \stackrel{?}{=} c1 \stackrel{?}{=} g7$ ? (after  $16... \stackrel{?}{\sim} c6 17 d5! \stackrel{?}{\sim} a5$  [on  $17... \stackrel{?}{\sim} d8$  18 c4! robs Black of his normal counterplay with ... c4, Olafsson-Ivkov, Buenos Aires 1960, and now White can leisurely build up a strong attack with  $\stackrel{?}{=} h2$ , g4,  $\stackrel{?}{=} g1$  and later the stock sac  $\stackrel{?}{\sim} f5$ ]  $18 b4 \stackrel{?}{\sim} b7$  19 a4 with a slight advantage)  $17 b4 \stackrel{?}{\sim} c6 18 \stackrel{?}{\sim} d5! \stackrel{?}{\sim} xd5 19 exd5 \stackrel{?}{\sim} e7$   $20 dxc5 \stackrel{?}{\sim} xd5$  (if  $20...dxc5 21 \stackrel{?}{=} e3 \stackrel{?}{=} d6 22 \stackrel{?}{=} xc5 \stackrel{?}{=} xd5 23 \stackrel{?}{=} b3!$ )  $21 \stackrel{?}{=} b3 \stackrel{?}{\sim} f6$  (if  $21... \stackrel{?}{=} c6 22 \stackrel{?}{=} g5!$ )  $22 exd6 \stackrel{?}{=} xd6 23 \stackrel{?}{\sim} g5! \stackrel{?}{=} f8$   $24 \stackrel{?}{=} e3 \stackrel{?}{=} xd1 25 \stackrel{?}{=} exd1 h6 26 \stackrel{?}{\sim} e4! \stackrel{?}{\sim} xe4 27 \stackrel{?}{=} xd7 \stackrel{?}{=} ac8 28 c4 \stackrel{?}{\sim} g5$   $29 \stackrel{?}{=} xg5 hxg5 30 c5$  Black resigns. (Fischer-Rinaldo, US Open 1957.)

B] The sharp 16 b4 cxb4 17 cxb4 ②c4 18 ②xc4 bxc4 19 罩c1 exd4 20 ②xd4 d5 (not 20...c3 21 食b3 ②xe4 22 罩xe4! 罩xe4 23 豐f3 食c6 24 豐xc3 wins) 21 exd5 罩xe1+? (better is 21...豐d6) 22 食xe1 豐d6. (Fischer-Matanovich, Bled 1961.) And now, as Keres pointed out,


White can retain his extra Pawn with 23 ©f3! Not 23... wxd5? 24 &c3! wins a piece. Or 23... xd5 24 &e4.

When examined microscopically, Black has his problems. The hole on d5 might be described as "gaping".

On 17...h5? 18 2d5! 2xd5 19 exd5 Black's K-side is weakened.

Black has a new burden: neutralizing the potential attack along the open h-file.

19 ... **豐c6** 20 **g5!?** ...



SHOCRON

Position after 20 g5!?

**FISCHER** 

The old line 20 \(\mathbb{\text{\text{\text{\text{B}}}}\)g3 f6 (better is 20...\(\mathbb{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}}\)f6) 21 g5! is good for White. (Boleslavsky-Tal, USSR 1957.) I'd always thought my line was an improvement (the idea is to clear g4 for the Knight before Black can force an exchange with ...\(\mathbb{\text{C}}\)c4) but a closer look at this game shows that Black may have resources.

≜xg4

20... 彙xg5 puts White's concept to the crucial test. After 21 ②d5! 彙xc1 (21... 彙xd5 22 彙xg5 wins the exchange) 22 ②f6+ �h8! (if 22... 查f8 23 罩axc1 罩e7 24 ②xh7+ �g8 25 罩cd1! 罩a8 [25... 罩xd1 26 ②f6+ �g7 27 罩xd1 ②b7 28 g4! followed by g5 with a strong attack] 26 ②f6+ �g7 27 ②d5 彙xd5 28 罩xd5 White's better) 23 罩axc1 (23 ②xe8 彙g5 24 ②f6 ②c4! Black has good play for the exchange) 23... 罩f8 (not 23... 罩e7 24 營g3 threatening either 營xe5 or 營h4) 24 營g3 營c7! 25 營g5 �g7 and now White can force a draw with 26 ⑤h5+, etc., or try for more with either 26 f4 or 罩e3.

21 **₺g4** 

Black can't allow 66+. As a consequence, White obtains the Bishop pair and attacking prospects along the open h-file.


22 **₩xg4 ②b6!** 

To prevent a4 and, as will be seen, to swing the Knight to f8 in order to defend the vulnerable h7 Pawn. For Unzicker's 22...f6 see game 10.

23 g3 c4!

The right timing. He's careful to see that a4 is restrained. Wrong, for example, is 23... a4 b4 25 cxb4 cxb4 26 \delta b3! and this Bishop comes crashing back into the game via the open diagonal.

Phase one is over. Having seen his K-side threats neatly parried, White is compelled to start some action on the opposite wing.



SHOCRON

Position after 25...42f8

**FISCHER** 

#### 26 **b4**

26 b3 leads to trouble after 26...b4! 27 cxb4 c3 28 a3? ②e6 29 營h3 h5 30 gxh6 e.p. ②d4! and wins. On 26 a4 b4! 27 cxb4 逸xb4 28 a5 threatening 逸a4) 28...營c7 is satisfactory.

26 ... \wideta e6

Sharper is 26...a5! 27 a3 (if 27 bxa5 營a6 28 a4 營xa5) 27...還a8=. Bad, however, is 26...cxb3 e.p. 27 食xb3 營xc3 28 食e3 (28 食b2!? 營xb2 29 營f3 ②e6 30 食xe6 罩f8! holds. But not 30...fxe6? 31 罩xh7! 宣f8 32 罩ah1! 營xf2+ 33 營xf2 罩xf2+ 34 含xf2 罩d2+ 35 含f3 食xg5 36 罩h8+ mates) 28...罩d7 (not 28...營c8? 29 營f3 ②e6 30 罩xh7! wins) 29 罩xh7! should win.

| 27 | <b>豐e2</b> | a5          |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 28 | bxa5       | <b>≝a6</b>  |
| 29 | <b>≜e3</b> | <b>豐xa5</b> |
| 30 | a4         | ≌a8         |

30... 響xc3! 31 axb5 leads to equal play.

31 axb5 ₩xb5

More active is 31...豐xc3! (if 32 罩ac1 臭a3!). But not 31...豐xa1? 32 罩xa1 罩xa1 33 豐xc4, resigns.

| 32 | ≌hb1          | <b>≝c6</b> |
|----|---------------|------------|
| 33 | 罩 <b>b</b> 6! | <b>營c7</b> |
| 34 | <b>≣ba6</b>   | •••        |

Obtaining control of the a-file.

| 34 |             | <b>≣xa6</b> |
|----|-------------|-------------|
| 35 | <b>ℤxa6</b> | ≌c8         |
| 36 | ₩g4         | <b>©e6</b>  |


Bringing the Knight back into the game. Wrong would be an attempt to simplify with 36.... 全c5 37 全xc5 營xc5 38 全a4! and Black has trouble finding a move. If 38... 全e6 39 全d7. Or 38... 三d8 39 三c6 營a7 40 三xc4 三d2 41 營f3 staying a Pawn ahead.

37 **Qa4 国b8** 38 **国c6 型d8?** 

Up to here Shocron has defended coolly, but now he makes a fatal miscalculation. Correct is 38... 增d7! and it's not clear how White can improve his position any further. If 39 \$\dingle\$h2 (not 39 \$\overline{\text{Z}}\text{xc4} \$\overline{\text{wd3}}\$! 40 \$\overline{\text{Z}}\text{c6}\$ \$\overline{\text{Z}}\text{b1}\$ with a strong attack) 39... \$\overline{\text{Z}}\text{b1}\$! 40 \$\overline{\text{Z}}\text{b6}\$ (if 40 \$\overline{\text{Z}}\text{xc4} \$\overline{\text{wd3}}\$ 41 \$\overline{\text{Z}}\text{c8}\$+ \$\overline{\text{c9}}\text{7}\$ 42 \$\overline{\text{wh4}}\text{2xg5}\$! 43 \$\overline{\text{2}}\text{xg5}\$ \$\overline{\text{Z}}\text{h1}\$! \$\overline{\text{wf1}}\$! with a perpetual) 40... \$\overline{\text{wd3}}\$ 41 \$\overline{\text{Z}}\text{xb1}\$ (not 41 \$\overline{\text{Z}}\text{xe6}\$? \$\overline{\text{wf1}}\$!) 41... \$\overline{\text{wxb1}}\$ 42 \$\overline{\text{d}}\text{7}\$ \$\overline{\text{c7}}\$! (on 42... \$\overline{\text{C}}\text{c5}\$ 43 \$\overline{\text{c6}}\$ followed by \$\overline{\text{d}}\text{5}\$ should win) 43 \$\overline{\text{2}}\text{c6}\$ \$\overline{\text{wd3}}\$! with drawing chances.

₩c8!

Blow for blow! Apparently Shocron was prepared for this trick, having seen that 39...fxe6? 40 營xe6+ 全f8 41 營xe5 is crushing.



**SHOCRON** 

Position after 39... 響c8!

**FISCHER** 

Now how does White avoid losing material?

40 **åd**7!

Black resigns

This is the shot he overlooked. On 40... 響xd7 41 罩xg6+ wins his Queen.

## 7 Olafsson [Iceland] - Fischer

ZURICH 1959

KING'S INDIAN DEFENSE

### Pride goeth

Miscalculating, as he explains in his notes, Fischer rapidly gets into trouble and is thrown on the defensive. Olafsson quietly strengthens his attacking prospects and seems well on the road to victory. But he tries, prematurely, to force the issue (21 🖺 b1) and, as the game opens up, loses the initiative, although he seems to be blissfully unaware of it. He fails to foresee the power of the riposte to his 24 🗒 d2. Still blind to the danger, while seeking a forced win, he misses several opportunities to equalize. In extreme time pressure, he is compelled to exchange Queens under particularly unfavorable circumstances. The resulting endgame holds no further surprises.

| 1 | c4                  | <b>₫</b> f6         |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| 2 | ©c3                 | <b>g</b> 6          |
| 3 | <b>d4</b>           | <u></u> <b>≜</b> g7 |
| 4 | e4                  | <b>d6</b>           |
| 5 | <b>4</b> 13         | 0-0                 |
| 6 | <b>≜e2</b>          | <b>e5</b>           |
| 7 | d5                  | <b>⊘bd7</b>         |
| 8 | <u></u> <b>∮</b> g5 | •••                 |


Steinitz automatically gave this pin a question mark. Since there is no real threat involved (because the Bishop is worth more than the Knight) Black can now gain time by kicking it around.

Petrosian has had some success with this treatment. The idea is to restrain ... De8 and the subsequent ... f5.

| 8 | •••        | h6 |
|---|------------|----|
| 9 | <b>≜h4</b> | a6 |

This slow system has never been refuted. But better is 9...g5! 10 \(\delta\)g3 (Black's break with ...f5 has now been blunted, but on the other hand White's Bishop on g3 is deadwood), 10...\(\delta\)h5! 11 h4, the latest wrinkle

(11 ②d2 ②f4 12 0-0 ②xe2+ 13 營xe2 f5 14 exf5 ②f6 15 c5 拿xf5 16 罩ac1 罩f7! 17 ②c4 拿f8 is better for Black. Wexler-Reshevsky, Buenos Aires 1960), 11...②xg3! 12 fxg3 gxh4! 13 罩xh4 (if 13 ②xh4 營g5 14 ②f5 ②f6; or 13 gxh4 f5 14 exf5 ②f6 15 0-0 拿xf5) 13...f5 14 營c2 ②c5 15 象d3 營f6 with advantage. (Damyanovich-Hort, Sarajevo 1964.)



The idea is to free the Knight and thus make possible the break with ...f5. In some variations, the Queen may help to support ...b5 also, particularly if White elects to castle long.

11 g4!? ...

In the Candidates' Tournament, 1959, Tal essayed against me the quieter 11 0-0 h7 12 b4 g5 (later I tried 12... f6!? against him) 13 f3 f5 with chances for both sides. The text is risky and commits White to Q-side castling.

Intending ... ②h3-f4, but White's simple reply brands it as a mistaken plan. Correct is 12... ②c5 13 0-0-0 (13 b4 ②d7 leaves White with a shaky game) 13...f5=.

Weak is 14...f5 15 2xg5! hxg5 16 gxf5 gxf5 17 2dg1.

15 **f3** ∅a4

15...b5!? 16 b4 ₺b7 may not be too bad.

| 16 | ∅xa4         | <u></u> ≜xa4 |
|----|--------------|--------------|
| 17 | <b>b3</b>    | <b>≜d7</b>   |
| 18 | <u>\$</u> f2 | c5!          |
| 19 | h4           | ***          |

Black's game springs to life after 19 dxc6 e.p.? bxc6 20 句b1 d5! 21 exd5 (or 21 兔c5 d4 22 兔xf8 兔xf8 with a juicy position) 21...cxd5 22 罩xd5 兔c6, etc.

| 19 | ***        | ②h7        |
|----|------------|------------|
| 20 | <b>≜e3</b> | <b>b</b> 5 |
| 21 | ∅b1?       | •••        |

Intending \(\bigup\)d2. But correct is 21 \(\bigs\)d3! (if 21 h5 \(\bigo\)g5), maintaining the bind by restraining ...f5.

21 ... f5!

Ready or not – here we come! Olafsson was sure that this break was impossible, or he wouldn't have allowed it.

22 gxf5 gxf5 23 exf5 ...

To prevent ...f4 which would seal the K-side and neutralize White's attack.

This is the position White played for.


24 ... e4!

The game turns on this shot. 24... If 6 or 24... h5 cedes the initiative.

25 **\( \beta\)dg1** ...

25 ... exf3?

Correct is 25... Za7! and if 26 & xh6 exf3 transposing to the game.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 25...exf3?

**OLAFSSON** 

26 **gxh6?** 

*26* ..

31

**≌a7!** 

Olafsson later told me he had underestimated the strength of this defensive move.

| 27 | <b>≜xg7</b>   | ≅xg7 |
|----|---------------|------|
| 28 | <b>罩xg7</b> + | ġxg7 |
| 29 | ≜d3           | •••  |

An admission of defeat since Black's f-Pawn now becomes dangerously potent. But not 29 \$\frac{2}{3}\$xf3? (or 29 \$\frac{2}{6}\$c3+ \$\frac{2}{6}\$c3+ \$\frac{2}{6}\$c3+ \$\frac{2}{6}\$c3+ \$\frac{2}{6}\$c3+ \$\frac{2}{6}\$c3+ \$\frac{2}{6}\$c4+ \$\frac{2}{6}\$c6+ (the saving resource) and Black hangs on to his extra piece. My game hinges on this defense, on the fact that the f-Pawn has such divine protection.

| 29 | ***          | bxc4        |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 30 | <b>⊑g1</b> + | <b>\$h8</b> |
| 31 | <b>₩c3</b> + | •••         |

Now Black gets another passed center Pawn, but White's defense is difficult anyway. 31 bxc4 f2 32 罩f1 臭xd3 33 豐xd3 豐e1+ 34 堂c2 勾f6 35 勾d2 勾g4 wins.

#### *32* **₩xe5**+

After 32 £xf5 5xf5 33 bxc4 6xf6 White has nothing better than to transpose into the actual game with 34 \(\extrackleq\) xe5.

| 32 | •••          | dxe5 |
|----|--------------|------|
| 33 | <b>≜</b> xf5 | ℤxf5 |
| 34 | bxc4         | •••  |

34 d6 公f6 35 公d2! offers no better: e.g., 35...cxb3 36 axb3 e4 37 公c4! f2 38 罩f1 公g4! (threatening ...e3) 39 含d1 公h2! 40 d7 罩d5+ is decisive.

| 34 | •••         | <b>②f6</b> |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 35 | <b>⊘</b> d2 | f2         |
| 36 | ãh1         | •••        |

**e4** 

White must keep his f1 square open for the Knight.

36

37

FISCHER

Position after 36...e4

A better chance is offered by 37 ②f1 ②g4! 38 當d2 (if 38 d6 罩f6 39 d7 罩d6) but 38...罩f3! squelches all counterplay.

| 37 | •••           | <b>e3</b>  |
|----|---------------|------------|
| 38 | Ø <b>f1</b>   | <b>≝e5</b> |
| 39 | <b>‡e2</b>    | ②h5!       |
| 40 | <b>∲</b> f3   | <b>e2</b>  |
|    | White resigns |            |

One of the Black Pawns must reincarnate.

**⊉d1** 

# **8** Fischer - Keres [U.S.S.R.]

ZURICH 1959

RUY LOPEZ

#### Meat and potatoes

Alekhine said, in his prime, that to wrest a point from him it was necessary to win the same game three times: once at the beginning, once in the middle, once at the end. No less a tribute may be paid to Keres.

Each phase of this game is fascinating and hard-fought. Even the errors, and there are more than a few, contribute to making it an unusually complete exhibition of two master craftsmen using all the tools of their trade. While perhaps unglamorous, there is meat here, and potatoes too. And it is likely that as a result of this victory Fischer came to be regarded as a serious contender by the leading Soviet Grandmasters — this was the first time he had defeated one.

| 1  | e4                   | e5         |
|----|----------------------|------------|
| 2  | <b>∅</b> f3          | <b>②c6</b> |
| 3  | <b>û</b> b5          | <b>a6</b>  |
| 4  | <u></u> <b>â a 4</b> | <b>∅f6</b> |
| 5  | 0-0                  | <b>≜e7</b> |
| 6  | <b>≝e1</b>           | <b>b</b> 5 |
| 7  | ₫b3                  | 0-0        |
| 8  | c3                   | <b>d</b> 6 |
| 9  | h3                   | ♠a5        |
| 10 | <u>\$</u> c2         | c5         |
| 11 | <b>d4</b>            | <b>≝c7</b> |
| 12 | <b>∅bd2</b>          | cxd4       |

Keres has abandoned 12... **Z**d8 13 **②**f1 d5? 14 dxe5! dxe4 (if 14... **②**xe4 15 **꾈**e2 **\$b7** 16 **②**e3 threatening **②**xd5) 15 **②**1d2! exf3 16 exf6 **\$£**xf6 17 **꾈**xf3 **\$£**e6 18 **②**e4 with a winning attack.

| 13 | cxd4       | <b>≜b7</b>  |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 14 | آ <b>n</b> | <b>≣ac8</b> |
| 15 | <b>≜d3</b> | <b>②c6</b>  |

Keres later played 15... d7 against Smyslov at the Candidates' 1959. The game continued 16 de3 (better is 16 d5 f5 17 de3! f4 18 df5 d8 19 de4!) 16... exd4 17 dxd4 def6 18 ddf5 g6=.

*16* **②e3** 

**ℤfe8** 

17 **5**f5?

A superficial plan. Correct is 17 d5! ②b4 (if 17...②b8 18 a4!) 18 **\$**b1 a5 19 **@e2!** ②d7 (if 19...**@**b6 20 ②f5!) 20 **\$**d2 **@**b6 21 a3 ②a6 22 b4 followed by **\$**d3 with a bind.

 17
 ...
 急f8

 18
 急g5
 ②d7


 19
 罩c1
 營b8

To get out of the pin.

Overlooking White's follow-up. After 21...exd4 22 罩xc8 豐xc8 23 豐xd4 公c5! White has precisely nothing.

22 <u>\$xc1</u>

exd4



KERES

Position after 22...exd4

**FISCHER** 

23 ②h6+!

Keres probably expected 23 \widetilde{\text{\text{\text{\text{2}}}}\c5=.

| 23 | ***           | gxh6       |
|----|---------------|------------|
| 24 | ₩ <b>g4</b> + | <b>∳h8</b> |
| 25 | ₩xd7          | •••        |

Regaining the piece. Black's extra Pawn is meaningless in view of his mangled Pawn formation.

25 ... \dds!

An energetic maneuver! This Bishop is headed, if circumstances permit, toward the defense of Black's weakened K-side.

26 響f5 **三e5!** 27 響f3 f5!

Aggressive defense!

28 **≜f4! ℤe8** 

On 28... 這e7 29 營d1 &xe4 30 &xe4 fxe4 31 營xd4+ &g7 32 營d5! maintains pressure against the weak Pawns.

Not 31 罩xe8? এxe8 32 豐xf5? 鱼g6! and Black wins!

31 ... \(\frac{1}{2}\)d7 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xh6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)matrix


A difficult choice. The alternative was 32 \(\beta\xxxxxxf5\) \(\beta\xxxxf5\) 33 \(\beta\xxxxf5\) with possibilities of probing his sick Pawns.

32 ... **Ze6!**33 **Lxf8** ...

On 33 皇f4 營e8! looks tenable.

On 34 \(\mathbb{\text}\)xf5?? \(\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}\)eller the wins! The text forces Black into an ending where his weak Pawns can't be concealed by

tactical tricks. On 34 罩c7 營e7 holds; e.g., 35 食xf5? 罩e1+ 36 含h2 or 36 含f2 營e3+ 37 含g3 營e5+) 36...營e5+ wins.



Losing a vital tempo, which gives Black time to rush his King toward the center. At the time I rejected 36 \( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*}

| 36        | •••        | <b>ġg7!</b> |
|-----------|------------|-------------|
| <i>37</i> | ℤc7        | 罩 <b>f7</b> |
| 38        | <b>∳e2</b> | •••         |

Now 38 罩a7 loses all of its effectiveness after the reply 38... 全c8.

*38* ... f4!?

A risky selection in time-pressure, aimed against 39 當d3?? 皇f5+. Best is simply 38...當f6 (on 38...皇e6 39 罩c6 is strong) 39 罩a7 (not 39 f4 皇e6 40 罩c6? 罩g7 41 當f2 罩xg2+!) 39...皇c8 40 罩xf7+ 當xf7=.

*39* **ℤa7 ⊈f6** 

40 **\(\beta\) xa6 \(\beta\) e7**+
41 **\(\beta\) f2** ...

41 \( \delta \) d2 is refuted by \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \text{\text{\$\geq}} \\ \end{aligned} \).

41 ... <u>\$e6!</u>

Sacrificing a second Pawn for counterplay on the open c-file. On 41... 堂e5 42 罩a7 keeps Black tied up.

On 43 \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) \( \) d3! 45 bxc4 bxc4 and Black's passed Pawns should be sufficient to draw.

Not 47 \( \begin{aligned} \beg

No better is 48 তxh7 (if 48 &xh7 তc1 threatening 49... &c4) 48... ©c1 49 &d3 &c4. The winning line is 48 b3! (to shut him out from c4). If 48... ©c1 49 &e4! &xe4 50 fxe4, etc.

Not 49... 2c4? 50 \( xf4! \) xd3 51 \( xd4+, etc. \)

| 50 | <b>⊈e2</b> | <b></b> g1  |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 51 | <b>⊈f2</b> | ≌d1         |
| 52 | <b>⊈e2</b> | <b> ⊑g1</b> |
| 53 | <b></b> g5 | ≜xa2?       |

Keres later claimed that 53... Ial would have drawn easily: e.g., 54 & xh7 & c4+55 & d2 Ixa2 56 & c2 Ial.

55... তxb2 56 \$xd4 \$b1! should hold the draw.


| 56 | ãh5           | <b>≅xb2</b> |
|----|---------------|-------------|
| 57 | ⊈xd4          | <b>ℤxg2</b> |
| 58 | <b>ℤxh6</b> + | •••         |

The second adjournment. There are two technical obstacles facing White:

- 1) He cannot exchange Bishops; the ending where he is two Pawns ahead remains a theoretical draw with Rooks on the board.
- 2) He cannot exchange Rooks so long as Black's King has access to f6; the ending (even with two extra Pawns) is still a draw with Bishops on the board.

| 58 | •••          | <b>⊈e</b> 7 |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 59 | <b>⊈e</b> 4  | <b>ℤ</b> g5 |
| 60 | <u></u> âa6? | •••         |

Keres thought 60 全f1! was the winning chance. If 60... 宣g1 61 全a6! and Black no longer has the defense mentioned in the next note. Wrong is the immediate 60 全d3 owing to 60... 全f7! 61 全xf4 宣h5 62 宣xh5 全xh5 followed by ... 全xf3.



**KERES** 

Position after 60 \(\mathbb{2}\)a6?

**FISCHER** 

60 ..

拿f7?

This slip is fatal. Keres told me he had reached this position in adjournment analysis, but had forgotten his drawing line over-the-board. Right is 60... \$\dots\$b1+! 61 \$\div xf4 \$\overline{\textit{If5}}\$+ 62 \$\div g4 \$\overline{\textit{If6}}\$ 63 \$\overline{\textit{Ixf6}}\$ \$\div xf6\$ with the aforementioned blockade.

61 **gc8!** 

Headed for g4. Not 61 堂xf4? 罩h5 draws.

61 ..

**■**g6

After 61... \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}

62 **Eh7**63 **\$g4** 

**\$f8 罩g7** 

Not 63... \( \begin{aligned} & \text{Zxf7+!} \end{aligned} \)

•••

White still can't afford to trade.

64 ... 65 **基xg6!** 66 **尝xf4** 67 **尝g5!** 

**≣g6** ≜xg6+

**ģg7** 

This makes all the difference. Black's King can no longer set up a blockade on f6.

67 ... 68 f4 69 h4

**≜d3** 

₿e4

Of course not 69 f5? &xf5! and White is left with what Hans Kmoch talls "the impotent pair."

| 69 | ••• | <b>≜d3</b> |
|----|-----|------------|
| 70 | h5  | <b>≜e4</b> |
| 71 | h6+ | <b>∲h8</b> |

On 71...\$f7 72 \$h5+\$g8 73 \$g6 makes progress.

| 72 | <b>£</b> f5 | <u> </u>   |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 73 | <b>≜g6</b>  | <u> </u>   |
| 74 | <b>∲f6</b>  | <u> </u>   |
| 75 | <b>堂</b> g5 | <b>≜e6</b> |
| 76 | ≜h5         | ***        |


Back on the right track.

On 77... 2xg4 78 2xg4 2xh6 79 2f5 wins.

78 **f**5 ...

Finally the f-Pawn is free to advance.

| <i>78</i> | •••          | <b>£f7</b>    |
|-----------|--------------|---------------|
| 79        | <b>≜h</b> 5  | <b>≜c4</b>    |
| 80        | <b>≜g6</b> + | <b>\$</b> g8  |
| 81        | f6           | Black resigns |



KERES

Final Position after 81 f6

**FISCHER** 

On 81...\$\dagger\$ 82 \$\dip\$f4 \$\dip\$h8 83 \$\dip\$e5 \$\dip\$c4 84 \$\dip\$d6 \$\dip\$b3 85 \$\dip\$e7 \$\dip\$c4 86 \$\dip\$f7 \$\dip\$d3 87 \$\dip\$e8! \$\dip\$c4 88 \$\dip\$d7 \$\dip\$g8 89 \$\dip\$e6 \$\dip\$h7 90 f7 and queens.

### 9 Walther [Switzerland] - Fischer

ZURICH 1959

SICILIAN DEFENSE

### Betwixt the cup and the lip

Here, against a minor European master, Fischer appears to be busted after seventeen moves, and admits he was ready to resign on move 36. Nevertheless, he extracts a miraculous draw from a hopeless ending, two Pawns down. Time and again Walther fumbles, allowing Fischer to prolong the struggle until he gets his break on move 54.

What makes this game memorable is the demonstration it affords of the way in which a Grandmaster redeems himself after having started like a duffer; and how a weaker opponent, after masterfully building a winning position, often lacks the technique required to administer the coup de grâce. As Capablanca remarked, "The good player is always lucky."

| c5         |
|------------|
| d6         |
| cxd4       |
| <b>②f6</b> |
| a6         |
| e6         |
| <b>≗e7</b> |
|            |

Sharper is 7...豐b6 8 豐d2 豐xb2 9 罩b1 豐a3 which I tried with success later in my career.

8 **響**(3

2bd7

More exact is 8... wc7 to prevent 9 \(\textit{\$\textit{\$\text{e}}}\)c4.

9 0-0-0

Sharper is 9 &c4! 0-0 (9...&c7? 10 &xe6! fxe6 11 &xe6 &b6 12 &xg7+ &f7 13 &f5 with a crushing attack) 10 0-0-0. The text gives Black a chance to repair his earlier inaccuracy.


For  $10 \ge e2$  see game 14. For  $10 \ge e2$  see games 12 and 15.

Pointless. Better is 11 a3.

Only not 11... 2xf6? 12 2xb5! axb5 13 2dxb5 wins.

12 a3 is necessary. Black comes out all right after 12 e5 全b7 13 營g3 dxe5 14 fxe5 公d7 15 罩he1 0-0-0! (Paoli-Tolush, Balatonfüred 1958.)

As I learned (see game 15), Black should avail himself of ...b4! (followed by ...\$b7 and ...d5) the instant he has the opportunity.



13

**FISCHER** 

Position after 12...\$b7

WALTHER

At the risk of repeating myself, 13 a3 is mandatory.

The disadvantage of this move is that Black loses his option of Q-side castling. Right is 13...b4 14 ②ce2 g6! 15 g4 e5 16 ⑤b3 d5 17 ⑤d2 0-0 with initiative.

14 **g4** ...

14 a3 is still correct. We both suffered from the *idée fixe* that ...b4 was unplayable.

14 ... ②d7 15 g5 ②b6?

15...b4! 16 ©ce2 ©c5 still makes a fight of it.

16 f5! e5

Now on 16...b4? 17 fxe6! splatters Black.

Not 16... \(\hat{2}xg5\)? 17 \(\hat{2}xb5+!\) \(\hat{2}e7\) 18 fxe6 fxe6 19 \(\hat{2}\)xe6!, etc. But I still thought Black was all right. Walther's next move quickly disabused me of that notion.


17 **f6! gxf6** 

I'd overlooked that on 17...exd4 18 2 d5! is deadly.

18 gxf6 19 约d5! ....

Black's busted.

19 ... △xd5 20 exd5 ⇔d8



**FISCHER** 

Position after 20... \\$d8

WALTHER

21 ©c6+! ...

A wise investment. The Pawn sac is insignificant compared to the opening of the center files against Black's King.

| 21 | •••                  | <b>Exc</b>   |
|----|----------------------|--------------|
| 22 | dxc6                 | <b>Wxc</b> 6 |
| 23 | <u></u> ≜e4          | <b>豐b6</b>   |
| 24 | <b>營h5</b>           | 會c7          |
| 25 | <u></u> <b>≜</b> f5! | ≌d8          |
| 26 | ₩xf7+                | <b>\$b8</b>  |
| 27 | ₩e6                  | ₩c7          |
| 28 | <b>ℤe3!</b>          | <b>≜h6</b>   |
| 29 | 罩c3                  | <b>≝b7</b>   |
| 30 | <b>f</b> 7           | •••          |
|    |                      |              |

Very business-like. Not 30 罩xd6?? 營h1+.

| 30 | •••          | <u></u> <b>£g</b> 7 |
|----|--------------|---------------------|
| 31 | ≌cd3         | <b>£</b> f8         |
| 32 | <b>營xe5!</b> | •••                 |


Should be decisive. "Any resemblance to chess is purely incidental."

| 32 | •••            | dxe5       |
|----|----------------|------------|
| 33 | 罩xd8+          | <b>∳a7</b> |
| 34 | <b>≌1d7</b>    | h5         |
| 35 | 罩 <b>xb7</b> + | ġxb7       |
| 36 | <b>c</b> 3     | ѐс7        |

Ordinarily the curtain would be drawn here, but I just wanted to see that he'd do next.

The wrong track. On 37 \( \mathbb{Z} e8! \) Black resigns.

*37* ... **\$\dot{\dot} d6** 



**FISCHER** 

Position after 37...\$d6

WALTHER

#### 

I was still prepared to resign after 38 \( \mathbb{Z} = 8! \) Black has absolutely no moves. White simply strolls his King to e4, creating \( zugzwang. \)

Even simpler is 39 罩a7+ 當f6 40 息d3.

The game was adjourned. Strangely enough, I began to feel the position contained some swindling prospects.

| 41 | cxb4 | ≗xb4        |
|----|------|-------------|
| 42 | h3   | <b>ġ</b> f6 |
| 43 | ≌b5  | <b>≜</b> d6 |
| 44 | ≗e4  |             |

On 44 a4 \(\mathbb{2}\)b8! forces the exchange of Rooks (if 45 \(\mathbb{2}\)d5? \(\mathbb{2}\)e5). The pure opposite-colored-Bishop ending is Black's best chance to draw.

44 ... \(\beta\)e8

My first threat in the entire game!

| 45 | ≌f5+        | <b>\$g7</b>  |
|----|-------------|--------------|
| 46 | <b>≙</b> 13 | <b>ℤe1</b> + |
| 47 | <b>©c2</b>  | 罩f1!         |
| 48 | <b>≝d5</b>  | ***          |

The threat was 48... 這f2+ 49 當b1 (if 49 當b3? 當g6 wins a piece) 49... 這f1+ with a draw.


48 ... <u>If2+</u> 49 <u>Id2</u> ...

49 含b1 鱼a3! 50 bxa3 罩xf3 51 罩xh5 罩xa3 is also hopeless for Black.

49 ... \(\begin{align\*}
\textbf{\textit{Z}} \text{xd2+} \\
\text{\text{}} \text{\text{}} \text{\text{}} \text{\text{}} \\
\text{\text{}} \text{\text{}} \text{\text{}} \text{\text{}} \\
\text{\text{}} \text{\text{}} \text{\

Or 49... \( \textit{Zxf3} \) 50 \( \textit{Zxd6} \) \( \textit{Zxh3} \) 51 a4, etc.

| 50 | <b>≌xd2</b> | h4          |
|----|-------------|-------------|
| 51 | <b>ġd3</b>  | <b></b> \$6 |
| 52 | ġc4         | ⊈e7         |



This natural push throws away the win! The Swiss endgame composer, Fontana, pointed out the proper method: 54 b4! 堂c7 55 堂a5! 堂b8 56 b5 臭a3 57 b6 堂c8 58 堂a6 堂b8 59 臭g2! and Black is in zugzwang. If 59...堂c8 (or 59...皇c5 60 a4) 60 堂a7 皇c5 61 a4, etc.

The theme underlying Black's defense is this: once he succeeds in sacrificing his Bishop for both the Q-side Pawns, then White will be left with the "wrong Bishop" for his h-Pawn.

|                     | Dra          | wn           |
|---------------------|--------------|--------------|
| 63                  | <b>≜</b> b5+ | <b>\$c5</b>  |
| 62                  | <b>\$</b> a4 | <b>\$</b> c6 |
| 61                  | b6+          | <b>⊈</b> b7  |
| 60≜f2 also draw     | s.           |              |
| 60                  | ⊈b3          | <u></u> \$d2 |
| 59                  |              | <u> </u>     |
| 59 b6+ is met by 5. | 9≜xb6!       |              |
| 59                  | ₿e2          | ***          |
| 58                  | <b>b</b> 5   | <u>≗</u> f2  |
| 57                  | <b>\$c4</b>  | <u> </u>     |
| 56                  | a5           | <b>\$a7</b>  |
| 55                  | <b>b</b> 4   | <b>\$b8</b>  |
| 54                  | •••          | <b>堂c7</b>   |

White's Pawns are stymied. On 64 b7 \$f4 65 a6 \$b6=

# 10 Fischer - Unzicker [W. Germany]

ZURICH 1959

RUY LOPEZ

### Milking the cow

The Ruy Lopez has been so extensively analyzed that often both players reel off their first twenty moves in two minutes flat.

Nevertheless, it gives rise to situations that call for tact and patience. As Bronstein remarked, "When you play the Ruy, it's like milking a cow." Fischer, here, milks the cow to a fare-thee-well.

The first twenty-two moves are identical with game number 6. Unzicker then varies with the dubious ...f6, which undermines his e-Pawn and leaves him with weak squares. Retribution, though not swift, is sure. Creating simultaneous threats on both wings, Fischer finally infiltrates on the a-file. Black is so tied up that he cannot defend one of his Pawns when attacked — making defeat imminent.

| 1          | e4             | e5         |
|------------|----------------|------------|
| <i>2 3</i> | <b>©f3</b>     | ©c6        |
| 3          | <b>&amp;b5</b> | a6         |
| 4          | <b>≜a4</b>     | <b>约f6</b> |
| 5          | 0-0            | ≗e7        |
| 6          | <b>≝e1</b>     | <b>b</b> 5 |
| 7          | <b>≜</b> b3    | <b>d6</b>  |
| 8          | <b>c</b> 3     | 0-0        |
| 9          | h3             | ②a5        |
| 10         | ≜c2            | c5         |


10...c6 11 d4 營c7 is an interesting alternative. (ROSSOLIMO) – Black avoids weakening his d5.

| 11 | d4    | <b>營c7</b>  |
|----|-------|-------------|
| 12 | €Dbd2 | <b>皇d7</b>  |
| 13 | Øf1   | <b>≝fe8</b> |
| 14 | ©e3   | ***         |

Tal and Geller recommend 14 b3 and if 14...g6 15 \$g5.

| 14 | •••          | <b>g</b> 6  |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 15 | dxe5         | dxe5        |
| 16 | <b>€</b> )h2 | <b>≣ad8</b> |
| 17 | <b>₩</b> 13  | <u></u> ≜e6 |
| 18 | <b>⊘hg4</b>  | ©xg4        |
| 19 | hxg4         | •••         |

Against Matanovich, at Portoroz 1958, I tried the inferior 19 🖾 xg4 20 hxg4 c4 21 g3 20 b7 22 20 c5 23 20 h1 f6=. Black's Knight is already prepared to parachute to d3.



UNZICKER

Position after 19 hxg4

FISCHER

19 ...

**營c6** 

White gets an edge after 19... ©c4 20 ©d5 &xd5 21 exd5.

| 20 | g5!? | ②c4                     |
|----|------|-------------------------|
| 21 | ©g4  | <u></u> <u></u> <u></u> |
| 22 | ₩xg4 | f6?                     |

For analysis of this position see game 6. Unzicker prefers active defense. He eliminates the potential pressure along the h-file, it is true, but at the cost of weakening his e-Pawn.

| 23 | gxf6        | <b>≜</b> xf6 |
|----|-------------|--------------|
| 24 | a4!         | <b>∅</b> b6  |
| 25 | axb5        | axb5         |
| 26 | <b>≜ ₽3</b> |              |

Because both flanks are fluid, White, with his two Bishops, is better able to penetrate and exploit the "loose" Pawns.

#### ≌a8

26...公c4 is met by 27 单b3 instituting an awkward pin.

If he swaps, White gains the a-file; if he doesn't, White keeps the d-file.

Black should ease the pressure by 28... 基本 29 基本 1 基 a 8 30 基本 a 8 + ② x a 8, though 31 營 d !! followed by 營 a !! forces an invasion on the Q-side.

Now White must penetrate on either the a- or d-file. Black's e-Pawn has clearly been exposed as a weakling.


31 ...

Zxa1

The threat was 32 \( \bar{2}\) xa8 \( \Delta\) xa8 33 \( \bar{2}\)d5.

②d7

Apparently defending everything. 33 \( \bigsize a7 \) can be met by 33...\( \bigsize d6. \)



UNZICKER

Position after 32...4\(\textit{d}\)d7

FISCHER

Bringing the Bishop into the game puts additional pressure on Black's overburdened pieces.

33 ... ②f6

Not 33...營xe4 34 食f3 營f4 (if 34...營c2 35 冨a7 with a winning attack) 35 營xf4 exf4 36 食c6 冨e7 (or 36...冨d8 37 冨d1) 37 冨a8+! 含g7 38 冨a7 wins a piece.

34 **□a7** 


Infiltration!

34 ... **≝d6** 

On 34... 2 xe4? 35 \( \) h6 forces mate.

35 **≜e2!** 

Simply attacking a Pawn. Curiously, Black is in too much of a straitjacket to do much about it.



UNZICKER

Position after 35 \(\mathbb{L}e2!\)

**FISCHER** 

35 ... \( \begin{align\*}
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How can Black defend the Pawn?

- A] 35...b4? 36 罩a6 ②xe4 37 營h4 營d5 38 食f3 營d3 39 罩a7 wins.
- B] 35... ②xe4? 36 營h6 罩e7 37 營f8 mate.
- c] 35... 學b6 36 罩f7 ②g8 37 豐h4 h6 38 豐g4 罩d8 39 盒xb5! wins.

38 **≜e2** ...

The win is still far from clear. White's major technical problem is creating a passed Pawn on the Q-side while sheltering his King from a perpetual check.

38 ... 響c7

Threatening ... 2xe4.

Black should wait around with 40... 營c7.

41 **\disp**g2 ...

Sharper and possibly immediately decisive is 41 b4! cxb4 42 2c5!

41 ... **營a**5

On 41... \widetilde{\pi}xb3 42 \widetilde{\pi}xc5 \@xe4 43 \widetilde{\pi}xe5+ \@f6 44 c4 should win.

It's better to refrain from 44 f3 which weakens the K-field.

Step one is completed: White has a passed b-Pawn.

46 ... ②g4 47 營c5 營xc5

Forced. 47... d8? loses a second Pawn after 48 2e2.

The idea is to create another passed Pawn in the center.

49 ... 當e7 50 當f3 包f6

On 50...h5 51 \(\delta\)c4 maintains the bind (if 51...\(\delta\)d7 52 \(\delta\)f7).


51 **≜b5** 

Not 51 fxe5? 2d7 draws.

51 ... \( \psi \) e6

Striving to keep the blockade as long as possible.

52 **≜c4**+ **≜e7**53 **c6!** ...



UNZICKER

Position after 53 c6!

FISCHER

53 ... **De8** 

| 54 | fxe5         | <b>h</b> 6            |
|----|--------------|-----------------------|
| 55 | ġe3          | ©c7                   |
| 56 | <b>Ġ</b> d4  | h5                    |
| 57 | ġe3!         | <b>g</b> 5            |
| 58 | <b>≜e2</b>   | h4                    |
| 59 | gxh4         | gxh4                  |
| 60 | ≜c4          | <b>©e8</b>            |
| 61 | <b>\$</b> f4 | <b>Ġ</b> d8           |
| 62 | <b>ġ</b> g4  | <b>©c7</b>            |
| 63 | <b>≜f7</b>   | <b>©</b> 2 <b>9</b> 7 |
| 64 | ġxh4         | '&xc6                 |
| 65 | Ġg5          | Black resigns         |

After 65... \$\dip d7 66 \$\dip f6 \$\dip e8+ 67 \$\dip xe8+\$ leads to an elementary win.

## **11** Fischer - Benko [U.S.A.]

### CANDIDATES' TOURNAMENT 1959

#### SICILIAN DEFENSE

#### Unheard melodies

Paul Morphy is the idol of all the romantics who pine for the swashbuckling chess of yesteryear; but it is rarely possible to succeed with that kind of flamboyance any longer since players now are more evenly matched. A rise in the standard of defense has necessitated a corresponding adjustment in the character of attack. In modern chess most of the beauty resides in the annotations. Brilliancies often exist only as grace notes — because the opposition anticipates and thwarts them with appropriate rejoinders. To the uninitiated, some of the most hard-fought struggles seem devoid of all bravura. That is the situation in this game.

Confronted with a dozen beautiful outlandish losing variations, Benko chooses what appears to be a prosaic one. Is this "ugliness" not a by-product of skill? Though the reader may feel cheated, and the winner frustrated, does it not argue for the perspicacity of the loser who sidestepped those seductive invitations?

| 1 | e4          | c5         |
|---|-------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>2</b> f3 | © c6       |
| 3 | d4          | cxd4       |
| 4 | ②xd4        | €)f6       |
| 5 | © c3        | d6         |
| 6 | <b>≜c4</b>  | <b>豐b6</b> |

For 6...\(\delta\)d7 see game 13. By putting immediate pressure on the center, Black forces the Knight to a passive post.

7 **②de2** ...

For 7 \( \tilde{\O}\)b3 see game 58, note to Black's sixth move. No good is 7 \( \tilde{\O}\)d5 a6 8 \( \tilde{\O}\)e3 \( \tilde{\O}\)d4 \( \tilde{\O}\)xe4, etc. And 7 \( \tilde{\O}\)xc6!? bxc6 only helps Black strengthen his center, but after 8 0-0 White has promising tactical chances.

| 7  | •••        | e6  |
|----|------------|-----|
| 8  | 0-0        | ≗e7 |
| 9  | <b>≜b3</b> | 0-0 |
| 10 | 當h1        | ••• |

If 10 食e3 營c7 11 f4 ②g4!

A finesse aimed at provoking 12 &e3 \(\text{\center}\)c7 after which White's initiative is blunted.

12 f4 b5


Another virtue of Black's last move was that it freed this Pawn.

*13* ∅g3 b4?

Gligorich suggests simply 13...\2b7. Also satisfactory is 13...\2xb3! 14 axb3 \2b7 (or 14...b4) 15 \2h5 \\2\h5 \8=.

The text exposes Black to a vicious attack.

14 e5! ...



BENKO

Position after 14 e5!

**FISCHER** 

14 ... dxe5

A] It's too late now for 14...公xb3 15 exf6 gxf6 (if 15....皇xf6 16 公ce4) 16 皇h6, etc.

19 罩f3 with a decisive attack (YUDOVICH). If now 19...會h8 20 罩g3 營h6 21 營g4 (threatening 營g8+!) 21...營g6 22 營h4.

#### 15 **<u>\$xf6</u>**

gxf6

B] The best chance is 15...bxc3! 16 ②e4 �b4 17 �g4 £xf6 18 ②xf6+ �h8 19 �h4 h6 20 ②g4 threatening ②xh6 with a strong attack.


### 16 ②ce4

**營d4** 

Benko gave this move a lot of thought. On the alternative 16... 營c7 17 ②h5! (Black holds after 17 營g4+ 含h8 18 營h4 宣g8 19 ②xf6 宣g7 20 營h6 兔b7!) 17...f5 18 ②hf6+! 含g7 19 營h5! 兔xf6 (not 19...h6 20 宣f3 宣h8 [20...exf4 21 宣h3 宣h8 22 ②e8+!] 21 宣g3+ 含f8 22 營xh6+!) 20 ②xf6 h6 (if 20... 宣h8 21 營g5+ 含f8 22 營h6+ 含e7 23 營h4 含f8 24 ②xh7+ wins the exchange) 21 宣f3! 宣h8 (not 21...含xf6 22 營h4+含g7 23 宣g3+含h7 24 宣h3 wins) 22 ②e8+! 显xe8 23 宣g3+含f8 24 營xh6+含e7 25 營h4+含d6 (if 25...含f8 26 宣h3! 營d8 27 營h6+含e7 28 營g5+ wins the Queen) 26 宣d3+含c6 (if 26...含c5 27 兔a4! threatens 營f2+) 27 兔a4+含b7 28 兔xe8 wins material.

#### 

Already Black is without a satisfactory defense.



**BENKO** 

Position after 17 營h5!

FISCHER

17 ...

②xb3

A] On 17...會h8 18 營h6 黨g8 (if 18...exf4 19 包h5 wins) 19 包xf6, etc. B] 17...exf4 18 包f5! exf5 19 黨xf4 營xe4 (otherwise 黨h4) 20 黨xe4 fxe4 21 營xa5 wins. (This key line wouldn't work had Black interpolated 13...包xb3! earlier!)

C] 17... 堂g7 (LOMBARDY) 18 罩ad1 豐xb2 19 豐h4 魚b7 20 氫xf6!

18 **營h6!** 

exf4

On 18...f5 19 c3! is devastating: e.g., 19...bxc3 20 bxc3 \(\exists \)-any 21 \(\exists \)h5 forces mate.

| 19 | 4)h5          | f5          |
|----|---------------|-------------|
| 20 | ℤad1!         | ₩e5         |
| 21 | <b>©ef6</b> + | ı⊈xf6       |
| 22 | <b>②xf6</b> + | <b>豐xf6</b> |
| 23 | <b>豐xf6</b>   | •••         |

Now it's skin and bones.

| 27 | ≅xf1         | Black resigns |
|----|--------------|---------------|
| 26 | <b>豐xc5</b>  | ≗xf1          |
| 25 | <b>≝e7!</b>  | <u></u> ≜a6   |
| 24 | <b>豐g5</b> + | <b>\$</b> h8  |
| 23 | ***          | <b>©c5</b>    |

## 12 Gligorich [Yugoslavia] - Fischer

## CANDIDATES' TOURNAMENT 1959

#### SICILIAN DEFENSE

## Castling into it

Although not perfect, this is perhaps the most bitterly contested game in this book. Fischer chooses a difficult variation which requires Olympian judgment. He submits his King to an attack which, on the face of it, can only be described as irresistible. Why did he do it? Because, we are told, it was strategically justified.

Gligorich, too, must be given equal credit for his courage and restraint. His continuation, despite intensive post-mortem analysis, has yet to be improved upon. The complexity of each phase of this tumultuous struggle must be studied to be believed. Curiously, in the "barren" Rook and Pawn ending, Gligorich somehow missed a win — a fact which he is probably unaware of to this day.

| 1  | e4  | c5         |
|----|---|------------|
| 2  | <b>∅</b> f3   | d6         |
| 3  | <b>d4</b>   | cxd4       |
| 4  | <b>②xd4</b>   | <b>②f6</b> |
| 5  | ©c3   | a6         |
| 6  | <u></u> | e6         |
| 7  | f4  | <b>≜e7</b> |
| 8  | <b>豐f3</b>  | <b>營c7</b> |
| 9  | 0-0-0   | ∅bd7       |
| 10 | g4  | <b>b</b> 5 |

Gligorich and I have a standing feud with this position, which we've reached no less than three times. I've lost twice and drawn once (this one).

11 **\( \hat{\pm} \) xf6** ...

Interesting is 11 皇g2 皇b7 12 国he1 b4 13 ②d5!? exd5 14 exd5 當f8 15 ②f5 国e8 and Black won. (Bernstein-Fischer, US Championship 1957-8)

11 ...

gxf6!?

For 11... 2xf6 see game 9.

12 f5

Giving up e5 in order to exert pressure on e6. Our game at Zurich 1959 continued: 12 单g2 单b7 13 罩he1 0-0-0 14 a3 勾b6=.


In the US Championship 1959-60, Mednis played 12 a3 against me. The game went 12...2b7 (12...2b8 is sharper) 13 f5 e5 14 2de2 2b6 15 2d5 2xd5 16 exd5 2c8 17 2c3 2c4 18 2xc4 bxc4 19 2b1 2b8 20 2a2 with a better game for White.

12 ... De5

Simagin gave this a "?" and proceeded to analyze the alternative 12...b4 13 fxe6 bxc3 (if 13...\(\Delta\)e5 14 \(\Delta\)d5!) 14 exd7+ \(\Delta\)xd7 15 e5, etc. By this logic, the whole variation is unsound for Black. We shall see.

13 **Wh3** 0-0!

Not 13... 2d7 14 g5! fxg5 (if 14...exf5 15 4d5) 15 fxe6 fxe6 16 4xe6 and Black's game collapses.



FISCHER

Position after 13...0-0!

GLIGORICH

Petrosian and Tal both happened to stroll by the board at this instant. Petrosian made a wry face which looked to me like "Can Black do this and live?"

Black's "ugly" defense is based on sound positional considerations: once he can consolidate, there is a strong potential in the two Bishops coupled with his beautifully posted Knight and compact Pawn mass. These assets, in the long run, hopefully, should outweigh the temporary weakness of his King and the immobile target on e6.

The consistent strategical plan. Gligorich intends ②f4, bringing additional pressure to bear on e6. Simagin gave the offhand 14 營h6 登h8 15 g5! and "wins". It is incredibly naïve to imagine that a player of Gligorich's caliber could overlook such a simple refutation. In this line simply 15... 墨g8! refutes White's strategy. 16 g6 (if 16 gxf6 ②g4 regains the Pawn with advantage) 16... fxg6 17 ②xe6 (weaker is 17 fxe6 急b7) 17... ③xe6 18 fxe6 墨ac8 19 營d2 (if 19 a3 d5! 20 exd5 ③xa3) 19... ②c4 20 ③xc4 (if 20 營d4 營a5) 20... 營xc4 21 營d5 墨ge8 threatening ... ②f8 (or ... b4).

In a sense my judgment was vindicated when Bronstein (as Black) reached the diagram against Kholmov in the 1964 USSR Championship. The continuation was 14 g5!? b4? (Kholmov gives the best defense: "14...fxg5! 15 fxe6 fxe6 16 ②xe6 營d7 17 ②d5 營xe6 18 營xe6+ ②xe6 19 ②xe7+ 含f7 20 ②f5=") 15 gxf6 ②xf6 16 ③g1+ 含h8 17 營h6 營e7 18 ②c6!! ②xc6 19 e5!! and White won brilliantly.

14... b7 also comes into serious consideration.

Unsound is 14... **a**d7 15 **a**f4 **a**c8 16 **a**h6 **a**h8 17 **a**h5 **a**g8 18 **a**xf6 **a**g7 19 **a**e2 **a**d8 20 g5, etc.

Gligorich gives 16 \( \mathreve{L}\)e2 as correct. After 16...\( \mathreve{W}\)b7 17 fxe6 fxe6 it's anybody's game. On 16 fxe6 fxe6 17 \( \waldeta\)dxe6 \( \mathreve{L}\)xe6 (or ...\( \mathreve{W}\)a5 or ...\( \mathreve{W}\)b7) 18 \( \waldeta\)xe6 \( \mathreve{W}\)c8=.


Suddenly the game opens up! But more prudent is 16... \$\mathbb{U}\$ and if \$17 \mathbb{Z}\$ e1 \$\mathbb{U}\$ b6!

#### 17 fxe6

Weak is 17 exd5? exf5! and White can't recapture because of the pin on the g-file.

17 ... dxe4 18 包d5 豐c5

Black's game hangs by a hair. 19 exf7 🖾 xf7 20 🖾 xe7 👑 xe7 is roughly even.



#### **FISCHER**

Position after 18... ₩c5

GLIGORICH

19 ②xe7

Weird complications result from the key line 19 5f5!:

- B) 19...豐xg1 20 公fxe7 &xe6 (if 20...豐xg4 21 豐xg4 冨xg4 22 公c7 冨b8 23 冨d8+ 曾g7 24 公f5+ 曾g6 25 e7 wins) 21 公xg8 (if 21 公xf6 冨g7) 21...食xg4 22 營h6 &xd1 23 公gxf6 豐g6 24 豐xg6 hxg6 25 含xd1 with winning chances.

19 ... 響xe7 20 句f5 ...

If 20 We3 &b7 21 exf7 Wxf7 Black wins a Pawn.

Possibly Gligorich had originally intended 21 国d6? 豐xa2 22 豐h6 overlooking that Black can win with 22...豐a1+ (if 22...逸xf5 23 豐xf6+ 国g7 24 国d8+ leads to a draw by perpetual) 23 堂d2 ②f3+ 24 堂e3 (if 24 堂e2?? 豐e1 mate; or 24 堂c3? 豐a5+ 25 堂b3 豐a4+ 26 堂c3 b4+ 27 堂c4 兔e6+ leads to mate) 24...豐xb2! wins.

21 ... <u>\$d7!</u>

Defending against the powerful threat of 罩d8! Not 21...②xg4? 22 罩xg4! 罩xg4 23 罩d8+ 罩g8 24 豐g7 mate.


22 **Zd6** ...

White has no choice. Black threatened ... **国**g6 followed by ... **劉**xa2. Or on 22 **\$\dinger\$b1 ②**xg4.

22 ... ②xg4!
23 罩xg4 ...

Forced. 23 \(\begin{aligned} \pm\ \text{xe6}? \(\Delta\)\text{xh6} wins a piece.

Handing Black the game on a silver platter. Correct is 24 罩f4 豐g5 25 豐xf6+ 豐xf6 26 罩dxf6 e3! 27 罩xf7 罩g1! 28 罩xd7 e2 29 罩d1! exd1=豐+ 30 堂xd1 堂g7 31 堂e1 罩f8 32 罩xf8 堂xf8 33 堂f2 with good drawing prospects.



FISCHER

Position after 24 \(\mathbb{Z}xg8+?\)

GLIGORICH

Black has two ways to recapture: which one is correct?

Returning the compliment! The winning line is 24...堂xg8! 25 罩xf6 豐e5 with an extra Pawn and a dominating position (if 26 罩xa6? 罩xa6 27 豐xa6 豐f4+ wins a piece).

On 26... 營b7? 27 營f6+ 罩g7 28 營d8+ 罩g8 29 營xd7 wins.

I should have contented myself with the draw now by 27... 当d5 28 罩d6, etc.

| 28 | <b>豐xg5</b> | ℤxg5           |
|----|-------------|----------------|
| 29 | 罩xf7        | <u>\$g4</u>    |
| 30 | <b>Ġd2</b>  | . <b>ģ.</b> f3 |
| 31 | <b>Ġe3</b>  | <b></b> g1     |
| 32 | <b>≜h3</b>  | •••            |

Not 32 曾f2? 罩h1.


Playing, as Dr. Tarrasch wryly put it, "for the loss." Nowadays I would know better than to try to squeeze a win out of such a simplified ending.

Gligorich is also playing to win – by cashing in on my inexperience. Simply 34 \( \)\frac{1}{2}e7 \( \)\frac{1}{2}xc2 \( 35 \)\( \)\frac{1}{2}f5 holds the draw. But he is purposely inviting me to overextend myself.

| 34 | •••          | e3          |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 35 | <b>\$f5</b>  | ℤg1         |
| 36 | <b>罩xh7+</b> | <b>⊈g8</b>  |
| 37 | ≅c7          | <b>≜g4?</b> |

Still chasing the chimera of the missed win. Black should simply force a draw with 37...e2 38 當f6 當h8 39 罩h7+ 當g8 40 罩c7 當h8, etc.

| 38 | ≜xg4 | ℤxg4 |
|----|------|------|
| 39 | ≌c3  | e2   |
| 40 | 罩e3  | 罩g2  |



FISCHER

Position after 40... 国g2

GLIGORICH

In my excitement I had originally intended 40... \$\mathbb{Z}\$g7? overlooking the simple reply 41 \$\displant d4\$ (among others). Fortunately, Black can still hold the draw.

41 當d4 e1=響!

After 41... 基xh2? 42 當d3 Black is really lost!

Not 43... \( \) xh2? 44 \( \) c5 with a fatal penetration on the Q-side.

On 45 h4 \$\delta\$d6 holds the balance. The threat now is \$\boxed{\beta}\$h1.


Trying to finagle. 49 \$\displant xb5 \$\displant c7\$ leads to an easy book draw.

*49* ... **\$\delta\$d6** 

Crisper is 49...b4 50 罩d1+ (on 50 含b6 含c8 the Black King gets in front of the Pawn) 50...含e6 51 罩d3 含e5 52 含b6 含e4 53 罩h3 含d4 54 含b5 罩a8 55 含xb4 罩b8+ 56 含a5 罩a8+ 57 含b6 罩b8+ 58 含c6 (if 58 含a6 含c5=) 58...罩b4 59 罩g3 罩b8 with an impenetrable blockade.

| 50 | <b>Ġ</b> b6 | <b>堂d7</b> |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 51 | <b>b</b> 4  | <b>罩h3</b> |
| 52 | 罩c1         | ≌h8?       |

After the game Olafsson scolded me: "How can you play an ending like this so fast?" (I'd only been taking a few seconds a move for the last dozen moves or so.) "Because there's no danger. It's a dead draw," I replied. Had I known then what I know now, I would have selected 52... \( \begin{align\*} \bex \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} \be



FISCHER

GLIGORICH

53 **\$xb5**? ...

Now it's Gligorich's turn to let me out. As Olafsson showed me, White can win with 53 \( \frac{1}{2} \) c7+! It's hard to believe. I stayed up all night analyzing, finally convincing myself and, incidentally, learning a lot about Rook and Pawn endings in the process. Gligorich failed to point it out in his notes to the Bled tournament book. The main point is Black cannot get his King in front of the Pawn.


A sample line is 53 罩c7+! 含d6 (if 53...含d8 54 罩c5 含d7 55 含b7! 含d6 56 罩xb5) 54 罩c6+ 含d7 (if 54...含d5 55 含xb5 罩b8+ 56 罩b6) 55 含xb5 罩b8+ (if 55...罩h4 56 罩c1 罩h8 57 含a6) 56 罩b6 罩h8 57 罩b7+含8 58 含a6 罩h6+59 含a7 with a book win.

| 53 | •••         | <b>罩b8</b> + |
|----|-------------|--------------|
| 54 | <b>\$a4</b> | <b>⊒a8</b> + |

The game was adjourned again. But the crisis has passed.

| 55 | <b>\$</b> b3 | ℤc8         |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 56 | ≅xc8         | \$xc8       |
| 57 | Ġc4          | <b>ġb8!</b> |
|    |              |             |

#### Drawn



**FISCHER** 

Final Position after 57... \$\ddots b8!

**GLIGORICH** 

Black holds the "distant opposition." For example, 58 堂c5 (or 58 堂d5 堂b7) 58...堂c7 59 堂b5 堂b7, etc.

# 13 Fischer - Gligorich [Yugoslavia]

## CANDIDATES' TOURNAMENT 1959 SICILIAN DEFENSE

## Something new

During the mid-fifties, Gligorich, Reshevsky, and Najdorf were considered the strongest non-Soviet Grandmasters. Within a few years Fischer managed to surpass them. However, in so doing, he succeeded in beating Gligorich only once — up to 1966 (see game 56).

On the occasion of this first win, Fischer employs a novel attacking system (13 We2) against the Dragon Variation. Gligorich fails to react vigorously enough and makes the mistake of castling too soon, thereby exposing himself to the same type of sacrificial combination that demolished Larsen in game 2.

| 1 | <b>e4</b>   | <b>c</b> 5   |
|---|-------------|--------------|
| 2 | <b>包f3</b>  | ©c6          |
| 3 | d4          | cxd4         |
| 4 | <b>©xd4</b> | <b>€</b> )f6 |
| 5 | <b>©c3</b>  | d6           |
| 6 | ₾c4         | <b>≜d7</b>   |

For Benko's 6... \$\mathbb{\text{\begin{align\*} \text{W} b6 see game 11.} \end{align\*}}\$

#### 8 **f3**


8 ... @a5

Releasing the central tension this way is wrong. Correct is 8... 2xd4 9 \(\mathbb{U}\)xd4 \(\ddot\)g7 but after 10 \(\ddot\)g5! White still keeps control.

9 **拿g5 拿g7** 10 **豐d2 h6** 

A concession. But on 10...0-0 11 \$\oldsymbol{2}\$h6 followed by h4-h5 produces a strong and almost mechanical attack.

A totally new idea at the time. 13 2xc4 2xc4 14 g4 was the usual, and good, procedure. The text permits Black to capture what was considered, then, to be the more important of the White Bishops.



#### GLIGORICH

Position after 13 We2!?

**FISCHER** 

Bronstein was so impressed with this concept that he enthusiastically gave my thirteenth move "!!" claiming it was virtually the winning line. Alexander Kotov, the commissar of chess criticism in the Soviet Union, wrote, with more sober restraint: "It is difficult to agree with this."

13 ...

②xe3

Not 13... 營c7? 14 公db5.

14 **≝xe3** 

0 - 0

Reminiscent of game 12, it is now Gligorich who castles into it! At Mar del Plata 1960, Marini played against me the stronger 14...豐b6 (threatening ...e5) 15 豐d2 豐c5 16 f4 h5? (better is 16...b5 or ...0-0) 17 勾f3 臭h6 18 e5! with a powerful attack.

Kotov recommends 14...豐a5 15 🕏 b1 (he gives only 15 g4? 豐g5!) 15...豐c5 16 豐d3 a6 and Black's all right. So best is probably 15 f4 (after 14...豐a5) 15...0-0 16 h3 e6 but Black's two Bishops may offset the weakness of the d-Pawn.

15 g4

Timing is important. On 15 h4 h5 locks it up.

15 ... 16 **h4**  **幽a5** 

**e6** 

On 16...h5 17 g5 2e8 18 f4-f5 gives White a strong game.

17 @de2!

04360

Black holds out after 17 g5 hxg5 18 hxg5 包h5 19 f4 豐c5 (threatening ...e5).


17 ... 18 **g5**  ℤc6

hxg5

On 18... This 19 gxh6 &f6 20 f4 continues the Pawn stampede.

19 hxg5 20 f4 9)h5

罩fc8



GLIGORICH

Position after 20... 罩fc8

**FISCHER** 

21 曾b1

An important preparatory move. On the immediate 21 f5!? exf5 22 🖾 d5 "wa2! gives Black good play.

| 21 | ***        | ₩b6 |
|----|------------|-----|
| 22 | <b>豐f3</b> | 罩c5 |
| 23 | ₩d3!       | ••• |

Several Yugoslav chess journalists scurried forward toward the analysis room, where Matanovich was explaining the game on a demonstration board. Apparently the feeling was that I had just blundered.

The more obvious 23 f5 looks good, but Black still has defensive resources with 23...exf5 24 罩xh5 (if 24 勾d5 營d8 25 exf5 食xf5 26 罩xh5? 罩xc2! wins for Black) 24...gxh5 25 勾f4 罩xc3 26 bxc3 罩xc3 27 營xh5 罩xb3+ 28 cxb3 營e3, etc.

23 ... ≜xc3

The threat against the d-Pawn is awkward to meet. On 23... 這5c6 24 f5! exf5 25 區xh5! gxh5 26 exf5 is crushing. Or if 23... 區8c6? 24 ②a4 wins the exchange. Finally on 23... 食f8 24 f5! exf5 25 ②d5 營d8 (if 25...fxe4 26 營xe4 食f5 27 營xf5 wins a piece) 26 區xh5! gxh5 (26... 區xd5 27 食xd5 gxh5 28 exf5) 27 ②f6+ 含g7 28 營h3 releases an avalanche.

24 Dxc3

24


Exf4

This is what the crowd thought I had overlooked.

**營f3** 25

9)h5

On 25...e5 26 De2! is decisive.



GLIGORICH

Position after 25...42h5

FISCHER

26 罩xh5!

I've made this sacrifice so often, I feel like applying for a patent!

26

gxh5

27 ₩xh5 ₫e8

The best defensive try On 27... 會f8 28 營h8+ 會e7 29 營f6+ 會e8 30 国h1 鱼b5 31 鱼xe6! fxe6 32 營xe6+ 含d8 (or 32... 含f8 33 国h8+ 含g7 34 營f6 mate) 33 罩h8+ 含c7 34 罩xc8 mate.

> ₩h6! 28

罩xc3

29 bxc3

On 29 Zh1, Wd4 holds out for a while.

29

罩xc3

White still retains a winning attack after 29... 響e3 30 罩h1 響xc3 31 g6 營g7 32 營h2! (BRONSTEIN).

30

g6!

fxg6

罩h1 31

₩d4

32 **營h7+** 

Again a mistake! 32 \(\exists xe6+\) mates more quickly.

32

Black resigns

## 14 Keres [u.s.s.r.] - Fischer

## CANDIDATES' TOURNAMENT 1959 SICILIAN DEFENSE

## Too many cooks

Professionals spend much of their spare time hunting for "cooks" with which they hope to surprise future opponents. It was rumored, for example, that Marshall waited for over ten years before springing his famous gambit on Capablanca, at New York, in 1918. But, as it happened, the wily Cuban refuted it over-the-board!

Keres, in like manner, confronts Fischer with an innovation which the latter, in all innocence, proceeds to destroy. Rather than admit that his surprise Queen sacrifice is good for only a draw at best, Keres presses for more, offering material in order to sustain his initiative. Fischer continues to accept everything, but — at the very moment when victory is within his grasp (on move 31) — stumbles. Now he must win the game all over again; and he manages to do so, with an assist from Keres, in another twenty-two moves.

| 1 | e4          | <b>c5</b>            |
|---|-------------|----------------------|
| 2 | <b>∅</b> f3 | d6                   |
| 3 | d4          | cxd4                 |
| 4 | ©xd4        | <b>€</b> 2 <b>f6</b> |
| 5 | ©c3         | <b>a6</b>            |
| 6 | <u>≜g</u> 5 | <b>e6</b>            |
| 7 | f4          | <b>≜e7</b>           |

Sharp is 7... \$\mathbb{\text{\psi}} b6\$ which I've tried on several occasions.

8 **豐**f3 **豐c7** 

8...h6 9 **Qh4** g5!? 10 fxg5 **Qfd7** 11 **Qxe6!**? fxe6 12 **Wh5+ 含f8** 13 **Qb5! Zh7!** (Gligorich-Fischer, Portoroz 1958) is now considered a drawish variation!


| 9  | 0-0-0       | €Dbd7 |
|----|-------------|-------|
| 10 | <u></u> ≜e2 | ***   |

An innovation whose dubious merit appears on move 13. For 10 ad3 see game 9. For 10 g4 see games 12 and 15.

12 e5!?

On 12 a3 \( \begin{aligned} \text{Eb8!} \text{ followed by ...b4 gives good counterplay.} \end{aligned}

12 ... **âb7** 



**FISCHER** 

Position after 12... 臭b7

KERES

13 exf6!?

The crux of Keres' prepared line. After 13 豐g3 dxe5 14 fxe5 公d7 15 豐xg7 豐xe5 Black stands better.

13 ... **£xf3** 

So I chopped it off!

Not 14... **a**c8? 15 fxe7 **a**xe7 16 **b**f5! (BONDAREVSKY).

15 **k**xa8 d5


So far, so forced. Now ...0-0 is threatened.

*16* **≜xd5** ...

On 16 &c6+ \$f8 17 ②ce2 \$e7 followed by ... 罩c8.

*16* ... ≜xd4

| 17 | <b>≝xd4</b>  | exd5        |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 18 | <b>②xd5</b>  | <b>豐c5</b>  |
| 19 | <b>≝e1</b> + | <b>\$18</b> |
| 20 | <b>c</b> 3   |             |



**FISCHER** 

Position after 20 c3

**KERES** 

White seems to have fair prospects. But a Queen is a Queen!

20 ... h5!

A hard move to find — even somewhat risky — over-the-board. Probably Keres had expected 20...g6 21 g4 會g7 22 g5 h6 (if 22... 宣d8 23 ②f6 冨xd4 24 冨e8 冨d8! 25 冨xd8 豐e3+ draws) 23 h4 hxg5 24 fxg5 冨d8 25 ②f6 冨xd4 26 冨e8 冨d8! 27 冨xd8 豐e3+ with a draw by perpetual.

21 **f5** 

To hinder ... g6.


Kotov gives 21 ②b4 豐c8? (simply 21...g6 is more than sufficient; if then 22 ②xa6 豐c6) 22 ②c6! and wins.

Zagoryansky also mistakenly thinks White has all the chances. He gives "21 星e5! g6 (more passive is 21...豐c8 22 ②e7 豐a8 23 ②c6 f6

24 罩e6 當f7 25 f5) 22 f5!" but 22...曾g7 23 f6+ 當h6 (if 24 g4 b4!) is quite satisfactory for Black.

21 ... \( \beta\)h6!

The key to Black's defense; now the Rook sneaks into play via the side exit.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 21... \\ \( \bar{\text{\$\sigma}}\)h6!

KERES

22 **f6?** ...

Throwing away a Pawn in an attempt to keep Black bottled up. Keres should just try to maintain the status quo with 22 \( \mathbb{Z} \) ed1, although Black retains some slight winning chances. But he seems to labor under the delusion that White has the initiative.

22 国de4 曾g8 23 国e8+ 曾h7 24 国d8 国d6 neutralizes all White's threats.

| 22 | ***           | gxf6 |
|----|---------------|------|
| 23 | ②f4           | h4   |
| 24 | <b>□d8</b> +? |      |


Continuing the "attack". The defensive 24 \( \mathbb{Z} = 2 \) was in order.

| 24 | ***        | <b>\$g7</b>  |
|----|------------|--------------|
| 25 | ≌ee8       | <b>豐g1</b> + |
| 26 | <b>Ġd2</b> | <b>豐f2</b> + |
| 27 | ©e2        | <b>⊑g</b> 6  |
| 28 | <b>g</b> 3 | •••          |

28 国g8+ \$h6 29 国h8+ \$g5 gets White nowhere.

Or 30 罩d6+ 含e7 31 罩dxg6 fxg6 32 罩xg6 h3 wins (ZAGORYANSKY).

30 ... fxg6 31 gxh4 ...



FISCHER

Position after 31 gxh4

KERES

31 ... 豐xh2?

The winning method is 31...豐xh4! 32 罩d6+ 含f7 33 h3 豐h6+! (if 33...豐xh3 34 罩xg6! 含xg6?? 35 勾f4+) 34 含d1 (if 34 含e1 豐xh3 35 罩xg6 豐h4+! 36 罩g3 f4 wins; or on 34 含c2 豐xh3 35 罩xg6 豐h2 wins) 34...豐xh3 35 罩xg6 豐f1+ and ...含xg6.

Now Black has to win the game over again.

32 ... **≝h1**33 **Ġc2** ...

33 ②f4? allows penetration with ... ₩b1.

33 ... \( \&\delta \) e5 34 a4 ...


An even tighter defense is 34 ②c1! followed by ②d3+ with a probable draw. But not 34 ②f4? 營h2+! 35 含d1 營xf4! 36 罩xf4 含xf4 with a won King and Pawn ending: e.g., 37 含e2 (if 37 b3 含e3!)

37... 會g3 38 b3 曾xh4 39 c4 bxc4 40 bxc4 曾g5 and the King is "in the square".

Trying to capitalize on the disjointed state of White's minor pieces.

35 ©c1 .

Forced. Not 35 含d2? 響a1! 36 含c2 bxa4, etc.



In time pressure, Keres creates new losing chances for himself. Also bad is 36 \$\displant b\text{ta}1 bxa4 37 \$\begin{align\*} \alpha a4 \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} \alpha b2 \displant \begin{align\*} \displant b2 \displant b2 \displant \begin{align\*} \displant b2 \displant b2 \displant \begin{align\*} \displant b2 \displan

The right defense is 36 曾d1! bxa4 (not 36...豐xb2?? 37 勾d3+) 37 勾d3+ 曾f6 38 冨xa4 a5 39 冨d4 (not 39 冨xa5? 豐g4+ and ...豐xh4) and Black can't make any headway.

36 ... bxa4+ 37 **\&a3** ...

On 37 罩xa4 (if 37 含xa4 營c2+ 38 包b3 營xb2) 37...營d2! 38 包a2 f4 is deadly.

37 ... 響c2 38 包d3+ 常f6 39 Dc5

**營c1!** 


Threatening ... 營a1+.

40 ②xa4 f4 41 ②c5 f3 42 ②d3 ¥e3 transposes into the note after White's 41st move.

40 ...

₩e3

The game was adjourned and Keres sealed his move.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 40... We3

KERES

41 €\(\text{\Pi}\)xa6?

This makes it easy.

I had expected 41  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ d4 f4 42  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ d3 f3. The win is hard, but eventually Black breaks through on a3. For example, 43  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ b3 (43 b4? f2 wins) 43...  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ g7 44  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ a3  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ e2 45  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ b3  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ d1+ 46  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ c4 (if 46  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ a3 a5 47  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ a2 a4 48  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ 12  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ b3+ 49  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ a1 a3, etc.) 46...a5 47  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ b5 a4 48  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ a5  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ b3 49  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ a6 a3 50 bxa3  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ xa3+ 51  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ b5  $\stackrel{?}{=}$ xc3, etc. Maybe White can improve, but Black should win because the blockade is not airtight.

41 ... 42 \(\beta\)d4 f4 曾f5!

The move Keres missed when he sealed his forty-first. He had probably anticipated 42...f3 43 ②c5 f2 44 ②e4+ 豐xe4 45 罩xe4 f1=豐with a dead draw since Black can't create another passed Pawn.

### 43 **Db4**


More resistance could have been offered by 43 ②c5 but it's still lost after 43... 豐e7! 44 b4 豐xh4 45 b5 豐f6, etc.

43 ...

**營e7!** 

This temporary pin is decisive. Now Black wins the h-Pawn and his two passed Pawns become irresistible.

| 44 | <b>\$b3</b>       | ₩xh4         |
|----|-------------------|--------------|
| 45 | <b><b>②d3</b></b> | <b>g</b> 5   |
| 46 | <b>c4</b>         | <b>豐g3</b>   |
| 47 | c5                | f3           |
| 48 | <b>⊈c4</b>        | f2           |
| 49 | €xf2              | <b>豐xf2</b>  |
| 50 | <b>c6</b>         | <b>響xb2</b>  |
| 51 | Ġc5               | <b>豐c3</b> + |



**FISCHER** 

Position after 51... ₩c3+

**KERES** 

*52* **\$\d5** 

On 52 罩c4 營a5+ 53 含d4 營c7 wins.

## **15** Smyslov [ *u.s.s.r.* ] - Fischer

### CANDIDATES' TOURNAMENT 1959 SICILIAN DEFENSE

## A whopper

Here is Fischer's first win against Vassily Smyslov; and it is hard to recall when the former world champion, conducting White, has been so badly outplayed.

On move 13 of a crucial opening variation, Smyslov makes what appears to be a "lapsus manus." Rather than fight a prolonged uphill positional battle, he sacrifices a Pawn to try to regain the initiative. This proves to be a piece of bad judgment, since, basically, the loss of this Pawn alone brings about his demise. Defending with deadly precision, Fischer gradually consolidates — the shadow of his Pawn looming larger with each approach to the endgame. Smyslov thrashes about, striving desperately for complications, avoiding exchanges like the plague. But he is unable to get off the hook.

| 1 | e4           | c5         |
|---|--------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>©</b> 13  | d6         |
| 3 | <b>d4</b>    | cxd4       |
| 4 | ②xd4         | <b>②f6</b> |
| 5 | ©c3          | <b>a6</b>  |
| 6 | <u>\$g</u> 5 | •••        |

For 6 \( \mathref{L}\)e2 see games 4 and 42. For 6 \( \mathref{L}\)c4 see games 17, 55, 58.


| 6 | ***   | <b>e6</b>   |
|---|-------|-------------|
| 7 | f4    | <b>≗</b> e7 |
| 8 | 營品    | <b>豐c7</b>  |
| 9 | 0-0-0 | 2bd7        |

Weak is 9...h6 10 皇h4 ②bd7 11 皇d3 b5 12 e5! 皇b7 13 ②xe6! fxe6 14 皇g6+ 曾f8 15 exf6 皇xf3 (better is 15...②xf6) 16 fxe7+ 曾g8 17 gxf3 ②f6 18 皇xf6 gxf6 19 e8=豐+ 墨xe8 20 皇xe8 d5 (Gligorich-Bobotsov, Hastings 1959-60); 21 f5! (MCO) wins.

For 11...gxf6 see game 12.

12 **g5** 

②d7



FISCHER

Position after 12...42d7

**SMYSLOV** 

13 **âh3**?

Innovation or omission? In either case, after this move White throws away his theoretical advantage and even loses the initiative. Necessary is 13 a3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b7 (13...\(\frac{1}{2}\)b8! is in vogue) and now there are two main lines:


A] 14 h4 d5 15 exd5 ②b6 16 f5 ②xd5 17 fxe6 0-0-0 18 皇g2 ②xc3 19 營xb7+ 營xb7 20 皇xb7+ 含xb7 21 bxc3 皇xa3+ 22 含b1 fxe6 23 ②xe6 富c8 24 富h3 g6 25 c4 富he8 and shortly drawn. (Sherwin-Fischer, US Championship 1959-60.)

B] 14 鱼h3 0-0-0 15 f5!? (interesting is 15 鱼xe6!? fxe6 16 ②xe6 豐c4 [Keres recommends 16...豐b6] 17 ②d5 with unclear complications, though White won, Tal-Gligorich, Moscow 1963) 15...鱼xg5+ 16 曾b1 e5 17 ②dxb5 axb5 18 ②xb5 豐b6! (better than 18...豐c5 which I played against Gligorich at the Candidates' 1959) 19 ②xd6+ 曾c7 20 ②xf7 鱼f6 is roughly equal.

13 ... b4!

My game with Walther (game 9) had taught me this lesson well.

14 ②ce2 **臭b7** 15 **含b1?** ... In this sharp variation, White has no time for such amenities. 15 ②g3 avoids incurring any severe disadvantage, while the speculative 15 鱼xe6!? fxe6 16 ②xe6 營c4 17 ②xg7+ (better is 17 ②2d4) 17...當f8! favors Black.



I could see from the expression on Smyslov's face that he already thought he was busted.

17 f5!? ...

On 17 e5 g6! 18 \( \begin{aligned}
& \text{Ec1} \( \begin{aligned}
& \text{Bo6!} \) and if 19 c3 a5 followed by ...0-0 with a powerful attack in the works. Smyslov's keen positional judgment tells him that such a course for White is lifeless. So he sacs a Pawn instead.

| 17 | ***          | dxe4 |
|----|--------------|------|
| 18 | ₩g4          | exf5 |
| 19 | <b>Ødxf5</b> | g6!  |

Perhaps this simple retort escaped him. Was he hoping for 19...0-0? 20 5h5! g6 21 \$\mathbb{\text{g6}}\$ g3! winning material (if 21...\$\text{d8}\$ 22 \$\mathbb{\text{g}}\$ xd8! \$\mathbb{\text{w}}\$ xd8 23 \$\mathbb{\text{g6}}\$ f6+, etc.)? The rest of the game is, if one may use that hackneyed phrase, "a matter of technique." Black's a Pawn ahead with the better game to boot.

20 ②xe7 ...

Not 20 心h6? 鱼c8 21 營h4 鱼xh3 22 營xh3 鱼xg5.

| 20 | •••                  | <b>豐xe7</b> |
|----|----------------------|-------------|
| 21 | <b>營f4</b>           | 0-0         |
| 22 | <b>罩d6</b>           | ãad8        |
| 23 | <b></b> ₫ <b>f</b> 6 | •••         |


Naturally Smyslov avoids swapping.

| 23 | ***         | ⊒d5 |
|----|-------------|-----|
| 24 | <u>இg</u> 4 | ©d7 |
| 25 | 罩fi         | ••• |

A desperate attempt to complicate. On 25 ②xe4? 罩d4 26 এxd7 營xd7 wins a piece. Or 25 營xe4 罩d1+! 26 罩xd1 鱼xe4 27 罩xd7 營e5.

Not 25... ②xf6? 26 gxf6 營e5 27 營h6 wins.

Threatening 27... 12xf6 28 gxf6 \(\mathbb{U}\)c5! 29 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 \(\mathbb{U}\)d4. To avert further material loss, Smyslov is forced to indulge in the simplifications he has been trying so hard to forestall.



FISCHER

Position after 26... 罩d2

SMYSLOV

27 **g**xd7 ...

Forced, but now White's game rapidly deteriorates and the extra Pawn makes its presence felt.

| 28 | <b></b> ae1 | <b>ℤe8</b> |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 29 | h4          | ₩c5!       |
| 30 | <b>≝c4</b>  | •••        |

Horrible, but necessary, to meet the main threat of ... \cong c3.

| 30 | •••  | <b>豐xc4</b> |
|----|------|-------------|
| 31 | bxc4 | ≌d4         |

Now Black hacks away unmercifully.

| 32 | <b>c</b> 5   | <b>ℤxh</b> 4 |
|----|--------------|--------------|
| 33 | <b>c6</b>    | <b>≜c8</b>   |
| 34 | <b>≝d6</b>   | ≌c4          |
| 35 | <b>Ġ</b> b2  | <b>⊈g7</b>   |
| 36 | <b>\$</b> b3 | <b>ℤg4</b>   |
| 37 | <b>©e2</b>   | <b>≝e6!</b>  |
| 38 | <b>≝ed1</b>  | •••          |

Or 38 罩xe6 食xe6+ 39 含b2 罩c4, etc.

| 38 | •••         | <b>罩g2</b>  |
|----|-------------|-------------|
| 39 | <b>②f4</b>  | <b>≅xd6</b> |
| 40 | <b>ℤxd6</b> | ≌d2         |
| 41 | <b>ℤd3</b>  | ***         |

The only move. Smyslov might have resigned had we adjourned here. But we were both playing fast and, as a consequence, were still well in the first session, carried by sheer momentum.

| 41 | •••        | 国f2 |
|----|------------|-----|
| 42 | <b>≝d4</b> | ••• |

Again forced. On 42 包d5 e2 43 罩e3 罩f3 wins.

| 42 | ***        | <b>e2</b>     |
|----|------------|---------------|
| 43 | <b>②d3</b> | <u></u> \$£f5 |
| 44 | <b>c</b> 7 | <b>ℤf3</b>    |


45 c8=₩

≜xc8

Again 45...e1= was quicker, but I wanted to avoid "complications."

| 46 | ⊒e4        | <b>≜</b> f5   |
|----|------------|---------------|
| 47 | ℤxe2       | ı≜xd3         |
| 48 | cxd3       | <b>≅xd3</b> + |
| 49 | ⊈xb4       | <b>罩d5</b>    |
| 50 | <b>⊑g2</b> | h6            |
| 51 | gxh6+      | <b>\$xh6</b>  |
| 52 | a4         | g5            |
| 53 | 罩c2        | ℤd6           |
| 54 | Ġc5        | <b>≝e6</b>    |
|    |            |               |

### White resigns



**FISCHER** 

Final Position after 54... Ze6

**SMYSLOV** 

# **16** Fischer - Petrosian [ u.s.s.r. ]

## CANDIDATES' TOURNAMENT 1959

CARO-KANN DEFENSE

## Four Queens

Fischer extracted a slight minus score from the seven games in which he was called upon to face the Caro-Kann, prompting Botvinnik to note: "Fischer's both strong and weak point lies in that he is always true to himself and plays the same way regardless of his partners or any external factor."

This variation is not only complex and critical — but perilous. After a single slip the edge passes to Black. But Petrosian overestimates his position and, somewhat recklessly, dissipates his advantage. In time-pressure he misses a forced draw and Fischer regains the upper hand. From this point on, with four marauding Queens roaming the board, the play becomes "rich and strange" — resulting in a tortuous draw.

| 1 | e4          | <b>c6</b> |
|---|-------------|-----------|
| 2 | ©c3         | d5        |
| 3 | <b>5</b> 13 | ***       |

The purpose of this line is to exclude the possibility of ...\$f5. For example, 3...dxe4 4 2xe4 15? 5 2g3 1g6 (if 5...1g4 6 h3) 6 h4 h6 7 2e5 1h7 8 1h5 g6 1h5 g6 1h6 1h6 1h6 1h6 1h6 1h6 1h6 1h6 1h7 1h

*3* ... ≜g4

3...包f6 4 e5 包e4 5 包e2! 營b6 6 d4 c5 7 dxc5 營xc5 8 包ed4 包c6 9 鱼b5 a6 10 鱼xc6+ bxc6 11 0-0 營b6 12 e6! fxe6 13 鱼f4 is good for White. (Fischer-Olafsson, Candidates' 1959.)


4 h3 ½xf3

to prevent ...f6) 10...f6 11 ②xg6 hxg6 12 豐d3 當f7 13 h5 gxh5 14 gxh5 ②ge7=.

5 響xf3

到f6

The old 5...e6 6 d4 dxe4 7 ②xe4 營xd4 8 Qd3 gives White a good attack for the Pawn. And on 5...dxe4 6 ②xe4 ②d7 7 ②g5!? (better is simply 7 d4) 7...②gf6 8 營b3 e6 9 營xb7 ②d5! Black gets good play. (Fischer-Cardoso, Portoroz 1958.)



PETROSIAN

Position after 5... 2f6

FISCHER

Inferior is 6 d4 dxe4 7 ②xe4!? (7 營e3 ②bd7 8 ②xe4 ②xe4 9 營xe4 ②f6 10 營d3 營d5! is equal, Fischer-Keres, Bled 1961) 7...營xd4 8 Qd3 ②bd7 threatening ...②e5.

On 6 e5 4 fd7 7 e6? (playable is 7 \ g3 e6 8 \ e2 Spassky-Reshko, Leningrad 1961) 7...fxe6 8 d4 e5!

Finally on 6 g3 dxe4 7 ②xe4 ②xe4 8 xe4 d5! 9 xd5 cxd5 10 ②g2 e6 (if 11 c4 ②c6 12 cxd5 ②b4!) gives Black an even ending (SUETIN).

6 d3 e6 7 g3 ...

A recent try is 7 \( \textstyle d2 \) followed by 0-0-0. Against Larsen, at Zurich 1959, I tried 7 a3 \( \textstyle c5 \) 8 \( \textstyle e2 \) 0-0 9 0-0 \( \textstyle \textstyle bd7 \) and Black got a satisfactory game.

7 ... <u>\$b4</u>
8 **\$d2** ...

Not 8 皇g2? d4 9 a3 豐a5.

8 ...

d4


Inferior is 8... \$\begin{aligned}
\$\begi

9 2b1

皇xd2+

In this tournament Keres and Benko both tried 9... \$\subseteq b6\$ forcing White to weaken the Q-side with \$10\$ b3. But Black's Queen is slightly misplaced after \$10... \$\subseteq bd7\$ \$11 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g2 a5 \$12\$ a3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd2+ (the retreat \$12...\(\frac{1}{2}\)e7 seems illogical—even though Keres beat me with it) \$13 \(\overline{1}\)xd2 \$\widetilde{1}\)gc5 \$14 \(\widetilde{1}\)d1 h5 \$15\$ h4! with an edge. (Fischer-Benko.) Petrosian apparently didn't want to get involved with this line despite the fact that his countryman, Tal, accused me of "bad judgment" for preferring White here.

| 10 | € xd2                | e5   |
|----|----------------------|------|
| 11 | <u></u> <b>≜ g 2</b> | c5   |
| 12 | 0-0                  | © c6 |
| 13 | <b>營e2</b>           | •••  |



PETROSIAN

Position after 13 We2

FISCHER

The critical juncture. In our earlier game (round two) Petrosian continued with 13...g5 14 ②f3? (Simagin gives 14 f4 gxf4 15 gxf4 豐e7 16 ②c4 ②d7 17 豐g4 "with advantage" but after 17...0-0-0 18 fxe5 ⑤b8 Black succeeds in planting his Knight on e5 where it cannot be dislodged) 14...h6 15 h4 圖g8 16 a3 豐e7 17 hxg5 hxg5 18 豐d2 ②d7 19 c3 0-0-0 20 cxd4 exd4 with advantage for Black.

Fearing a prepared line, Petrosian deviates.

On 13...g5 I had intended 14 c3! 營e7 15 公f3 h6 16 cxd4! exd4 (if 16...公xd4 17 公xd4 cxd4 18 罩ac1. Or 16...cxd4 17 h4 罩g8 18 hxg5 hxg5 19 罩fc1 0-0-0 20 b4! 含b8 21 b5 公a5 22 營d2 wins a Pawn) 17 e5! 0-0-0 18 罩fe1. Now the Bishop diagonal is unblocked and Black can't set up a blockade on his e5, as in our first game.

After 13...0-0 14 f4 \$\displays h8 15 f5 \$\displays g8 16 g4 f6\$ White has a tough nut to crack, but his initiative is permanent. The text indicates Petrosian's intention to castle long without trying to prevent f4.


14 f4 0-0-0 15 a3 ②e8

Also playable is 15... 2d7 16 b4 f6 and if 17 2c4 b5.

16 **b**4

cxb4

Wide open! Safer is 16...f6 17 b5 (if 17 bxc5 營xc5 18 fxe5 公xe5) 17...公a5 18 公b3 公xb3 19 cxb3 含b8 20 a4=.



PETROSIAN

Position after 16...cxb4

FISCHER

17 Dc4?

Now Black has time to consolidate. Correct is 17 fxe5! with advantage in all variations:

- A] 17... 響xe5 18 罩xf7 響xg3 19 e5! 響e3+ 20 響xe3 dxe3 21 公c4.
- B] 17...bxa3 18 公c4 罩f8 19 罩xa3 (if 19...b5 20 營g4+!).
- c] 17...②xe5 18 axb4 含b8 19 ②f3 f6 20 營f2! ②xf3+ (if 20...營xb4 21 ②xe5 fxe5 22 營f7 penetrates) 21 營xf3 ②d6 (if 21...營xb4 22 e5!) 22 罩a5 a6 23 營f4 罩he8 24 罩d5.

D] 17...會b8 18 axb4 ②xb4 (18...②xe5 19 ②f3 transposes to "c") 19 ②c4 ②c6 (if 19...②c7 20 ②d6! 罩hf8 21 罩fb1 ②ca6 22 營d2 營xe5 23 ②xb7! 含xb7 24 罩xa6! wins) 20 營f3 罩f8 21 e6! 營xe6 22 e5! followed by 罩fb1 and White has a winning attack.

17 ... f6!

I had expected 17...bxa3 18 fxe5 transposing to "B" above.

 18
 fxe5
 fxe5

 19
 axb4
 ∅c7

Black wants to secure a Q-side blockade. The b-Pawn won't run away.

20 **2a5 2b5!** 

I already knew I'd been outplayed. Petrosian didn't even consider 20...\(\infty\)xb4, opening up the lines.

On 22... 響xb4? 23 響g4+ 罩d7 24 罩f7 罩hd8 25 響xg7 regains the Pawn.

23 h4 **\$\delta\$b7** 

Ordinarily one would expect Petrosian to simplify and simplify in order to reach a winning ending. 23... hf8! is strong.

24 h5 \widetilde{\psi} xb4

Really risky! I was amazed he was allowing so much counterplay. 24... hf8 is still right. On 24... gxh5 25 \widetilde{\text{W}}\text{xh5} \widetilde{\text{Lhf8}} 26 \widetilde{\text{Ef5}}!

25 罩f7+ 當b6

On 25...會b8 26 營f2 嶌hf8 27 c4! 公c7 (if 27...dxc3 e.p.? 28 嶌axa7! 嶌xf7 29 營b6+) 28 營f6 with good play.

26 營配!


a5

Not 26... Thf8? 27 c4! 2c3 28 Taxa7 wins.

27 c4

包c3?

Continuing to underestimate the danger. Safer is 27...5 d6.



PETROSIAN

Position after 27...如c3?

**FISCHER** 

28 **□f1?** 

Why didn't I play 28 營f6! immediately? If then 28... 宣df8 (28... 宣hf8 29 宣f1! 宣xf7 30 營xd8+! 宣c7 31 宣f7 wins) 29 營xe5 宣xf7 30 營xh8 營c5 31 e5 — it's difficult for Black in view of his exposed King and White's passed e-Pawn.

Finally, after 28 曾f6! 曾c5 29 曾g7! 含a6 (if 29...a4 30 富a7! or 29...富a8 30 富b7+ 含a6 31 曾c7! 富hc8 32 富b5! wins. Or 29...富dg8 30 富b7+ 含a6 31 曾c7 富c8 32 冨xa5+!) 30 冨a7+! 曾xa7 31 冨xa5+ 含xa5 32 曾xa7+ 含b4 33 曾b6+ 含a3 34 c5! and White's c-Pawn is dangerous.

28 ..

a4

Still playing with reckless abandon! Safer is 28... Wd6 to prevent Wf6.

 **營c5** 

30 **≅xh7!** 

•••

Now I decided to start playing for the win. On 30 豐g7 罩dg8! 31 罩b7+ 含a6 32 豐c7 罩c8! 33 豐g7 罩cg8! draws by a "perpetual check" on the Queen.

30 ...


≣df8!

Forcing what looks like a favorable ending.

| 31 | <b>豐xg6</b> | 罩xf1+ |
|----|-------------|-------|
| 32 | ı xf1       | 罩xh7  |
| 33 | <b>營xh7</b> | a3    |

Petrosian had been banking on the speed of this Pawn.

| 34 | h6         | a2   |
|----|------------|------|
| 35 | <b>豐g8</b> | a1=₩ |
| 36 | h7         | •••  |



PETROSIAN

Position after 36 h7

**FISCHER** 

36 ...

**幽d6?** 

In time-pressure, Petrosian overlooks 36... De2+ 37 &f2 Dxg3! and White has nothing better than to take a perpetual with 38 \bigwedge b8+.

A good last-ditch try. Curiously, the King will be safer in White's territory where it obtains shelter from the cluster of Pawns.

Right is 39 營h2! immediately, preventing Black's King from reaching safety behind the lines. If then 39...營f6 40 g5. Or 39...營a1 (39...營a2? 40 營xa2 公xa2 41 營a8! wins a piece) 40 營g7 wins the e-Pawn. Finally on 39...營a67 40 營a8 renews the attack.

39 ... ≌ae7


Forced, to defend against the threat of \mathbb{\mathbb{W}}\text{xe5+.}

Not 39... 響xf8 40 響xf8+ 含b6 41 響b4+ 含a6 (if 41... 含c7 42 響e7+) 42 響a3+ 含b7 43 響xa7+ 含xa7 44 g5 and queens.

40 **營a8** ...

I thought this was it! The two Queens are closing in for the kill.

Slippery as an eel!



**PETROSIAN** 

Position after 41...\$b3!

FISCHER

Now White sealed. It's fantastically complicated!

The tournament bulletins suggest 42 c5 營xc5 (if 42...營g6 43 Qe2! 營gg5 44 Qd1+!) 43 營g8+ 含a3 44 營c2 營b4 45 營a8+ 營a4 (not 45...公a4? 46 營c1+ 含a2 47 營g8+ 營b3 48 營c2+! wins) 46 營cxa4+ 公xa4 47 營xc6 "with good winning chances," but after 47...公c3 it's likely Black can draw.

42 響a1

After the game a kibitzer asked Petrosian if he thought 42 c5 would have won for White. Petrosian, who must have analyzed it for many hours (not knowing, of course, what my sealed move was), simply replied: "I don't know."

42 ... **₩a3** 

The only move to stop mate on b2.


Now White has to try to make do with the g-Pawn.

On 45 營xc6 公d1!

45 ... **\$b3** 

Not 45... ②d1 46 Wc1+ ②b2 and the Knight is stranded out-of-play. The text renews the threat of ... ②d1.

A gross oversight, but probably best anyway! White can't win anymore. If 47 g5 \bulletharpoonup h4, etc.



Having overlooked Petrosian's last move, I was somewhat shaken! Not 48 dxe4? ②xe4+ 49 當h4 ②xd2 50 g5 ②xf1 51 g6 d3 wins. Also on 48 營d1+? (48 營xc3+? dxc3 49 dxe4 c2 wins) 48...②xd1 49 dxe4 ②e3 50 鱼e2 ②xc4 51 g5 ②d6 52 g6 ②e8 and Black again wins.

The right retort, however, is 48 g5! and it's still a hard fight.

I offered a draw, afraid that he wouldn't accept. Black certainly has the edge now. If 49 g5 e4! Or if 49 单g2 營h6.

After having fought so hard for the draw, however, Petrosian was obviously unprepared to readjust his frame of mind and start playing for a win. So...

Drawn

# 17 Fischer - Tal [U.S.S.R.]

### CANDIDATES' TOURNAMENT 1959 SICILIAN DEFENSE

### A very near miss

This is one of the four games that Fischer lost to Tal who, in winning this tournament, earned the right to meet and trounce Botvinnik for the world championship.

In jest the whimsical Tal signed Fischer's name, in addition to his own, when asked for an autograph. "Why not?" he quipped; "I've beaten Bobby so often ... that gives me the right to sign for him!"

A careful reading of Fischer's notes will reveal a clear echo of the strong emotions that engulfed him during this tense encounter. He misses a win in the opening and several draws along the way, demonstrating dramatically how a continuously advantageous position can abruptly be turned into defeat by seemingly insignificant miscalculations.

| 1        | e4          | c5        |
|----------|-------------|-----------|
| 2        | <b>2</b> 13 | d6        |
| <i>3</i> | d4          | cxd4      |
| 4        | €xd4        | <b>16</b> |
| 5        | ©c3         | <b>a6</b> |
| 6        | ≜c4         | ***       |

We had some excellent results with this. See also games 55 and 58.

I had no better luck against Blackstone, in an exhibition game at Davis, California, 1964, with 7 0-0 皇e7 8 皇b3 豐c7 9 f4 b5 10 f5 b4 11 fxe6!? (11 ②ce2 e5 12 ②f3 皇b7 is bad for White) 11...bxc3 12 exf7+ 當f8 13 皇g5 ②g4! and Black should win.

This reaction must be prompt!

In our first lap game here Tal played the weaker 7... 全67? 8 f4 0-0 (for 8...b5 see the note to Black's 8th move) 9 当 3 当c7 and now 10 f5! (instead of 10 0-0? b5 11 f5 b4! 12 ②a4 e5 13 ②e2 全b7 and Black stands better) 10...e5 (not 10...②c6 11 全e3 with a bind) 11 ②de2 b5 12 a3 全b7 13 g4 with a strong attack.

8 **f4!?** 

Against Olafsson, at Buenos Aires 1960, I continued 8 0-0 2e7 (if 8...b4 9 20a4 20xe4 10 2e1 20f6 11 2g5 with attack) 9 2f3!? 2e7 (not 9...2b7? 10 20xe6!) 10 2e3 b4 11 20ce2 g6 12 c3? (12 26h6! is very strong) 12...20xe4 13 2e3 20f6 14 cxb4 0-0= with a double-edged position.

R.Byrne-Evans, US Championship 1967 went 8 營f3, but White got nothing after 8...食b7 9 食g5 b4 10 ②a4 ②bd7 11 0-0 營a5 12 食xf6 ②xf6 13 罩fe1 兔e7.

8 ... **b4**!

Indirectly undermining White's center.

9 🖏 a4 🗒 xe4

9... \$b7 is also playable.

10 **0-0 g6?** 

Correct is 10... \(\mathbb{b}\) 57.


11 **f5!** ...

This riposte caught Tal completely unaware. Black's King, trapped in the center, will soon be subject to mayhem.

11 ... gxf5

12 €\xf5! ...

Panov, with typical iron curtain "objectivity" commented in the Soviet tournament bulletins: "Almost all game Fischer played in Tal style. But all his trouble was in vain because Tal did not defend in Fischer style – instead he found the one and only saving counterchance!"



TAL

Position after 12 2xf5!

**FISCHER** 

12 ...

ℤg8

Woozy, Tal stumbles into a dubious defense. Better is 12...d5 (not 12...exf5? 13 營d5 罩a7 14 營d4 spearing a Rook) 13 公h6 拿xh6 14 拿xh6.

13 皇d5!

A shot!

13 ..

罩a7

"13...exd5 14 營xd5 夏xf5 15 冨xf5 冨a7 16 營xe4+ 冨e7 17 營xb4 冨e2 18 夏g5! 冨xg5 19 冨xg5 營xg5 20 營xb8+ wins." (PANOV.)

14 **Qxe4**?

Correct is 14 皇e3! ②c5 15 營h5! 罩g6 (if 15...②xa4 16 皇xa7 exd5 17 罩ae1+) 16 罩ae1! and White's every piece is bearing down on Black's King (KEVITZ).

14 ... exf5

Probably it's better to avoid exchanges with 15 \(\ddots\) d5 or 15 \(\ddots\) f3.

15 ... \( \begin{align\*} \begin{alig

A unique way of shielding the e-file.

| 16 | <u></u> \$xc8  | ₩xc8 |
|----|----------------|------|
| 17 | <u></u> \$£f4? |      |

The right move is simply 17 c3! (not 17 營xd6? 宣xg2+ 18 含xg2 宣e2+ 19 含f3 鱼xd6 20 含xe2 營xc2+ wins) and if 17...營c6 18 宣f2.


Such a surprise that I didn't dare believe my eyes! I had expected 18... 營xf3 19 罩xf3 罩e2 20 罩f2 罩xf2 21 含xf2 and White has a slight edge after a3 because of Black's disconnected Pawns.

Tal finds an inspired defense.

White remains a clear Pawn ahead after 20... 響xf3 21 罩xf3 臭g7 22 c3.

TAL





Position after 21...₩xb8

**FISCHER** 

The crowd was shouting and whistling with each move. Later I was informed that many sport fans were in the audience. Maybe some soccer match had been canceled. As a consequence chess was the main attraction that day in Belgrade.

Many annotators believed that 22 国ae1 was the winning move. Tal himself confessed he thought Black was lost after that. But 22...堂d8! holds in all lines (not 22...国g6? 23 營xf7+ 堂d7 24 国d1+! 国d6 25 国xd6+ 堂xd6 26 国f6+! wins). I've studied this position for ages, it


seems, and the best I can find is 23 国d1+ 含c7! (23...含c8? 24 營c6+ wins) 24 營f4+ (if 24 国d4 營b7!) 24...含b7 25 国d6 營c7 26 營xb4+ 含c8 27 国xa6 營b7! 28 營xb7+ 含xb7 29 国af6 国g7=.

22 ... **Zd7**23 **Zae1**+ ...

23 ... <u>\$e7</u>

Finally Tal "develops" his Bishop. Not 23...當d8 24 罩xf7! 鼻e7 25 罩fxe7 罩xe7 26 罩d1+ wins.

I thought he had to go to g7, whereupon 26 \wind xd7 wins easily.



TAL

Position after 25...\&f8!

FISCHER

26 **營xd7** 

Not 26 罩f1+ 含g7 27 罩f7+ 含h8 and if 28 營xd7 罩d8 29 營g4 營e5 wins.

Within a handful of moves the game has changed its complexion. Now it is White who must fight for the draw!

28 c3! ...

Black's extra piece means less with each Pawn that's exchanged.

On 28...bxc3 29 營c8+ 拿d8 30 營xc3=.

On the wrong track. Right is 29 cxb4! \widetilde{\text{w}}\text{tb4} (if 29...\text{axb4} 30 \text{ a3! bxa3} 31 \text{ bxa3} \widetilde{\text{w}}\text{xa3} \text{ draws}) 30 \widetilde{\text{w}}\text{f3+} \widetilde{\text{cg}}\text{7} 31 \widetilde{\text{w}}\text{e2} \text{ draws, since Black can't possibly build up a winning K-side attack and his own King is too exposed.

On 31... \widetilde{\text{w}} xb4 32 \widetilde{\text{w}}e2 White should draw with best play.

Creating losing chances. I don't see how Black can make any progress after 32 營e4. If 32...食c7 33 營e7+ 含g8 34 營e8+ 營f8 35 營e4, etc.

| 32 | •••                                   | <b>≝c6</b> +                          |
|----|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 33 | ≅e4                                   | <b>豐xc4</b>                           |
| 34 | \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ | \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ |

I overlooked this. Now Black has winning chances. I had planned on a draw after 34...食e7? 35 a3! dissolving Black's b-Pawn (35...b3 is answered by 36 罩c7 followed by 罩b7).


| 35 | <b>\$g2</b> | <b>\$</b> f6 |
|----|-------------|--------------|
| 36 | <b>\$13</b> | 'de5         |
| 37 | \$e3        | •••          |

37 a3 is met, as always, by ...b3. Once White can eliminate Black's b-Pawn it's a theoretical draw.

| 37 | •••        | <u> </u>     |
|----|------------|--------------|
| 38 | \$e2       | <b>\$</b> d5 |
| 39 | <b>Ġd3</b> | <b>≜</b> f6  |

White might be able to draw this ending, but it's an ugly defensive chore.

Too passive. I wanted to avoid immobilizing my Q-side Pawns with 40 b3, but it's the best hope now. On 40... \$e7 41 \$\mathbb{Z}\$d4+ preserves drawing chances.



TAL

Position after 40 \(\subseteq c2\)?

FISCHER

| 40 | ***        | <b>皇e5</b>  |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 41 | ≌e2        | <b>罩f6</b>  |
| 42 | ℤc2        | <b>≝f3+</b> |
| 43 | Ġe2        | <b></b> If7 |
| 44 | <b>Ġd3</b> | <b>≜d4!</b> |

Little by little Tal inches his way in.

45 a3

On 45 b3 \( \begin{aligned} & \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned} &

45 **b**3 46 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c8

Equally hopeless is 46 罩e2 (or 46 罩d2 罩f3+ 47 含e2 罩f2+) 46...罩f3+ 47 曾d2 真xb2, etc.

| 46 | •••           | ≗xb2         |
|----|---------------|--------------|
| 47 | <b>ℤd8</b> +  | <b>∲c6</b>   |
| 48 | <b>ℤb8</b>    | <b>罩f3</b> + |
| 49 | <b>\$c4</b>   | <b>ℤc3</b> + |
| 50 | ġb4           | Ġc7          |
| 51 | <b>罩b5</b>    | <b>≜a1</b>   |
| 52 | a4            | b2!          |
|    | White resigns |              |

If 53 曾xc3 b1=營+!

The discovered-check theme is strangely reminiscent of the finale of game 31.

# 18 Spassky [U.S.S.R.] - Fischer

MAR DEL PLATA 1960 KING'S GAMBIT

### Old wine in a new bottle

Here is the second of the three losses contained in this volume. As in the previous example, Fischer misses a win by inches. Deviating from his cherished Sicilian, he enables Spassky to employ the King's Gambit — not quite believing he would. Spassky is one of the few Grandmasters who still does so in competition. Fischer promptly wins a Pawn and hangs on to it, but neglects to steer for a highly favorable ending (23... \wightarrow\textit{g3}). Just four moves later, 27 \widetilde{\mathbb{E}}e5! effects his undoing.

Undaunted by this early setback, Fischer scored  $12\frac{1}{2}$  out of his last 13, pulling neck and neck with Spassky for first.

| 1 | e4          | <b>e</b> 5 |
|---|-------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>f4</b>   | exf4       |
| 3 | <b>2</b> f3 | <b>g</b> 5 |

This loss spurred me to look for a "refutation" of the King's Gambit, which I published in the *American Chess Quarterly*, Vol. 1 (1961), No. 1. The right move is 3...d6!

4 h4 ...

The only realistic try for any advantage. There is no longer anything "romantic" about the Muzio Gambit, which has been analyzed to a draw after 4 **a**c4 g4 5 0-0 (if 5 包e5 營h4+ 6 含f1 包c6!) 5...gxf3 6 營xf3 營f6, etc.


4 ... g4 5 ②e5 ②f6

On 5...h5 6 &c4 罩h7 7 d4 d6 8 ②d3 f3 9 gxf3 &e7 10 &e3 &xh4+11 &d2 &g5 12 f4 &h6 13 ②c3 White has more than enough compensation for the Pawn. This is vintage analysis.

#### 6 **d4**

On 6 &c4 d5 7 exd5 &g7 (the old 7... &d6 is also adequate) is the modern panacea. And on 6 2xg4 2xe4 7 d3 2g3 8 &xf4 2xh1 9 e2+ (9 &g5 &e7 10 e2 h5 11 e5 f6! 12 2xf6+ \$f7 wins – Steinitz) 9... e7 10 2f6+ \$d8 11 &xc7+ \$xc7 12 2d5+ \$d8 13 2xe7 &xe7 and Black should win. Morphy-Anderssen, Paris 1858.

| 6 | ***          | d6       |
|---|--------------|----------|
| 7 | <b>≨</b> ∆d3 | ∑xe4     |
| 8 | &xf4         | <u> </u> |



#### **FISCHER**

Position after 8...\$g7

SPASSKY

9 ₽c3?

After this White has no compensation for the Pawn. Better is 9 c3 We7 10 We2 &f5. At least White keeps a grip on his f4 – for what that's worth.

> 9 ... ⟨∆xc3 10 bxc3 c5

Immediately nibbling at White's center. Keres gives 10...0-0 first.

On 11 We2+ 2e6 (12 d5? 2xc3+).

It doesn't pay to be greedy with 12...h5. After 13 皇g5 f6 14 皇c1 followed by 包f4 Black's K-side is all messed up.

| 13 | <u></u> <u></u> âxg4 | 0-0  |
|----|----------------------|------|
| 14 | ≜xc8                 | ≅xc8 |
| 15 | ₩g4                  | f5   |

Winning a second Pawn, but creating a K-side weakness. Simply 15...\$\dot\dot\beta\$h8 is stronger.

Black snatches the initiative after 17 臭xd6 罩f6 18 臭f4 罩g6.


Also good is 17... 營d7 18 盒xd6 罩fe8 and if 19 公c5 營f7 (KMOCH).

More accurate is 18 &xd6 罩f6 (if 18... 罩g8 19 ②e5!) 19 &e5 ②xe5 20 ②xe5 with a little play left for White.

On 18...d5 19 ©c5 creates problems.

Now White's h-Pawn must fall.

What else? On 22 營xf5 (not 22 罩f4? 鼻d6 or 22 營f4? 罩g4) 22...營xh4+ 23 含g1 營g4 forces a favorable exchange of Queens (if 24 營f2 鼻d6 produces a strong attack).



**FISCHER** 

Position after 23 \$\displays1\$

SPASSKY

23 ...

**豐g4?** 

Drifting. Not realizing the danger, I thought Black could whip up an attack along the g-file. But correct is 23... \$\mathbb{Z}g3!\$ 24 \$\mathbb{Z}xg3\$ (if 24 \$\mathbb{Z}e2\$) \$\dark d6\$) 24... \$\mathbb{Z}xg3\$ (threatening 25... \$\mathbb{Z}xd3\$ followed by ...c2) and White, a Pawn down, has a tough ending to hold – as Spassky pointed out in our post-mortem analysis.

24 罩f2

Threatening ... \$h4.

25 **ℤe4** 

**豐g5** 

I started to feel uncomfortable, but little did I imagine that Black's game would collapse in four short moves! I should have taken a draw by repetition with 25...營d1+ 26 臺e1 營g4 27 臺e4 營d1+, etc. And if 28 含h2 臺c6 29 營b8+ 臺g8 30 營e5+ 臺g7.

26 營d4!

0 ga4: ...


This powerful centralization completely paralyzes Black.

26 ...

**罩f8?** 

#### 27 **≌e5!**

I had reckoned on 27 ②e5? 基xf2 28 豐xf2 奠c5! 29 豐xc5 豐xg2 mate.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 27 \( \mathbb{Z} e5! \)

SPASSKY

Incredibly, Black must lose a piece. While trying to figure out what was going on in Spassky's head, I blundered and lost the game!

27 ...

ãd8

Trying to squirm out! The Queen has no shelter. On 27... 当g6 28 罩xe7 wins. Or 27... 当h4 28 罩xf8+. Or 27... 全f6 28 当d6!

28 **營e4** 

₩h4

I knew I was losing a piece, but just couldn't believe it. I had to play one more move to see if it was really true!

29 **If4** 

Black resigns

On 29... 灣g3 30 罩xe7 is most efficient.

# 19 Gudmundsson [Iceland] - Fischer

### REYKJAVIK 1960

GRUENFELD DEFENSE

### A long voyage home

Illustrating, rather subtly, how a weaker player may be lured to his own destruction, Fischer entices his opponent to abandon his passive though solid attempts to settle for a draw. Wrongly convinced that he holds an advantage, Gudmundsson, with 16 e4, gives Fischer the opportunity to launch a long, unclear sacrificial combination. Gudmundsson makes matters unexpectedly easy with 24 \( \mathbb{I} \) but the analysis accompanying the text shows the sacrifice to be sound in all variations. Fischer's performance from here on is typical in its clarity and forcefulness.

1 d4 ∅f6 2 ∅f3 ...

Solid but passive.

2 ... d5 3 e3 ...

Voluntarily locking in the Bishop lacks energy and reduces White's options.

3 ... g6 4 c4 ...

4 c3 would lead to the Colle System.

After 6 \( \mathrevere\*e2 c5! \) it's difficult for White to equalize:

A] 7 0-0? cxd4 8 \( \Omega xd4 \( \Omega c6 \) 9 cxd5 \( \Omega xd5 \) 10 \( \Omega xd5 \) \( \Wardstar xd5 \) 11 \( \mathrevere\*e3 f3 \)

"dc4 12 ②xc6 bxc6 and Black stands better. Aaron-Gligorich, Stockholm 1962.

B] 7 cxd5 ②xd5 8 ¥b3 ②xc3 9 bxc3 ¥c7 10 0-0 b6 11 a4 ②c6 again Black's better. Goglidze-Botvinnik, Moscow 1935.

c] 7 dxc5 營a5 8 cxd5 (if 8 0-0 dxc4 9 鱼xc4 營xc5) 8...公xd5 9 營xd5 鱼xc3+ 10 鱼d2 (after 10 含f1 鱼g7 11 鱼d2 營c7 Black regains his Pawn at will, with a strong attack) 10... 區d8! 11 鱼xc3 營xc3+ 12 bxc3 區xd5 with the superior ending (if 13 區d1 區xc5 14 區d8+ 含g7 15 0-0 ②c6 16 區e8 b6).

6 ... e6

Another good build-up is 6...c6 followed by ...e6, ...b6, ...\delta b7, ...\delta bd7, ...c5, etc.


7 **鱼e2 ②c6** 8 **豐c2** ...

Probably best (Black threatened ... 2a5 winning the two Bishops). As Evans pointed out in *Trophy Chess* (in an analogous position): "8 cxd5 exd5 permits Black to solve the problem of his QB. He has the semiopen e-file and good squares for his pieces. It is now White who must fight for equality!"

Also good is 10 ②xe5 (if 10 d5? ②a5) 10...②xe5 11 dxe5 ②g4 12 e6! (not 12 f4? ②xe5! 13 fxe5? 營h4+ 14 g3 營xc4, etc.) 12...②xe6 13 ③xe6 fxe6 14 0-0=.

10 ...

回g4



**FISCHER** 

Position after 10... 2g4

**GUDMUNDSSON** 

#### *11* **0-0**

Stronger is 11 e6!  $2 \times 6$  12  $2 \times 6$  fxe6 13 0-0 (13  $2 \times 6$  9 ce5! 14  $2 \times 6$  2  $2 \times 6$  16  $2 \times 6$  16  $2 \times 6$  17  $2 \times 6$  2 ce5! 14  $2 \times 6$  2 ce5! 15  $2 \times 6$  2 ce5! 16  $2 \times 6$  2 ce5! 17  $2 \times 6$  2 ce5! 17  $2 \times 6$  2 ce5! 18 ce6 2 ce7 2 ce7

| 11 | •••  | ©cxe5 |
|----|------|-------|
| 12 | ②xe5 | ②xe5  |
| 13 | ı⊈e2 | c6    |


The chances are now equal.

14 **f4** 

Apparently stronger is 14 e4 but after 14...  $ext{@h4!}$  15 h3 (if 15 f4  $ext{@g4}$ ) 15...g5! 16 f4 (or 16  $ext{@d1}$  f5 17 f4  $ext{@g6}$  18 fxg5 f4!) 16...gxf4 17  $ext{@xf4}$  (on 17  $ext{@xf4}$   $ext{@g3}$ ) 17...  $ext{@h8}$  gives Black good prospects along the ventilated g-file.

| 14 | ••• | ⊕g4!         |
|----|-----|--------------|
| 15 | h3  | <b>≜</b> f5! |

White was doubtlessly expecting 15... 46 f6 16 e4 with an ideal center.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 15...\$f5!

**GUDMUNDSSON** 

16 e4?

Provoking a powerful combination.

White should abandon his hopes in the center and settle for 16 數b3 ②f6 17 劉xb7 ②e4! 18 劉xc6 ②c8 19 劉a6 ②xc3 20 bxc3 ②xc3

21 鱼a3 鱼xa1 22 鱼xf8 鱼d4! 23 exd4 營xd4+ 24 含h1 含xf8. Black is better, but White has excellent drawing chances.

| 16 | •••        | <b>營d4</b> + |
|----|------------|--------------|
| 17 | <b>≌h1</b> | <b>约f2</b> + |
| 18 | 罩xf2       | •••          |


All forced. Not 18 曾h2 约xe4.

| 18 | •••  | <b>豐xf2</b> |
|----|------|-------------|
| 19 | exf5 | ≜xc3!       |

This clean-cut line reduces White's options. Inexact would be 19... 宣fe8 20 包e4! 營e1+ 21 含h2 gxf5 (if 21... 食d4 22 兔e3! 營xa1 23 兔xd4) 22 包g3 and if 22... 食d4? 23 兔e3!

| 20 | bxc3        | ≅ae8         |
|----|-------------|--------------|
| 21 | <b>≜</b> d3 | 罩e1+         |
| 22 | <b>Ġh2</b>  | <b>幽g1</b> + |
| 23 | <b>Ġ</b> g3 | <b>ℤfe8</b>  |

Just as complicated is 23...gxf5 24 食xf5 罩fe8 25 食xh7+ 含g7 26 營f5, etc.



FISCHER

Position after 23... Ife8

GUDMUNSSON

24 \( \beta \) b1?

Also bad is 24 \(\extrm{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\til\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\t

A] 25 兔xg6? 罩1e2! (not 25... 罩8e2 26 兔xf7+ 含h8 27 營t5 罩xg2+28 含h4 營f2+29 含h5 營f3+30 含h6! and White wins!) 26 兔xf7+ 含h8

27 營f5 罩xg2+ 28 含h4 營e1+ 29 含h5 含g7! (threatening 30... 罩h8+) 30 食xe8 營xe8+ 31 含h4 營d8+ 32 營g5+ 罩xg5 33 fxg5 營d1 with an easy win.

B] 25 罩b1 罩8e3+! 26 兔xe3 (if 26 會g4 營h2 27 兔xe3 leads to the same) 26... 罩xe3+ 27 會g4 (not 27 會h4? 營h2 28 營f2 罩xh3+!) 27... 營h2 28 營f2 (if 28 兔xg6 營g3+ 29 會h5 營xf4! 30 兔f5 罩g3! 31 兔g4 會g7 32 營c1 [if 32 會h4 罩xg4+ 33 hxg4 營h2+ mates] 32... 罩e3 wins), 28... 罩xd3 (if 28... 冨xh3!? 29 兔xg6! fxg6 30 冨h1! holds) 29 冨b2! (29 冨xb7 loses to 29... 冨xh3! 30 冨b8+ 會h7 31 f5 冨h6!) 29... 冨xc3 30 冨d2 and White has drawing chances even though a Pawn behind.

24 ... gxf5

Threatening either .... \$\delta\$h8 or .... \$\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \text{8e6} & \text{with a devastating check to} & \text{follow on the g-file.} & \end{aligned}\$

25 **ad2** ...

No better is 25 এxf5 罩1e2 26 鱼xh7+ 含h8 27 營f5 罩xg2+ 28 含h4 罩g7 (among others) wins.


 25
 ...
 黨xb1

 26
 灣xb1
 豐xb1

 27
 盒xb1
 黨e2

This is what Gudmundsson overlooked. If now 28 &c1 \( \mathbb{Z}e1 \) picks off one of the Bishops. So...

### White resigns



**FISCHER** 

Final Position after 27... Ze2

**GUDMUNDSSON** 

# 20 Fischer - Euwe [Holland]

# LEIPZIG OLYMPIC 1960 CARO-KANN DEFENSE

### Theoretical scuffle

Former world champion, Dr. Max Euwe had for decades been considered one of the world's leading authorities on opening theory. His Chess Archives ranks with Modern Chess Openings as an indispensable source of reference. It is no small wonder, then, when he selects a risky but playable variation. Fischer, however, just a little better versed in its intricacies, introduces a nuance on move 15 which ruffles his opponent no end.

Fischer's method of dispatching his veteran adversary — on home grounds, as it were — is deceptively simple. After a mere eighteen moves the opening has become an ending and the duel is over. Euwe fights on, but to no avail.

| 1 | e4   | <b>c6</b>  |
|---|------|------------|
| 2 | d4   | <b>d</b> 5 |
| 3 | exd5 | cxd5       |
| 4 | c4   | ***        |

At that time I was convinced the Panov-Botvinnik attack was the sharpest.

| 4 | ••• | <b>₫</b> f6 |
|---|-----|-------------|
| 5 | ©c3 | 9c6         |

In our game at Buenos Aires 1960, Ivkov played 5...e6 6 包含 267 7 c5 0-0 8 单d3 b6 9 b4 bxc5 (better is 9...a5 10 包a4 包fd7!) 10 bxc5 包c6 11 0-0 单d7 12 h3 包e8 13 单f4 with a bind.

6 **Df3** 

On Botvinnik's old 6 皇g5 e6! (6...dxc4? 7 d5 ②e5 8 營d4 is strong) 7 cxd5 exd5 8 皇xf6 營xf6 9 ②xd5 營d8 10 ②c3 (if 10 皇c4 皇e6 11 營e2? b5!) 10...營xd4 11 營xd4 ②xd4 12 0-0-0 皇c5 13 ②x4 ②c6—.

6 ... <u>\$g4!?</u>

Risky but playable. Safer is 6...e6.

| 7 | cxd5       | ②xd5      |
|---|------------|-----------|
| 8 | <b>營b3</b> | .⊈xf3     |
| 9 | gxf3       | <b>e6</b> |


On 9...②db4!? 10  $\hat{2}$ e3 ②xd4 11  $\hat{2}$ xd4 營xd4 12  $\hat{2}$ b5+ ②c6 13 0-0 White gets a strong attack. (Evans-Henin, Las Vegas Open 1965.)

| 10 | <b>營xb7</b>   | ②xd4       |
|----|---------------|------------|
| 11 | <b>≜b5</b> +  | ∅xb5       |
| 12 | <b>'</b> ₩c6+ | <b>⊈e7</b> |
| 13 | <b>豐xb5</b>   | ©xc3       |

An alternative is 13... 營d7 14 公xd5+ exd5 (14... 營xd5 15 營xd5 exd5 16 0-0 gives White good play against Black's isolated d-Pawn and a-Pawn) 15 營b4+ (15 營e2+ 含f6 16 h4 wins, according to Evans) 15... 含e8 16 營d4 with a clear advantage.

14 bxc3 營d7

After 14... 營d5 15 營xd5 exd5 16 罩b1 gives White a slight edge.



**EUWE** 

Position after 14... 響d7

**FISCHER** 

15 **罩b1!** 

The innovation. Months before the game I had shown this line to Benko and he suggested this innocent-looking move. Upon looking deeper I found that, horrible as White's Pawn structure may be, Black can't exploit it because he'll be unable to develop his K-side normally.

It's the little quirks like this that could make life difficult for a chess machine.

15 ... \(\begin{align\*}
\begin{align\*}
\text{\$\frac{1}{2}d8?}
\end{align\*}

Also difficult is 15...豐xb5 16 罩xb5 含d6! 17 罩b7 f6 18 含e2 含c6 19 罩f7 a5 20 含e3 with an enduring pull.


| 16 | ≜e3        | <b>豐xb5</b> |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 17 | ≅xb5       | <b>≝d7</b>  |
| 18 | <b>ġe2</b> | •••         |

18 \( \mathbb{Z}\) a5 is unnecessary. White can win the a-Pawn at his leisure.

18 ... f6
19 **Zd1!** ...

To swap Black's only active piece.

19 ... 罩xd1 20 掌xd1 掌d7 21 罩b8! ...



**EUWE** 

Position after 21 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 2b8! \end{aligned} \)

FISCHER


21 ... \\delta c6 \\ 22 \\delta xa7 \\ g5

Striving to untangle the K-side.

| 23 | a4           | <b>≜</b> g7 |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 24 | <b>≝</b> b6+ | <b>ġd5</b>  |
| 25 | <b>≝b7</b>   | <b>≜</b> f8 |
| 26 | ≌h8          | 9220        |

Still trying to decide how to squeeze the most out of it.

| 26 | ***           | <u> </u>     |
|----|---------------|--------------|
| 27 | 罩 <b>b</b> 5+ | <b>\$</b> c6 |
| 28 | <b>≝b6</b> +  | <b>\$</b> d5 |
| 29 | a5            | f5           |
| 30 | <b>≜b8!</b>   | ≌c8          |
| 31 | <b>a6</b>     | ≅xc3         |
| 32 | ≌b5+          | •••          |



**EUWE** 

Position after 32 罩b5+

FISCHER

*32* ... **ġc4** 

After the game Euwe showed me a cute trap he might have played for – and almost fainted when I fell into it! The line arises after 32...\$\div c6\$ 33 \$\overline{a}\$a5 \$\div d4\$ and he asked, "What do you do now?" I looked a few seconds and played 34 \$\div e5\$? whereupon he uncorked 34...\$\overline{a}\$c5! which leads to a draw. Upon reconsideration, however, simply 34 \$\div e2\$ wins. It's these tidbits that you remember best.

| 33 | <b>≝b7</b> | <b>≜d4</b>    |
|----|------------|---------------|
| 34 | 罩c7+       | <b>\$</b> d3  |
| 35 | ≅xc3+      | 'exc3         |
| 36 | <b>≜e5</b> | Black resigns |

He can't stop the a-Pawn.

## 21 Letelier [Chile] - Fischer

#### LEIPZIG OLYMPIC 1960

KING'S INDIAN DEFENSE

### A Queen for the King

Letelier transgresses opening principles by neglecting his development in order to win material. Pugnaciously, he mixes it up with the unorthodox 5 e5 and proceeds to snatch Pawns. But his judgment proves to be unwise.

Striking from behind the lines, Fischer causes the overextended White center to crumble. Letelier, busily engaged on a material hunt, neglects to safeguard his rear, leaving his King marooned in the center. Fischer rapidly encircles the hapless monarch and, with a startling Queen sacrifice, induces abdication.

| 1 | <b>d4</b>  | <b>€</b> )f6 |
|---|------------|--------------|
| 2 | <b>c4</b>  | <b>g</b> 6   |
| 3 | <b>©c3</b> | <b>≜g7</b>   |
| 4 | e4         | 0-0          |
| 5 | e5         | •••          |

Weak. Letelier snapped at the chance to take me "out of the book," but this premature advance leaves White with all the responsibility of holding his overextended center Pawns.

| 5 | ***       | <b>②e8</b> |
|---|-----------|------------|
| 6 | <b>f4</b> | <b>d6</b>  |

Weaker is 6...c5 7 dxc5 營a5 8 鱼e3 f6? 9 ⑤f3 fxe5 10 fxe5 ⑥c6 11 鱼e2 ⑥c7 12 0-0 ⑥e6 13 ⑥d5 營d8 14 營d2 etc. (Koralev-Roshal, USSR 1962.)

7 ... c5!

"Now the artificially constructed White center begins to crumble." (LOMBARDY.)

8 dxc5 \(\preceq \text{\pi} \c6

"Black rapidly develops his pieces while White nurtures his own dreams with ill-gotten gains." (LOMBARDY.)


9 cxd6 ...

White tries to compensate for his lack of development by continuing to snatch material. Instead he should be seeking to return the Pawn in the least damaging way (by keeping the lines closed). Better is 9 2f3 2g4 10 2e2.

9 ... exd6
10 ②e4 ...

"More realistic would have been 10 \$\omega\$f3." (LOMBARDY.) I intended 10...\$\omega\$g4. After the text White no longer has time to castle.

10 ... \$f5!



FISCHER

Position after 10...\$f5!

LETELIER

11 **如g3?** ...

A better chance is  $11 \, \bigcirc xd6 \, \bigcirc xd6 \, 12 \, \bigcirc xd6 \, \bigcirc xd6 \, 2xd6 \, 2x$ 

11 ... <u>\$e6</u>

I also considered 11... 營c7 12 公xf5 gxf5. White's center must collapse.

12 **Df3** ...

By now White is more than willing to return the Pawn in order to catch up in development.

12 ... **些c7** 


Also playable is 12...dxe5 13 營xd8 罩xd8 14 兔c5 exf4. But I wanted to fracture him in the middle game.

13 **營b1** ...

Continuing his "attack". On 13 & e2 dxe5 14 & c5 營a5+ 15 b4 ②xb4 16 & xf8 含xf8! 17 0-0 exf4 18 ②e4 & f5 is overwhelming. And on 13 營c2 (in order to prepare 0-0-0) 13...dxe5 14 f5 gxf5 15 ②xf5 ②b4 16 營b3 (if 16 營b1 & xf5 17 營xf5 ②d6 18 營b1 ②xc4 19 ②g5 f5 20 ②e6 營c6 21 & xc4 營xc4 22 ②xf8 黨xf8 with a winning attack) 16... & xf5 17 營xb4 ②f6! is strong. If 18 營c5 營b8 (threatening ... ②g4).

13 ... dxe5 14 f5 e4!

"An unexpected shot that sends White spinning." (LOMBARDY.)



FISCHER

Position after 14...e4!

LETELIER

On 15 wxe4 gxf5! 16 axf5? (if 16 wh4 &xb2) 16...wa5+ wins a piece.

| 15 | •••  |      | exf3 |
|----|------|------|------|
| 16 | gxf3 | 3.57 | f5!  |


"The Pawn on e6 can be ignored in favor of the attack." (LOMBARDY.) The threat is ...f4.

| 17 | f4         | €2f6 |
|----|------------|------|
| 18 | ≜e2        | ≅fe8 |
| 19 | <b>∲f2</b> | ℤxe6 |

Finally Black regains the Pawn with interest.

"Anyone interested in sui-mate (helpmate) problems?" (LOMBARDY.)

| 21 | ***           | ≅xe3!  |
|----|---------------|--------|
| 22 | ℤxe3          | ≅xe3   |
| 23 | 'de xe3       | ₩xf4+! |
|    | White resigns |        |



**FISCHER** 

Final Position after 23... \wxf4+!

LETELIER

On 24 含xf4 息h6 mate! Or 24 含f2 ②g4+ 25 含g2 ②e3+ 26 含f2 ②d4 27 營h1 ②g4+ 28 含f1 ②xf3 with a winning attack.

# 22 Szabo [Hungary] - Fischer

#### LEIPZIG OLYMPIC 1960

#### KING'S INDIAN DEFENSE

### Bad judgment

Once a contender for the title, Szabo's performances nowadays are spotty and unpredictable. Here, with breathtaking bluntness, he attempts to wipe Fischer from the board. In the process he leaves himself wide open on the dark squares. Fischer promptly invades on the Q-side, by means of a curious Queen maneuver, while Szabo, preoccupied with his own K-side attack, fails to realize the danger in time. 21...\(\mathbb{Z}\)e3! is the blow that ends all effective resistance. Rather than fight on against hopeless odds, Szabo resigns three moves later.

| 1 | d4         | <b>₫</b> 16         |
|---|------------|---------------------|
| 2 | c4         | <b>g</b> 6          |
| 3 | <b>©c3</b> | <u></u> <b>≜</b> g7 |
| 4 | e4         | 0-0                 |
| 5 | <u> </u>   | •••                 |

For 5 e5 see game 21. For 5 \$\angle\$13 see games 7, 28 and 30.

5 ... d6

After 5...h6 6 \( \)e3! allows White to set up a Saemisch formation (6...d6 7 f3) where the inevitable \( \)edd d2 will be more effective than usual.

6 **₩d2** ...

Better is simply 6 \( \) e2 c5 7 d5 e6 8 \( \) f3 h6 9 \( \) h4 exd5 10 cxd5 g5 11 \( \) g3 \( \) h5 (not 11...b5? 12 \( \) d2!) with a double-edged struggle. Larsen-Fischer, Santa Monica 1966.


6 ... c5! 7 d5 ...

On 7 ②f3 (7 dxc5 dxc5 8 豐xd8 罩xd8 9 e5 ②g4 10 f4 f6 is better for Black) 7...cxd4 8 ②xd4 ②c6=.

7 ... e6 8 &d3 ...

8 dxe6 &xe6 9 包f3 包c6 10 &e2 &g4! 11 0-0 罩e8 12 營f4 &xf3 13 &xf3 包d4 14 罩ad1 罩e5 leads to equality. (Evans-Gligorich, Dallas 1957.)

8 ... exd5



FISCHER

Position after 8...exd5

**SZABO** 

White has no advantageous way to recapture.

9 ②xd5 ...

A] 9 exd5 ②bd7 10 f4 (to stop ...②e5) 10...h6 11 皇h4 罩e8+ 12 ②ge2 ②e4! 13 皇xd8 ②xd2 14 皇c7 皇xc3 15 bxc3 ②e4 16 皇xe4 罩xe4 17 皇xd6 ②b6 18 當f2 皇g4! with a promising ending.

B] 9 cxd5 a6! 10 f4 (if 10 a4 營a5 threatening ...b5) 10...h6 11 息h4 ②xe4! 12 息xd8 ②xd2 13 息c7 息xc3 14 bxc3 ②e4! 15 鱼xe4 罩e8 etc.

In this opening variation Black must play sharply. White has a space advantage, but he temporarily lags in development.

9 ... <u>≜</u>e6
10 **△**e2 **≜**xd5

Releasing the tension and, by forcing White to recapture with a Pawn, eliminating the backward d-Pawn on an open file.


11 exd5

On 11 cxd5 c4! 12 &c2 \( \frac{1}{2}\) bd7 13 0-0 \( \frac{1}{2}\) c5 14 \( \frac{1}{2}\) c3 b5!

11 ... △bd7
12 0-0 ...

Not 12 f4 營e8! 13 營c2? (to stop ... 包e4) 13... 包g4! invading on the weak dark squares (notably e3).

12 ...



FISCHER

Position after 12... De5

2e5

**SZABO** 

*13* **f4?** 

After 13 2 c3 the game is even.

This lemon, weakening White's e3 and e4, came as a pleasant surprise. Szabo misjudges White's attacking prospects.


| 13 | •••         | ②xd3       |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 14 | <b>營xd3</b> | h6         |
| 15 | <b>≜h4</b>  | <b>ℤe8</b> |
| 16 | <b></b> ae1 | •••        |

16 ②c3 is the best of a bad choice, though 16...營b6! (threatening ...⑤g4) creates problems. If 17 h3 ②h5! increases the pressure on White's game.

16 ... **豐b6!** 17 **食xf6** ... On 17 b3 2e4! gives Black a nice bind.

| 17 | ***        | <b>≜xf6</b> |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 18 | f5         | <b>g</b> 5  |
| 19 | <b>b</b> 3 | ₩a5!        |

A nettlesome maneuver!



20 a4 loses to 20... Qd4+ 21 含h1 (not 21 公xd4? Exe1) 21... Ee3 22 習d1 Eae8 and the pin on the e-file is decisive.

The best defense is 20 營b1!

| 20 | ***           | <b>豐xa2</b> |
|----|---------------|-------------|
| 21 | ℤc2           | 罩e3!        |
| 22 | ₩xe3          | <b>營xc2</b> |
| 23 | <b>∲h1</b>    | a5          |
| 24 | h4            | <b>a4</b>   |
|    | White resigns |             |

White's Pawns fall like ripe apples. I'll never forget the disgusted look on Szabo's face as he took his King and just sort of shoved it gently to the center of the board, indicating his intention to resign.

## 23 Fischer - Tal [U.S.S.R.]

### LEIPZIG OLYMPIC 1960

FRENCH DEFENSE

### No holds barred

Their first encounter after Tal became world champion proves to be an old-fashioned slugfest. Typically aggressive, Fischer rapidly achieves a winning bind, but unwisely permits Tal to touch off "a dazzling array of fireworks" with 14... \*\(\Delta\)\text{xe5!} The struggle seesaws for seven moves before settling in a perpetual check.

The quality of this confrontation left little doubt that, in time, Fischer would yet take Tal's measure. He did just that less than a year later, after Tal had lost his return match with Botvinnik (Game 32). Reading Tal's palm, Fischer predicted: "The next world champion will be ... Bobby Fischer!"

| 1 | e4  | <b>e6</b> |
|---|-----|-----------|
| 2 | d4  | d5        |
| 3 | ©c3 | ₫b4       |
| 4 | e5  | c5        |
| 5 | a3  | Ձa5       |

A dubious alternative to 5...\$\documentum{1}{2}xc3+ (see game 24).

6 **b4!** 

Alekhine's recommendation.

6 ... cxd4

6...cxb4 7 5 b5 yields a potent attack.

7 **豐g4** ②e7

Or 7... \$\displays 18 8 bxa5 dxc3 9 a4! followed by 10 \$\displays a3+ is strong. (LILIENTHAL and ZAGORYANSKY)

8 bxa5 ...

Also good is 8 4b5.

8 ... dxc3 9 營xg7 罩g8 10 營xh7 公bc6

On 10... ②d7 11 ②f3 營c7 12 逸b5 a6 13 逸xd7+ 逸xd7 14 0-0 d4!? (Archives) 15 ②xd4 營xe5 16 營d3 is better for White.

11 **Df3** ...

11 f4 bolsters the center but shuts in the QB and weakens the dark squares.

11 ... **豐c**7

On 11... 響xa5 12 包g5! 置f8 13 f4 (followed by the advance of the h-Pawn) ties Black up.

12 **gb5!** ...

Harmoniously pursuing development without losing time. Also playable is 12 皇f4 皇d7 13 皇e2 0-0-0 14 營d3 營xa5 15 0-0 罩g4 16 皇g3. (Unzicker-Duckstein, Zurich 1959.)


12 ... **gd7** 

13 0-0 ...

Unsound is 13 &xc6? &xc6 14 0-0 d4! 15 ②g5 營xe5 16 營xf7+ 含d7 with advantage.

*13* ... 0-0-0

After the game Petrosian suggested 13...②xe5 but 14 ②xe5 營xe5 15 ②xd7+ 含xd7 16 營d3! keeps White on top (if 16...營e4? 17 營xe4 dxe4 18 f3! wins a Pawn).



TAL

Position after 13...0-0-0

FISCHER


14 **£g5**?

I simply underestimated the force of Tal's reply.

14 ...

5)xe5!

Setting off a dazzling array of fireworks! I thought Tal was merely trying to confuse the issue.



TAL

Position after 14 ... Dxe5!

**FISCHER** 

15 Dxe5

 国h8! Black regains his piece with greater activity: e.g., 18 国ae1 国xh7 19 国xe5 国xe7 and the compact center Pawns far outweigh White's passed h-Pawn.

Not playable is 15 &xe7? ②xf3+ 16 \$h1 單h8!

15 ...

≜xb5

Playing for the win. After 15...豐xe5 16 盒xe7 罩h8 17 罩fe1 (17 罩ae1? loses to 17...豐b8!) 17...豐xel+ 18 罩xel 罩xh7 19 盒xd8 含xd8 (weak is 19...盒xb5 20 盒f6!) 20 盒xd7 含xd7 21 罩e3! bails White out.

16 ②xf7

White could still have kept some tension with 16 Qxe7 營xe7 (if 16...營xe5? 17 罩fe1) 17 罩fe1, etc.


16 ...

≜xf1!

16... Idf8 17 Ifb1 全c6 18 Od6+! wxd6 19 wxe7 is about equal.

17 ②xd8

**■**xg5 **■**xg2+!



TAL

Position after 18... \(\mathbb{Z}xg2+!\)

**FISCHER** 

19 曾h1!

The saving move. Not 19 含xf1? 罩xh2! 20 營f7 (if 20 公xc7 罩xh7 wins a piece) 20... 罩h1+! produces a winning attack from nowhere!

19 ...

**幽e5** 

On 19... **世**c4 20 **世**xe7 **国**g8 21 **日**f4! holds nicely (if 21... **世**xf4? 22 **世**e6+ **e**c7 23 **世**xg8).

20 **罩xf1** 


**營xe6** 

21 \$\disp\xg2\$

₩g4+

### Drawn

Black has a perpetual check.



TAL

Final Position after 21... \#g4+

**FISCHER** 

# 24 Fischer - Darga [W.Germany]

**WEST BERLIN 1960** 

FRENCH DEFENSE

## Asking for trouble

The Winawer Variation has given Fischer consistent trouble. He has had the utmost difficulty cracking Black's tortoise-like shell; even his successes are unconvincing. Maintaining the same line of attack year after year has provided his opponents with ample opportunity to sharpen their defenses.


Darga's 12...f6 obliges Fischer, in order to get something out of the opening, to speculate on a Pawn sacrifice (13 \(\frac{1}{2}\) a3!?). Though Darga's reaction may not be ideal, he proceeds sensibly and equalizes. Underestimating Fischer's chances, however, he falls prey to a scintillating mid-game attack. And so, once again, by virtue of his native ability, Fischer avoids the retribution that is the usual price for failing to secure an advantage in the opening.

| 1 | e4         | e6             |
|---|------------|----------------|
| 2 | d4         | d5             |
| 3 | <b>②c3</b> | ₫b4            |
| 4 | e5         | c5             |
| 5 | a3         | <u>\$</u> xc3+ |

For 5... \( \) a5 see game 23.

| 6 | bxc3 | ②e7 |
|---|------|-----|
| 7 | a4   | *** |

Smyslov's favorite, largely responsible for Botvinnik's giving up the Winawer Variation. Sharper is 7 \(\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{W}}} \)g4. I felt that Black's carapace could be cracked only by positional means, but my results have been somewhat disheartening.



DARGA

Position after 7 a4

**FISCHER** 

7

**營c7** 

More usual is 7...②bc6 8 ②f3 豐a5 9 豐d2 (on 9 皇d2 皇d7 10 皇e2 c4 11 h4!? f6 12 h5 fxe5 13 h6 gxh6 14 ②xe5 ②xe5 15 dxe5 0-0-0 16 罩xh6 ②g6 Black's better, Fischer-Padevsky, Varna 1962) 9...皇d7 10 皇d3 and now Black has two main continuations:

B] 10...f6! 11 0-0 fxe5 12 axe5 (no better is 12 dxe5 as Smyslov tried against Uhlmann at Havana 1964) 12...axe5 13 dxe5 0-0 14 c4 axe2 15 axd2 axe6 (Fischer-Uhlmann, Stockholm 1962.)

I may yet be forced to admit that the Winawer is sound. But I doubt it! The defense is anti-positional and weakens the K-side.

8 **D**f3

**b6** 

The idea is to eliminate the bad Bishop with ... \(\hat{\matheta}\)a6. An alternative is 8... \(\hat{\matheta}\)d7 9 \(\hat{\matheta}\)d3 \(\alpha\)bc6.

9 **Qb5**+!

**≜d7** 

More radical is 9... \$\displaystyle{2}\$ f8!? 10 \$\displaystyle{2}\$ d3 \$\displaystyle{2}\$ a6.

On 9... Dec6 (after 9... Dbc6 Black can no longer enforce ... 2a6) 10 0-0 2a6 11 Dg5 h6 12 Dh3 is in White's favor.

After 10 0-0 \( \hat{2}\)xb5 11 axb5 a5 12 \( \hat{1}\)g5 h6 13 \( \hat{1}\)h3 \( \hat{1}\)d7 14 \( \hat{1}\)f4 0-0! (Ivkov-R.Byrne, Sousse 1967) Black has no problems.

10 ... ②bc6

Black has gained a tempo, but whether his Pawn belongs on b6 is moot.

11 0-0 c4

12 **åe2 f6**13 **åa3!?** ...

Keeping tension in the center at the cost of a Pawn. 13 \( \mathbb{Z} e1 \) is solid but less aggressive. I tried this same Pawn sac against Mednis in the 1962-3 US Championship with the slight but significant difference that Black's b-pawn was still on b7. The sac may well have been unsound in that game.

13 ... fxe5

Mednis declined and castled, but after 14 \( \mathbb{I} = 1! \) got a cramped game (14...fxe5 is answered by 15 \( \mathbb{I} \) xe5! keeping the e-file open).

14 dxe5 ...


White doesn't have anything to show after 14 ②xe5 ②xe5 15 dxe5 營xe5 16 罩e1 營xc3 17 兔h5+ g6 18 兔g4 (if 18 兔xe7 含xe7 19 營xd5? 營xa1! wins) 18...營f6, etc.

14 ... @xe5

After 14...0-0 15 🖾 d4! is followed by f4 and White has not been inveigled into misplacing his Rook on e1.

15 **□e1** ...

The threat is 16 ②xe5 豐xe5 17 皇h5+.



DARGA

Position after 15 Zel

**FISCHER** 

15 ...

€27c6

Black has a seeming multiplicity of defenses:

A] 15...②5c6 16 ②g5! 0-0! (if 16...h6 17 臭h5+ g6 18 ②xe6 臭xe6 19 罩xe6 gxh5 20 營xd5! 罩d8 21 營xh5+ 含d7 22 罩ae1 regains the piece) 17 臭g4 營f4! (if 17...e5 18 臭e6+ 含h8 19 臭xd5!) 18 臭xe6+! (if 18 ○xa6 營xf2+ 10 含h1 罩行!) 18...兔xa6 19 ②xa6 營xf2+ 20 含h1 罩f5! 21 罩e2! 營h4 22 ②d4! 罩h5 (not 22...②xd4? 23 臭xe7) 23 ②f3 營f6 24 營e1 罩e8 25 罩e6 營f7 26 營e2! 罩h6 27 罩e3 followed by 罩e1 and Black's crushed.

B] 15... 25g6 16 h4! (on 16 2g5 0-0! 17 2g4 16 holds) 16... 2c6 17 2g5 and it's difficult for Black's King to escape the crisscross; if 17...0-0-0? 18 2f7. Or 17...h6? 18 2xe6! 2xe6 19 2g4. Or on 17... 2f4 18 2g4 continues the pressure.

c] 15...包7g6 16 包xe5 包xe5 transposes to the game.

包xe5 约c6

On 17...包f7 (17...包g6? 18 f5) 18 **Qh5** g6 19 f5! 0-0-0 20 fxe6 **Qxe6** 21 **Zxe6** gxh5 22 **Wxh5** White stands much better.

18 **gg4** 

Better is the finesse 18 **\$\frac{1}{2}\$** \$\frac{1}{2}\$\$ \$\frac{1}

18 ... 19 **ê xe6** 

0 - 0 - 0

≜xe6

| 20 | <b>ℤxe6</b> | <b>≝d7</b> |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 21 | f5          | •••        |

To continue with f6 which gets a grip on the f-file. On 21 豐f3 ②d8 22 罩e5 豐c6=.

21 ... ②d8!

Driving the Rook from its command outpost on the sixth rank.

Darga is defending with vigor!

23 **Ef3 We4** 24 **a5!** ...


Commencing operations against the castled King while Black's Queen is temporarily cut off from the Q-flank.

24 ... ②c6?

Correct was 24...b5 with an even game.

25 axb6 axb6 26 ₩b1! \$\delta c7

The opening of the a-file is already decisive. On 26...堂b7 27 遠c5 wins. Or 26...堂b7 27 f6 gxf6 28 罩xf6 d4 29 營b5, etc



DARGA

Position after 26... \&c7

FISCHER

Problem: White to play and win.

27 **皇c1!** 

**警e1+** 

There's no satisfactory defense to the threat of 皇f4+. On 27... 包e5 28 皇f4 罩e8 29 營b5 penetrates decisively.

| 28 | <b>罩f1</b>    | <b>豐xc3</b>   |
|----|---------------|---------------|
| 29 | <u>\$</u> f4+ | <b>ġb7</b>    |
| 30 | <b>營b5!</b>   | Black resigns |

## **25** Lombardy [*u.s.A.*] - Fischer

### USA CHAMPIONSHIP 1960-1 SICILIAN DEFENSE

## When the Maroczy didn't bind

Geza Maroczy left a strange legacy: the discovery that a certain type of Pawn formation imposes a near-decisive cramp on the opponent. In this game, after Lombardy's sixth move, he obtains, with Fischer's consent, the dread "Maroczy bind." From here on, given a few developing moves, White's game almost plays itself — unless Black takes early and energetic counter-measures. This is easier said than done.

The method that Fischer chooses to free himself (9...d5) involves the sacrifice of a Pawn. Lombardy reacts sluggishly, overlooking a neat tactical point  $(17... \ h4+)$  at the tail-end of a combination. Even so, he still has excellent drawing chances. But somewhat discouraged by the rapid turn of events, he indulges in a unique form of self-immolation. In short, Lombardy, not Maroczy, lost.

| 1 | e4   | c5   |
|---|------|------|
| 2 | ©f3  | d6   |
| 3 | d4   | cxd4 |
| 4 | ©xd4 | €)f6 |
| 5 | f3   | •••  |

A passive, non-developing move which leads to nothing. White wants to gain control of d5, establishing a Maroczy bind with c4, 6c3 etc. But after going to all that trouble he can't prevent ...d5 after all. Correct is that tired old move -5 6c3.

5 ... Qc6

Sharper is 5...e5! 6 \( \Delta b5 + \) (6 \( \Delta b5 \) a6 7 \( \Delta 5c3 \) \( \Delta e6 8 \( \Delta d5 \) \( \Delta xd5 \)
9 exd5 \( \Delta f5 = \)) 6 .... \( \Delta bd7 7 \Delta f5 \) d5! 8 exd5 a6 9 \( \Delta xd7 + \Boxed xd7 + \Boxed xd7 \) 10 \( \Delta e3 \)
\( \Delta c5 \) 11 c4 b5=. (Cardoso-Fischer, 5th match game 1957.)

e6

6

6... ②xd4 7 ₩xd4 g6 is a sound alternative.

7 **②c3** 

**≜e7** 

Premature is 7...d5? 8 cxd5 exd5 9 & b5 winning a Pawn.


8 **ke3** 

8 ②c2 0-0 9 ②e3 d5!? 10 cxd5 exd5 11 exd5? (better is 11 ②exd5) 11...②e5 12 豐b3 兔c5 13 兔d2 罩e8 14 兔e2 ②g6 15 ②c2 ②h4 16 0-0-0 ②xg2 with advantage (Foguelman-Fischer, Mar del Plata 1960.)

8 ... 9 \(\sigma\)c2 0-0

d5!?

Reckoning that the loss of a Pawn is compensated for by superior development. 9... \( \tilde{\text{Z}} \) e8 is sound but passive.



FISCHER

Position after 9...d5!?

LOMBARDY

10 cxd5

exd5

Better is 11 exd5 🖾b4 (11...🖾e5 doesn't work well now because of 12 👑d4 followed by 0-0-0) 12 &c4 &f5 13 🖾xb4 &xb4 14 0-0 🚾c8. Black regains the Pawn, but with an inferior position.


11 ... 12 **≝xd5**  ∅xd5

•••

On 12 exd5 ②b4 13 奠c4 奠f5 14 ②xb4 奠xb4+ 15 曾f2 罩e8 with good play for the Pawn. (If 16 豐b3 奧a5 threatening ...罩xe3.)

Too intent on holding on to the Pawn. Correct is 13 皇e2 皇h4+! 14 g3 皇f6 15 0-0 皇xb2 16 罩ab1 =.

Again too optimistic. After 14 營e2 食f6 15 0-0-0 White can survive – temporarily anyway (if 15...句b4 16 基xd7!).



**FISCHER** 

Position after 14 \( \bar{2} c 1 \)

LOMBARDY

14 ...


2b4!

This unexpected "discovery" jolts White back to reality.

15 ②xb4 ...

Loses the exchange, but avoids the worst. On 15  $ext{@e}2$   $ext{@xa2}$  regains the Pawn with continuing pressure. And on 15  $ext{@c}4$   $ext{@a}5$  16  $ext{@xb4}$   $ext{@xb4}+$  17  $ext{@f}2$   $ext{@a}c8$  18  $ext{@d}5$   $ext{@xc1}$  19  $ext{@xc1}$   $ext{@e}1+!$  White meets a devastating attack wherever he turns: i.e., 20  $ext{@e}3$  (if 20  $ext{@g}1$ ?  $ext{@b}6+$ ) 20... $ext{@b}6+$  21  $ext{@f}4$  (not 21  $ext{@d}4$ ?  $ext{@f}2+$  or 21  $ext{@e}2$   $ext{@f}2+$  22  $ext{@d}1$   $ext{@e}6$ ) 21... $ext{@c}7+$  22 e5  $ext{@xc1}+$ , etc.

| 15 | •••        | 豐xc1+ |
|----|------------|-------|
| 16 | ≜xc1       | ≜xb5  |
| 17 | <b>包d5</b> | •••   |



FISCHER

Position after 17 2d5

LOMBARDY

17 ...

皇h4+!

The scorpion's sting at the tail-end of the combination.

18 **g3** 19 **Exf1**  ≜xf1 ≜d8

The smoke clears. Black is an exchange ahead for a Pawn. But there are still great technical difficulties. White's Knight is on a dominating outpost and his Pawn structure is solid.

20 **gd2** 21 **gc3**  **ℤc8** f5!

Weaker would be 21... Ze8 because of 22 g4 blocking the K-side.

22 e5

This advance is necessary, but it undermines the support of the Knight (which can now be driven away).

22 ... Zc5
23 5b4 ...

23 🖾 f4 (or 23 🖾 e3) would cost a pawn after 23... 🚉 a5.

 23
 ...
 **a**5

 24
 a3
 **a**xb4

 25
 axb4
 **a**d5


 26
 **a**e2
 **a**f7

 27
 h4
 **a**e6

Black has steadily improved his grip, but his winning chances are still problematic, hinging mainly on sacrificing on b4 or e5 at the right moment.

*30* **ℤe1?** 

A gross blunder. Correct is 30 \( \bar{2}\)a1 a6 31 \( \bar{2}\)g1.



#### **FISCHER**

Position after 30 \( \mathbb{Z}e1? \)

罩xc3+!

LOMBARDY

30 ...

Swapping everything leads to a won King and Pawn ending.

| 32       堂d2       基xel         33       堂xel       堂d5         34       堂d2       堂c4         35       h5       b6         36       堂c2       g5         37       h6       f4         38       g4       a5         39       bxa5       bxa5         40       堂b2       a4   |    |               |              |
|--|----|---------------|--------------|
| 33       曾xe1       曾d5         34       曾d2       曾c4         35       h5       b6         36       曾c2       g5         37       h6       f4         38       g4       a5         39       bxa5       bxa5         40       曾b2       a4         41       曾a3       曾xc3         42       曾xa4       曾d4         43       曾b4       曾e3  | 31 | bxc3          | ℤxe5+        |
| 34       當d2       當c4         35       h5       b6         36       當c2       g5         37       h6       f4         38       g4       a5         39       bxa5       bxa5         40       當b2       a4         41       當a3       當xc3         42       當xa4       當d4         43       當b4       當e3  | 32 | <b>Ġd2</b>    | <b></b> ℤxe1 |
| 35       h5       b6         36       堂c2       g5         37       h6       f4         38       g4       a5         39       bxa5       bxa5         40       堂b2       a4         41       堂a3       堂xc3         42       堂xa4       堂d4         43       堂b4       堂e3   | 33 | <b>\$</b> xe1 | <b>曾d5</b>   |
| 36       堂c2       g5         37       h6       f4         38       g4       a5         39       bxa5       bxa5         40       堂b2       a4         41       堂a3       堂xc3         42       堂xa4       堂d4         43       堂b4       堂e3  | 34 | Ġd2           | 當c4          |
| 37       h6       f4         38       g4       a5         39       bxa5       bxa5         40       \$\displays{b}2       a4         41       \$\displays{a}3       \$\displayxc3         42       \$\displayxa4       \$\displaydd4         43       \$\displaybeta b4       \$\displayeq e3  | 35 | h5            | <b>b</b> 6   |
| 38       g4       a5         39       bxa5       bxa5         40       \$\displaystyle{c}\disp | 36 | Ġc2           | g5           |
| 39       bxa5       bxa5         40       \$\delta \beta 2       a4         41       \$\delta \alpha 3       \$\delta \cdot        | 37 | h6            | f4           |
| 40       當b2       a4         41       當a3       當xc3         42       當xa4       當d4         43       當b4       當e3   | 38 | g4            | a5           |
| 41 <b>堂a3 堂xc3</b> 42 <b>堂xa4 堂d4</b> 43 <b>堂b4 堂e3</b>  | 39 | bxa5          | bxa5         |
| 42       曾xa4       曾d4         43       曾b4       曾e3   | 40 | \$b2          | a4           |
| 43 <b>\$b4 \$e3</b>  | 41 | Ġa3           | ġxc3         |
| 424CARIAN 53 . 35  | 42 | 當xa4          | ġd4          |
| White resigns  | 43 | \$b4          | Ġe3          |
| S .  |    | White resigns |              |

# **26** Fischer - Reshevsky [U.S.A.]

NEW YORK 1961: 2nd Match Game SICILIAN DEFENSE

### Time will tell

The opening has always been regarded as the old warrior's weak point, and were it not for this handicap who knows how far Reshevsky might have gone toward the summit?

Whatever the case, being familiar with the latest wrinkles does have the merit of saving time on the clock and, hopefully, of catching an opponent off guard. Although Reshevsky is bested in the theoretical duel (after 13 &f3) his practical cunning enables him to extricate himself — at a great cost of time. In the end it is the clock, as much as Fischer's persistence, that causes his downfall.

| 1 | e4         | <b>c5</b> |
|---|------------|-----------|
| 2 | <b>Df3</b> | ©c6       |
| 3 | d4         | cxd4      |
| 4 | ②xd4       | <b>g6</b> |

Allowing White the chance to get a Maroczy bind (with 5 c4). Apparently Reshevsky had booked up on this for the match. Black's idea is to dispense with an early ...d6 and possibly strive for a later ...d5 (thereby saving a tempo).

5 Dc3 ...

In match game 8 I got an edge with the more traditional 5 c4 包f6 6 包c3 包xd4 7 豐xd4 d6 8 奠e2 奠g7 9 奠e3 0-0 10 豐d2, etc.

| 5 | ***            | <u> </u> |
|---|----------------|----------|
| 6 | <b>&amp;e3</b> | 9)f6     |
| 7 | <u>\$</u> e2   | •••      |

In the 4th and 6th games of the match I continued with 7 & c4 0-0 8 & b3 ② g4 (8... ② a5?) brought Reshevsky to grief against me in the US Championship 1958-9 after 9 e5 ② e8 10 & xf7+! & xf7 11 ② e6!! winning Black's Queen) 9 & xg4 ② xd4 and White got a clear advantage both with 10 & h4 and 10 & d1 respectively.

7 ... 0-0

On 7...d5? 8 & b5 wins a Pawn.


8 **f4** 

Despite his familiarity with the Dragon Variation, I felt Reshevsky really didn't know the latest wrinkles in Alekhine's Attack. The point of Black's "accelerated fianchetto" becomes apparent after the indifferent 8 0-0? d5! 9 exd5 \$\overline{\infty}\$b4=.

8 ... d6

Now on 8...d5? 9 e5 ©e4 10 ©xe4 dxe4 11 ©xc6 bxc6 12 \widetilde{\text{w}}xd8 \\ \text{\text{\text{\text{Zxd8}}} 13 \\ \text{\tint{\text{\t

9 ፟**⊘b3** 



RESHEVSKY

Position after 9 4b3

...

FISCHER

9 ... <u>ĝe6</u>


I was right. This is the old (and second-rate) move. Correct is 9...a5! 10 a4 全6 11 公d4? (after 11 g4 公b4! Black's Knight can no longer be dislodged by a3; the best White has is 11 0-0 罩c8=) 11...豐b6! 12 公xe6 豐xe3 13 公xf8 公g4 with a strong attack. (Makievsky-Veresov, USSR 1954.)

10 g4 d5 11 f5 皇c8

Lipnitzky recommends 11...gxf5!? It's interesting.

*12* exd5

€)b4



RESHEVSKY

Position after 12...\$\Db4\$

FISCHER

*13* **≜f3!** 

The modern way – White maintains his center Pawn and sacs two Pawns on the K-side where Black must expose his King to get them.

13 d6 has been known to be only a draw since the famous Alekhine-Botvinnik encounter, Nottingham 1936, which continued: 13...豐xd6! (if 13...exd6? 14 g5) 14 盒c5 豐f4 15 罩f1 豐xh2 16 盒xb4 氫xg4! 17 盒xg4 豐g3+ 18 罩f2 豐g1+ with a perpetual.

Another weak line is 13 fxg6 hxg6 14 皇f3 皇xg4! 15 皇xg4 ②xg4 16 豐xg4 ②xc2+ 17 曾f2 ②xa1 18 罩xa1 罩c8! with a good game. If 19 皇d4? 罩c4. (PANOV)

| 13 | •••      | gxf5 |
|----|----------|------|
| 14 | a3       | fxg4 |
| 15 | <u> </u> | •••  |

On 15 axb4 gxf3 16 \(\extrm{\text{\text{\text{W}xf3}}}\) \(\extrm{\text{\text{\text{g}}}}\) defollowed by ...\(\extrm{\text{\text{\text{\text{h}}}}\)5-g6. White's whole idea is to keep Black's QB restricted to the Q-side.

Ney's improvement over 16 \(\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{M}}}\)e2 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{L}}}\)f5! and the Bishop retreats to g6, when necessary, defending the K-side.

16 ... e6

The best choice in a difficult position. Up to here we had both played briskly, but now Reshevsky began to consume time on the clock. After

16...公d7 17 0-0-0 ②e5 18 營e2 Black's game is lifeless. White has h3 and 鱼d4 in the offing.

17 0-0-0 ...

Black gets the initiative after 17 d6? ②d5! 18 &xd5 exd5 19 營xd5 蓋e8, etc.


*17* ... **⊘xd5** 

The lesser evil. On 17...exd5 18 h3 g3 19 \(\textit{a}\)d4 is strong.

18 h3! g3 19 星hg1 豐d6!

Reshevsky is putting up a first-rate defense.

20 **≜xd5** exd5



RESHEVSKY

Position after 20...exd5

**FISCHER** 

Despite his material deficit, it is obvious White has a strong attack. His problem is how to land a haymaker.

21 ②xd5? ...

This gives Black a little breathing space.

Nowadays I would have played 21 **Qd4!** without giving it a second thought. After 21... **Qxd4** 22 **Qxg3+ Qg7** (22... **宣h8** 23 **Qxd4+** f6 24 **Qf3** leads to a bind) 23 **Qdg1 Qh6+** 24 **Qb1 Qe6** 25 **Qxg7+ Qxg7** 26 **Qxg7+ Qxg7** 27 **Qg3+ Qh8** (if 27... **Qf6** 28 **Qd6 Qg7** 29 **Qxd5** wins) 28 **Qe5+ Qg8** 29 **Qg5+ Qh8** 30 **Qf6+ Qg8** 31 **Qe2** with a winning bind.

| 21 | •••                 | <b>∲h8</b> |
|----|---------------------|------------|
| 22 | <u><b>\$</b></u> f4 | ***        |


Overlooking his reply. Vukovich suggests 23 豐f3 but 23... 全f5! 24 罩xg3 豐c6 holds.

Reshevsky chopped it off fast – he doesn't wait to be asked twice.

Rlack has succeeded in transferring the Dishop to the Verida and in sealing the g-file.

So White begins operations on the h-file!

| 25 | ••• | 罩fe8 |
|----|-----|------|
| 26 | ©e3 | ***  |



RESHEVSKY

Position after 26 De3

**FISCHER** 

Anxious to simplify and ease the tension (in time-pressure), Reshevsky finally goes astray.

The tempting 26... 響f6 is refuted by 27 ②xg4 營xb2+ 28 當d1 罩ad8 29 罩d3, etc.

But simply 26...f5! holds (if 27 營h2 堂g8).

27 **쌀h2!** 

Now the roof caves in.

27 ... <u>\$e6</u>

The late Abe Turner suggested 27... 全f5 but after 28 罩xg7! 堂xg7 29 公xf5+ 豐xf5 30 公d4 wins.

28 **\(\beta\)**xg7! ...

That does it. Once this Bishop is gone, White has a field day.

"Why didn't White play 28 🖾 d2...? So far as I can see Black can then resign. Or am I missing something?" (A.R.B.Thomas in a letter to Chess) Right, Mr. Thomas!

28 ... \$\disp\x\text{xg7}\$
29 \$\disp\h6+\$ \$\disp\g8\$

Or 29... h8 30 &e5+ mates in two.

**豐g6** 罩g1+ 30 31 罩xg6+ fxg6 9)d4 32 \Zad8 ҈е5 罩d7 33 2xe6 34 **≅**xe6 35 2)g4 罩f7 **營g5** 36 罩f1+ 37 **曾d2** h5 **營d8+** Black resigns 38

After 38... 宣f8 39 心h6+ taxes even Reshevsky's defensive ability.

# **27** Reshevsky [u.s.A.] - Fischer

LOS ANGELES 1961: 5th Match Game SEMI-TARRASCH DEFENSE

### Sheer pyrotechnics

Here, in probably the most exciting game of the match, Fischer, trying to win a Pawn, unwittingly triggers a series of "desperado" combinations which are brilliant and unorthodox. Pure tactics predominate for a period of ten moves (19 to 29). It is almost impossible to determine who is winning until Reshevsky emerges a clear exchange ahead. In the tricky ending that ensues Fischer obviously is fighting for a draw. But, once again, he has the clock as an ally.

In time-pressure, trying to preserve his slim advantage, Reshevsky pluys an aggressive line in which rischer finas a noie — enabling him to reverse their roles. Conscious of his newly acquired advantage, Fischer storms down the board with his K-side Pawns and overwhelms his opponent.

| 1 | d4   | <b>€</b> 2 <b>f</b> 6 |
|---|------|-----------------------|
| 2 | c4   | <b>e6</b>             |
| 3 | ©c3  | <b>d5</b>             |
| 4 | exd5 | •••                   |

This exchange variation, though insipid, has always been to Reshevsky's taste.

4 ... ②xd5

4...exd5 leads to the kind of wood pushing that always bored me.

5 **413** ...

Prematurely forceful is 5 e4  $\bigcirc$ xc3 6 bxc3 c5 7  $\bigcirc$ f3 cxd4 8 cxd4  $\bigcirc$ b4+=.

**c5** 

5


| 6 | e3         | ©c6 |
|---|------------|-----|
| 7 | <b>≜d3</b> |     |

Botvinnik and Robert Byrne prefer 7 &c4. A possible continuation might be 7...cxd4 8 exd4 &e7 9 0-0 0-0 10 Ze1 a6= (weaker is 10...b6 11 2xd5 exd5 12 &b5 Botvinnik-Alekhine, AVRO 1938).

7 ... <u>\$e</u>7

An alternative is 7...cxd4 8 exd4 g6 9 h4!? (9 0-0 2g7 10 2e4 is the positional approach) 9...2g7 (better is 9...h6) 10 h5 2db4 11 2g5 2xd3+ 12 2xd3 2g6 h6? 14 hxg6! hxg5 15 2xh8+ 2xh8 16 gxf7+ 2xf7 17 2gh7+ 2g7 18 d5! White won shortly. (Balcerovsky-Dunkelblum, Varna 1962.)

| 8  | 0-0  | 0-0  |
|----|------|------|
| 9  | a3   | cxd4 |
| 10 | exd4 | •••  |



FISCHER

Position after 10 exd4

RESHEVSKY

Fairly typical of the semi-Tarrasch formation: White has the freer game and attacking prospects, but the drawback of his isolated d-Pawn should not be minimized. Chances are even.

10 ... 5)f6

11 **≜c2** ...

A more flexible plan is 11 鱼e3 followed by 豐e2 and 罩ad1.

| 11 | ***        | <b>b</b> 6 |
|----|------------|------------|
| 12 | <b>營d3</b> | <b>≜b7</b> |
| 13 | <u> </u>   | <b>g</b> 6 |
| 14 | ≝fe1       | ≣e8        |
| 15 | h4         |            |

Evans criticized this "aggressive pass" and Barden extolled it. I don't see how else White can make headway. He has to create some K-side threats before Black consolidates and piles up on his d-Pawn.

| 15 | ***  | ≌c8  |
|----|------|------|
| 16 | ≅ac1 | ②d5  |
| 17 | ②e4  | f5!? |


I knew this was an "ugly positional blunder." But I actually thought Black would get the better of it after 18 ②c3 &xg5 19 hxg5 ②xc3 20 bxc3 (not 20 營xc3? ②e5) 20...②a5! (threatening ...&xf3 and ...營xg5).

| 18 | <b>②c3</b> | ≜xg5 |
|----|------------|------|
| 19 | ②xg5!      | •••  |

Crossing me up!

Not 20 豐g3? 包h5 21 豐e3 包xd4.

| 20 | •••  | <b>營xd4</b> |
|----|------|-------------|
| 21 | ②b5! | ***         |



FISCHER

Position after 21 4 b5!


RESHEVSKY

Marvelously alert! After the practically forced trade of Queens, White wins the exchange because of the imminent fork on d6.

21 ... খxe3

Best. After the game we analysed 21... 曾d5 22 曾xf4 曾xb5 (if 22... ②d4? 23 ②e4! 国xc1 24 曾xc1! fxe4 25 曾c7) 23 ②xe6 曾xb2 (if 23... 曾d5 24 ②c7 国xe1+ 25 国xe1 曾f7 26 ②e6 keeps the advantage); 24 智h6! (RESHEVSKY) with an irresistible attack. On 24... ②a5 (to stop ②b3; if 24... 国xe6 25 国xe6 ②d4 26 国e7 wins) 25 ②xf5! gxf5 (if 25... 曾f6 26 ②g5! or 25... 国xc1 26 国xc1 gxf5 27 国c7 wins) 26 国b1 智h8 (if 26... 曾c3 27 国e3) 27 曾g5+ 曾f7 28 曾xf5+ 曾g8 (not 28... 曾f6? 29 曾xh7+) 29 国e3 国c3 30 ②g5! 国f8 31 国e8! forces mate.

| 22 | fxe3  | ②xg2!     |
|----|-------|-----------|
| 23 | ⊈xg2  | ☑d4 dis.+ |
| 24 | ê_e4! | ***       |



**FISCHER** 

Position after 24 2e4!

RESHEVSKY

This game was played at the Beverly Hilton Hotel in Los Angeles, and I can still hear the audience gasping with each blow, thinking each of us had overlooked it in turn. "Fischer is winning!" "Reshevsky is winning!" The true state of affairs will crystallize in a matter of moves.

| 24 | ***   | <b>≜</b> xe4+ |
|----|-------|---------------|
| 25 | ②xe4  | 2xb5          |
| 26 | €)f6+ | •••           |

So the fork, after all, takes place here instead of d6!

| 26 | ***  | 2 | <b>\$</b> f7 |
|----|------|---|--------------|
| 27 | ☑xe8 |   | ℤxe8         |
| 28 | a4!  |   | •••          |

Inaccurate is 28 Zed1 Ze7! and the Knight can climb back into the game via c7-d5.

29 罩c7+

\$f6!


Black can't afford 29... Ze7 30 Zec1. The Rook is needed to mobilize the K-side Pawns.

30 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 3ec1! \\ \end{aligned} \end{aligned} \)

Keeping control of the open file. On either 30 \( \mathbb{Z}\)xa7 or \( \mathbb{Z}\)xh7, ...\( \mathbb{Z}\)c8.

30 ... h6 31 罩xa7 空e4 32 罩a6 罩d8!

32... \( \bar{2} b \) \( \bar{3} \) \( \bar{2} \) c6 is hopeless.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 32... \\ d8!

RESHEVSKY

Now it's clear that Black's fighting for a draw.

*33* **□c2** 

The only way to preserve winning chances. After 33  $\equiv$ xb6  $\equiv$ d2+34  $\rightleftharpoons$ g1 g5 35 hxg5+ (on 35  $\equiv$ cc6 gxh4 36  $\equiv$ xe6+  $\rightleftharpoons$ g5 37  $\equiv$ g6+  $\rightleftharpoons$ h5 38  $\equiv$ xh6+  $\rightleftharpoons$ g4 Black has enough play on the K-side to hold the draw; but not 35 a5? gxh4 36 a6 h3 37 a7 h2+38  $\rightleftharpoons$ h1  $\bigcirc$ g3 mate) 35...hxg5 36  $\equiv$ cc6 (not 36 a5? g4 37 a6  $\bigcirc$ g5 38 a7  $\bigcirc$ f3+ 39  $\rightleftharpoons$ f1 g3 40 a8= $\rightleftharpoons$ g2 mate!) 36...g4 37  $\equiv$ xe6+  $\rightleftharpoons$ g5 38  $\equiv$ h6 f4 keeps the balance.

33 ... **Zd3**34 **Zxb6** ...


After 34 當f3 罩b3 Black is in great shape.

34

... \( \bullet xe3

35 **a5** 

f4



**FISCHER** 

Position after 35...f4

RESHEVSKY

36 **Zf2**?

Short of time, Reshevsky probably didn't see how Black's Rook could get back in time to stop the a-Pawn. But now it is doubtful that White can even draw!

White should settle for 36 a6 f3+ 37 當f1 (not 37 當h2? 冨e2+) 37... 冨d3 38 當e1 冨e3+ 39 當f1 冨d3 with a draw. If 40 當g1 冨d1+ 41 當h2 f2 42 冨xf2+ 公xf2 43 冨b3 (43 a7 冨a1 wins) 43... 冨d7 44 冨f3+ 當g7 45 冨xf2 冨a7=.

| 36 | •••       | ②xf2        |
|----|-----------|-------------|
| 37 | ġxf2      | <b>ℤe5!</b> |
| 38 | <b>b4</b> | <b>≝e3!</b> |

This maneuver permits the Rook to get behind the passed Pawn.

39 **a6 \(\beta\) a3** 


Now White is stymied. In order to mobilize his Q-side Pawns, he must inch forward with b5, \( \mathbb{Z}\)b7, a7, b6, etc. But a half-dozen moves, in chess, can be a lifetime.

40 **ℤc6** ...

The last move of the time-control, and it definitely loses. The best chance is 40 b5 with the possibility of \( \mathbb{Z}b8 \) and b6 (giving up the a-Pawn) followed by b7, in some key variations.

| 40 | •••        | g5   |
|----|------------|------|
| 41 | hxg5+      | hxg5 |
| 42 | <b>b</b> 5 | g4   |

The sealed move. Black's Pawns suddenly proliferate from nowhere!



**FISCHER** 

Position after 42...g4

RESHEVSKY

*43* **\(\beta\) \(\beta\) c8** 

| 43 | •••       | <b>\$</b> f5 |
|----|-----------|--------------|
| 44 | <b>b6</b> | g3+          |
| 45 | ġe1       |              |


He decides to let the Pawns through rather than get mated after 45 堂g2 罩a2+ 46 堂g1 f3, etc.

| 45 | ***          | <b>≣a1</b> + |
|----|--------------|--------------|
| 46 | <b>⊈e2</b>   | <b>g2</b>    |
| 47 | <b>ℤf8</b> + | •••          |

On 47 \( \bar{\text{\subset}} \) \( \bar{\text{2}} \) \( \bar{\text{2}}

| 47 | •••           | <b>⊈e4</b>   |
|----|---------------|--------------|
| 48 | <b>罩xf4</b> + | <b>⊈</b> xf4 |
| 49 | <b>b</b> 7    | g1=₩         |

A hasty slip which, fortunately, still wins. As Isaac Kashdan pointed out after the game 49...\$\delta e4!\$ wins outright: e.g., 50 b8=\delta a2+ 51 \delta -any g1=\delta\$ mate. "What will the Russians say when they see this match?" he inquired, with gentle irony.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 49...g1=營

RESHEVSKY

| 50 | <b>b8</b> =₩+ | <b>\$</b> f5 |
|----|---------------|--------------|
| 51 | <b>營f8</b> +  | 'de4         |
| 52 | ₩a8+          | •••          |

No better is 52 營f3+ 含e5 53 營c3+ (if 53 營h5+ 含d6) 53... 營d4 54 營g3+ 含d5 55 營f3+ 營e4+, etc.

52 ... 當d4

Delicate footwork is required to escape the perpetual.

53 **≝d8**+ ...

Better than 53 營h8+ 含c4 54 營c8+ 營c5 55 營xe6+ 含b4 56 營e4+ 營c4+.

| 53 | ***           | Ġc4          |
|----|---------------|--------------|
| 54 | <b>營d3</b> +  | 當c5          |
| 55 | <b>豐c3</b> +  | <b>\$</b> d6 |
| 56 | <b>≝d2</b> +  | ġe5          |
| 57 | ₩b2+          | <b>堂f5</b>   |
|    | White resigns |              |

He runs out of checks after 58 当b5+ 含f6 59 当b2+ e5.

# 28 Reshevsky [U.S.A.] - Fischer

# LOS ANGELES 1961: 11th Match Game KING'S INDIAN DEFENSE

## A peccable draw

What proved to be the last game of this ill-starred match is a good example of how Reshevsky, by virtue of pluck, stamina, and alertness, salvages a draw from a lost position. It exemplifies, too, the demoralizing effect that continuously strong resistance can have on even the most robust opponent.

Fischer rapidly wrests the initiative and wins the exchange as the result of a pretty combination (28... \*\*Wxe4\*). However, he has difficulty gaining the offensive because Reshevsky throws obstacle after obstacle in his path. Nevertheless, Fischer's material advantage begins to make itself felt. He misses clear wins (on moves 38 and 42), whereupon his game deteriorates sufficiently to permit his stubborn opponent to set up an adequate defense. Still, there are several surprises in store just at the very end.

| 1 | c4         | <b><b><b><u>©</u>16</b></b></b> |
|---|------------|---------------------------------|
| 2 | d4         | g6                              |
| 3 | <b>包c3</b> | <b>≜g7</b>                      |
| 4 | e4         | 0-0                             |
| 5 | ≗e2        | •••                             |

Inferior is 5 e5. See game 21.

| 5 | •••        | d6  |
|---|------------|-----|
| 6 | <b>₽13</b> | e5  |
| 7 | 0-0        | ••• |

For 7 d5 see game 7.

Match game 9 (Reshevsky as White) had continued: 8 皇e3 罩e8 9 dxe5 (9 d5 ②d4! equalizes fully) 9...dxe5 10 營xd8 ②xd8 11 ②b5 ⑤e6 12 ⑤g5 ("full of sound and fury, signifying nothing" — Evans) 12...罩e7=. See game 57 note to Black's move 13.

| 8  | ***        | ©e7 |
|----|------------|-----|
| 9  | ©e1        | 2d7 |
| 10 | <b>②d3</b> | f5  |
| 11 | exf5       | *** |

11 f3 f4 followed by ...g5 etc gives Black a strong K-side attack.

11 ... ②xf5


11...gxf5 keeping Black's Pawn front mobile is very strong.

12 f3 **©d4** 

For 12... 66 see game 30.

13 **De4 b6** 

Hindering White's thematic break with c5.



FISCHER

Position after 13...b6

RESHEVSKY

14 <u>⊈g</u>5? ...

Apparently gaining a tempo, but only driving the Queen to a better square. 14 \(\text{\(\text{\(2\)}}\)d2 or \(\text{\(2\)}\)e1 appear to be more accurate.

14 ... 響e8 15 **全d2** ...

This Bishop must retreat eventually after ...h6. The idea is to prepare b4 without having to fear the reply ...a5.

15 ...

a5

Gaining more time. White must now stop for b3 (to enforce b4). On the immediate 16 a3 a4! fixes the Q-side.

16 **□e1** 

②xe2+

Otherwise the Bishop retreats to fl.

| 17 | <b>營xe2</b> | h6         |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 18 | <b>b</b> 3  | <b>g</b> 5 |
| 19 | a3          | <b>豐g6</b> |

Now it's obvious that it was a mistake to force Black's Queen to e8 – its presence on g6 lends momentum to the K-side initiative.


20 **b4** 

**到f6** 

21 bxa5?

•••

Correct is 21 4 df2, but after ... 4 Black stands better.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 21 bxa5?

RESHEVSKY

Now Reshevsky is hoping to get some counterplay after 21...bxa5 22 4 df2 4 h5 23 c5, etc. But –

21

g4!

- doesn't give him time to get it in.

22 Ødf2

Not 22 axb6? gxf3 23 營xf3 ②xe4 24 營xe4 皇f5 wins a piece. On 22 ②xf6+ 皇xf6 23 f4 皇f5 White's in trouble.

22

gxf3

23 **營xf3** 

گh5


Increasing the pressure. On 23... ②xd5 24 豐g3 holds.

|          | 24 | <b>We3</b>  | bxa5 |
|----------|----|-------------|------|
| Finally! |    |             |      |
|          | 25 | <b>Zac1</b> | •••  |

Typically, Reshevsky wants to mobilize his Q-side without making any concessions or creating any K-side weaknesses. After 25 g3 ②f4 26 №h1 ②h3! it's just a matter of time before Black invades on the light squares.

Loses material, but probably the best chance. On 26 g3 \( \bigsig 17 \) followed by ...\( \bigsig af8, \text{ White is not long for this world.} \)

Blunders the exchange. But no longer possible is 27 g3 axd5, etc.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 27 響g3

RESHEVSKY


| 27 | ***   | êxe4! |
|----|-------|-------|
| 28 | ≅xe4? |       |

Flustered, White makes the task somewhat easier. Better is 28 🖾 xe4 (not 28 🚊 xf4? exf4) 28... 👑 xg3 29 hxg3 🖾 d3 30 cxd6 cxd6 31 🚊 c6 🖾 xe1 32 🚊 xe1 with many more chances of holding the ending than in the actual game.

| 28 | ***  | ₩xe4!        |
|----|------|--------------|
| 29 | ②xe4 | ②e2+         |
| 30 | 當h1  | ∅xg3+        |
| 31 | hxg3 | <b>≡</b> a6! |
| 32 | cxd6 | exd6         |
| 33 | a4   | * ***        |

"Black has won the exchange, but the technical difficulties confronting him are enormous. His Pawns are discombobulated, his Bishop is hemmed in and his Rooks are virtually immobilized. Still, one has the feeling Fischer should win this game." (EVANS.)

| 33 | ***        | <b>罩f7</b>  |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 34 | g4         | <b>≜</b> f8 |
| 35 | <b>∲h2</b> | <b>\$h7</b> |
| 36 | ≌c8        | ≌b6         |
| 37 | ≌a8        | ≣b3         |
| 38 | ı⊈xa5      | •••         |



#### FISCHER

Position after 38 \$xa5

RESHEVSKY

38 ... \(\beta\)f4?

The right concept is to destroy the blockade on e4 with 38... **2**e3! 39 ②c3 (if 39 ②g3 **2**d3) 39...e4 40 **2**e8 **2**g7 41 ②xe4 **2**e5+, etc.

39 **拿c7!** ...

With his usual tenacity, Reshevsky finds the only move to keep the game alive. White is still quite lost, however.

| 39 | •••        | ≅xe4         |
|----|------------|--------------|
| 40 | ≅xf8       | <b>≝d3</b>   |
| 41 | <b>≝f6</b> | ≅xg4         |
| 42 | ≅xd6       | <b>ℤg7</b> ? |

43 \( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} \text{26!} & \text{...} \end{align\*}

Forced. 43 \(\hat{2}\)b6 loses to 43...\(\begin{array}{c}\)d2. And 43 \(\hat{2}\)a5 loses to 43...\(\begin{array}{c}\)dg3.

43 ...

### 罩xd5

44 \(\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
2c2!
\end{aligned}

Again I had overlooked White's reply.

44 ..

e4

Discouraged, I gave it one last try.

45 a5

罩d3

On 45...e3 46 & f4 \( \begin{aligned} \alpha 17 & \begin{aligned} \alpha 2 & \delta 47 & \begin{aligned} \alpha 2 & \delta 2 & \delt

46 **gf4** 47 **g3**  罩f7

47 g3 48 ≌c1 **e**3

Reshevsky, once more in severe time-pressure, overlooked that 48 \(\delta\)g2 draws easily. For on 48...\(\beta\)xf4 49 \(\beta\)c7+! is the saving clause.

罩e7 罩a3

**\$**g6

51 ... 52 罩xe3 罩xa5


...

52 @xe3 draws easily. Black can't make anything out of the pin on the e-file.

52 ... 53 **堂f3**? **Za2+** 

•••

A comedy of errors. Correct is 53 堂h3! in order to keep Black's King out of g4 after the exchange of Rooks: e.g., 53... 基xe3 54 毫xe3 h5 55 章f4 墨a1 56 毫c7 堂f5 57 章f4 墨b1 58 毫c7! 墨h1+ 59 堂g2 墨c1 60 章f4! (gaining a vital tempo by hitting the Rook), 60... 墨—any 61 堂h3! maintaining the blockade.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 53 \&f3?

RESHEVSKY

53 ...

≌b7?

Returning the favor.

As Evans originally pointed out in *Chess Life*, "The best winning chance is 53... \( \) \

Disgusted, I no longer thought there was a win. However, later I worked out a problem-like variation (after 54...h5):

A] 55 g4? h4 wins.

- B] 55 當e4 當f6! 56 Qd4+ 當e6 57 當f4 罩a4 58 當e3 當f5 leads to variations similar to "D".
- c] 55 當f4 罩a5! 56 এd2 罩f5+ 57 當e4 當f6 and Black's King will eventually penetrate to g4. For example, 58 息f4 (58 當e3? 當g5) 58...罩a5 followed by ...罩a4+ and ...當f5.
- D] 55 章f4 當f5 56 章d6 罩b2 57 章f4 罩b3+ 58 當g2 當g4 59 章d6 罩b2+ 60 當g1 當h3 61 童e5 罩b4! 62 童c7 (not 62 童f4? h4) 62...罩g4! 63 當f2 當h2 64 童e5 當h1 65 當f3 罩g8 66 童f4 罩f8 67 當f2 (if 67 當e3 當g2) 67...h4 68 當f3 h3 69 當f2 h2 70 當f1 罩a8 71 當f2 罩a2+ 72 當f1 罩a3! 73 當f2 罩f3+!! 74 當xf3 當g1 75 童e3+當f1 and the Pawn queens.

| 54 | <b>≝e6</b> + | <b>∲f5</b>   |
|----|--------------|--------------|
| 55 | <b>⊑e5</b> + | <b>∲</b> f6  |
| 56 | <b>⊑</b> d5  | <b>≌b3</b> + |
| 57 | <b>\$</b> 94 |              |

Drawn

## **29** Fischer - Geller [U.S.S.R.]

**BLED 1961** 

RUY LOPEZ

### Hoist with his own petard

As was his wont, Geller gambles with 7... #f6 in an attempt to assume an early offense. To thwart this maneuver, part of a patently prepared variation, Fischer sacrifices a Pawn (9 d4). Undaunted, Geller tries to continue his attack. But it backfires. With a series of rapier-like thrusts, Fischer demolishes Black in a mere twenty-two moves.

Subsequent attempts to improve on Geller's play have likewise failed. Thus, this fruitful encounter offers what has come to be accepted as the refutation of Black's ultra-aggressive system.

| 1 | <b>e4</b>    | <b>e</b> 5 |
|---|--------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>4</b> )13 | ©c6        |
| 3 | <b>≜</b> b5  | a6         |
| 4 | <b>≜a4</b>   | <b>d</b> 6 |
| 5 | 0-0          | •••        |

At that time this was considered inferior because it allows the pin which Black can initiate with his next move. 5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc6+ or 5 c3 were more standard. The text is more non-committal. White can deploy his forces to greater effect after he gets a look at Black's reply.

5 ... <u>\$g</u>4

This aggressive sally weakens Black's Q-side.

6 h3! ...


It's important to kick immediately, otherwise after ... 學f6 followed by ... 拿xf3 White's Pawn formation could be smashed.

6 ... <u>\$h5</u>

As a result of this game 6...h5 became fashionable. I had intended 7 d4 b5 8 \(\text{\textit{b}}\) \(\text{\text{2}}\) \(\text{2}\) \(\text{\text{2}}\) \(\text{\text{2}}\) \(\text{\text{2}}\) \(\text{\text{2}}\) \(\text{\text{2}}\) \(\text{\text{2}}\) \(\text{\text{2}}\) \(\text{\text{2}}\) \(\text{\text{2}}\) \(\text{2}\) \(\text{\text{2}}\) \

7 **c3 營f6?** 

Geller looked quite happy after his novelty, but sounder is 7... 466 8 d4 40d7 bolstering the center.



**GELLER** 

Position after 7... 響f6?

**FISCHER** 

8 **g4!** ...

I realized the danger inherent in weakening my K-side, but felt that I could capitalize on Black's lack of development (the traffic jam on his K-side) before he could get to my King.

8 ... <u>\$g6</u>
9 d4!

It's worth a Pawn to open up the game.

9 ... <u>\$xe4</u>

What else? The threat was 10 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g5 followed by 11 d5 winning a piece. He still looked happy.

#### *10* **②bd2**

#### ₿g6


An attempt to rehabilitate Geller's line was made in Smyslov-Medina, Tel Aviv 1964, which continued 10... dd3 11 exc6+ bxc6 12 = 10-0-0 but 13 = 2! proved to be very strong.

### 11 **a**xc6+

Trading old advantages for new. Now Black's Q-side Pawns are a shambles and his King can expect no shelter there.

11

bxc6



**GELLER** 

Position after 11...bxc6

**FISCHER** 

12 dxe5

A few weeks after the game it dawned on me that 12 營a4 would have been a tremendous shot. After 12...②e7 (apparently forced) 13 dxe5 dxe5 14 罩e1 e4 15 ②xe4 營xf3 16 營xc6+! ②xc6 17 ②f6++ 含d8 18 罩e8 mate. I was kicking myself for not having taken this course, but then I found that after 12 營a4 含d7! 13 dxe5 dxe5 14 ②c4 ②d6 White has no immediate way to exploit the exposed King.

#### 13 ②xe5!

**拿d6** 

On 13...0-0-0 14 We2 \$b7 15 Db3 (intending Da5+) is murderous.

14 **⊘xg6!** 

A little surprise, permitting him to open his h-file. Of course not 14 2xc6 h5.

14 ...

**豐xg6** 

Geller took a half hour on this recapture and stopped looking happy. He rejected 14...hxg6 15 ②e4 營h4 16 ②xd6+ cxd6 17 營xd6 營xh3? 18 黨e1+ and mates.

15 罩e1+

**∲f8** 

Another difficult decision. On 15...②e/ 16 ②c4 0-0-0 17 豐a4 White's attack comes first.

16 Dc4

h5

Still hoping to rise from the ashes and fan his attack.

17 ②xd6

cxd6

The best chance is 17... \widetilde{\pi} xd6.


18 **gf4** 

d5?

19 **豐b3** 

hxg4

Geller spent about forty minutes on this move. If 19...  $\bigcirc$  e7 20  $\square$ xe7!  $\bigcirc$ xe7 21  $\bigcirc$ b7+ wins. Or 19...  $\bigcirc$ f6 20  $\bigcirc$ b7  $\square$ e8 21  $\square$ xe8+  $\bigcirc$ xe8 22  $\square$ e1  $\bigcirc$ f6 24  $\bigcirc$ c8, etc.



**GELLER** 

Position after 19...hxg4

FISCHER


20 **營b7!** 

Stronger than 20 ₩b4+ ②e7 21 ₩xe7+ \$\displays g8 22 h4, etc.

20 ... 21 **食g3** 22 **쌀b4**+ gxh3 dis.+ \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \delta & \\ & \end{aligned} \end{aligned} \)

Black resigns

He must now lose both a Knight and a Rook.



**GELLER** 

Final Position after 22 \bullet b4+

**FISCHER** 

# 30 Gligorich [Yugoslavia] - Fischer

**BLED 1961** 

#### KING'S INDIAN DEFENSE

### A lyrical performance

This draw has the charm of perfection. Each move is interesting and, to this day, appears flawless.

With 17...c5 Fischer launches an intricate double-Pawn sacrifice which involves exact timing. Gligorich rises to the occasion, returning material in an attempt to wrest the advantage. The economy and ingenuity displayed by both players produces a harmonious flow of movement, remarkable in its esthetic appeal. The effect is of a pas de deux in which each partner contributes equally to the total symmetry.

| 1  | d4         | <b>②f6</b> |
|----|------------|------------|
| 2  | <b>c4</b>  | <b>g6</b>  |
| 3  | ©c3        | <b>≜g7</b> |
| 4  | <b>e4</b>  | <b>d6</b>  |
| 5  | <b>包f3</b> | 0-0        |
| 6  | ₾e2        | <b>e</b> 5 |
| 7  | 0-0        | ©c6        |
| 8  | d5         | ②e7        |
| 9  | ©e1        | <b>②d7</b> |
| 10 | <b>②d3</b> | •••        |

The older 10 f3 f5 11 \( \) e3 f4 12 \( \) f2 g5 has been abandoned. Black's K-side attack has practically been worked out to a forced mate!

| 10 | •••  | f5 |
|----|------|----|
| 11 | exf5 |    |

Petrosian-Tal, in this same tournament, continued (with Black's N on e8): 11 f4 exf4 12 皇xf4 fxe4 13 ②xe4 ②f5 14 皇g5 ②f6 15 g4 ②d4 16 ②df2 營e7=.

11 ... ②xf5

In this line White gets a grip on e4, Black on d4. 11...gxf5 is more energetic.

12 f3 🖺 f6

For 12... 4 see game number 28. Both moves give Black a nice game.

 13
 ②f2
 ②d4

 14
 ②fe4
 ②h5

White has the c5 lever; Black has the dynamic break with ...g5-g4. Chances are roughly even.

Keeping an eye on the d-Pawn so that ...c5 becomes possible.

16 g3 h6

In a later round Gligorich (as Black) played against Tal 16...c5? but after 17 55! 5xb5 18 cxb5 White obtained a bind.

17 **ge3** c5!

I was informed that Gligorich thought I had blundered a Pawn, but it is a deliberate sac. On 17...②xe2+ 18 Wxe2 g5 19 c5 White has it all his own way.

18 **½xd4** ...

Not 18 2b5 2f5 19 2d2 a6, etc.


18 ... exd4
19 **2b5** a6

Not 19... e5? 20 f4.

20 9 bxd6 ...

Apparently Black has lost a Pawn without any visible compensation. His pieces, which are now so awkwardly placed, soon spring to life, however.

20 ... d3! 21 \(\vec{\psi}\)xd3 ...



**FISCHER** 

Position after 21 \windsymbol{\psi}xd3

GLIGORICH

21 ..

拿d4+

The combination requires intricate footwork. A mistake would be 21... 逸xb2 22 ②xc8 逸xa1 23 ⑤b6 and it's all over (23... 逸d4+? 24 營xd4).


*22* **當g2** 

After 22 \$\circ\$h1 \$\overline{Q}\$xg3+ 23 \$\overline{Q}\$xg3 \$\overline{W}\$xd6 White is weak on all the squares and his K-side looks like Swiss cheese. Chances would be even.

22 ...

**②xg3!** 

This is the resource it was necessary to visualize as far back as move 17.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 22... 2xg3!

**GLIGORICH** 

23 @xc8!

Best. Not 23 hxg3? (or 23 堂xg3) 23...豐h3 mate. On 23 氫xg3 豐xd6 again is good.

23 ... 24 Ø **b**6! ②xf1

**豐c7!** 

Blow for blow! The threat of mate on h2 keeps the exchange.

| 25 | 罩xf1 | ₩xb6 |
|----|------|------|
| 26 | b4!  | •••  |

The saving clause.

26 ... ≝xb4


I saw the draw coming but felt the position was too precarious to play for a win. On 26...cxb4 27 c5! 28 20xc5 28 20xc5 29 20xc6+ 20xc6 20xc7 20

| 27 | ≌b1  | <b>豐a5</b> |
|----|------|------------|
| 28 | ②xc5 | ***        |

On 28 \( \mathbb{Z}\)xb7 \( \mathbb{Z}\)f7.

| 28 | •••   | <b>營xc5</b> |
|----|-------|-------------|
| 29 | ₩xg6+ | <b>≜g7</b>  |
| 30 | 罩xb7  | <b>豐d4</b>  |

The only move. Gligorich was so sure I'd "find" it that he wrote it down on his scoresheet while I was taking a minute to look for something better.



# **31** Fischer - Petrosian [ U.S.S.R. ]

**BLED 1961** 

CARO-KANN DEFENSE

## The sincerest form of flattery

This is Fischer's only win against Petrosian and it is achieved through an unconscious mimicry of the latter's style. Right up to the endgame Fischer seems content to return the ball without trying to force the issue. Each attempt to seize the initiative is meticulously rebuffed. Move by move, they seem to be drifting toward a draw. Petrosian offers one at move 27, but Fischer declines. Perhaps out of irritation, Petrosian immediately commits his first and only error. And Fischer, reverting to his normal style of play, takes full advantage of it.

| 1 | e4 | <b>c</b> 6 |
|---|----|------------|
| 2 | d4 | ***        |

For  $2 \triangle c3$  see game 16.

For 3 exd5 see game 20.

For 4... \$15 see game 49.

5 Øf3 ...

5  $\underline{\mathbb{\#}}$ e2  $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ df6 (weaker is 5... $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ gf6 6  $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ d6 mate) gives White nothing. I tried 5  $\underline{\mathbb{\&}}$ c4 against Portisch at Stockholm 1962, which continued: 5... $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ gf6 6  $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ g5  $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ d5 (the idea is to omit the usual ...e6 until after the QB has been developed) 7  $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ 1f3 h6 8  $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ e4  $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ 7b6 9  $\underline{\mathbb{\&}}$ b3 (better is 9  $\underline{\mathbb{\&}}$ d3  $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ b4 10 0-0  $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ xd3 11  $\underline{\mathbb{\#}}$ xd3 e6 12  $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ e5! with pressure) 9... $\underline{\mathbb{\&}}$ f5 10  $\underline{\mathbb{\%}}$ g3  $\underline{\mathbb{\&}}$ h7 11 0-0 e6=.



The knight is not particularly well-placed after 6 \( \frac{1}{2} \) g3.

| 6 | ***        | <b>∑xf6</b> |
|---|------------|-------------|
| 7 | <b>≜c4</b> | <b>≜</b> f5 |
| 8 | ₩e2        | <b>e6</b>   |
| 9 | <b>≜g5</b> | <u> </u>    |

This super-refinement reduces all of White's attacking prospects. Petrosian has a knack of snuffing out such dreams twenty moves before they even enter his opponent's head! After 9... 全 7 10 0-0-0 h6 11 全 h4 ② e4!? 12 g4 皇 h7 13 皇 g3 ② xg3 14 fxg3 營 c7 15 ② e5 皇 d6 16 h4 keeps the initiative. (Tal-Fuster, Portoroz 1958.)

| 10 | 0-0-0 | <b>≜e7</b> |
|----|-------|------------|
| 11 | h3    | •••        |

It might have been better to prevent further simplifications with 11 曾b1 包d5 12 皇c1! 0-0 (not 12...皇xf3 13 豐xf3 皇g5 14 豐g3!) 13 皇d3, etc.


| 11 | ***         | ≜xf3 |
|----|-------------|------|
| 12 | <b>豐xf3</b> | Ød5! |

Forces an exchange of bishops. If 13 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d2 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g5, etc.

| 13 | ≜xe7       | <b>營xe7</b> |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 14 | <b>ġb1</b> | <b>≝d8</b>  |

I had expected 14...0-0-0.

15 **警e4 b5!** 



**PETROSIAN** 

Position after 15...b5!

**FISCHER** 

Now it's apparent why Black didn't castle long. He wants to drum up counterplay on the Q-side, which he couldn't do if his King lived there.

The threat was ...a4-a3. Weaker is 17 a3 b4. Already White has been thrown on a mild defensive.

17...a4 would be met by 18 a3.

I thought he wanted to exchange Queens.


Practically forced – but now the d-Pawn is weak.

After 20 We2 0-0 (20... Wxd4 21 &xh7) 21 &c2 c5 White could easily end up with the bad Bishop.

After 20... wxe5 21 dxe5 ad7 22 f4 ac5 produces a drawn ending. And not 20... xxd4 21 axa5.

This looked like a shot –

- but instead it's a shock.



**PETROSIAN** 

Position after 21...h6!

FISCHER

### 22 \(\mathbb{\text{\pi}}\)xc5 ...

Now I saw that 22 豐xg7 宮e7! 23 dxc5 豐c6! (not 23...豐xc5 24 罩he1 罩dg8 25 罩xe6+! 含xe6 26 罩e1+ should win) 24 食g6 (forced) 24...罩df8 25 食xf7 豐e4+! 26 宮a1 罩h7! and Black wins.

| 22 | ***  | <b>豐xc5</b> |
|----|------|-------------|
| 23 | dxc5 | <b>⊉e7</b>  |


23... \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 23... \\ \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 23... \\ \begin{al

| 24 | <b>c</b> 6  | <b>Zd6</b> |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 25 | <b>≌he1</b> | 罩xc6       |
| 26 | <b>ℤe5</b>  | <b>≌a8</b> |
| 27 | ₫e4         | ***        |

After 27 \$\mathbb{Z}\$ \$\mathbb{Z}\$ a7 followed by ...\$\mathbb{\tilde{Q}}\$d7-c5 Black's solid as a rock. Right after I made this move, Petrosian offered a draw. I was ready to accept, but Tal happened to be standing there at that instant, hovering anxiously, since a drawn result would practically clinch first place for him. So I refused – not because I thought White has anything in the position, but because I didn't want to give Tal the satisfaction!

27 ... \( \begin{aligned} \beg

Serendipity. Simply 27... Exe4 leads to a dead draw.



**PETROSIAN** 

Position after 27... \$\mathbb{Z}\$d6?

**FISCHER** 

28 **½xa8** ...

This obvious capture shattered Petrosian, who apparently had been engrossed in analyzing the intricacies of 28 基xd6 含xd6 29 基xe6+ fxe6 30 急xa8 含c5 31 b3 ②d7 32 含c2 含d4 with an absolute bind on the dark squares.

| 28 | ***        | <b>ℤxd1</b> + |
|----|------------|---------------|
| 29 | <b>堂c2</b> | 罩fI           |

There's no turning back. If 29... Id8 30 Exa5 wins.

| 30 | 基xa5       | 罩xf2+      |
|----|------------|------------|
| 31 | <b>ġb3</b> | 罩h2        |
| 32 | <b>c</b> 5 | <b>∳d8</b> |

On 32... Exh3 33 Ea7+ &d8 34 Exf7 Exg3+ 35 &xb4 the Q-side Pawns hurtle toward a touchdown. The Bishop, since it can control both wings at once, is vastly superior to the Knight.


Not 33 Za7 2d7! 34 c6 2b6 holds.

Now 33... ②d7 is refuted by 34 c6.

Or 34...會e7 35 會xb4 (not 35 c6? 包d5) 35... 基xg3 36 a4 wins.

I suspect Petrosian saw White's reply, but wanted to be put out of his misery. 35...當c8 36 冨xf7 冨xg3+ 37 當xb4 is futile.

There's no defense to the discovered checkmate.



**PETROSIAN** 

Final Position after 36 \$\displace c4!

**FISCHER** 

# **32** Fischer - Tal [ u.s.s.r. ]

**BLED 1961** 

SICILIAN DEFENSE

### The moral victor

After an early lapse by Tal on move 6, Fischer relentlessly presses home his advantage. He misses several opportunities to shorten Tal's resistance, but the outcome is never really in doubt.

"Finally, he has not escaped me!" exulted Fischer.

"It is difficult to play against Einstein's theory," sighed Tal, who went on to capture first prize.

But it was Fischer, finishing a strong second, who had the consolation of scoring  $3\frac{1}{2}$  out of 4 against the Russian contingent, and of being the only player (in a field of twenty) to emerge undefeated.

| 1 | e4          | c5         |
|---|-------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>4</b> 13 | <b>②c6</b> |
| 3 | d4          | cxd4       |
| 4 | ②xd4        | е6         |
| 5 | <b>එc3</b>  |            |

No doubt Tal expected 5 5b5 which I had played exclusively at Buenos Aires 1960. I still think that might be best (see game 54).

| 5 | ***        | <b>当c7</b> |
|---|------------|------------|
| 6 | <b>g</b> 3 |            |

A perfectly legitimate treatment which Botvinnik labeled a "very cunning and well-masked idea." Actually no trap is intended. It becomes one only by virtue of Tal's reply.

6 ... ②f6?

Probably the losing move! Tal looked worried immediately after having made it, but I'm not sure he was convinced he had really been careless. Correct is 6...a6 7 \(\exists g2\) \(\overline{0}\)f6 8 0-0, etc.

#### 7 **2db5!**

Curiously enough, Bisguier, who was present at Bled and witnessed the game, forgot this move when he reached the identical position against Benko at San Antonio 1962!

7 ... 🖞 Ъ8

On 7... a5 8 2d2 d8 9 2f4 e5 10 2g5 is strong.


8 **gf4** 

2e5

Tal took a long time on this risky reply. The alternative 8...e5 9 &g5 a6 10 &xf6 (not 10 &a3 b5 11 &xf6 b4!) 10...axb5 (not 10...gxf6 11 &a3 b5 12 &d5) 11 &g5 gives a clear advantage.

#### 9 **≜e2!**

Perhaps Tal underestimated this simple move. It prepares \$\mathbb{\omega} d4\$ and keeps an eye on the b5 square.



TAL

Position after 9 \&e2!

**FISCHER** 

In the tournament book Tal suggested the rather startling 9...包g8 to avoid material loss. After 10 營d4 f6 11 0-0-0 (if 11 总xe5 fxe5 12 營c4 含d8! holds) 11...a6 12 ②d6+ 总xd6 13 營xd6 營xd6 14 基xd6 leads to a promising endgame.

| 10 | ≜xe5! | <b>豐xe5</b> |
|----|-------|-------------|
| 11 | f4    | <b>₩b8</b>  |
| 12 | e5    | a6          |

Tal didn't give this a second thought. On 12...包g8 13 包e4 拿e7 14 營d2 followed by 包bd6+ and 0-0-0 is crushing.

| 13 | exf6 | axb5 |
|----|------|------|
| 14 | fxg7 |      |

Keres thought 14 2e4 \$18 15 \$\text{ \$\text{#}}\d4\$ was stronger. But I wanted the Pawn. With only two draws against Tal, out of six times at bat, I was in no mood to speculate!

| 14 | •••        | <b>ℤg8</b>  |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 15 | ©e4        | <u></u> ≜e7 |
| 16 | <b>豐d4</b> | ≌a4         |


A desperate attempt to complicate. 16... 27 (BOTVINNIK) held out more chance for survival.

*17* **②f6**+ **≗xf6** 

17... 當d8? loses to 18 当b6+.

18 **≝xf6 ≝c7**19 **0-0-0!** ...

19 hs is answered by 19...ds. And 19 hxb5? Was+ wins a piece.



TAL

Position after 20 \&b1

**FISCHER** 

20 ... **∑a6** 

Not 20... a5 since 21 h5 d5 (if 21... d6 22 axd6!) 22 axd5! exd5 23 ae1+ wins outright.

Also bad is 20... 響a5 21 b3! and the threat of 鱼h5 is decisive.


21 **Qxb5** ...

I was so intent on snatching material and not botching this one that I missed 21 鱼h5 d6 (or 21...d5 22 罩xd5!) 22 罩he1 豐e7 23 豐h6 含d7 24 豐xh7 with a quick win in view.

The best chance. On 22... 營d8 23 營h6 f5 24 營h5+ 含e7 25 g4 cracks Black open.

23 fxe5! ...

Black was hoping for 23 wxe5+ wxe5 24 fxe5 xg7 with some drawing prospects, even though a Pawn behind. In top-flight chess, you have to drive your advantage home unmercifully.



TAL

Position after 24 exf6

**FISCHER** 

The threat is simply 2xh7.

The only move. 24... b6 25 hf1 wins easily.

 25
 臭xh7
 豐g5

 26
 臭xg8
 豐xf6

 27
 틸hf1
 豐xg7

28 **âxf**7+ **ġd8** 

Black has succeeded in staving off immediate defeat, but the endgame is hopeless.

29 **Qe6 營h6** 

On 29...\$\documentering c7 30 \$\documents f5 maintains the pressure.

| 30 | ≗xd7           | ≜xd7         |
|----|----------------|--------------|
| 31 | <b>罩f7</b>     | <b>豐xh2</b>  |
| 32 | <b>≝dxd7</b> + | ⊈e8          |
| 33 | 罩de7+          | <b>\$d8</b>  |
| 34 | <b>国d7</b> +   | <b>\$</b> c8 |
| 35 | 罩c7+           | <b>\$d8</b>  |
| 36 | 罩 <b>fd7</b> + | Ġe8          |
| 37 | <b>≝d1</b>     | •••          |

White has been gaining time on the clock.

37 ... b5 38 罩b7 豐h5

38... 營xg3 39 罩xb5 is equally convincing.

39 g4 ₩h3

Or 39... 響xg4 40 罩h1 響d4 41 罩h8+! 響xh8 42 罩b8+ wins.

| 40 | g5           | 豐田         |
|----|--------------|------------|
| 41 | <b>ℤe1</b> + | <b>堂f8</b> |
| 42 | ≅xb5         | <b>ġg7</b> |
| 43 | <b>≝</b> b6  | <b>豐g3</b> |
| 44 | Äd1          | <b>營c7</b> |
| 45 | <b></b> dd6  |            |

Threatening 46 罩g6+ 含h7 47 罩h6+ 含g7 48 罩bg6+ 含f8 49 罩h8+ 含f7 50 罩h7+ winning the Queen.

45...豐c5 46 罩b7+ 含—any 47 罩d8 mate.

46 b3 **含h7**47 **基a6** Black resigns

Black must submit to the loss of his Queen or get mated. There is no defense against 48 罩a7+ 當g8 49 罩dd7, etc.

# 33 Fischer - Trifunovich [Yugoslavia]

**BLED 1961** 

RUY LOPEZ

## The drawing master

Trifunovich has earned the reputation of being a very hard man to beat, and the other Grandmasters have acquired a healthy respect for his technical skill. At Bled, for example, he lost only this one game.

Trifunovich's experiment with a dubious line in the opening meets with an abrupt and effective antidote (13 \( \text{2}\)\)xd4), saddling him with an isolated e-Pawn for the duration of the mid-game. He decides, perhaps unwisely, to sacrifice it at an appropriate moment to gain some counterplay. Although he succeeds in outplaying Fischer in the endgame, he cannot overcome his material deficit. What ultimately defeats him is force majeure.

| 1 | e4          | e5         |
|---|-------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>2</b> 13 | <b>2c6</b> |
| 3 | <b>≜b5</b>  | a6         |
| 4 | <b>≜a4</b>  | <b>∅f6</b> |
| 5 | 0-0         | ②xe4       |
| 6 | <b>d4</b>   | <b>b</b> 5 |
| 7 | <b>≜b3</b>  | exd4?      |

Considered to be weak - and it is. But Trifunovich must have had some equalizing idea in mind, since he rarely chooses a genuinely risky line. The tried and tested 7...d5 must be played.

A reader of Tal's Latvian chess magazine (Shakhmaty) suggested 8 公xd4 but 8...公e7! seems to hold: e.g., 9 罩e1 (if 9 象xf7+ 含xf7 10 營f3+ 含g8 11 營xe4 d5 is adequate) 9...d5 10 公c6! 公xc6 11 象xd5 象b7! 12 象xe4 象e7 13 象xc6+ 象xc6 14 營e2 含f8, etc.


9 ②xd4? ②xd4 10 豐xd4 &e6 (threatening ...c5) is better for Black.

9 ...

҈£еб

On 9...dxc3 10 \( \Darksymbol{\pi} xd5 \( \Darksymbol{\pi} b7 \) 11 \( \Darksymbol{\pi} xe4 \) (not 11 \( \Darksymbol{\pi} xe4+? \( \Darksymbol{\pi} e7! \) 11...\( \Darksymbol{\pi} e7 \) (11...\( \Darksymbol{\pi} xd1? \) loses to 12 \( \Darksymbol{\pi} xc6++ \) 12 \( \Darksymbol{\pi} e2 \) prevents Black from castling.

| 10 | ②xe4 | dxe4       |
|----|------|------------|
| 11 | ≌xe4 | <b>≜e7</b> |
| 12 | ≜xe6 | fxe6       |



TRIFUNOVICH

Position after 12...fxe6

FISCHER

13 @xd4!


An improvement over the "book" line. Trifunovich probably expected the usual 13 罩xe6 but after 13...豐d5! 14 豐e2 0-0 15 罩xe7 ②xe7 16 豐xe7 罩ae8 17 豐xc7 罩f7 18 豐g3 罩xf3! 19 gxf3 罩e1+20 堂g2 豐c4 21 堂h3 豐e6+22 豐g4 豐c6 and shortly drawn. (Dolodonov-Kicin, corres., USSR 1965.)

*13* ... 0-0

He thought quite a while on this. Weak is 13...e5? 14 營h5+ g6 15 公xc6, etc. On 13...營d5 14 營g4 0-0-0 15 盒e3 Black's e-Pawn is untenable. Finally the "simplifying combination" 13...公xd4 14 罩xd4 營xd4? 15 營xd4 罩d8 falls short after 16 營g4.

| 14 | ₩g4  | ∅xd4         |
|----|------|--------------|
| 15 | 罩xd4 | <b>≝c8</b>   |
| 16 | ≌e4  | <b> ₫f</b> 6 |

White has a strategically won game, but the technical problems are considerable. Moreover a tempting trap now stared me in the face.



TRIFUNOVICH

Position after 16... \$\bu00e4f6\$

**FISCHER** 

*17* **≜e3** 

Keres suggests 17 \(\(\text{\geq}\)f4 in the tournament book, but 17...\(\text{\geq}\)d6 is an adequate reply.

I was considering the blunder 17 全g5? 罩g6 18 h4 h6 19 營h5 but Trifunovich seemed too quiet all of a sudden, and I suspected he had tuned in on my brain waves. At the last minute I saw 19...營e8! wins; for if 20 全xe7 罩xg2+! 21 含xg2 營xh5.

| 17 | ***        | <b>豐d7</b> |
|----|------------|------------|
| 18 | <b>罩d1</b> | <b>豐c6</b> |
| 19 | <b>≜d4</b> | <b>Zg6</b> |
| 20 | <b>豐e2</b> | Ĭd8        |
| 21 | <b>g</b> 3 | <b>₩d5</b> |

Threatening ...c5.

22 **Zel!** c5

Black's welcome to 22... a2 23 b3 a5 (otherwise a1) 24 axe6 with a crushing attack.


| 23 | <b>≜c3</b>  | ℤd6 |
|----|-------------|-----|
| 24 | ≜e5         | ≌d8 |
| 25 | <b>拿f4!</b> | *** |

Preventing ... \wd2.

25 ... c4

Again 25... wa2 is met by 26 b3 followed by Exe6. Black decides to sacrifice his e-Pawn in order to get some activity. After 25... f7 26 b3 (threatening a4 at the right moment) leaves Black with little to do but sit back and wonder where White will penetrate next.

| 26 | 罩xe6         | <b>≅</b> xe6 |
|----|--------------|--------------|
| 27 | ₩xe6+        | ₩xe6         |
| 28 | <b>≅</b> xe6 | <b>≜</b> f6  |
| 29 | <b>≅xa6</b>  | 罩d1+         |
| 30 | 當g2          | •••          |



#### TRIFUNOVICH

Position after 30 \delta g2

**FISCHER** 

30 ... \( \prescript{\

After the game Gligorich suggested that 30... 2b1! offered drawing chances. It makes things harder, but White should win after 31 a4! (not 31 b3 2b2) 31... 2xb2 (if 31...b4 32 2c6 2xb2 33 2xc4 2c3 34 2d6!) 32 axb5 2xb5 33 2c6 c3 34 2e6 2f7 35 2e2 and eventually White's King marches to d3 and, after trading Bishops, captures the weak c-Pawn.

| 31 | <b>≝</b> b6 | <b>≌a1</b>  |
|----|-------------|-------------|
| 32 | 罩xb5        | 罩xa2        |
| 33 | 買c5         | <b>□</b> 24 |

On 33...c3 34 皇e5 皇a1 35 罩c7 罩xc2 36 罩xg7+ 當f8 37 罩c7 leads to an easy win. Black's c-Pawn isn't going anywhere.

| 34 | <b>≜e5</b> | ≜xe5 |
|----|------------|------|
| 35 | ≅xe5       | 罩a2  |

On 35... a3 36 ae3! a2 37 ac3 wins.

| 36 | 罩e2         | <b>堂f7</b>   |
|----|-------------|--------------|
| 37 | <b>\$13</b> | <b>\$</b> f6 |
| 38 | <b>åe4</b>  | <b>g</b> 5   |
| 39 | <b>Ġd4</b>  | <b>曾f5</b>   |
| 40 | f3          | •••          |

While not bad in itself, the text indicates a wrong frame of mind. White should be looking for the quickest win, not ways to prolong Black's agony.

Simply 40 當xc4 當g4 41 當b3 is easy.

The simplest path is 41 當xc3 冨a3+ 42 當d4 冨xf3 43 c4, etc. (KERES) Curiously now, I never do win his c-Pawn!


| 41 | •••         | <b>⊑</b> a3 |
|----|-------------|-------------|
| 42 | <b>⊈c4</b>  | h5          |
| 43 | <b>Ġ</b> b4 | <b>≣a8</b>  |
| 44 | f4          | ***         |

On 44 Exc3 h4 offers a few little problems.

I hadn't seen this defense. Now Black saves his c-Pawn and the win takes twenty moves longer than it should have.

If the Rook leaves the second rank, then ... \(\ddot\)d2.

On 46... 宣c8 47 h4 會f3 48 區g1 會f2 49 區d1 曾xg3 50 區d4 followed by 區c4 does the trick.



TRIFUNOVICH

Position after 46...\$d4

**FISCHER** 

47 罩e2

**罩b8**+

| 48 | <b>⋭</b> a4  | <b></b> Ig8 |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 49 | h4           | <b>≝f8</b>  |
| 50 | <b></b> ■e7  | <b>≦f3</b>  |
| 51 | <b>≝d7</b> + | <b>堂c4</b>  |
| 52 | <b>罩c7</b> + | <b>⊈d4</b>  |
| 53 | <b>≅d7</b> + |             |

Repeating moves to gain time on the clock.

| 53 | ***          | <b>⋭c4</b>   |
|----|--------------|--------------|
| 54 | <b>≝c7</b> + | <b>Ġd4</b>   |
| 55 | <b>⋭</b> b3  | ≅xg3         |
| 56 | <b>≝d7</b> + | Ġe4          |
| 57 | ≅h7          | <b>Ġd4</b>   |
| 58 | 罩xh5         | <b></b> g1   |
| 59 | ≌h8          | 罩b1+         |
| 60 | <b>⊈a4</b>   | <b>≌a1</b> + |
|    |              |              |

There is no time for 60...\bulletb2 because of 61 g6.

| 61 | <b>Ġ</b> b5  | <b>罩b1</b> + |
|----|--------------|--------------|
| 62 | <b>Ġc6</b>   | <b>≝g1</b>   |
| 63 | <b>ℤd8</b> + | <b>堂c4</b>   |
| 64 | <b>ℤe8</b>   |              |

Threatening \( \mate! \)

On 65...含a3 66 罩b8 wins.

| 66 | <b>Ġe6</b> | <b></b> ≡e1+ |
|----|------------|--------------|
| 67 | <b>∲f7</b> | <b>罩f1</b> + |
| 68 | <b>Ġg6</b> | <b>罩f2</b>   |
| 69 | h5         | •••          |

Now the h-Pawn becomes the dangerous candidate.

| 69 | •••        | ≅xc2          |
|----|------------|---------------|
| 70 | h6         | <b>≌h2</b>    |
| 71 | h7         | c2            |
| 72 | <b>ℤc8</b> | <b>Ġb3</b>    |
| 73 | <b>⊈g7</b> | Black resigns |

## 34 Bertok [Yugoslavia] - Fischer

STOCKHOLM 1962

QUEEN'S GAMBIT DECLINED

## Hanging pawns unhung

Classical theory expounds the danger of "hanging Pawns," but Fischer demonstrates here, in a revolutionary manner, that they are just as often an asset as a liability.

Bertok's errors seem insignificant, yet he drifts into a passive position. On the verge of exploiting Black's loose center, he always lacks just the one tempo needed to do so. Meanwhile, using the open b-file as a base of operations, Fischer manages to force White into a defensive posture. In the midst of this Q-side tension, the winning move (21...g5) comes unexpectedly on the opposite wing.

| 1 | <b>d4</b>  | <b>d5</b>           |
|---|------------|---------------------|
| 2 | c4         | <b>e6</b>           |
| 3 | <b>②c3</b> | <u></u> <b>≜</b> e7 |

A refinement attributed to Petrosian, but actually played by Charousek in the 'nineties – and probably dating back even farther.

White, having no other good waiting move, is obliged to develop, thus restricting his option of playing this Knight to e2.

4 cxd5 exd5 5 皇f4 c6 6 e3 皇f5 7 g4 (R.Byrne's 7 ②ge2! is best) 7...皇e6 (7...皇g6! is better) 8 h3 was played frequently in the 1963 title match between Botvinnik and Petrosian. White is slightly better.

Back to the main line. The shadow boxing is over.

5

6 e3

h6

Petrosian usually omits this move (see note to Black's 8th).

7 **Qh4** 

**b6** 

Tartakover's Defense.

8 cxd5

\*\*\*

The best procedure, opening the c-file and preparing 罩c1 with pressure on Black's c-pawn. An alternative is 8 单d3 单b7 9 0-0 ②bd7 10 罩c1 c5 11 營e2 dxc4 12 单xc4 ②e4=. (Petrosian-Fischer, Candidates' 1959.)


8 ...

2xd5

Inferior here is 8...exd5 9 ≜d3 and 10 €e5! followed by f4 with a Pillsbury attacking formation: White has g4-g5 in the air – this line is playable for Black only with his pawn on h7 (instead of h6).

響xe7 exd5

The text is drawish, but I had already clinched first prize.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 10...exd5

BERTOK

11 **Qe2** 

•••

Sharper is 11 国c1 鱼e6! 12 幽a4 c5 13 幽a3 国c8 14 鱼e2 and now 14...曾f8 levels while 14...曾b7! is the prescription for maintaining

tension. If 15 dxc5 bxc5 16 0-0 (16 基xc5? 基xc5 17 營xc5 營xb2 is bad for White) 16...營b6 is double-edged.

11 ... <u>\$e6!</u>

The right post. At b7 this Bishop would block the b-file and obstruct later operations there.


12 0-0 c5 13 dxc5? ...

Producing hanging center Pawns which, in this case, exert a tremendously cramping influence on White's future development. Better is 13 🖾 e5 🖾 d7 (not 13...c4? 14 b3 b5 15 a4) with equality.

| 13 | ***        | bxc5          |
|----|------------|---------------|
| 14 | <b>幽a4</b> | ₩b7!          |
| 15 | <b>豐a3</b> | <u>ව</u> ් d7 |
| 16 | ②e1        | ***           |

What else is there? Black's center is well-protected, and he is ready to assume the Q-side initiative with ...a5 and ... \$\mathbb{W}\$b4.

| 16 | •••        | a5   |
|----|------------|------|
| 17 | <b>△d3</b> | c4   |
| 18 | <b>②f4</b> | ⊑fb8 |



FISCHER

Position after 18... \$\bar{2}\$fb8

BERTOK

19 **≌ab1?** 

White's game is already difficult, e.g., 19 皇f3 ②f6 20 罩fd1 豐xb2 21 豐xb2 罩xb2 22 ②xd5 ②xd5 ②xd5 23 皇xd5 皇xd5 24 罩xd5 c3! 25 罩dd1

(if 25 罩c5 c2 26 罩c1 罩d8 wins) 25...c2 26 罩dc1 罩ab8 27 含f1 罩b1 28 含e2 罩xa1 29 罩xa1 罩b1 wins.

Best is 19 ②xe6 fxe6 20 臭g4 罩a6! 21 b3! (if 21 營e7? ②f8 or 21 罩ab1 營b4 22 營c3 營xc3 23 bxc3 罩ab6) 21...cxb3 22 axb3 營xb3 23 營e7 ②f8 24 罩a3 with good drawing chances (if 24...營b4 25 營xb4 至xb4 26 臭e2 罩a7 27 罩fa1 a4 28 臭d1, etc.).

| 19 | •••  | <b>≜</b> f5! |
|----|------|--------------|
| 20 | 罩bd1 | <b>包f6</b>   |
| 21 | ≌d2  | ***          |

The following variation gives some insight into the nature of White's problem: 21 皇f3 響xb2 22 響xb2 罩xb2 23 ②xd5 ②xd5 24 皇xd5 (if 24 罩xd5 皇e6 25 罩c5 罩c8! 26 罩xa5 c3 27 罩c1 c2 28 皇e4 罩b1! 29 罩xb1 cxb1=響+ 30 皇xb1 罩c1 mate) 24...罩c8 25 e4 皇e6! 26 皇xe6 fxe6 27 a4 c3 28 罩c1 c2 and White, completely tied up, must lose material.

FISCHER

Position after 21...g5!

2

Practically forcing the win of a piece.

22 ②xd5 ...

To break the hammer-lock. On 22 h5 e4 23 \square c2 \square b4 is crushing.

BERTOK

Not 23 &f3? &d3.

23 ...

₿e6

Black has some temporary discomfort but it's only a matter of time before he consolidates and wins with his extra piece.

Blundering a Pawn. The lesser evil is 24 axd5 axd5 25 f3 but White is still lost if Black exercises a modicum of caution.

24


②xe3!

Threatening mate.

| 25 | <b>豐xe3</b> | ≜xc4       |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 26 | h4          | ⊒e8        |
| 27 | <b>≝g3</b>  | <b>豐e7</b> |
| 28 | b3          | ≜e6        |
| 29 | f4          | g4         |

Sealing the g-file and neutralizing all threats.

30 h5 營c5+ 31 單f2 皇f5 White resigns



FISCHER

Final Position after 31...\$f5

BERTOK

# 35 Fischer - Julio Bolbochan [Argentina]

STOCKHOLM 1962

SICILIAN DEFENSE

### A brilliant cadenza

Called upon to face his favorite defense, Fischer quickly obtains the advantage against Black's rather passive opening strategy. Bolbochan, burdened with a bad Bishop against a good Knight, defends with extreme care but is gradually forced to retreat behind his lines. Disdaining several opportunities to enter a favorable ending, Fischer presses for a quick decision in the mid-game. His judgment is rewarded when the pressure which he painstakingly has accumulated erupts in a violent attack, beginning with 34 hxg6. Fischer's invasion on the weakened squares is a model of accuracy. It culminates in a keen combination which, appropriately, earned a tie for the first brilliancy prize.

| 1 | e4          | <b>c5</b>            |
|---|-------------|----------------------|
| 2 | <b>D</b> f3 | d6                   |
| 3 | <b>d4</b>   | cxd4                 |
| 4 | ∅xd4        | <b>∮</b> ) <b>f6</b> |
| 5 | ©c3         | a6                   |
| 6 | h3          | ***                  |

Black's loss of time with ...a6 may possibly justify this loss of time. The variation is specifically directed against the characteristic ...e5 of the Najdorf System. Thus if 6...e5 7 2 de2 2e7 (or 7...2e6 8 g4 d5 9 exd5 2xd5 10 2g2 with a comfortable edge) 8 g4 0-0 9 2g3! g6 10 g5 2e8 11 h4 with a powerful attack: e.g., 11...f6? 12 2c4+2g7 13 h5 fxg5 14 hxg6 hxg6 15 2h5+!

6 ... ②c6

For 6...g6 see game 43. For 6...b5 see game 41.


| 7 | g4         | ②xd4       |
|---|------------|------------|
| 8 | ₩xd4       | <b>e</b> 5 |
| 9 | <b>營d3</b> | <b>≜e7</b> |

More accurate is 9... 2e6 immediately.

Weak is 10 b3 as played in Gereben-Geller, Budapest 1952.

Now the Knight interferes with the normal development of the QB. But on 10... 4 h5 11 h4 followed by an eventual \$\frac{1}{2}e^2\$ will cause trouble.

Sharper is 11 h4 包c5 12 豐f3.



**BOLBOCHAN** 

Position after 11 2e3

**FISCHER** 

The best chance is 11... ②xg5 12 ③xg5 營xg5 13 營xd6 營e7 14 營xe7+ ②xe7 15 ②d5+ 查f8 16 0-0-0 g6 (KOTOV) holding White to a minimal endgame edge.

Amateurs are often puzzled by this apparent loss of time. Actually it is a handy defensive move, getting out of the pin on the c-file which could become annoying after ... b5-b4. One never knows when lightning will strike!

The knight has no future on c5, so Bolbochan tries to bring it into play via b6.

| 16 | h4  | <b>b</b> 5 |
|----|-----|------------|
| 17 | ≜h3 | 鱼xh3       |

After 17...②b6 18 &xb6 營xb6 19 ②d5 營d8 (not 19... &xd5? 20 &xc8) 20 ②xe7+ 營xe7 21 營xd6, etc.

On 17... Ze8 18 2d5 2f8 19 h5 with a tremendous bind. Black has to reckon with the possible breakthrough on g6.

| 18 | ≅xh3       | ② <b>b</b> 6 |
|----|------------|--------------|
| 19 | <u> </u>   | <b>豐xb6</b>  |
| 20 | <b>②d5</b> | •••          |

White has a strategically won game; his Knight cannot be dislodged.


| 20 | *** | <b>₩d8</b> |
|----|-----|------------|
| 21 | f4  | 9.00%      |

Threatening f5. An example of some of the nonsense that has been written about my games, both by admirers and detractors, is the following (by Lublinsky) in the 1962 Russian *Yearbook:* "Brilliant intuition! Fischer refuses to enter into the Rook and Pawn endgame and plays to continue his attack." But White can't! Not 21 ②xe7+? Wxe7 22 Wxd6?? Ifd8 and Black wins.

| 21 | ***        | exf4        |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 22 | ₩xf4       | <b>₩</b> d7 |
| 23 | <b>豐f5</b> | ⊑cd8        |

Insufficient is 23... Ifd8? (or 23... Insufficient is 23... Insuff

Shows how ideal the position is – White can afford the luxury of probing weaknesses on both wings.



**BOLBOCHAN** 

Position after 24... 營a7

FISCHER

25 罩c3

Tempting is 25 包f6+!? 臭xf6 (if 25...gxf6? 26 gxf6 堂h8 27 豐g5 罩g8 28 fxe7!) 26 gxf6 g6 27 豐g5 堂h8 and White has no forced win in sight. Objectively best is 25 包xe7+ 豐xe7 26 罩xa6 罩fe8 27 a4! But I was hoping to win in the middle game. Ironically, I wouldn't have been warded the brilliancy prize had I chosen the best line here. They don't give medals for endgame technique!

25 ...

g6!

On 25... 曾d7? 26 富c7 wins. On 25... 富d7? 26 ⑤f6+! 食xf6 (26... gxf6 宣 gxf6 宣 h8 28 fxe7 wins) 27 gxf6 g6 28 曾g5 宣 h8 29 曾h6 富g8 三 富c8! forces mate.

26 **營g4** 27 **營f3**  ₩d7

**豐e6** 

Not 27... **国**c8? 28 **国**xc8 **国**xc8 29 **包**b6.

28 **ℤc7** 


**Zde8** 

回 28... Idd 29 回f4 wins. And after 28... Ife8 29 Iff Black has maily any moves. 29... Ic8 is answered by 30 Ia7 Ia8 31 Ixa8 Ixa8 Ixa8 Ic7.

29 **⊘f4** 30 **⊆d5** 31 **a3**  響e5

**營h8** 

...



**BOLBOCHAN** 

Position after 31 a3

**FISCHER** 

31 ..

h6

A bid for freedom — otherwise 罩a7 mops up the Q-side Pawns. On 31...f6 32 營b3! 罩f7 33 罩xd6 fxg5 34 hxg5 營e5 35 罩f6! 罩ef8 36 罩xf7 罩xf7 37 罩c8+ 食f8 38 ②e6 wins.

*32* gxh6

₩xh6

On 32... 2xh4? 33 \( \times \text{xg6! fxg6 } 34 \) \( \text{\text{"b3}} \) is decisive (34... \( \text{\text{\text{\$\text{2}}} f7 } 35 \) \( \text{\text{\$\exitex{\$\tex{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exi}\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\texi{\$

*33* **h5** 


皇g5

After 33...g5 34 ©e2 followed by ©d4(or g3)-f5 maintains a winning bind. Black also has to contend with the threat of \(\mathbb{Z}\)a7.

34 hxg6!

fxg6

On 34...2xf4 35 gxf7+ \( \frac{1}{2}xf7 \) 36 \( \frac{1}{2}xf7 \) \( \frac{1}{2}xf7 \) 37 \( \frac{1}{2}h5! \) wins.



BOLBOCHAN

Position after 34...fxg6

**FISCHER** 

35 **譽b3!** 

The coup de grâce.

*35* ...

罩xf4

On 35...會h8 (or 35... 拿xf4 36 罩h5+) 36 ②xg6+ 豐xg6 37 罩xg5 罩f1+ (37... 豐xg5 38 豐h3+ forces mate) 38 會a2 豐xg5 39 豐h3+ 會g8 40 豐xf1 leads to a win.

36 **Ze5**+ 37 **Zxe8**+

**含f8** 

Black resigns

After 37... 查xe8 38 豐e6+ 查f8 39 豐c8+ mates.

# **36** Fischer - Korchnoi [ u.s.s.r. ]

STOCKHOLM 1962

RUY LOPEZ

## Gaston and Alphonse

"I like to coax my opponents into attacking, to let them taste the joy of the initiative, so that they may get carried away, become careless, and sacrifice material," wrote Korchnoi, whose comments are interwoven in the notes.

Fischer needs no coaxing. He improves on a well-known Capablanca line (with 15 d5). Still, the advantage he derives, if any, is microscopic. Korchnoi seems to labor under the delusion that he has the worst of it, though Fischer keeps asserting that White has nothing. Nevertheless, he overreaches himself, giving Korchnoi a chance to assume the initiative. But Black falters and then cracks under the pressure of the clock.

| 1 | e4          | e5         |
|---|-------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>2</b> 13 | <b>②c6</b> |
| 3 | <b>鱼b5</b>  | <b>a</b> 6 |
| 4 | <b>≜a4</b>  | <b>②f6</b> |
| 5 | 0-0         | <b>皇e7</b> |
| 6 | 罩e1         | <b>b</b> 5 |
| 7 | <b>≜</b> b3 | 0-0        |
| 8 | <b>c</b> 3  | <b>d6</b>  |
| 9 | <b>d4</b>   | ***        |

An old try, championed by Yates and Alekhine, but discarded in the course of progress. It is still theoretically crucial — on its success (or failure) hinges the necessity of White's losing a tempo here with the customary 9 h3.

| 9  | ***  | <u> </u> |
|----|------|----------|
| 10 | _≜e3 | exd4     |


Gligorich's 10...d5 is probably best. On the old 10...包xe4!? 11 鱼d5 豐d7 12 鱼xe4 d5 13 鱼xh7+! 含xh7 14 dxe5, White, according to Robert Byrne, can keep his extra Pawn and weather the attack.

### 11 **cxd4**

### 2a5

11...d5 12 e5 ②e4 13 ②bd2 ②xd2 14 營xd2 盒xf3 15 gxf3 **\$**b4 16 營c2 **\$**xe1 17 營xc6 **\$**b4 18 **\$**xd5 is known to favor White.

12 **gc2** 



KORCHNOI

Position after 12 \(\mathbb{L}c2\)

**FISCHER** 

12

②c4

12...c5 may be better; 13 \(\Delta\)bd2 cxd4 14 \(\Delta\)xd4 \(\Delta\)c6 15 \(\Delta\)e3 d5 16 exd5 \(\Delta\)bd= (Yates-Bogolyubow, New York 1924.) Hence 13 dxc5 dxc5 14 \(\Delta\)bd2 seems the only try for an advantage.

13 **遠c1** 14 **b3**  **c**5

Interesting is 14 \( \text{\text{D}bd2} \text{\text{D}xd2} \) \( \text{2xd2} \) \( \text{2xf3} \) 16 gxf3. (Geller-Panno, Amsterdam 1956.)

14

②a5

Korchnoi is of a mind that the retreat 14...心b6 completely equalizes. But White can keep a pull after 15 心bd2 cxd4 (maybe better is 15...心fd7 16 h3 逸h5 17 g4 逸g6 18 d5 逸f6 19 罩b1 h5! Pietzsch-Szabo, 1962) 16 h3 逸h5 17 g4! 逸g6 18 心xd4. (Pietzsch-Matanovich, Havana 1962.)

"A strong continuation which improves on 15 \(\frac{15}{2}\)b2 \(\frac{16}{2}\)c6! 16 d5 \(\frac{16}{2}\)b4 (Capablanca-Bogolyubow, London 1922) when Black gains the advantage of the pair of Bishops." (KORCHNOI.)

15 ...

**②d7** 

On 15...公xe4 16 罩xe4 鱼xf3 17 營xf3 鱼f6 18 公c3 b4 19 鱼b2 bxc3 20 鱼xc3 鱼xc3 21 營xc3 White has a big advantage.

16 **②bd2** 

皇f6

Aiming to strike on the dark squares before White can mobilize a K-side initiative.

17 **罩b1** 

c4

Korchnoi considers this overambitious, believing that it creates too many Pawn weaknesses. He thinks Black ought to play 17...②e5 18 h3 ②xf3+19 ②xf3 ②xf3 20 營xf3 b4; but after 21 ②f4 罩e8 (too passive is 21...②b7 22 ②d3, etc.) 22 營g3 ②e5 23 ③xe5 罩xe5 (if 23...dxe5 24 ③d3) 24 f4 罩e7 25 罩bd1 (threatening e5) maintains the pressure.

18 h3

"White does not fall for 18 b4? c3! 19 bxa5 cxd2 20 axd2 De5 when the ensuing break-up of the Pawn protection of White's King more than compensates for his extra doubled Pawn." (KORCHNOI.)

18 ...

⊈xf3

"Giving White the two Bishops, but if 18...\$\frac{1}{2}h5 19 b4! is now strong: 19...c3 20 bxa5 cxd2 21 \$\frac{1}{2}xd2 \$\frac{1}{2}e5 22 g4." (KORCHNOI.)

In this line simply 19...\(\Delta\)b7 followed by ...a5 yields good counterplay. On 18...\(\Delta\)h5 I intended 19 g4! (deadening Black's Bishop is worth this weakness). 19...\(\Delta\)g6 20 \(\Delta\)f1-g3, etc.

19 Dxf3

cxb3

 Black's Knight on a5 is stranded; should it retreat to b7, then b4 smothers its future.


| <i>20</i> | axb3        | <b>≝c7</b> |
|-----------|-------------|------------|
| 21        | <u></u> ≜e3 | •••        |

"Up to here, White has played in excellent style, but this inaccurate move considerably improves the Black position. White ought to play 21 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d2 or, still better, 21 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e2! protecting the KB and preparing the powerful maneuver \(\frac{1}{2}\)d4." (KORCHNOI.)

The truth is, White just doesn't have that much. After 21 皇d2 or 罩e2 Black can still reply with ....皇c3.

"Now Black has sufficient play on the black squares." (KORCHNOI.)

*23* ∅**d4** ...



#### **KORCHNOI**

Position after 23 🖾d4

**FISCHER** 

23 ... \( \begin{align\*} \begin{alig

"Worried by his loose Pawn front and his scattered minor pieces, Black decides that he ought to get another piece into play rather than spend a move protecting his King's side. However, Fischer soon demonstrates that the White Knight obtains splendid prospects on the King's side, hence 23...g6 is much better." (KORCHNOI.)

On 23...g6 24 皇d3 ②c5 25 罩c2 ②ab7 26 ②e2 皇g7 the Bishop dances away and White has nothing.

| 24 | <b>约f5</b>   | ∅b7 |
|----|--------------|-----|
| 25 | <b>≜.d</b> 4 | დრ  |

The threat was  $\triangle xg7$ .

| 26 | <b>∅h6</b> + | <b>當f8</b> |
|----|--------------|------------|
| 27 | 罩c1!         | •••        |

"This powerful move is a reminder to Black that he has problems on the c-file as well as in the neighborhood of his King." (KORCHNOI.)

"In the event of White's exchanging Bishops, Black wants to be ready to recapture with a piece (Queen or Rook) rather than be left with a Pawn on c3 which will most likely be fatally weak." (KORCHNOI.)

Not 27... 2xd4 28 \widetilde{\text{w}} xd4 f6 29 \widetilde{\text{w}} xb4.

"This inaccuracy grants Black a fresh chance of recovery. A very strong continuation here was 28 \( \mathbb{Z} e3! \) with the threat of 29 \( \mathbb{L} xc3 \) bxc3 \( 30 \) \( \mathbb{Z} d4! \) f6 \( 31 \) \( \mathbb{L} b1 \) when the c-Pawn would fall." (KORCHNOI.)

On 28... add 29 Zec2 maintains the pin.

| 29 | ⊒ec2         | <b> ②e5</b> |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 30 | <u>\$</u> f1 | ②c5         |

"Sacrificing a Pawn for the moment; but the Black pieces obtain excellent activity." (KORCHNOI.)

| 31 | <b>≜xc3</b> | bxc3       |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 32 | ≅xc3        | <b>⊈g7</b> |
| 33 | <b>ᡚg4</b>  | ②xg4       |
| 34 | <b>營xg4</b> | <b>罩b8</b> |

Breaking the pin and threatening the e-Pawn and/or the b-Pawn. Not 34... \( \textit{Z} \text{xe4?} ? 35 \) \( \text{w} \text{xc8} .

"White's best chance is to revive his attack on the King's wing." (KORCHNOI.)

| 35 | •••        | ©xe4 |
|----|------------|------|
| 36 | <b>營f4</b> | f5   |

"36...\Zb7 may be safer here." (KORCHNOL)


The text weakens the K-side, but White can't exploit it.

| 37 | ≌e3 | ≝e5           |
|----|-----|---------------|
| 38 | Ĭc6 | <b>≝be8!?</b> |

"Short of time, I overlooked White's next move completely. Even so, the text is not bad, but for practical purposes Black ought to choose the simple 38...g5 maintaining a good position without risk." (KORCHNOI.)

After 38...g5 39 營f3 罩be8 40 罩xa6 營xd5 41 b4 the chances are approximately equal.





#### KORCHNOI

Position after 39 \( \bar{\textit{Z}} \)xd6!

**FISCHER** 

39 ...

₩a1?

"A bad error, after which Black is two Pawns behind with no compensation. Correct and necessary is 39...g5! 40 国d7+ 當g6 41 營f3 當b6! with the threat 42...公xf2!. For instance:

- A] 42 &d3? ②xf2 43 基xe5 ②xd3 dis. ch.
- B] 42 g4? 如xf2 43 罩xe5 如xg4 dis. ch.

"Instead, Black panics at the unexpected turn of events, and Fischer efficiently finishes the game in a few moves." (KORCHNOI.)


Incidentally, Korchnoi neglects to add that after 41... \$\mathbb{\text{\subset}}\$ Black has the additional threat of ... \$\subseteq\$ f6 (as well as ... \$\subseteq\$ xf2) trapping the Rook. He also neglects to analyze the right defense: 42 \$\mathbb{\text{\subseteq}}\$ e2! \$\subseteq\$ xf2 (What else? If 42... f4 43 \$\mathbb{\text{\subseteq}}\$ xe4 \$\mathbb{\text{\subseteq}}\$ e2 \$\mathbb{\text{\subseteq}}\$ h6 45 \$\mathbb{\text{\subseteq}}\$ c7! wins): 43 \$\mathbb{\text{\subseteq}}\$ xe5!

35 ... ②xe4 36 ≝f4 f5

"36...罩b7 may be safer here." (KORCHNOI.)
The text weakens the K-side, but White can't exploit it.

"Short of time, I overlooked White's next move completely. Even so, the text is not bad, but for practical purposes Black ought to choose the simple 38...g5 maintaining a good position without risk." (KORCHNOI.)

After 38...g5 39 營f3 罩be8 40 罩xa6 營xd5 41 b4 the chances are approximately equal.



KORCHNOI

Position after 39 \( \bar{\textit{Z}}\)xd6!

**FISCHER** 

39 ..

**幽a1?** 

"A bad error, after which Black is two Pawns behind with no compensation. Correct and necessary is 39...g5! 40 單d7+ 當g6 41 響f3 響b6! with the threat 42...⑤xf2!. For instance:

- A] 42 鱼d3? 如xf2 43 罩xe5 如xd3 dis. ch.
- B] 42 g4? ⑤xf2 43 罩xe5 ⑤xg4 dis. ch.
- c] 42 罩xe4! (best) 42...罩xe4 43 g4 罩f4 44 gxf5+ 當h6 45 豐g3 罩e5 with at least a draw.


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Incidentally, Korchnoi neglects to add that after 41...豐b6! Black has the additional threat of ...②f6 (as well as ...②xf2) trapping the Rook. He also neglects to analyze the right defense: 42 豐e2! ②xf2 (What else? If 42...f4 43 罩xe4 罩xe4 44 豐c2 含h6 45 罩c7! wins); 43 罩xe5!

②e4+ (it's fascinating that Black has no better discovery; if 43...公g4+44 国e3! 国xe3 45 營xa6 營xa6 46 夏xa6 公f6! 47 国d8 国xb3=. But not 43...公xh3++? 44 含h2 營g1+ 45 含g3! f4+ 46 含f3! 国xe5 47 營xa6+! wins) 44 含h2 国xe5 45 營xa6 營xa6 46 夏xa6 公f6 regaining the d-Pawn with a draw in view.

| 40 | <b>ℤxa6</b> | <b>≝d4</b>    |
|----|-------------|---------------|
| 41 | 罩d3         | ₩b2           |
| 42 | d6          | g5            |
| 43 | <b>營e3</b>  | f4            |
| 44 | ₩a7+        | Black resigns |

Black must lose a Rook after 44... 會f8 45 d7 罩d8 46 營b6 會e7 47 營xd8+ 含xd8 48 罩a8+ followed by 49 d8=營+.



#### **KORCHNOI**

Final Position after 44 營a7+

**FISCHER** 

# **37** Keres [U.S.S.R.] - Fischer

CURAÇAO 1962 SICILIAN DEFENSE

# Only a draw

This contest brings to mind Emanuel Lasker's axiom: "When evenly matched opponents play 'correctly' the games seldom have any content and frequently end in draws." Here a little incorrect play provokes a series of brilliant moves leading to a most unusual draw.

Employing a slow, closed system against the Sicilian, Keres is strategically outplayed. By adjournment, however, he manages to achieve equality. Fischer refuses a draw, and the struggle flares anew. Working with a Rook against two minor pieces, he makes steady inroads. Each serpentine twist in the endgame, including the double error on move 56, is a joy, a revelation, and a study in itself. Keres' saving resources smack of sheer wizardry.

| 1 | <b>e4</b>  | <b>c</b> 5 |
|---|------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>空e2</b> | d6         |
| 3 | g3         | <b>g</b> 6 |

Sharper is 3...d5! 4 &g2 dxe4 5 &xe4 (on Lombardy's 5 0bc3 0f6 equalizes – but not 5...f5 6 d3 exd3 7 cxd3 0f6 8 0-0) and White's attack is worth more than a Pawn) 5...0f6 6 2g2 0c6 7 0-0 e6=.

Harmless. Correct is 5 c3 ②c6 6 d4 with a powerful center. If Black goes Pawn hunting now he gets shattered: 6...cxd4 7 cxd4 營b6? 8 ②bc3 ②xd4? 9 ②d5 營c5 10 ②xd4 ②xd4 11 ②e3! ③xe3 12 fxe3 營a5+ 13 b4 營d8 14 冨c1 冨b8 15 0-0 ②d7 16 營d4 f6 17 ②c7+ ⑤f7 18 e5! with a strong attack. (Samarian-Wesen, corres. 1958.) The sober 6...e5 7 dxc5 dxc5 8 營xd8+ ②xd8 9 ②a3 allows White only a slightly better ending.

6 c3 e5! 7 d3

Now White has to regroup in order to get in d4.

7 ... ②ge7 8 a3 ...

A lemon, but already White must fight for equality. On 8 &e3 0-0 9 d4 exd4 10 cxd4 (Pachman-Tal, Amsterdam 1964) 10...cxd4 (also good is 10...d5 11 \( \tilde{\to}\) bc3 \( \tilde{\te}\)g4!) 11 \( \tilde{\to}\)xd4 \( \tilde{\to}\)e5 Black captures the initiative.

8 ... 0-0

Deciding to ignore the Q-side. Keres hoped for 8...a5 9 a4! and White has tricked Black into weakening his b5 square.

9 **b4** ...

Probably played against Keres' better judgment, but I guess he wanted to justify his last move. One lemon leads to another.

9 ... b6 10 f4 exf4!

Abandoning the center to play against White's shaky Pawn structure.

11 gxf4 ...


Not 11 axf4? (or 11 axf4 d5) 11...cxb4 12 axb4 axb4!

11 ... d5!

Wrong is 11...cxb4 12 axb4 @xb4? 13 f5! @ec6 14 d4 @a6 15 e5, etc.

. 12 e5 ...

Poker-faced, as always, Keres made this move as though it were the most natural one on the board. But it was the last thing he wanted to do, since it exposes the poverty of White's strategy.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 12 e5

**KERES** 

12 ...

皇g4

Not bad, but 12... 15 à la Nimzovich is even better. After 13 23 2ce7 maintains a solid blockade, and Black can break with ... 16 at his leisure.

13 h3

≜xe2

Black's QB makes it difficult to exploit the white square weaknesses.

The only way to keep the center from crumbling. After 15 e6 f5 the advanced e-pawn becomes a target.

15 ... ②a5
16 ②d2 ...

Better is 16 罩a2. If then 16...fxe5 17 fxe5 罩xf1+ 18 豐xf1 食xe5 19 食g5! is strong.

Any recapture proves to be awkward. Also 18 皇xf1 豐c7! 19 包f3 (not 19 d4 cxd4 20 cxd4 豐c3) 19...包b3 is similar to the game.

| 18 | ***  | <b>2</b> b3 |
|----|------|-------------|
| 19 | 罩b1  | ②xc1        |
| 20 | ≣xc1 | <b>營c7!</b> |
| 21 | ≣e1  | •••         |

Still impossible is 21 d4? cxd4 and White can't recapture because of the pin. Despite the drawing tendency of the opposite colored Bishops, White has a difficult game: he's weak on all the squares and his King is somewhat exposed.

| 21 | •••        | ℤd8 |
|----|------------|-----|
| 22 | <b>②h2</b> |     |

Black gets an iron grip after 22 d4 cxd4 23 cxd4 2f5 followed by ... \( \hat{2}\)h6, etc.


| 22 | ***  | d4   |
|----|------|------|
| 23 | cxd4 | cxd4 |
| 24 | ②f3? | 2000 |

A terrible boner, just when White could equalize with 24 包g4! 置f8 25 置f1.

24 ... <u>\$h6!</u>

Keres probably underestimated the strength of this reply.





**FISCHER** 

Position after 26 響e6

KERES

26 ... 5\(\text{d5}\)?

Tempting but wrong. Correct is 26...②f5! 27 營f6+ (if 27 公h2? 彙e3+ wins) 27.... 28 營e6 罩f8 followed by .... 2h6 again, and it's just a matter of time before Black invades on the weak dark squares. For example, 29 公g5 (not 29 公h2 營c3!) 29... 2h6 30 公e4 2e3+ 31 含h1 2f4 32 公f6 營c3 33 罩d1 營c2, etc.

*27* ∅**h2!** 

The saving clause. Not 27 ②xd4? 營c5.

27 ... **De3** 

After 27... ②f4? 28 豐f6+ 曾g8 29 ②g4 White wins!

28 **&c6!** ...

Now the Queen is hemmed in and Black has nothing. The Knight on e3 must coordinate with the heavy artillery to be really meaningful.

28 ... **宣f8** 29 **公f3 皇f4** 

On 29... \(\text{\ti}}\text{\tetx{\text{\tetx{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\tet{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\te

Not 32 ②xd4?? 曾g3+.

32 ... <u>@xe3+</u>

On 32... 響f4 33 會f2! holds.

 33
 当xe3
 当g3+

 34
 含f1
 当xh3+

 35
 空e1
 当f5

 36
 d4
 空g7


36...h5? 37 營h6+ 當g8 38 盒d5+ 營xd5 39 營xg6+ draws.

37 **∲f2!** ...

The right plan – the King must stay on the K-side to blockade Black's Pawns. Eventually Black, to make progress, must advance; but in so doing he will expose his King to perpetual check.

Worse is 37 豐e5+ 豐xe5+ 38 dxe5 罩f4 (intending 罩a4). White's e-Pawn can always be stopped by the King.

On 39... 曾f4+ 40 豐xf4 罩xf4 41 會g3 holds. And not 39...h4? 40 豐e7+ 罩f7 41 豐xf7+!



The game was adjourned and Keres sealed his move. Upon resuming the next day, he offered me a draw, which I rejected. I knew Black no longer had a winning advantage, but felt no harm could come from continuing since there was little danger of losing. Besides, winning this game would still have put me in contention for first place even as late as round 14, the halfway mark.

| 41 | ₩e2         | <b>營f5</b>   |
|----|-------------|--------------|
| 42 | <b>豐e3</b>  | g5           |
| 43 | <b>堂g2</b>  | <u>□</u> g4+ |
| 44 | <b>Ġ</b> f2 | 罩f4          |
| 45 | <b>堂</b> g2 | ₩c2+         |

Beginning a series of exploratory checks to see if White goes to the wrong square. For instance, 46 曾g3? 置g4+ 47 曾h3 豐g2 mate. Hope springs eternal!

| 46 | \$h1       | <b>幽b1</b> + |
|----|------------|--------------|
| 47 | \$h2       | ₩a2+         |
| 48 | <b>∲h3</b> | <b>豐f7</b>   |
| 49 | <b>∲h2</b> | <b>豐f6</b>   |
| 50 | <b>\$2</b> | <b>\$</b> 97 |

Getting out of the potential pin. Not 50...g4? 51 \dig g3. Black must strive to advance the Pawns so that they retain maximum mobility.


52 當h2? loses to 52...g4.

52 ... **Eg4**+

## 52...g4 is refuted by 53 @xh4!

| 53 | <b>Ġh1</b> | <b>ℤg3</b> |
|----|------------|------------|
| 54 | ₩e4        | g4         |
| 55 | <b>②h2</b> | <b>豐g5</b> |
| 56 | Øf1?       |            |

A blunder on the last move of the second time-control. Perhaps Keres has allowed me to get a little too much out of the position, but he can still hold a draw with 56 營e5+! 營xe5 57 dxe5 (threatening 急d7) 57... 基xa3 58 公xg4, etc.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 56 42f1?

KERES

56 ...

罩h3+?

I had a feeling this might be a mistake, but time was short and I had to make a move – any move. "Patzer sees a check, gives a check." But now the game can no longer be won.

Correct is 56... 基xa3! 57 d5 g3 58 d6 (if 58 **\$** d7 **基** a1 59 **\$** g2 **基** a2+60 **\$** g1 **\$** f6 61 **\$** f5 **\$** f2) 58... **基** a1 59 **\$** e7+ (if 59 **\$** g1 **\$** c5+ wins) 59... **\$** xe7 60 dxe7 h3! 61 e8= ①+**\$** f8 wins.

| 57 | <b>ġg1</b>  | <b>≣xa3</b> |
|----|-------------|-------------|
| 58 | d5          | <b>g</b> 3  |
| 59 | <b>≜d7!</b> | <b>⊑a1</b>  |

No longer gains a tempo, as in the last note.


60 <u>\$f5!</u> ...

The idea is to advance the Pawn to d6 without allowing ... <u>w</u>c5+. I must confess that I still expected to win. But now Keres really starts to find moves!

| 61 | ₩f4   | ≣e1 |
|----|-------|-----|
| 62 | d6    | ≌e5 |
| 63 | ₩g4+! | ••• |

Not 63 d7? 罩xf5 64 豐xf5 豐xf5 65 d8=豐 豐f2+ and mate next.

63 ... **♦ f8**64 **d7 Ed5** 



#### **FISCHER**

KERES

On 65... 營b2+ 66 會h3 營f2 67 奠e4! 營xf1+ 68 奠g2 營f2 69 營b4+! holds.

66 **Qxd7!** ...


I thought this was a mistake at the time, but that he was lost anyway. Keres, however, has seen just one move further –

66 **營f2**+ 67 **曾h3 豐xf1**+ 68 曾xh4 g2**豐b4+** 曾f7! 69 **譽b3+** 當g7 70 **豐g3**+ 71 當h7!

Haven – at last. Now I was sure I had him. Surely he would go in for 72 食f5+ 豐xf5 73 豐xg2 豐f4+! 74 豐g4 (on 74 含h3 豐h6+! wins) 74...豐xg4+ 75 含xg4 含g6! gaining the opposition and winning White's last Pawn by force.

#### 

What's this? He makes no attempt to stop me from queening!? Gradually my excitement subsided. The more I studied the situation, the more I realized Black had no win.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 72 We5!!

KERES

72 ...

**₩h1+** 

The main line also draws – by a miracle: 72... 響f2+ 73 當h3 g1=響 (making a Knight with check also doesn't win) 74 皇f5+ 當h6 (74... 響xf5+ 75 響xf5+ 響g6 76 豐xg6+ 含xg6 77 當g4! is similar to the final note) 75 營f6+ 含h5 76 皇g6+! 營xg6 77 營g5+!! 含xg5 Stalemate!

73 **盒h3** 

響xh3+

| 74        | 當xh3         | g1=營         |
|-----------|--------------|--------------|
| <i>75</i> | <b>豐e7</b> + | <b>\$</b> h8 |
| 76        | <b>學18</b> + | <b>åh7</b>   |
| 77        | <b>₩f7</b> + |              |

Drawn

A last try might have been 77... 曾g7 78 曾xg7+! 曾xg7 79 曾g3! holding the "distant opposition": e.g., 79... 會f6 80 曾f4 曾e6 81 曾e4 曾d6 82 曾d4 曾c7 83 曾d5 曾b7 84 曾c4 曾c7 85 曾d5 曾d7 86 曾e5 and Black can't penetrate.

# **38** Fischer - Keres [ u.s.s.r. ]

CURAÇAO 1962 RUY LOPEZ

## Detective story

Occasionally one comes across a miraculous victory in which, despite intensive post-mortems, there seems to be no losing move or pattern, no blunder on the part of the vanquished. But how can that be possible? A loser must make a mistake somewhere, however infinitesimal, however it may evade detection. Is it Keres' opening novelty which leads him to disaster? Could his defense have been improved afterward? If so: where? Whatever the answer, the reader is invited to share the magnifying glass with Fischer and hunt for that elusive error.


| 1 | e4          | e5         |
|---|-------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>∅</b> f3 | ②c6        |
| 3 | <b>L</b> b5 | a6         |
| 4 | ≗a4         | <b>∅f6</b> |
| 5 | 0-0         | ₫e7        |
| 6 | 罩e1         | <b>b</b> 5 |
| 7 | <b>≜b3</b>  | d6         |
| 8 | c3          | 0-0        |
| 9 | h3          | •••        |

For 9 d4 see game 36.

| 9  | ***        | €)a5       |
|----|------------|------------|
| 10 | <b>≜c2</b> | <b>c</b> 5 |
| 11 | d4         | <b>©d7</b> |

"Now it is not easy to find a satisfactory continuation for White." (KERES.)

Keres' novelty, introduced on this occasion, has since become quite fashionable. I was – and still am – unimpressed. Black loses time redeveloping his knight to b6, but the K-side is weakened by its absence and it's questionable whether the Knight is not better where it stands originally.



**KERES** 

Position after 11...�d7

**FISCHER** 

12 dxc5!

12 \( \text{\text{D}}\)bd2 was all the rage, but 12...cxd4 13 cxd4 \( \text{\text{D}}\)c6 may equalize. But not 12 dxe5 \( \text{\text{D}}\)xe5! with complete freedom.

"In spite of having won this game, it is probable that Fischer is not very convinced of the correctness of this continuation, because in a later game he closed the center with 12 d5." (KERES.)

According to that logic, Keres must not be convinced of the correctness of 11... 42d7 since he later varied with the old 11... 42c7 (against Gligorich at Hastings 1965).

| 12 | ***   | dxc5        |
|----|-------|-------------|
| 13 | €Dbd2 | <b>營c7?</b> |

This is supposed to lead to trouble. If such a natural developing move is bad, then what kind of a position is this for Black? At the time Boleslavsky in his notes gave "13...f6!=" and this cryptic evaluation apparently cowed the chess world into abandoning 12 dxc5 – until very recently. After 13...f6 14 \( \tilde{1}\) h4 \( \tilde{1}\) b6 15 \( \tilde{1}\) f5 \( \tilde{1}\) f7 (Fischer-Ivkov, Havana 1965) 16 \( \tilde{2}\) g4! (instead of my 16 \( \tilde{1}\) xe7+?) 16...\( \tilde{2}\) h8 17 h4! threatening h5 followed by \( \tilde{1}\) f3-h4 is in White's favor: e.g., 17...g6 18 \( \tilde{1}\) h6 \( \tilde{1}\) g7 \( \tilde{1}\) and \( \tilde{1}\) f3, etc.

| 14 | <b>9</b> n | ② <b>b</b> 6 |
|----|------------|--------------|
| 15 | ©e3        | <b>ℤd8</b>   |
| 16 | ₩e2        | <u> </u>     |
| 17 | ∅d5!       |              |


The idea is to open lines and take advantage of Black's weakened K-side.

17 ...

∅xd5

18 exd5
19 © xe5

≜xd5



**KERES** 

Position after 19 Exe5

**FISCHER** 

Since his early attacking days, Keres has switched to positional-defensive chess. But this type of position is too much even for him.

19 ...

ℤa7

To defend the second rank. What else can Black do? White threatens to build up with 单f4 and 罩ad1, and already sacrificial themes are in the air.

20 **鼻f4** 


₩b6

### 21 **Zad1!**

Threatening 22 \( \) \(

21 ... g6

22 **©g4** 



**KERES** 

Position after 22 2g4

**FISCHER** 

22 ...

5)c4

Some recommended the more direct 23 ②h6+ 會g7 24 罩xd5 罩xd5 25 ②xf7. I thought this might win at the time, but it looked speculative — and 25... 營f6! refutes. Since Black is tied up in knots, I felt sure of a patient strategical victory.

23 ...

\$e6

23...②xb2 loses to 24 罩xd5! 罩xd5 25 兔e4 罩d8 26 豐xb2 f5 27 c4! (threatening 豐g7 mate).

24 **≜b3!** 

Pinning the Knight and piling on the pressure.

24 ..

**營b8** 

To prevent White's Queen, in some variations, from penetrating to e5.


25 **\\ \( \) \( \) <b>\( \) \** 

₫xd8

Not 25...豐xd8? 26 皇xc4 皇xc4 (if 26...bxc4 27 豐e5) 27 日f6+! 含h8 28 豐e5, etc.

bxc4

Cashing in! "Converting a spatial advantage into a material one." (See Evans' New Ideas in Chess.)



KERES

Position after 27 \under xc4!

FISCHER

27 ...

**₩d6** 

Not 27... 豐xb2 28 罩xe6! Or 27... 拿xc4?? 28 罩e8 mate.

28 **₩a4** 

豐e7

| 29 | <b>②f6</b> + | <b>\$h8</b> |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 30 | <b>包d5</b>   | <b>≝d7</b>  |
| 31 | ₩e4!         | •••         |

Back to the old stand, angling for e5 again.

31... 2xd5? 32 We8+ mates. The weakness of Black's first rank has consistently proved to be his undoing throughout the mid-game.

*32* **②f4** ...

32 c4 is also good.

32 ... 罩e7

Token resistance.

33 **åg**5 ...

33 皇f8! wins outright.

33 ... **罩e8** 34 **食xd8 罩xd8** 

On 34... 響xd8 35 響e5+ f6 (not 35... 會g8 36 包d5!) 36 響xc5 鱼xa2 37 罩xe8+ 豐xe8 38 c4 is the easiest path to victory.

On 35... Ze8 36 We5+ is decisive.

₩xe6 36 fxe6 37 **ℤxe6** 罩d1+ 罩d2 會h2 38 罩b6 罩xf2 39 罩b7! 罩f6 40 當g3 41 Black resigns

Not only is Black a Pawn behind, but his King on the first rank is cut off as well. A likely winning line is 41... 會 8 42 b4 cxb4 43 cxb4 罩d6 44 a4 罩d3+ 45 會h2 罩a3 46 a5 罩a4 (if 46... 會h8 47 會g1 罩a2 48 會f1 會g8 49 會e1 罩xg2 50 b5 axb5 51 a6 罩a2 52 a7) 47 會g3 and the King invades!

# **39** Botvinnik [U.S.S.R.] - Fischer

## VARNA OLYMPIC 1962

### GRUENFELD DEFENSE

# The confrontation

This dramatic meeting between the generations took place on board I after it was rumored that Botvinnik would be given a "rest day" against the American team. But it was fated that Fischer, at last, albeit with Black, would have a crack at the world champion.

Walking into a prepared variation, Fischer promptly refutes it. "The reader can guess that my equanimity was wrecked," confesses Botvinnik, whose notes are incorporated here. Nervously, he proceeds to run his still tenable position downhill. But Fischer, instead of nursing his winning advantage, simplifies too quickly and reaches an adjournment where victory is problematical. After a sleepless night of analysis, Botvinnik finds a stunning defense. Fischer engages in a seemingly harmless transposition of moves (51...b5), and falls into a pit — throwing away the win he maintains was still there.

| 1 | <b>c4</b> | <b>g6</b> |
|---|-----------|-----------|
| 2 | <b>d4</b> | •••       |

If White so desires, he can prevent the Gruenfeld by 2 \$\overline{2}\$ c3 \$\overline{2}\$ f6 3 e4.

The spur of the moment. I could see by the glint in his eye that he had come well armed for my King's Indian.

The sharpest try is 4 cxd5 \( \frac{1}{2}\)xd5 5 e4.

The main line, but I don't believe this early development of the Queen can give White anything.

5 ... dxc4

A solid alternative is 5...c6.


Also interesting is Donald Byrne's provocative 7...\(\int\)c6.

8 **ge3** ...

On 8 2e5 2e6 9 d5 2c8 followed by ...e6 equalizes.

8 ... **Dfd7** 

Smyslov's Variation.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 8...42fd7

**BOTVINNIK** 

So far theory has found no way to derive any clear advantage for White.

A] 9 0-0-0 ②c6 10 鱼e2 ②b6 11 營c5 營d6 12 h3 鱼xf3 13 gxf3 f5! (13... 區fd8? 14 e5! [Reshevsky-Evans, Las Vegas 1965], practically forces a won endgame for White, since if 14... 營d7? 15 d5! ②xe5 16 f4) 14 d5 (if 14 e5 營xc5 15 dxc5 f4! is adequate) 14... ②e5 15 f4 (if 15 ②b5? 營f6 16 鱼d4 fxe4 17 fxe4 營f4+, etc.) 15... ②ed7 with a nice game.

B] 9 国d1 ②c6 10 營b3 e5! 11 dxe5 皇xf3 12 gxf3 ②cxe5 13 皇h3 ②xf3+ 14 含e2! ②fe5 15 皇xd7 ②xd7 16 營b5 c6 17 營xb7 區b8 18 營xd7 區xb2+ 19 含f1 營xd7 (Simagin's 19...營f6 has also been analyzed to a draw) 20 區xd7 皇xc3= Evans-Fischer, US Championship 1962-3.

9 **≜e2** 

②c6

Botvinnik thinks 9... 4 b6 first is more accurate.

10 **罩d1** 

②b6

10...\(\delta\)xf3 followed by 11...e5 also gives Black active play.

11 **營c5** 12 **h3**  ₩d6!

h3

12 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)xd6 is answered by ...cxd6! improving Black's Pawn structure and neutralizing White's center.

12 ... 13 gxf3 ≜xf3

gxf3 \begin{align\*} \

Wrong is 13... wc5 14 dxc5 &xc3+15 bxc3 2a4 16 d2! Botvinnik is of the opinion that 13...e6 (FURMAN) gives Black an equal game. But I feel it is not in the hypermodern spirit, which is precisely to tempt White into advancing his center Pawns in the hope they will become overextended.

*14* **d5** 

•••

Opening the diagonal for Black's KB can't be right, but White is still striving for an opening advantage. On 14 e5 營xc5 15 dxc5 罩xd1+16 含xd1 ②d7 17 f4 g5! 18 fxg5 兔xe5=. Or 14 營xd6 (if 14 ②b5 營xc5 15 dxc5 ②a4!) 14...cxd6=.

14 ... 15 \$\tilde{\phi}\b5 ②e5

•••

"At once 15 f4 is not good because of 15…②ec4 16 奠xc4 營xc5 17 奠xc5 ②xc4 18 e5 ②xb2 19 罩d4 f6! and White's central position breaks up." (BOTVINNIK.)

On 15 f4 also playable is simply 15... ②ed7 16 營b5 (16 營xd6 cxd6 gives Black a comfortable ending) 16...e5! 17 f5 (17 dxe6 e.p. 奠xc3+! 18 bxc3 營xe6) with equal chances.


15 ...

**營f6!** 

16f417e5

©ed7

On 17 \widetilde{\text{wxc7?}} \widetilde{\text{wxb2}} \text{ White can't castle and } 18...\widetilde{\text{b4}} + is threatened.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 17 e5

**BOTVINNIK** 

17 ...

₩xf4!

"A very unpleasant surprise — now White really had to start playing. Up to here I had only had to remember my analysis, though that was not so easy. I had a recollection of the Black Queen being trapped somewhere on the K-side; and following this track I managed to recall the whole variation. At last everything was in order — on the board was the familiar position; then suddenly it was obvious that in my analysis I had missed what Fischer had found with the greatest of ease at the board. The reader can guess that my equanimity was wrecked.

However, if you assess 17... \(\vert\) xf4 from an objective point of view, then although it is the best way out for Black, as you will see from what comes later, his position is still difficult." (BOTVINNIK.)

When I made this move, I felt sure he had overlooked it.

18 **Qxf4** ...

Black's last is tactically justified after 18 營xb6 營e4! 19 f3 營h4+! 20 食f2 營b4+ followed by ...axb6! (toward the center).

| 18 | ***  | ②xc5        |
|----|------|-------------|
| 19 | ©xc7 | <b>⊒ac8</b> |
| 20 | d6   | exd6        |
| 21 | exd6 | •••         |

Not 21 罩xd6? ②cd7.

21 ... \(\hat{\pmaxb2}\)

"So Black has won a Pawn; but the Knight on c7 and the Pawn on d6 confine his Rooks – and also, White has two Bishops. The first thing White must do is complete his development." (BOTVINNIK.)

22 **0-0 5**bd7

"A bad mistake; evidently, Black overestimated his possibilities. Of course, he had to prepare the move … êe5; the only way this could be done was by 22… ②cd7 and after 23 êf3 êe5 24 êxe5 ②xe5 25 êxb7 罩b8 White has no more than a minimal advantage.

Now White has the two important squares d5 and c5 at his disposal and his spatial advantage becomes crushing." (BOTVINNIK.)


Needless to add, I couldn't disagree more. Why should Black return the Pawn?

23 罩**d5** ...

23

Archives recommends 23 4 ds but after 23... g7 the burden of proof rests with White – he's a Pawn down.

**b**6



**FISCHER** 

Position after 23...b6

BOTVINNIK

24 皇63?

"Feeble play. Actually, White had played quite consistently so far and here he could have deployed his force with maximum efficiency by 24 \(\beta\)c4! with the threat of \(\beta\)e1-e7.

The bishop is out of it on f3 and merely becomes an object of attack. Black now frees himself, and a Pawn down White is in a critical position." (BOTVINNIK.)

After 24 奠c4! it is true that White has a bind, but with 24...②e6 Black can practically force a draw, if he wants it, after 25 单h2 ②d4 threatening ...②f6) 26 罩b1 奠c3 27 罩c1 奠b2, etc.

24 ... \(\tilde{\to}\)e6!

"Apparently, this forces the exchange of the Knight on c7, for 25 单h2 全d4 26 单g2 包f6 is very bad for White. In fact, even here 26 罩xd4! pointed out by Geller) 26...单xd4 27 罩e1 gave White a real chance to get out of all his troubles. A second error running makes his position hopeless." (BOTVINNIK.)

The reader is invited to judge for himself whether, in Geller's line, White has any real compensation for the exchange and a Pawn. Here 27...\$c5 followed by ...\$26 or ...\$18 should extricate Black.

25 ②xe6? ...

This really took me aback. After 25 \(\mathbb{L}\)e3 at least White's still in the same.

26 **Zd3** 

On 26 罩dd1? (or 26 罩d2? 食c1 27 罩d4 e5) 26...罩f8! 27 食g4 罩xf4 28 食xe6+罩f7 wins.

26 ... ②c5 27 罩e3 ...

Bad is 27 罩d2 罩f8 28 d7 罩cd8.

27 ... e5

28 **\( \( \paralle xe5** \) ...

Just leads to a dead lost ending. I expected 28 \( \subseteq xe5!? \) (hopeless though it is) to try and keep a little "dynamic imbalance."

On 31 \( \) fe1 \( \) cc7! flushes White off the 7th rank.

"A pointless move, since White cannot go into the lost Rook and Pawn ending; he should have played at once 32 \( \) = 1 \( \) 18 33 \( \) = 3 (or 33 \( \) \( \) 45) — Black would still have had technical difficulties." (BOTVINNIK.)

32 ... 罩c7 33 罩e1 尝f7 34 尝g2 ...

"And now 34 \( \pme{2}\)e6+ was preferable, as the Bishop is poorly posted at g4." (BOTVINNIK.)

| 34 | •••          | ©c5        |
|----|--------------|------------|
| 35 | <b>ℤe3</b>   | <b>≝e7</b> |
| 36 | <b>罩f3</b> + |            |

"White's best practical chance consisted in an exchange of Rooks and a position with his King on d4 (or e3), his Bishop on c2 and his f-Pawn at f4. But all that is impossible  $-36 cite{2}$ f3 h5! and White loses his Bishop." (BOTVINNIK.)


| 36 | •••        | <b>ġg7</b> |
|----|------------|------------|
| 37 | ℤc3        | ≌e4        |
| 38 | <b>≜d1</b> | <b>≌d4</b> |

"Before this I considered the game completely hopeless for me, but the text move gave me new heart; why had my opponent allowed my Bishop to get to a good post (and the only good one!) at c2? Surely, by 38... It (39 &c2 Ic1) White's defenses could have been completely disorganized." (BOTVINNIK.)

Alter 30... Eet Simply 37 & 13 in more logical.

| 39 | êc2         | <b>\$</b> f6 |
|----|-------------|--------------|
| 40 | <b>\$13</b> | ġg5          |

"In general terms, d6 is the best square for the King; for then the Knight would not need to defend the b-Pawn and Black would win by advancing his Q-side Pawns. But this maneuver is also not bad." (BOTVINNIK.)



"Could have led to an immediate draw – and just at the very moment when Black was nearing his goal. You see, White was already in zugzwang: against a King move Black plays ...\$\delta\$h4 and ...\$\delta\$e6-f4(xh3); if \$\delta\$b1, the reply ...\$\delta\$d1 wins; and if the White Rook moves from its place, then ...\$\delta\$c4 is decisive. So after, for instance, \$41...\$\delta\$b4 42 a3 \$\delta\$d4 43 f3 a5 White would have had no satisfactory reply.

It is psychologically understandable why Black decided on the Rook and Pawn ending – earlier (see White's 23rd move) White had avoided it. But there is a difference between these two endings – the Black King is in a bad position on g5." (BOTVINNIK.)

Although I agree that Black can win by keeping the minor pieces and gradually improving his position, the text should also produce the same result, if only by a hair's breadth.

| 42 | ≜xe4 | <b>ℤxe4</b> |
|----|------|-------------|
| 43 | ℤa3  | •••         |

After 43 \( \begin{align\*} 2 \begin{alig


43 ... **Ee**7

"Perhaps 43...a5! 44 罩b3 罩b4 was better; Black obtained either a won Rook and Pawn ending or — after 45 罩xb4 axb4 46 f4+ 當f5 47 當f3 當e6 48 當e4 (48 當g4 h6) 48...當d6 49 當d4 b5 50 當d3 當d5 — a probably won Pawn ending." (BOTVINNIK.)

44 **\(\beta\)**3 **\(\beta\)**c7

"His last chance consisted in improving the position of his King by the maneuver ... \$\delta h6-g7." (BOTVINNIK.)

45 **a4** ...



**FISCHER** 

Position after 45 a4

BOTVINNIK

"Here Black sealed a move. White's threat is to exchange a pair of Pawns on the Q-side by a5 (for example, 45...宣c4 46 a5 bxa5 [or 46...b5 47 宣f7] 47 宣f7 a6 48 h4+ 含h6 49 宣d7) after which the weakness of Black's h-Pawn together with the unfortunate position of his King would guarantee the draw.

The most subtle move was 45... 當h6, although even then Black gets nowhere after 46 国d3! 国c5 47 h4 国a5 48 国d4.

What happened in the game is also most probably a draw." (BOTVINNIK.)

The game was officially "drawn" at breakfast. The Russian team had a table near the American team. Someone inquired of Botvinnik what he thought of the adjourned position. Hardly looking up from his plate, the world champion shrugged, "Nichia" (draw). The word quickly spread, and I overheard someone at the English table saying: "The Russians said Fischer could have won before adjournment..."

| 45 | •••        | ≌c5 |
|----|------------|-----|
| 46 | <b>罩f7</b> | ≣a5 |
| 47 | 罩xh7!      | *** |

"A very fine idea, found during overnight analysis by Geller. Because if his bad King position Black finds it difficult to mobilize his connected passed Pawns." (BOTVINNIK.)


This was the first defense I had considered! Passive play is hopeless: = g., 47 \( \) ft \( \) ft \( \) ft and Black brings his king to the Q-side.

| 47 | 0.06 | ≅xa4 |
|----|------|------|
| 48 | h4+! | ***  |

I had analyzed mainly 48 f4+ but Botvinnik's line is best and also contains a sly trap.

"Or 48...當f6 49 罩b7! 罩a5 50 當g4 b5 51 f4 a6 52 罩b6+當f7 53 罩b7+ and White is quite safe." (BOTVINNIK.)

"The weakness of the g-Pawn and the a-Pawn gives White sufficient counterplay." (BOTVINNIK.)




Later in the 1962 Russian *Yearbook*, he analyzed the entire ending more exhaustively and came to the conclusion, after considerable soulsearching, that it was drawn even against the best line: 51... \$\dddots\$ d4! The bracketed comments are mine. "52 \$\overline{\text{Zxg6}}\$ b5 53 h5 b4 54 \$\ddots\$ g2 b3 55 h6 b2 56 h7 \$\overline{\text{Zh1!}}\$ 57 \$\ddots\$ xh1 b1=\overline{\text{W}}+ 58 \$\ddots\$ h2 \$\overline{\text{W}}\$ b8+ 59 \$\ddots\$ g1 \$\overline{\text{W}}\$ h8 [59... \$\overline{\text{W}}\$ e5! seems to do the trick: if 60 \$\overline{\text{Zg8}}\$ \$\overline{\text{W}}\$ e1+ 61 \$\ddots\$ h2 \$\overline{\text{W}}\$ xf2+ 62 \$\ddots\$ h3 \$\overline{\text{W}}\$ f3+! forces the win of the h-pawn or if 60 \$\ddots\$ f1 \$\overline{\text{W}}\$ h2 61 \$\overline{\text{Zg7}}\$ a5 62 \$\overline{\text{Za7}}\$ \$\ddots\$ d3!] 60 \$\overline{\text{Zg4}}\$ + \$\ddots\$ c3 61 \$\overline{\text{Zh4}}\$ a5 62 \$\ddots\$ g2 \$\ddots\$ b3 63 \$\overline{\text{Zh3}}\$ + \$\ddots\$ c2

64 罩h4 a4 65 罩xa4 豐g7+! (if 65...豐xh7 66 罩g4-g3 and the Rook holds the third rank, shuttling to e3, if necessary, keeping Black's King out—with a draw); 66 當f1 豐xh7 wins, since White can't get his Rook back to the third rank: e.g., 67 罩a2+ 當b3 [68 罩a5 seems to hold here] or 67 罩a3 豐h1+ 68 當e2 豐d1+ 69 當e3 豐c1+ wins the Rook. Or 67 罩g4 豐h1+ 68 罩g1 (if 68 當e2 豐d1+ wins the Rook) 68...豐h3+69 罩g2 (if 69 當e1 豐f3 forces mate) 69...當d2 70 當g1 當e1 wins (71 罩g3 豐f1+).

Was it really true that the adjourned position was lost? Was I mistaken?" (BOTVINNIK.)

Botvinnik then went on to give a corrected analysis which, as we shall see, also falls short. 51... ad4! 52 axg6 b5 53 h5 b4 54 h6! (instead of his previous 54 曾g2) 54...b3 (if 54... 富h1 55 曾g2! 富h5 56 罩a6 b3 57 罩xa7 罩xh6 58 罩b7 含c4 59 含f3 leads to a theoretical draw) 55 罩g4+ (if 55 h7 罩h1 56 罩g7 a5 wins) 55...會c5! (not 55...會c3? 56 罩h4 and White queens with check; or 55... 當d3? 56 罩b4 當c2 57 罩c4+ draws) 56 罩g5+ 含c6! [Here I break camp with Botvinnik, only to meet at the next diagram. He gives 56... \$\diagram\$ b4 overlooking that White can obtain an immediate draw with 57 \( \begin{aligned} loses to 58 \$\dig g2!) 58 h7 \$\bar{z}\$h1! 59 \$\bar{z}\$xa7 \$\dig b3\$ 60 \$\bar{z}\$b7+ \$\dig c2\$ 61 \$\bar{z}\$c7+ 會d2 62 罩b7, etc.] 57 罩g6+ 含b7! 58 罩g7+ (if 58 罩g4 a5 wins) 58...\$a6! (the idea is to keep the King off the b-file so that White's Rook can't check from behind) 59 罩g6+ (if 59 當g2 b2 60 h7 b1=豐 probable mate, certainly win of material) 59...\$\dot\dot\abelas! (not 59...\dot\dot\beta\beta\beta\)? 60 罩g7 a5? 61 當g2! wins) 60 罩g5+ (if 60 罩g7? b2 61 罩xa7+ 當b6 wins) 60... 堂a4! (finally Black has crawled up along the a-file) 61 罩g4+ (61 罩g7 a5 62 罩b7 罩h1 is easy; or 61 罩h5 b2 62 h7 b1=營 63 h8=營 > d3+ 64 含f4 罩e1! is the pause that refreshes – White is checkless – if 65 罩e5 營d4+ 66 含f5 營xf2+ 67 含e6 營b6+ is decisive) 61...含a3 62 罩h4 b2 63 h7 b1=營 64 h8=營.



FISCHER

Possible position after 64 h8=\(\begin{array}{c}\) (analysis)

BOTVINNIK

Botvinnik also reached this position in his analysis independently, and concluded that it was a draw. However, it is precisely here, in this barren wilderness, that Black can wend his way to a win.

Correct is 64... 營b3+! 65 含e2 (if 65 含f4 營f7+ or 65 含g2 營d5+66 f3 營d2+) 65... 營d1+66 含e3 罩b1!! 67 營f8+ (not 67 營c3+? 罩b3 or 67 罩h3 含a2! 68 營g8+ 營b3+ wins) 67... 含a2 and White's King will be without shelter from the coming avalanche of checks.

Now to return to the dreary (for me) game.

52 h5! ...


"Now Black is left with two RP's and the draw becomes a question of theory." (BOTVINNIK.)

The move I overlooked. 52 \( \) xg6 \( \) d4 transposes into the note to Black's 51st.

| 52 | ***         | <b>≅a3</b> + |
|----|-------------|--------------|
| 53 | <b>Ġ</b> g2 | gxh5         |

Botvinnik visibly relaxed. I had played right into his hands.

| 54 | <b>≝g</b> 5+ | <b>\$</b> d6 |
|----|--------------|--------------|
| 55 | ≅xb5         | h4           |
| 56 | f4           | <b>\$</b> c6 |
| 57 | <b>≝b8!</b>  | h3+          |
| 58 | ∲h2          | a5           |
| 59 | f5           | <b>堂c7</b>   |
| 60 | 罩 <b>b</b> 5 | <b>\$</b> d6 |



FISCHER

Position after 60...\$d6


BOTVINNIK

"Generally speaking, this ending would be drawn even without the f-Pawn – any textbook on the endgame will tell you this." (BOTVINNIK.)

| 61 | f6           | <b>\$e6</b>  |
|----|--------------|--------------|
| 62 | <b>≌</b> b6+ | <b>\$17</b>  |
| 63 | <b>Za6</b>   | <b>\$</b> g6 |
| 64 | <b>罩c6</b>   | a4           |
| 65 | <b>ℤa6</b>   | <b>\$</b> f7 |
| 66 | <b>ℤc6</b>   | <b>≝d3</b>   |
| 67 | <b>≌a6</b>   | a3           |
| 68 | ġg1          |              |

#### Drawn

"Too many mistakes?' the reader may justly ask. Yes, there were rather a lot!" (BOTVINNIK.)



**FISCHER** 

Final Position after 68 \$\delta g1\$

BOTVINNIK

# 40 Fischer - Najdorf [Argentina]

#### VARNA OLYMPIC 1962

#### SICILIAN DEFENSE

### The Najdorf Variation

The durable Najdorf Variation remains Fischer's favorite, and he constantly experiments when confronted with it. Here, against the originator of the defense, he employs an unorthodox continuation. Najdorf counters sharply, launching an early struggle.


In order to preserve the initiative, Fischer gambits a Pawn with  $7 \ \text{ } \Delta d5$ . Najdorf unwisely declines, only to accept three moves later under more unfavorable circumstances. He loses his way in the complications, allowing a devastating sacrifice which pins his King in the center. Although Najdorf defends with precision, it is too late to compensate for his earlier dilatory tactics. He finds himself ensnarled in a mating net after twenty-four moves. Rather than prolong his agony, the grand old master tenders his resignation.

| 1 | e4          | c5        |
|---|-------------|-----------|
| 2 | <b>5</b> 13 | <b>d6</b> |
| 3 | <b>d4</b>   | cxd4      |
| 4 | €xd4        | € 16      |
| 5 | ©c3         | a6        |
| 6 | h3          | •••       |

For  $6 \stackrel{2}{\otimes} g5$  see games 9 and 15. For  $6 \stackrel{2}{\otimes} e2$  see games 4 and 42. For  $6 \stackrel{2}{\otimes} c4$  see games 17, 55, 58.

6 ... b5!?

The sharpest reply. For 6...96 see game 43. For 6...9c6 see game 35.



NAJDORF

**FISCHER** 

The idea is to exploit the hole on c6. Najdorf apparently underestimated the strength of this "eccentric" move which appears to violate principle by moving the same piece twice.

A good alternative was 7 a4.

7 ... **½b7?** 

Black's subsequent troubles can be traced to this. No better is 7...\Dbd7?? 8 \Dc6 winning the Queen. And on 7...\Dfd7 8 \Dc6! h6? 9 \Dc6!

On 7...e6 8 🖾 xf6+ \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\) xf6 9 c4 b4 Black's Queen is misplaced and his O-side has been weakened.

Unclear are the complications stemming from 7... 2xe4! 8 \(\superscript{\omega}\)f3 \(\omega\)c5 and White is confronted with 2 main lines:

A] 9 ②f6+? gxf6 10 營xa8 逸b7 11 營a7 營c7 (or 11...e5 12 b4 exd4 13 bxc5 營e7+ 14 逸e2 ②c6 15 營b6 dxc5 16 0-0! is good for White) 12 b4 ②cd7 and Black has excellent play for the exchange.

B] 9 b4! e6 (not 9...②b7? 10 營c3! but interesting is 9...②cd7 10 營c3! a7 11 拿g5!? or even 11 拿xb5) 10 bxc5 (if 10 ②f6+ 營xf6 11 營xa8 營xd4 12 營xb8 營xa1 13 營xc8+ 含e7) 10...exd5 11 營xd5 罩a7=.

White must play sharply, else his advantage evaporates. After the tame  $9 \, \text{@d}3$ , @d7 is tenable.

9 ... bxc4

Had Najdorf correctly evaluated the results of this decision, he would have chosen 9...b4. The 1962 Russian Yearbook gives 9... xe4

10 cxb5 **全**g7 11 **当**g4 **全**g6 12 **分**f5 with advantage. But 12...0-0 is unclear.


10 **≜xc4** 

**≜xe4** 

On 10... Ya5+11 全d2 Ye5 12 Yb3! Yxe4+13 会d1 White has a very strong attack.

d5

...



**NAJDORF** 

Position after 12 **Ze**1!

**FISCHER** 

12 ...

e5

- B] 12...e6 13 營h5 皇g6 14 營xd5 營xd5 置a7 16 皇f4 置d7 17 ⑤xe6 fxe6 18 皇xe6 ⑤c6 19 罩ac1, etc.
- - D] 12... 2d7 13 2c6 \( \mathbb{e}\)c7 14 \( \mathbb{k}\)xd5, etc.
- - F] Relatively best is 12...dxc4 13 罩xe4 營d5 14 營f3 e6.

#### *13* **₩a4**+!

13 ...

20d7

On 13... 營d7 14 兔b5! axb5 15 營xa8 兔d6 16 罩xe4! dxe4 17 營xe4 followed by ②f5 with a powerful bind.



**NAJDORF** 

Position after 13...42d7

**FISCHER** 

dxe4

14...dxc4 15 🗹 f5 leads to the same type of position as the game, except Black is without any material compensation.

15 Df5!

Perhaps Black had hoped for 15 \bigwide b3 \bigwide b6 16 \hat{2}xf7+ \div d8 with some chances for survival.

15 ... <u>\$c5</u> 16 **©g7+! ©e7** 

On 16...會f8 17 臭h6 曾g8 18 豐b3 is murder.

17 ②f5+

**\$e8** 

Back where we started – but Black has lost the right to castle.

18 **ge3** 

Tal suggested 18 食h6 but after 18... a7 19 ad1 曾b6 Black is still alive. The text robs Black of any possible counterplay.

#### *19* **fxe3**


The exchange of Bishops has failed to ease Black's defensive task. The threat of 2d6+ is now in the offing.

19 ... **豐b6** 20 **罩d1!** ...

Again after 20 &xf7+ 含d8! 21 罩d1 營b5 White has no immediate forced win.

20 ... 罩a7 21 罩d6! ...

The crusher! Either 21 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xf7+ \(\frac{1}{2}\)d8 or 21 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d6+ \(\frac{1}{2}\)e7 allow resistance.



NAJDORF

Position after 21 \( \bar{2}\)d6!

**營c7** 

**FISCHER** 

Best under the circumstances. On 21... 營c7 22 基xf6 wins. And on 21... 營xb2 22 身xf7+ (finally!) 22... 含xf7 (if 22... 含d8 23 營a5+ 含c8 [23... 基c7 24 身e6 wins] 24 ②e7+ 含b8 25 ②c6+ 含a8 26 ②xa7) 23 基xd7+ 基xd7 24 營xd7+ 含g6 25 營g7+ 含xf5 26 營g4 mate.


22 **@b3** 

On 22... 宣f8 23 ②g7+ 含e7 24 營a3! is very decisive.

23 **≜xf7**+ **\$\d\$** 

On 23... \$\delta f8 24 \delta h5 and mates.

24 **Qe6** 



**NAJDORF** 

Final Position after 24 \(\mathbb{L}\)e6

**FISCHER** 

24 ..

#### Black resigns

Najdorf has no taste for prolonging the torture. If, for example, 24... 這b7 25 營a4 營c8 26 營a5+ 含e8 27 營xa6 含d8 28 兔xd7 罩xd7 29 罩xd7+ 營xd7 (29... 含xd7 30 營d6+ 含e8 31 營e7 mate) 30 營xf6+ 含c7 31 營xe5+ 含b6 32 營xh8 with a winning endgame.

## 41 Fischer - Robatsch [Austria]

VARNA OLYMPIC 1962

CENTER COUNTER DEFENSE

## A bright cameo

Facing one of Robatsch's pet lines, Fischer proceeds to institute such a crisp attack that one is reminded of Morphy in his heyday. Noteworthy are White's 5th and 6th, practically refuting the whole variation.

Seeking safety for his King, Robatsch makes the mistake of castling too early. Fischer, already castled on the opposite wing, incurs no risk advancing his K-side Pawns, using them as battering rams to pry open the g-file. Robatsch is unable to effect a closure and Fischer rushes into the breach — compelling resignation in only twenty moves.

1 e4 d5 2 exd5 ₩xd5

This old move is considered weak but Black has a new twist in mind. The modern way is 2... 2f6. Then White has the choice of either 3 c4 or 3 \$\mathref{L}b5+\$ to hold the Pawn, or simply 3 d4. Against Bergrasser at Monaco 1967, I chose 3 \$\mathref{L}b5+\mathref{L}d7\ 4\mathref{L}c4\mathref{L}g4\ 5\ f3\mathref{L}fd7\ (safer is 5...\$\mathref{L}c8)\ 6\ g4!\ \mathref{L}c8\ 7\mathref{L}c3\mathref{L}bd7\ 8\ g5\mathref{L}bd7\ 9\mathref{L}b5+\mathref{L}fd7\ 10\ f4\mathref{L}xd5\ 11\mathref{L}xd5\ c6\ 12\mathref{L}c4\ cxd5\ 13\mathref{L}xd5\ and White's extra Pawn should prevail.

3 **②c3 ₩d8** 

A hypermodern approach, championed by Bronstein. The idea is to give up the center and then play against it. Seidman, as Black, played the more traditional 3...豐a5 against me in the 1958-9 US Championship, which continued: 4 d4 ②f6 5 ②f3 ②c6 6 d5!? (possibly an improvement over the usual 6 象b5) 6...②b4 7 象b5+ c6 (more crucial is 7...象d7 8 象xd7+ ②xd7 9 a3 ②f6 10 axb4 豐xa1 11 0-0 豐a6 12 冨e1 with a terrific attack. Not 12...0-0-0? 13 ②e5) 8 dxc6 bxc6 9 象a4 象a6? (9...象d7 is necessary) 10 a3! 冨d8 11 象d2 豐f5 12 axb4 冨d6 13 象b3 ②e4 14 冨xa6 冨xd2 15 豐c1 ②xc3 16 bxc3 冨d6 17 0-0 Black resigns.

4 d4

g6!?

The idea is to reserve the option of developing the KN to h6 followed by ... 575 with pressure on the d-Pawn. After the game Robatsch told me he'd enjoyed excellent results with this system.

5 **≜f4!** 

Against the pedestrian 5 句f3 (or 5 急c4 急g7 6 句f3 句h6) 5...皇g7 6 h3 句f6 (not 6...句h6 7 g4! Sokolsky) White holds no more than a minimal edge.


5 ...

**≜g7** 

On 5... The 6 & e5! f6 7 & f4 messes up Black's Pawns.

6 **營d2!** 

Ignoring the "threat." Weak is 6 5 5 5 6 6 followed by ...c6, etc. (Bronstein-Kholmov, USSR 1959). And 6 5 6 6 would permit Black the setup he is striving for.



ROBATSCH

Position after 6 幽d2!

**FISCHER** 

6

**②**f6

Stymied, Black can no longer play ... 42h6.

7 0-0-0

**c6** 

Better is 7...句d5 8 **å**e5 (8 **å**h6!? **å**xh6 9 **数**xh6 **②**xc3 ruptures White's Pawns) 8...0-0 9 h4 h5 10 **②**ge2 with a clear advantage but no forced win.

8 **k**h6

0-0?


Castling into it – with a vengeance. Black should strive to castle long with 8... 2xh6 9 \(\text{\mathbb{\math

9 **h4** 10 **h5!** 

**豐a5** 

•••

The attack plays itself. My experience with this line dates back to the Dragon-slaying days (see game 2).



ROBATSCH

Position after 10 h5!

**FISCHER** 

10 ..

gxh5

Horrible, but Black must keep the h-file closed one way or another. On 10... Zd8 11 hxg6 fxg6 12 鼻xg7 含xg7 13 營h6+ 含g8 14 包f3-g5 is slaughter.

Or 10...公xh5 11 &e2 公f6 12 &xg7 &xg7 13 營h6+ 查g8 14 g4! 罩d8 15 g5 公h5 16 &xh5 gxh5 17 罩xh5 &f5 (or 17...營f5 18 g6! 營xg6 19 罩g5) 18 g6! wins.

11 **盒d3** ...

It's important to exclude Black's Bishop from f5.

*11* ... ∅**bd7** 

Not 11... 全f5? 12 曾g5.

12 ②ge2 ...

Taking advantage of the lull to bring out the reserves.

12 ... 罩d8 13 g4! ②f8

On 13... 🖾 xg4 14 🖺 dg1! (threatening both f3 and/or 🗒 xg4+) wins at least a piece. Black hopes to hang on by clustering minor pieces around his King.

14 gxh5 ...

Now the open g-file becomes the new base of operations.


14 ... ②e6 15 罩dg1 當h8

Also hopeless is 15...當f8 16 鱼xg7+ 包xg7 17 營h6 包g4 18 營xh7.

Or 17... 2e6 18 2f4! forces mate.

Or 18...公f5 19 罩xg8+ ②xg8 20 營f8 followed by 罩g1 is tasty.

*19* **≝hg1** ...



**ROBATSCH** 

Position after 19 \Zhg1

**FISCHER** 

19 ..

915

Blundering a piece. But Black is completely tied up, and it's a pity he didn't allow the prettier finish after 19...營f8 20 d5! 奠d7 (if 20...cxd5 21 公xd5 公xd5 22 營xh7 mate) 21 d6! 公f5 22 營xf8 罩axf8 (or 22...罩gxf8 23 逸xf5 h6 24 dxe7 罩fb8 25 罩g7 逸xf5 26 罩xf7, etc.) 23 逸xf5 罩xg5 24 罩xg5 h6 25 dxe7 罩b8 26 罩g3! 逸xf5 27 罩f3 winning a piece.

*20* **≜xf5** 

Black resigns

## 42 Unzicker [W.Germany] - Fischer

### VARNA OLYMPIC 1962 SICILIAN DEFENSE

## Playing by ear

This game illustrates the hazard of trying to rely solely on natural talent, without detailed knowledge of the latest opening innovations. Seldom is a chess master so drastically punished, as is Unzicker here, for failing to do his homework.

Disastrously pursuing a line with which Tal had just barely survived against Fischer, Unzicker blunders further through apparent unfamiliarity with Geller's improvement (15 \$\ding\*h I!). That had previously defeated Fischer at Curação. Unzicker simply puts his trust in "natural moves" and drifts into a constrained position, allowing Fischer to penetrate neatly on the weakened squares. The early decision, on move 26, comes as a surprise only to Unzicker.

| 1 | e4          | <b>c5</b> |
|---|-------------|-----------|
| 2 | <b>Ø</b> 13 | d6        |
| 3 | d4          | cxd4      |
| 4 | ∅xd4        | <b>16</b> |
| 5 | <b>②c3</b>  | <b>a6</b> |
| 6 | <u></u> ≜e2 | •••       |

On and off, White resorts to this solid and still respected system (championed by Smyslov) whenever the sharper tries fail.

6 ... e5

Black's expectation in this Najdorf Variation is that his control of important squares, with possibilities of Q-side expansion, will more than compensate for the slight weakness of his backward d-Pawn.

7 \( \hat{1}\) \( \partial \text{b3} \)

To provoke f4-f5, weakening White's e-Pawn. For the non-committal 7...\(\hat{2}\)e7 see game 4.

| 8  | 0-0       | € bd7      |
|----|-----------|------------|
| 9  | <b>f4</b> | <b>豐c7</b> |
| 10 | f5        | ₫c4        |
| 11 | a4        | •••        |

To hinder ... b5.


11 ...

Better than 11... **3**c8? 12 a5 **\$e7** 13 **\$xc4 \*\mathbb{w}xc4** 14 **\$\mathbb{z}a4! \*\mathbb{w}c7** 15 **\$\mathbb{e}e3\$** h6 16 **\$\mathbb{z}f2\$** with a bind. (Schmid-Evans, Varna 1962.)

*12* **≜e3** 

0 - 0

鼻e7



**FISCHER** 

Position after 12...0-0

UNZICKER

13 **a5** 

A critical alternative is 13 g4 d5! 14 exd5 (if 14 g5 d4! or 14 ②xd5 ②xd5 15 exd5 ②f6 16 d6? এxd6 17 এxc4 營xc4 18 營xd6? 營xg4+19 含h1 營e4+) 14... 2b4 15 g5 2xc3 16 gxf6 2xb2 17 fxg7 罩fd8 18 罩b1 2c3. White's Pawns are overextended and his King is exposed.

13 ...

**b**5

Too passive is 13...h6 14 g4 包h7 15 皇f2 followed by h4.

At Curação 1962, Geller had found the right line: 15 會h1! 罩fc8 16 兔xb6 營xb6 17 兔xc4 罩xc4 18 營e2 罩b4 19 罩a2! and Black is hard-pressed to defend his a-Pawn, but 19...h6! 20 罩fa1 兔f8 21 罩xa6 罩xa6 22 罩xa6 營b7 23 勾a5 營c7 24 勾b3 營b7 (ZUCKERMAN) =.

Intending ... 2c6 followed by ... a5.

17 **Qxb5** ...

White has already dissipated his theoretical advantage. He should settle for 17 \( \Omega \text{xb5} \) axb5 18 \( \Omega \text{d3} \) with opposite colored Bishops.


 17
 ...
 axb5

 18
 包d5
 包xd5

 19
 豐xd5
 墨a4!

Avoids conceding the a-file and puts pressure on the e-Pawn.

20 c3 ₩a6



**FISCHER** 

Position after 20…營a6

UNZICKER


21 h3

It's hard for White to hit upon a constructive plan. At Curaçao 1962, Tal played against me 21 国ad1 国c8 22 包c1 b4 23 包d3!? (White's in a bad way anyhow) 23...bxc3 24 bxc3 and now 24...国xc3 (instead of my 24...国a5 lemon) wins outright. If 25 包xe5 dxe5 26 營xe5 (26 營d8+ 食f8!) 26...食b4! 27 營xc3 營xf1+! (KMOCH).

A handy *luft*, as becomes apparent later.

Creating more K-side weaknesses. Better is 24 Zad1.

What else? On 26 罩xa2 營xa2 27 罩e2 罩xc3!



**FISCHER** 

Position after 26 \&f1

UNZICKER

Now Black has a decisive shot.

27 罩xa2 (27 bxc3? 營f2 mate) 27...罩f3+ 28 含e2 罩f2+ 29 含d3 營xa2 30 罩a1 營xb2 wins. Black's first rank is no longer vulnerable since the King can escape to h7 on the check.

# 43 Fischer - Reshevsky [U.S.A.]

#### USA CHAMPIONSHIP 1962-3

SICILIAN DEFENSE

### The missing link

Many critics have dubbed this the "12th game" of the unfinished match, which had ended in a  $5\frac{1}{2}-5\frac{1}{2}$  tie. It is as adventurous and as bitterly contested as their earlier ones.

This time Reshevsky is well prepared for Fischer's opening, countering forcefully and equalizing without difficulty. However, instead of maintaining tension, he strives inconsistently for simplifications, forcing an exchange of Queens which leaves him with a strategically weak ending. Working with simultaneous threats on both wings, Fischer, despite the reduction in material, succeeds in exploiting several of his opponent's targets (backward Pawns on open files). Reshevsky defends this passive position with his usual tenacity, but is unable to prevent an eventual breakthrough.

| 1 | e4          | <b>c</b> 5   |
|---|-------------|--------------|
| 2 | <b>2</b> f3 | d6           |
| 3 | d4          | exd4         |
| 4 | <b>⊘xd4</b> | <b>€</b> )f6 |
| 5 | <b>②c3</b>  | <b>a6</b>    |
| 6 | h3          | <b>g</b> 6   |

A good reaction. So is 6...b5 (see game 40).

By transposing into a Dragon Variation, Black hopes to render h3 useless, since in the normal Yugoslav Attack White will be forced to advance this Pawn again, thereby losing a tempo.

Consistent, but perhaps premature. However, no other method offers more: e.g., 8 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e3 0-0 9 g5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e8! Or 8 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g2 0-0 9 0-0 \(\frac{1}{2}\)c6=.

8 ... \(\tilde{\Delta}\)h5!

On 8...包fd7 9 鱼e3 包c6 10 營d2 Black is slightly bottled up.

#### 9 **≜e2**

e5


I had intended to answer 9...公c6!? with 10 公b3 (and not 10 公xc6 bxc6 11 逸xh5 gxh5 12 營xh5 區b8 with good compensation for the Pawn).

10 **5b**3

Bad is 10 af5 gxf5 11 &xh5 f4 shutting out White's QB.

10 ... ∅f4 11 ∅d5 ...

11 2g4 2c6 12 2d5 might transpose to the game.



RESHEVSKY

Position after 11 2d5

**FISCHER** 

Objectively speaking, White has no opening advantage.

11 ...

2xd5

Instead of simplifying so readily, Black could try to exploit the weakened K-side. Tal says more "logical" is 11...0-0 12 h4 f5 (or the interesting Pawn sac 12...②d7!? 13 ②xf4 exf4 14 豐xd6 急e5).

Another possibility is 11...\(\infty\)xe2 (not 11...\(\infty\)xh3? 12 \(\text{\geo}\)e3 and the threat of 13 \(\text{\geo}\)b6 wins material) 12 \(\text{\geo}\)xe2 \(\text{\geo}\)e6=.

12 **豐xd5** 

②c6

Tal gives the dubious sac 12... \(\delta\) e6!? 13 \(\begin{aligned}
\text{ Mxb7} \(\delta\) d7 but 14 \(\delta\) e3 keeps the upper hand. But there's no need for Black to gamble. His position is basically sound.

#### *13* **≜g4**

#### ₫xg4


Tal gives 13...f5 14 gxf6 e.p. (if 14 exf5  $\bigcirc$ e7! 15  $\bigcirc$ ed3 gxf5 16  $\bigcirc$ h5+  $\bigcirc$ g6, etc.) 14... $\bigcirc$ exf6 15  $\bigcirc$ exc8  $\bigcirc$ exc8  $\bigcirc$ exc7, but after 17  $\bigcirc$ e3 followed by 0-0-0 White stands better.

14 hxg4

₩c8!

With the double threat of ... ₩xg4 and/or ... Db4.

On 15 營xd6 營xg4 16 營d3 罩d8 17 營e2 營g2 18 罩f1 h6 Black wrests the initiative.



RESHEVSKY

Position after 15 營d1

**FISCHER** 

15 ..

€)d4!

Apparently intent on simplifying at all cost. Reshevsky steers for an inferior ending. Tal gives 15... <u>e</u>6 16 <u>e</u>6 0-0-0=.

A Bulgarian magazine gives the sharp 15...d5!? as best, since it dissolves the backward d-Pawn immediately. The tactical justification shows up after 16 exd5 (if 16 We2 or 16 c3, ...d4) 16...\(2\)b4 17 c3 (if 17 0-0 \(2\)xc2 18 \(\)\(2\)b1 0-0 foils White's strategy) 17...\(\)\(2\)c4! and now there are two main lines:

B] 18 国h3 ②xd5 (if 18... We4+ 19 含f1 ②c2? 20 ②d2 wins) 19 We2 Wc7=.

| 16 | <b>c3</b> | ©xb3 |
|----|-----------|------|
| 17 | axb3      | ₩e6  |
| 18 | ⊑a5!      | f6?  |

Leads to a lifeless ending. Better chances are offered by 18...0-0 (or 18...b5 19 營d5 營xd5 20 exd5 含d7) 19 罩d5 罩ad8 followed by ...f5.


Not 19... \widetilde{\pi}xg4? 20 \widetilde{\pi}xb7 0-0 21 gxf6.

| 20 | ≅xd5        | <b>堂d7</b> |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 21 | gxf6        | ≜xf6       |
| 22 | g5          | <b>≜e7</b> |
| 23 | <b>\$e2</b> | •••        |

Now it's clear that Black's game is, at best, barely tenable. Both his d-Pawn and h-Pawn are ugly weaknesses exposed on open files.

| 23 | •••       | ≌af8       |
|----|-----------|------------|
| 24 | ҈е3       | <b>ℤc8</b> |
| 25 | <b>b4</b> |            |

More accurate possibly is 25 c4 \$\cdot\cdot c7\$ 26 b4 and Black has constantly to worry about breaks with c5, b5, or even f4.



RESHEVSKY

Position after 25 b4

**FISCHER** 

25 ... b5!?


Many annotators criticized this because it creates a fresh weakness (the a-Pawn). But if Black just waits he ultimately should get squeezed

to death after \$\ddotdoldrightarrow\$d3 followed by c4, etc. Reshevsky apparently feels more comfortable living with his new weaknesses, rather than with the uncertainties which would be created after an eventual c4.

White cannot keep d5 under control indefinitely. In order to make progress, the Rooks must strike at the backward RPs.

| 26 | ••• | <b>\$e6</b> |
|----|-----|-------------|
| 27 | ≌a1 | <b>ℤc6</b>  |
| 28 | 罩h3 |             |

On 28 \( \frac{1}{2}\) h4? h5! eliminates the weakness.



RESHEVSKY

Position after 28 罩h3

**FISCHER** 

28 ... <u>\$ f8</u>

29 **Zah1 Zc7** 

30 罩h4! ...

The critical position. Black is virtually in *zugzwang*. The Rook on h4 serves a valuable function, as will become apparent.

*30* ... d5

On 30... 當c4 (if 30... 當f7 31 當a1) 31 f3 當c7 32 會f2! d5 33 當a1 當c-34 exd5+ 會xd5 35 當d1+ 會e6 36 當d8 should win.

31 **\( \bar{a}\)1!** ...

Reshevsky doubtlessly underestimated this interpolation. He probably expected 31 exd5+ \$\delta xd5 32 \$\bar{\textbf{Z}}\dl d1+ \$\delta e6 33 \$\bar{\textbf{Z}}\d8 \$\delta g7!\$

31 ... \( \begin{align\*} \begin{alig


Or 31...dxe4 32 \( \bar{2}\) \(

The merit of the Rook on h4 is that it prevents the King from entering at c4.

34 **\(\beta\)d8 \(\beta\)f5** 

With Black's Rook on c6 (instead of c7, as before) he no longer has the reply ... 皇 g7. And on 34... 罩 c7 35 罩 a8 is decisive.

35 **Za8 Ze6** 36 **Zh3!** ...



RESHEVSKY

Position after 36 \( \bigs h3! \)

FISCHER

36 ... <u>≜g</u>7

Equally useless is 36... \$\delta g4 37 \$\bar{\textsf{g}}\delta 38 \$\bar{\textsf{g}}\delta 38 \$\bar{\textsf{g}}\delta 39 \$\bar{\textsf{g}}\delta 8 \$\delta g7 39 \$\bar{\textsf{g}}\delta 8 \$\delta g7 41 \$\bar{\textsf{g}}\delta 7. Or 36... \$\delta e4 37 \$\bar{\textsf{g}}\delta 38 \$\bar{\textsf{g}}\delta 7 38 \$\bar{\textsf{g}}\delta 8 \$\delta xh8 \$\delta xh8 \$\delta g7 40 \$\bar{\textsf{g}}\delta 8 41 \$\delta 41 \$\delta 45 \delta 42 \$\bar{\textsf{g}}\delta 1 \$\delta 8 \delta 3 \$\delta 3 \delta 3 \$\delta 3 \delta 3 \$\delta 3 \delta 3 \delta 3 \$\delta 3 \delta 3 \delta 3 \$\delta 3

| 37 | ≅xh8          | ı≜xh8      |
|----|---------------|------------|
| 38 | ≅xh7          | <b>ℤe8</b> |
| 39 | 罩 <b>f7</b> + | ġg4        |

Or 39... ee4 40 f3+ ed5 41 ed3 wins.

A buzz began to circulate in the playing hall and I wondered what it was all about. Later they told me  $41 \stackrel{\triangle}{=} f1!$  (threatening  $42 \stackrel{\triangle}{=} f2+$ ) forces at least the win of a piece. Of course the text move also wins, but it takes ten moves longer.

On 44... \$\disp\xg5 45 \Big1+ \dispf4 46 \Bixg6, etc.

After 45... 2xd4+ 46 cxd4 2xg5 47 e5 the center Pawns are zesistible.

つr 47... 宣f8+ 48 皇f6 曾h3 49 冨h1+ 皇h2 50 e5 冨e8 51 曾e4, etc. The is silence.

| 48 | e5          | <b>≝f7</b> +  |
|----|-------------|---------------|
| 49 | <b>∳e4</b>  | <b>罩f5</b>    |
| 50 | <b>e6</b>   | <b>≜d8</b>    |
| 51 | <u> </u>    | ı≜xf6         |
| 52 | gxf6        | ≅xf6          |
| 53 | <b>Ġ</b> d5 | <b>罩f2</b>    |
| 54 | 罩e1         | Black resigns |

## **44** Fischer - Fine [U.S.A.]

NEW YORK 1963: Skittles Game
EVANS GAMBIT

#### Shock treatment

Having become one of the leading players in the world, Fine quit chess at the height of his career (1945) to become a practising psychoanalyst; but he has lost none of his love for the game and little of his brilliance. The following is one of seven or eight offhand games played at his home in New York. As far as can be ascertained, Dr. Fine very nearly held his own.

Here, departing for the first time from his beloved Ruy Lopez, Fischer employs the daring gambit introduced by Captain Evans a century ago. This ploy has all but disappeared from the arena. Fine, although the author of several opening manuals, is understandably rusty, and he gets caught in a vise from which he never escapes. Fischer uncorks a sparkling finish in seventeen moves.

| 1 | <b>e4</b>   | <b>e</b> 5 |
|---|-------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>6</b> 13 | €)c6       |
| 3 | <b>≜c4</b>  | <b>皇c5</b> |
| 4 | b4!?        | 鱼xb4       |

Safer is 4...\$b6, but that is hardly the way to refute the gambit.


5 c3 <u>\$a</u>5

For 5... **½**e7 see game 50.

6 d4 exd4

6...d6 7 0-0 (better is 7 ₩b3) 7... &b6 is the famous Lasker's Defense which put the Evans out of commission last century.

7 0-0



FINE

Position after 7 0-0

**FISCHER** 

7 ..

dxc3


"A little too greedy." (MCO, 10th Ed.)

8 **₩b3** 

₩e7

More usual is 8... @f6 9 e5 @g6 10 @xc3 @ge7 and now either 11 @e2 or @a3 leads to complicated positions which Tchigorin, for example, thought were playable for Black.

9 @xc3



**FINE** 

Position after 9 2xc3

**FISCHER** 

9

②f6?

The best defense follows an old analysis from Freeborough and Ranken (1893); 9...營b4! 10 兔xf7+ 含d8 11 兔g5+ (if 11 兔xg8? 營xb3! holds) 11...②ge7 12 ②d5 營xb3 13 axb3 兔b6 (13...兔b4! looks better) 14 當fc1 h6 15 當xc6 hxg5 16 ②xb6 cxb6 17 萬xb6, etc.

10 **②d5!** 

**②xd5** 


Necessary is 10... wxe4; but 11 2g5 produces a violent attack.

*11* **exd5** 

2e5

On 11... 2d8 12 & a3 is decisive (12...d6 13 \bigwib5+).

12 **公xe5** 13 **臭b2**  響xe5 響g5



FINE

Position after 13... 響g5

**FISCHER** 

14 h4!

...

Deflecting the "overloaded" Queen.

14 ...

**營xh4** 

On 14... 曾h6 15 曾a3 (threatening 罩fe1+) wins. Or 14... 曾g-15 罩fe1+ 食xe1 (if 15... 會d8 16 曾e3 食b4 17 智h6!! gxh6 18 食f6-食e7 19 食xe7+ 會e8 20 食g5+! 曾f8 21 食xh6+ 曾g7 22 冨e8+!! 曾xe23 食xg7 wins) 16 冨xe1+ 曾d8 17 智e3 智xh4 18 g3! and Black Queen must relinquish its guard of e7.

15 **追xg7** 

罩g8

16 **罩fe1**+

**\$**d8

FINE

Position after 17 置g3!

**FISCHER** 

17 ...

**Black resigns** 

17... ₩xg3 18 &f6 mate.

# 45 Fischer - Bisguier [U.S.A.]

# NEW YORK STATE CHAMPIONSHIP 1963 TWO KNIGHTS' DEFENSE

#### Ghosts

Steinitz, nicknamed "the Austrian Morphy" (although two styles could hardly be more dissimilar), apparently exercises a great influence on Fischer, who has restored several of his pet lines to prominence. One of these is the bizarre 9 2h3!, found wanting at the turn of the century, and perhaps best left there.

Bisguier appears unimpressed, regaining his gambit Pawn with a strong initiative. But he misses several opportunities to gain an advantage and is gradually outplayed. Just at the critical moment, when the chances are roughly equal, he commits the same kind of gross oversight that had doomed Fischer against Spassky (game 18). He suffers the same fate.

1 e4 ...

Best by test.

1 ... e5
2 包f3 包c6

The last time I played this move in a tournament was when I was 12 at the 1955 US Junior Championship.

3 ... ②f6!?

Steinitz considered this to be an unsound sacrificial continuation!

4 4∂g5 ...


Tarrasch branded this a "duffer's move" and Panov called it "primitive." But there is no other way for White to try for an advantage.

4 d3 is tame. And after 4 0-0 ②xe4 5 ②c3 ②xc3 6 dxc3 ¥e7! White has no compensation for the Pawn. Finally, 4 d4 leads to the Max Lange attack.

| 4 | ***  | d5   |
|---|------|------|
| 5 | exd5 | €)a5 |

5... $\triangle$ d4!? (FRITZ) and 5...b5!? (ULVESTAD) are both interesting but unsound. On 5... $\triangle$ xd5 6 d4! (6  $\triangle$ xf7!? is the "Fried Liver Attack") is so strong that 5... $\triangle$ xd5 is practically extinct.

| 6 | <b>≜b5</b> + | <b>c6</b> |
|---|--------------|-----------|
| 7 | dxc6         | bxc6      |
| 8 | ুe2          | h6        |
| 9 | ②h3!?        | •••       |



**BISGUIER** 

Position after 9 5h3!?


**FISCHER** 

To my knowledge, this is the first time that this move had been employed in Grandmaster chess for over seventy years. It is one of Steinitz's many unique opening contributions. The famous cable match game in 1891 between Steinitz and Tchigorin, which ended in a victory for Black, apparently caused the chess world to shy away from this variation.

- A] 9...\$\(\delta\)d6 (STEINITZ) might be worth investigating. If 10 d4 (TCHIGORIN) then 10...e4 (FISCHER).
- B] 9.... 全f5 is too crude: 10 0-0 營d7 11 宣e1 全xh3 12 gxh3 營xh3 13 全f1 and Black is busted, e.g., 13... 營g4+? 14 營xg4 公xg4 15 h3 wins a piece (STEINITZ).
- c] 9...g5 10 d3 g4 11  $\bigcirc$ g1  $\bigcirc$ c5 12  $\bigcirc$ c3 effectively wards off the threats (12... $\bigcirc$ b6 is answered by 13  $\bigcirc$ a4!).

#### *10* **0-0** ...

Played by Steinitz in the 6th game of his second match with Tchigorin in 1892. Better is 10 d3! 0-0 11 包c3 星e8 12 0-0 食xh3 13 gxh3 豐d7 14 食g4 包xg4 15 hxg4, etc., as I played vs. Radoicich here in a later round.



BISGUIER

Position after 10 0-0

FISCHER

*10* ... **0-0** 

Dr. Gottschall, in the 1892 Deutsche Schachzeitung, suggests 10...g5. remarking it strange that a player as aggressive as Tchigorin did not chance it. Gottschall gives 11 \$\text{\text{\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}}\$ for \$\text{\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}\$ \$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}\$ \$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}\$ \$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}\$ \$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}\$ \$\text{\$\te

After 10...g5 11 2h1 g4 12 2g1 2e4 let us suppose White tries to avert material loss with 13 b4 (of no avail is 13 2e1 2e4 2d1 2d1 2xf2+ 2f2 2f2 2f2 2f2 2f2 2f2 2f2 2f2 2f2 2f3 2f2+ 2f3 2f4 2f3 2f4 2f4 2f5 2f5 2f5 2f5 2f6 2f6 2f6 2f6 2f6 2f6 2f7 2

11 d3 \(\hat{2}\)xh3

This certainly seems an improvement over the aforementioned Steinitz-Tchigorin match game which continued: 11...2d5 (Gottschall's 11...2h7 also merits attention) 12 c4 2e7 13 2h1 2xh3 14 gxh3 2f5 15 f4 exf4 16 2xf4 2e3 17 2xe3 2xe3 18 2c3 and White won easily with his Q-side majority.

#### 13 **§f3** ...

A difficult choice. I rejected 13 \(\delta\)g2 since this was the square I had reserved for my Bishop. On 13 \(\delta\)g4 \(\delta\)xg4 followed by ...f5 gives fair attacking chances.

So Black regains the Pawn, but I have faith in my two Bishops.

It would be a mistake to play for the win of a Pawn by 14 兔g2 營h4! 15 營e1 宣fe8! 16 營xa5 ②g4 17 h3 兔xf2+ 18 宣xf2 (if 18 營h1 營g3) 18...營xf2+ 19 含h1 e4! 20 hxg4 (if 20 dxe4 宣xe4) 20...exd3 with a winning attack.

Not 14...e4? 15 ②xe4 ②xe4 16 @xe4 @d6 17 f4, etc.

The Queen is forced off the h-file. On 15... Wh4? 16 公f3 Wh5 17 We1 wins a Pawn.


Perhaps better is 16 \(\supersection{\text{ is } 16 \subsection{\text{ with possibilities of a slightly favorable ending.}}\)

| 16 | ***           | <b>ℤfe8</b> |
|----|---------------|-------------|
| 17 | ©e4           | <b>≜b6</b>  |
| 18 | <b>②xf6</b> + | •••         |

I was worried about the maneuver …包d5-f4. But sharper is 18 b4 包b7 19 b5.

Stronger is 19...g5 preventing White's break on f4 once and for all. Then by bringing his Knight to h4(!) Black could get a good game.

Serves the double purpose of preventing ...c4 and of enforcing f4. For all the good it does, Black's Bishop on b6 might just as well be a Pawn for the rest of the game.



**BISGUIER** 

Position after 20 營c3!

FISCHER

20 ... ②c6

Too late now is 20...g5? 21 f4!

21 f4 ②d4 22 ≝c4 ...

To prepare c3, driving the Knight away from d4. I didn't like the looks of 22 fxe5 \(\mathbb{E}\)xe5 23 \(\mathbb{L}\)f4 \(\mathbb{E}\)e2, etc.

23 c3 ...

After the game a kibitzer suggested 23 鱼e4 營h5 24 f5 but this allows Black to turn the tables by 24...營e2 25 區g1 公f3!

23 ... ②f5

On 23...②e2 24 f5 ভf6 (24...ভh5? 25 &f3!) 25 &e3 ②f4 26 &e4 is tremendous.

24 fxe5 ...


After 24 2e4 Wh5 just who has got the attack is not quite clear!

25 当f4 turns out badly after 25... 全c7! 26 全e4 当h5!

25 ... \( \begin{align\*} \begin{alig

Black is playing for an advantage. 25... De3 26 & xe3 Exe3 is absolutely equal.

*26* **≜e4** 



**BISGUIER** 

Position after 26 2e4

**FISCHER** 

The critical position.

26 ... \( \beta \textb{xb2}?

A pity that just when the game was getting interesting, Black has to make this terrible mistake.

Correct is 26... **=**8! (threatening ... **=**8xe4). Bad would be 27 **=**91 **=**9h5 28 **=**afl **=**0e3! 29 **=**9b5 **=**xe4 30 dxe4 **=**2xfl 31 **=**8e8+ (if 31 **=**xfl **=**94 wins) 31... **=**h7 32 **=**xg7+ **=**xg7 33 **=**2e5+ **=**xe5 34 **=**xe5+ f6 35 **=**9e7+ **=**26 36 **=**8e8+ **=**25 escaping the perpetual and should win.

After 26... **Z**e8! therefore, the best White has is 27 皇f3 (to prevent ... **W**h5) 27... **Z**xb2 28 **Z**ael with even chances, owing to the Bishop pair.

27 **g**e5! ....

Bisguier slumped and his chest collapsed, as he saw that Black cannot avert the loss of a piece.

 27
 ...
 **Ze8** 

 28
 **Zxf5 Zxe5** 

 29
 **Zxe5 Black resigns**

## **46** Fischer - Benko [U.S.A.]

# USA CHAMPIONSHIP 1963-4 PIRC-ROBATSCH DEFENSE

### Romp

Chess Life, January 1964, reported:

"In the later stages of the tournament some of Fischer's opponents did almost as much to guarantee his 11-0 score as Bobby did. The building tension worked to Fischer's advantage...On Monday, December 30, Fischer won his last game of 1963 — defeating Pal Benko with a neat little combination, after Benko had shown some suicidal tendencies in the management of his defense."

And so, in twenty-one moves, another Grandmaster is demolished. Benko misses a chance to simplify (on move 15) in order to reach an inferior but possibly tenable ending. This is fortunate for the reader, who otherwise would be cheated of White's scintillating 19th move. That alone is worth the price of admission!

| 1 | e4         | <b>g</b> 6 |
|---|------------|------------|
| 2 | d4         | <u> </u>   |
| 3 | <b>Øc3</b> | ***        |

3 c4 d6 4 ©c3 transposes to a King's Indian. An unorthodox try 13 h4!?

| 3 | *** | <b>d6</b> |
|---|-----|-----------|
| 4 | f4  |           |

Sharpest. Another build-up is 4 2e3 2f6 5 f3, etc.

| 4 | ***         | <b>D</b> f6 |
|---|-------------|-------------|
| 5 | <b>2</b> f3 | 0-0         |
| 6 | <b>拿d3</b>  | ***         |

An improvement over 6 &e2 which I played against Korchnoi E Curação 1962. That game continued: 6...c5 7 dxc5 👑 a5 8 0-0 👑 xc5-9 �h1 ②c6 10 ②d2 a5! 11 ②b3 👑 b6 12 a4 ②b4 13 g4 &xg4! with big advantage.

Preparing to sac the "minor exchange." Interesting is Valvo's 5...心a6!? 7 e5 dxe5 8 fxe5 心d5 9 心xd5 豐xd5 about equal. (Bisguier-Benko, match 1964.)


The book gives 6...②bd7 70-0 (7 e5 is best) 7...e5 8 dxe5 dxe5 9 fxe5 ①xe5 10 ②xe5 營d4+ 11 含h1 營xe5 12 意f4 營c5 with a tenable game. Fischer-Perez, Havana 1965 continued; 6...②c6!? 7 e5 dxe5 8 fxe5 ②d5 (Spassky's 8...②g4 or maybe even 8...②h5 is better) 9 ②xd5 營xd5 10 c3 意g4 11 營e2! with a pull.

I overheard someone explaining this game to a beginner: "You take off the Knight here, another piece comes out to replace it, so Black hasn't really stopped White's development..."

On 9... 4 d7 10 e5 keeps Black cramped.

| 10 | dxe5 | dxe5 |
|----|------|------|
| 11 | f5   | •••  |

Already threatening to obtain a winning bind with g4-g5.



**BENKO** 

Position after 11 f5

**FISCHER** 

11 ... gxf5

Best. My original note said: "If immediately 11... 2d4 12 \( \text{\textit{g}} f2 \) gxf5 13 exf5 with a quick crush in sight." This verdict was later confirmed


#### *12* ₩**xf5**

After 12 exf5 e4! Black gets good counterplay.

12 ...

€)d4

Benko is willing to gamble a Pawn to drive White's Queen from its dominating post. 12... after dominating post. 12...



**BENKO** 

Position after 12...4 d4

**FISCHER** 

13 營配

I was tempted to accept the dare with 13 營xe5! ②g4 14 營xg7— 含xg7 15 hxg4 with threats all over the place. For example, if 15...②e6
16 e5 罩h8 17 食h6+ 含g8 18 ②e4 wins. But 15...②c6 is hard to crack.

13 ... ②e8

More active than 13... 2d7 14 0-0-0 2c5 15 2b1 followed by 2e2 and c3 driving out the Knight. Now with ... 2d6 pending, Black threatens either to break with ... f5 or, in some lines, to advance with ... c5-c4.

*14* **0-0** 

An alternative is 14 0-0-0 ad6 15 ae2. I thought White's King would be safer after the text – the drawback is the K-side Pawns can no longer safely advance.

*14* ... ∅**d6** 

Sharp! I had expected 14...c6 15 ©e2 after which Black must either exchange his only well-placed piece or allow White's Knight to scramble to g3 followed by h5 or f5.

15 **豐g3** ...

The only way to sustain the initiative. On 15 add f5 16 axd4 axe4! 17 axe4 fxe4 wins a Pawn. And after 15 ae2 f5 gives Black active counterchances.

15 ... \$\dispha\$h8

On 15...f5 16 皇h6 豐f6 17 皇xg7 豐xg7 18 豐xg7+ 含xg7 19 exf5 公6xf5 20 罩ael 罩ae8 21 公e4 with a comfortable edge, but certainly no forced win.

*16* ₩**g4** ...

To prevent ...f5.

16 ... c6

Too passive. Black should seize the opportunity for 16...c5!


17 **營h5** ...

Threatening 18 \(\precent{a}\)xd4 exd4 19 e5.

17 ... ₩e8?

Either 17... De6 or ... c5 is essential.

The zwischenzug Benko missed. He had expected 19 e5 f5!



**BENKO** 

Position after 19 罩f6!

**FISCHER** 

A bolt from the blue!

19 ...

**ġg8** 

Forced. On 19...dxc3 (or 19...\(\delta\xxf6\)) 20 e5 mates.

20 **e5** 21 **⊴ e2!** 

h6

•••

Black was hoping for 21 罩xd6 營xe5! and he survives to an ending.

21 ...

Black resigns

There is no defense to the threat of 22 罩xd6. On 21...②b5 22 豐f5 wins. Or 21...拿xf6 22 豐xh6 forces mate.

## 47 Fischer - Bisguier [U.S.A.]

USA CHAMPIONSHIP 1963-4
RUY LOPEZ

### The Indian sign?

Bisguier is the one Grandmaster who consistently obtains decent positions against Fischer, only to throw them away for no apparent reason. Out of something like a dozen encounters, he has squeezed but a single draw.

Here is the only game in which Bisguier is outplayed from the start. Still, he does catch Fischer napping and nearly escapes. Describing his sensations before the game, Bisguier wrote:

"For the first time I was really in doubt as to what Bobby would play against me as White...I was hoping to play the Black side of the King's Gambit or the Two Knights' Defense, but he 'surprised' me with the Ruy Lopez...taken by surprise I was not so prepared or comfortable as I would like to have been. Now that Bobby has added psychology to his arsenal of weapons he is a much more dangerous opponent than ever before."

| 1 | <b>e4</b>   | e5  |
|---|-------------|-----|
| 2 | <b>4</b> 13 | ••• |

In a previous round, against Evans, I had hazarded a King's Gambit: 2 f4 exf4 3 &c4 營h4+ 4 含f1 and White won only after some uneasy moments.

| 2 | ***        | <a>□c6</a>  |
|---|------------|-------------|
| 3 | <b>≜b5</b> | <b>a</b> 6  |
| 4 | <b>≜a4</b> | <b>₫f</b> 6 |
| 5 | 0-0        | <b>≜e7</b>  |
| 6 | 罩e1        | <b>b</b> 5  |
| 7 | <b>≜b3</b> | 0-0         |
| 8 | <b>c</b> 3 | d6          |

Bernstein tried the Marshall Attack against me in the 1959-60 US Championship, and an interesting struggle developed: 8...d5!? 9 exd5 e4 (in place of the usual 9...公xd5) 10 dxc6 exf3 11 營xf3 臭g4 12 營g3 臭d6 13 營h4 罩e8 14 f3 臭f5 15 d4 臭xh2+ 16 含xh2 公g4+ 17 含g3

豐xh4+ 18 \$\cdot \text{xh4} \ \extstyre \text{xc1} \ 19 \ fxg4 \ \extstyre \text{xc1} \ 20 \ gxf5 \ \extstyre \text{d8} \ 21 \ a4! \ White won shortly.

| 9  | h3  | 2a5        |
|----|-----|------------|
| 10 | ₾c2 | <b>c5</b>  |
| 11 | d4  | <b>≝c7</b> |


For 11... 2d7 see game 38.

The Rauzer Attack. White gives up the center in order to exploit Black's weakened squares on d5 and f5.

Risky. Better is the usual 14... 鱼e6 15 包e3 罩ad8 16 豐e2 g6, etc.

An old line rehabilitated by Reshevsky against Bronstein at Zurich 1953. If now 15... ②e6 16 ②e3 g6 17 ②g5 ②c8 18 ②d5! ②xd5 19 exd5 ②xg5 (19... 三xd5 20 營f3! ②e6 21 ②xe6 fxe6 22 營g4!) 20 ②xg5 三xd5 21 三ad1 with a plus (LIPNITZKY).

Bronstein's move – after first interpolating 16 a4 \( \begin{array}{c} \) b8.



**BISGUIER** 

Position after 16 g3!

**FISCHER** 

This idea bankrupts Black's strategy. The slight weakening of the K-side is inconsequential, but Black's loss of time with his KN is.

Actually the sharpest continuation is 16 a4! as I played against Eliskases at Mar del Plata 1960 (I simply forgot to interpolate it here) 16... 温b8 17 axb5 axb5 18 g3! g6 19 h4! 鱼e6 20 包e3 c4 21 包g5 鱼xg5 22 hxg5 包a5 23 包g4 鱼xg4 24 營xg4 包b3 25 鱼xb3 cxb3 26 鱼e3 with a great advantage.

16 ... g6

Simply 16... 266 may be best. Then on 17 h4 h6 18 263 266. 16... 2xh3 is bad owing to 17 265 2xg5 (if 17... 2xf1 18 2xf5 2xg5 19 2xf5 620 2xf6! 2xf6!

17 h4! ...

Bronstein's 17 \$\displays h2\$ and Weinstein's 17 \$\displays g2\$ are time-consuming and hence weaker.


When I told Bronstein (at Mar del Plata 1960) that the text was a tremendous improvement over his game with Reshevsky, he replied: "Of course. After seven years one must find an improvement."

17 ... **鱼e6** 18 **包e3 f6** 

Probably best. 18...c4 19 ②g5! is similar to the quoted game with Eliskases.

*19* **②d5!** ...

Of course! Chess is a matter of timing. Given another move or two Black would be able not only to defend himself against this invasion, but even try for the initiative.



BISGUIER

Position after 19 2d5!

FISCHER

19 ..

**꾈b7** 

**豐xe7** 

White has the two Bishops - or a "half point" advantage.

21 ②h2

This Knight is also bound for d5.

Winning the second "minor exchange." On 23... \$\mathbb{Z}\$18 24 \$\mathbb{Z}\$29 the Knight is ready to pounce on d5, especially after Black's Rook has been deflected from the d-file.

More accurate is 25 奠e3 (25...公c5? 26 臭xc5 豐xc5 27 豐e6+ 曾g7 28 罩ad1 penetrates decisively).

25 ... 堂h8!

Alert. I had expected 25...g5 whereupon 26 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e3 is even more devastating than before.


On 26 hxg6 \( \mathbb{Z}\)g8 White is in trouble!

26 ...

g5

27 **ge3** 

⑤f4+!



**BISGUIER** 

Position after 27... 41/4+!

**FISCHER** 

*28* **♦h2!** 

28 gxf4? gxf4 threatening 29... \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 29... \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 29... \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}

28 ... ②d3
29 ♣xd3 cxd3?

Now the advanced soldier must fall. Exchanging a pair of Rooks would make it more difficult, but White still maintains his grip after 29... 基xd3 30 基ed1 基ad8 31 基xd3 cxd3 (31... 基xd3? 32 營c8+ 公d8 33 營xa6) 32 基d1 基d7 33 基d2 threatening a winning bind with 34 急c5.

*30* **≝ed1** 

罩d7

On 30...b4 31 罩d2 bxc3 32 bxc3 營a3 33 罩ad1 營xc3 34 營e6 堂g7 35 h6+! wins.

31 罩d2

(a)

A useless excursion, but there was no good defense. Strangely enough, Black's difficulty stems from his third move and its consequent

weakening on b6. If the pawn were still on a7 (preventing a later \$\mathbb{2}b6) he might well hold.

*32* **b3** 

₩d6

Not 32... \( \begin{aligned} & \text{Zc8} ? 33 \( \begin{aligned} & \text{Zxd3} ! \end{aligned} \)


*33* **□ad1** 

≌e8

On 33... ad8 34 axd3 axd3 axd3 axd3 a6 ab6!

*34* **≅xd3** 

**營xd3** 



**BISGUIER** 

Position after 34… 響xd3

**FISCHER** 

Black is braced to give up his Queen for two Rooks and keep control of the crucial d-file.

35 **營xd7!** 

Black resigns

A devastating X-ray. After 35...豐xd7 36 罩xd7 it's just a matter of time. E.g., 35...罩e6 37 當h3 followed by 當g4-f5, etc.

## 48 R. Byrne [U.S.A.] - Fischer

# USA CHAMPIONSHIP 1963-4 GRUENFELD DEFENSE

### The brilliancy prize

K. F. Kirby, editor of the South African Chess Quarterly, summed up the astonishment and admiration of the chess world when he wrote:

"The Byrne game was quite fabulous, and I cannot call to mind anything to parallel it. After White's eleventh move I should adjudicate his position as slightly superior, and at worst completely safe. To turn this into a mating position in eleven more moves is more witchcraft than chess! Quite honestly, I do not see the man who can stop Bobby at this time..."

And one can add nothing to Byrne's own words:

"And as I sat pondering why Fischer would choose such a line, because it was so obviously lost for Black, there suddenly came 18... "Exg2. This dazzling move came as the shocker... The culminating combination is of such depth that, even at the very moment at which I resigned, both grandmasters who were commenting on the play for the spectators in a separate room believed that I had a won game!"

| 1 | <b>d4</b>   | <b>€</b> 2 <b>f</b> 6 |
|---|-------------|-----------------------|
| 2 | c4          | <b>g</b> 6            |
| 3 | <b>g</b> 3  | <b>c6</b>             |
| 4 | <u>₫</u> g2 | •••                   |

In the 1962-3 US Championship we reached the same position, but Byrne continued 4 d5 b5! 5 dxc6 bxc4 6 cxd7+ 2bxd7 7 2g2 2b8 8 2f3 2g7 9 0-0 0-0= Black's weak c-pawn is compensated for by pressure on the open b-file.

| 4 | •••  | d5  |
|---|------|-----|
| 5 | cxd5 | ••• |

5 營b3 maintains more tension.

5 ... cxd5

| 6 | ©c3 | <b>拿</b> g7 |
|---|-----|-------------|
| 7 | e3  | ***         |

Benko-Fischer, US Championship 1962-3, continued 7 ②f3 0-0 8 ②e5 (if 8 0-0 ②e4!=) 8... 拿f5 9 0-0 ②e4 10 營b3 ②c6 11 營xd5 ②xc3 12 bxc3 營xd5 13 拿xd5 ②xe5 14 dxe5 拿xe5 with a draw shortly.

| 7  | •••        | 0-0        |
|----|------------|------------|
| 8  | ©ge2       | ©c6        |
| 9  | 0-0        | <b>b</b> 6 |
| 10 | <b>b</b> 3 | •••        |

It's hard for either side to introduce an imbalance into this essentially symmetrical variation.

Deadeye equality also ensues after 10 公f4 e6 11 b3 皇a6 12 罩e1 罩c8 13 皇a3 冨e8 14 罩c1, etc. (Stahlberg-Flohr, Kemeri 1937.)


| 10 | ••• | <u></u> <u></u> <b>≜</b> a6 |
|----|-----|-----------------------------|
| 11 | ≜a3 | <b>ℤe8</b>                  |
| 12 | ₩d2 | •••                         |

A good alternative is 12 罩c1.

A kibitzer later suggested 12 f4?! to prevent ...e5. But after 12...e6 followed by ...\$18 and eventual doubling on the c-file, Black gets at advantage.

I was a bit worried about weakening my d-pawn, but felt that the tremendous activity obtained by my minor pieces would permit White no time to exploit it. 12...e6 would probably lead to a draw.

Passive is 13 \( \text{\textsuper} \) ac1 exd4 (if 13...\( \text{\textsuper} \) c8 14 \( \text{\textsuper} \) fd1 e4 15 f3! is tenable 14 exd4 \( \text{\textsuper} \) c8 15 f3 although Black has difficulty breaking through.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 13...42xe5

BYRNE

14 罩fd1?

Add another to those melancholy case histories entitled "the wrong Rook." Correct is 14 ad1! Originally I gave the following "refutation": "14...②e4 15 axe4 dxe4 16 axe4 axd2 17 axd2 ac4 18 axa8 axd2 19 ad1 ac4 20 bxc4 (best) 20...axa8 regaining the Pawn with a big endgame advantage." But Averbakh found a hole in my analysis with 20 ac6! (instead of 20 bxc4 which I had carelessly given as "best"), 20...axa3 21 axe8 axe2 22 ad7 and White is the one who wins instead of Black!

I spent an evening just staring at the position after 14 罩ad1, trying everything, unwilling to let my brilliancy go down the drain. The more I looked, the more I liked White's game! For example, 14...罩c8 (14...②d3 is refuted by 15 營c2) 15 公xd5 公xd5 16 兔xd5 兔d3 17 兔g2 罩c2 18 營xc2! kaput. No better is 14...營d7 15 營c2 followed by 冨d2 and 冨fd1 (if 15...冨ac8 16 營b1!).

Another try which just falls short is 14 \( \) ad1 \( \) c7 \( 15 \) c1! \( \) e4!? (otherwise \( 16 \) b1 consolidates) \( 16 \) \( \) xd5! \( \) xc1 \( 17 \) \( \) xc1 \( \) xf1 \( 18 \) \( \) xe4 \( \) h3 \( 19 \) \( \) c7+ \( \) h8 \( 20 \) \( \) xa8 \( \) xa8 \( \) xa8 \( \) xa8 \( \) the eping the extra Pawn. Indeed, how does Black even equalize, let alone sustain the initiative?

Finally I found 14... ©c8! — the only move to keep the pressure. Now on 15 \(\times\) xd5 \(\times\) xd5 \(\times\) xd5 \(\times\) dd4 \(\times\) gd4 \(21\) \(\times\) fe1 \([0\) c2 \(15\) with a strong attack] \(21\)... \(\times\) xe3! should win) \(19\)... \(\times\) xd8 \(20\) \(\times\) xd8 \(21\) \(\times\) xd8 \(21\) \(\times\) xd8 \(21\) \(\times\) xd8 \(21\) \(\times\) xe5 with a better ending. And on \(15\) \(\times\) c1 \(\times\) d7! \(16\) \(\times\) cd1 \(\times\) ad8 Black has finagled a precious tempo, since his Queen is on d7 instead of d8. After \(14\)... \(\times\) c8! relatively best is \(15\) \(\times\) 20 \((\times\) (if \(15\) \(\times\) c1 \(\times\) e4 \(16\) \(\times\) xd5 \(\times\) xe2 \(17\) \(\times\) xe4 \(\times\) h8! wins the exchange. One possible line is \(18\) \(\times\) xc8 \(\times\) axc8 \(\times\) 2axc8 \(19\) \(\times\) c7 \(20\) \(\times\) c1 \(\times\) d7 \(21\) \(\times\) f3!) although Black keeps the initiative with \(15\)... \(\times\) f5.

14 ... ②d3!
15 ₩c2 ...

There is hardly any other defense to the threat of ... De4.


A] 15 ②d4 ②e4 16 ②xe4 dxe4 17 逸b2 罩c8 with a powerful bind.

B] 15 ②f4 ②e4 16 ②xe4 dxe4 (not 16... 鱼xa1? 17 ②d6) 17 罩ab1 罩c8 18 ②xd3 鱼c3! 19 營e2 鱼xd3 20 營g4 f5 21 營h3 鱼xb1! 22 罩xd8 罩exd8 23 鱼f1 罩d1 24 含g2 鱼d3! 25 鱼xd3 exd3 wins.

c] 15 f3 皇h6 16 f4 (if 16 ②f4? d4!) 16...皇g7! resumes the threat of ... ②e4, only White has weakened himself in the interim.

15 ...

②xf2!



**FISCHER** 

Position after 15...\(\alpha\)xf2!

**BYRNE** 

The key to Black's previous play. The complete justification for this sac does not become apparent until White resigns!

| 16 | \$xf2      | ∅g4+ |
|----|------------|------|
| 17 | <b>ġg1</b> | ©xe3 |
| 18 | ₩d2        | •••  |

Forced. Now on 18... atl 19 axd1 White is all right again.

18 ... □xg2!

Removing this Bishop leaves White defenseless on his light squares.

19 **♣xg2** d4! 20 **♣xd4 ♣b7**+

The King is at Black's mercy.


#### 21 曾f1

Equally hopeless is 21 會g1 &xd4+ 22 營xd4 罩e1+! 23 會f2 營xd4+ 24 罩xd4 罩xa1 25 罩d7 罩c8 26 罩xb7 (if 26 &b2 罩h1) 26...罩xc3 27 罩b8+ 會g7 28 &b2 罩xa2, etc.

Or 21 曾f2 豐d7! 22 罩ac1 豐h3 23 包f3 食h6 24 豐d3 食e3+ 25 豐xe3 罩xe3 26 曾xe3 罩e8+ 27 曾f2 豐f5! finis!

21 ...

**營d7!** 



FISCHER

Position after 21... 幽d7!

**BYRNE** 

#### White resigns

A bitter disappointment. I'd hoped for 22 營f2 營h3+23 含g1 罩e1+!! 24 罩xe1 食xd4 with mate to follow shortly. Also 22 ②db5 營h3+23 含g1 食h6 and the curtain comes down.

## 49 Fischer - Steinmeyer [U.S.A.]

#### USA CHAMPIONSHIP 1963-4

CARO-KANN DEFENSE

### A complex trap


While generally thought of as "one movers," some opening traps are deeper and more beautiful than others because falling into them requires a certain degree of skill. They might not attract and, if they did, might work for an amateur!

Steinmeyer's concept beginning with 13... #f4+ is both subtle and novel. The only trouble is that it meets with a smashing refutation. Instead of simplifying, as Steinmeyer hopes, his variation enmeshes him in complications. The nail in the coffin is 16 \$\overline{\infty}\$e5, after which Black's Queen can no longer be extricated without fatal loss of material.

1 e4 c6 2 d4 ...

For 2 ②c3 d5 3 ②f3 see game 16.

2 ... d5 3 \( \tilde{\pi} \c3 \) dxe4 4 \( \tilde{\pi} \) xe4 \( \tilde{\pi} \) f5



**STEINMEYER** 

Position after 4...\2f5

**FISCHER** 

More usual is the immediate ... ②d7 to prevent ②e5.

7 **h**4 ...


7 单d3 (if 7 包e5 包bd7 8 包xg6 hxg6 Black is solid), 7...e6 8 0-0 单e7 9 c4 0-0 10 单xg6 hxg6 leads to equality. (Evans-Benko, US Championship 1962-3.)

White can try to exploit the order of Black's moves by 8 ②e5, but 8... **\$**h7 9 **\$**c4 e6 10 **@**e2 ②d5! (not 10... **@**xd4? 11 ②xf7!) followed by ... ②d7 equalizes.

| 8  | ***         | ≜xd3       |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 9  | <b>營xd3</b> | <b>e</b> 6 |
| 10 | <b>≜</b> d2 | ∅bd7       |

Or 10... **2** c7 11 c4 (if 11 0-0-0 **2** d6 12 **2** e4 **2** f4! 13 **2** xf6+ gxf6 is satisfactory) 11... **2** bd7 12 **2** c3 (the whole idea is to prevent Black from swapping Bishops) 12...a5! 13 0-0!? (if 13 0-0-0 **2** b4!) 13... **2** d6

14 ②e4 (Tal suggested 14 d5!? mixing it up, but 14... 鱼xg3! holds; not 15 dxe6? ②e5; or 15 fxg3 cxd5 16 cxd5 ②xd5 17 鱼xg7 罩g8 18 營h7 ②7f6 19 鱼xf6 ②xf6 20 營xh6 營xg3 21 營d2=) 14... ②xe4 15 營xe4 0-0=. (Fischer-Donner, Varna 1962.)



STEINMEYER

Position after 12 c4

**FISCHER** 

12 ...

0 - 0 - 0

12... & d6! 13 ② e4 (if 13 ② e2 0-0-0 14 堂 b1 e5=) 13... & f4! leads to immediate simplifications.

*13* **≜c3!** 

Now Black no longer can force the exchange of Bishops.

13 ...

**營f4+?** 

The start of a faulty concept. After 13... 2d6 (on 13...c5 14 d5!) 14 ②e4 2f4+ 15 含b1 ②e5! 16 ②xe5 2xe5 produces equality.

14 **⋭b1** 


②c5?

He still has time to back out with 14... 響c7.

15 **營c2** 

Dce4

Now there is no turning back. On 15...②cd7 16 ②e5! is very strong: e.g., 16...②xe5 17 dxe5 ②d7 (or 17...②g4 18 罩xd8+ 含xd8 19 罩d1+ 含c8 20 罩d4) 18 罩d4 營xe5 19 罩xd7!, etc.



STEINMEYER

Position after 15... Dce4

**FISCHER** 

16 包e5!

A clear refutation. The Queen's retreat is cut off and the ancient weakness on Black's f7 is etched more sharply than ever. Shamkovich-Goldberg, USSR 1961, continued with 16 \(\frac{1}{2}\)a5? which won only against inferior defense.

16 ... ②xf2

What else? 16...②xg3 loses to 17 fxg3 營xg3 18 罩d3 營f4 19 罩f3 營e4 20 ②xf7. And 16...②xc3+ is refuted by 17 bxc3! 罩g8 (if 17...②g4 18 ②h5! 營f5 19 營xf5 exf5 20 ②xf7) 18 罩d3 h5 19 罩f3 營h6 20 ②xf7, etc.

#### 17 **Zdf1!**

Black resigns

Probably what Steinmeyer overlooked when he went into this whole mess. On 17... 學xg3 18 罩xf2 豐e3 (otherwise 罩f3) 19 罩e2 豐f4 20 氫xf7 wins at least the exchange.

Motivated by my lopsided result (11-0!), Dr Kmoch congratulated Evans (the runner up) on "winning" the tournament ... and then he congratulated me on "winning the exhibition."

## **50** Fischer - Celle [U.S.A.]

CALIFORNIA 1964: Exhibition Tour EVANS GAMBIT

#### Tour de force

As one of ten simultaneous clock games played on tour, at Davis College, this is a perfect example of the precept that if White makes a slip in the opening he is punished by loss of the initiative, while if Black makes a slip (since he is skating on thin ice from the very start) it is likely to be fatal. 6...d6 is the offender.

With 9 \subseteq h5 Fischer assumes a commanding control of space, but faces a strong defense which compels him to offer a piece in order to maintain pressure. Continuing with restraint and circumspection, he builds up the attack with a series of quiet developing moves — reminiscent of Morphy's famous victory over the Duke of Brunswick at the Paris opera. When the time is ripe, Fischer throws everything at Black's King, including the proverbial kitchen sink. His show of brute force is handsomely rewarded.

| 1 | e4          | e5  |
|---|-------------|-----|
| 2 | <b>D</b> 13 | ②c6 |
| 3 | <b>≜c4</b>  | ≜c5 |
| 4 | b4!?        | ••• |

The Evans was already analyzed to death by the 'nineties. But it still makes for enterprising chess.

Must be the trend. At least, on tour most players answered this way. For 5... \( \delta \) a5 see game 44.

6 d4 d6?

A mistake is usually much more serious in these open games. Black must return the Pawn with 6... 2a5! 7 2xe5 2xc4 8 2xc4 d5!

7 **dxe5** 

②xe5

dxe5

**營h5!** 


In an earlier exhibition game I played 9 營b3 but got nothing after 9... ②e6! 10 ②xe6 fxe6 11 ②a3!? (if 11 營xe6 營d6=) 11... 營d3!

9 ... 10 營**xe5**  g6

On 10...f6 11 Wb5+! c6? 12 Wb3 \$18 13 \$2xg8! wins.

11 **&a3!** 

•••



**CELLE** 

Position after 11 \(\mathbb{2}a3!\)

**FISCHER** 

Incredible how Black is so completely immobilized by this one move!

11 ...

**ℤf8** 

The only way to get relief. 11... 當f8? works in all lines except 12 營xf6!

*12* **0-0** 

**⊕**g4

12... 2d7 followed by ... 2b6 might be better, but this certainly looked good at the time.


Apparently Black has freed his game. If now 15 ②c2 ¥e5 virtually forces an exchange of Queens. 15 ②b5 is rendered harmless by ...②e5. How's White to sustain the initiative?

15 **≜b5**+! ...

That's how. This forces Black to weaken himself on d6, although White must sacrifice a piece to exploit it.

15 ... c6

On 15.... 2d7 16 營xc7 (not 16 營xg4 c6!).



**CELLE** 

Position after 15...c6

**FISCHER** 

16 \( \text{\tint{\text{\te}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\t

₩e6!

Some fascinating possibilities appear after 16...cxb5 17 ②d6+ 曾d8 18 罩fd1 黛d7 19 ②xb7+ 曾c8 20 ②d6+ 曾d8 21 罩d4! ②e5 22 罩ad1 曾c7 (if 22...g5 23 ②f5 豐e8 24 豐xe5! 豐xe5 25 罩xd7+ 曾e8 [if 25...曾c8 26 ②e7+! wins] 26 罩e7+! 豐xe7 27 ②g7 mate) 23 f4 ②g4 24 h3 ②f6 25 f5 曾b6 26 豐e3 曾c7 (after 26...曾a6 27 a4 smashes Black) 27 罩c4+! bxc4 (if 27...曾d8 28 豐c5 anyway) 28 豐c5+ 黛c6 (if 28...曾d8 29 豐a5 mate; or 28...曾b8 29 罩b1+) 29 ②b5+, etc.

Black may not have seen the mate, but he suspected the worst!

Piling on the pressure. White mustn't amateurishly rush in with 17 營c7 營d7! forcing him to simplify by 18 ②d6+ 含e7 19 ②xc8+ 国axc8 20 營xd7+ 含xd7, etc., and the advantage has evaporated.

17 ...

cxb5

He might as well take it since after 17... 全d7 18 公d6+ 空e7 19 全c4 White wins a Pawn without any risk.

18 **營c7** 

**皇d7** 


Forced.

*19* **②d6**+

ġe7

20 5f5+!

•••



**CELLE** 

Position after 20 4 f5+!

**FISCHER** 

The attack needs fresh fuel. Material is not what counts now, but open lines. Black is forced to capture against his will. 20... 堂e8 is out because of 21 ②g7+. And 20... 堂f6 21 罩d6 gxf5 22 營xd7! wins outright.

*20* 

•••

gxf5

21 exf5

⊒ac8

On 21... 豐xf5 22 豐d6+ 堂d8 (22... 堂e8 23 罩fe1+ 皇e6 24 豐d7 mate) 23 豐xf8+ 堂c7 24 豐xa8 wins.

22 **\(\beta\)**xd7+!

**營xd7** 

#### 23 **f6+!**


Originally I intended 23 \( \extstyle = 1 + \( \infty = 5 \) 24 \( \extstyle \textstyle = 5 \) \( \extstyle \textstyle \textstyle = 6 \) \( \extstyle \textstyle \textstyle = 5 \) \( \extstyle \textstyle = 5 \) \( \extstyle = 5 \) \( \extstyle \textstyle = 5 \) \( \extstyle = 5

23 ...

**②xf6** 

Not 23... 會e8? 24 罩e1+ 營e6 25 營xc8 mate. On 23... 會xf6 24 營xd7.

24 罩e1+



CELLE

Position after 24 罩e1+

**FISCHER** 

Note the amusing piece configuration. All Black's pieces are stepping on each other's toes.

24 ...

De4

The only legal move!

當fd8

•••

Here I forgot Lasker's maxim. 27 \wedge e7+ would have forced mate in four.

## 51 Fischer - Smyslov [U.S.S.R.]

HAVANA 1965 RUY LOPEZ

### Squeeze play

Fischer competed in this Capablanca Memorial Tournament by long-distance telephone, and his victory over the winner is reminiscent of the famous Lasker-Capablanca duel at St. Petersburg, 1914, where Black was also gradually constricted and strangled.


Taken by surprise with an antiquated line (5 d3), Smyslov soon gets into trouble. He finds a way out, although it burdens him with doubled King Pawns. After the subsequent exchange of Queens he apparently underestimates White's winning chances and permits himself to drift into a cramped ending. Applying persistent pressure, Fischer makes gradual inroads; the defensive task eventually proves too great and Smyslov buckles under the strain.

| 1 | e4                  | <b>e</b> 5  |
|---|---------------------|-------------|
| 2 | <b>∅</b> f3         | ©c6         |
| 3 | <b>≜</b> b5         | a6          |
| 4 | <u></u> <b>\$a4</b> | <b>2</b> f6 |
| 5 | d3                  | •••         |

Steinitz's favorite, long abandoned, and the first time I've employed it in a tournament game.

5 ... d6

A solid but passive reaction. An alternative is  $5...b5 6 \ 2b3 \ 2e7 7 a4$ , etc. Anderssen-Morphy, match 1858(!) continued:  $5...2c5 6 c3 b5 7 \ 2c2 0-0 8 0-0 d5 9 exd5 \ 2xd5 10 h3 h6 (Steinitz had a field day criticizing White's last two moves) <math>11 \ d4 \ exd4 \ with a satisfactory game for Black.$ 



**SMYSLOV** 

Position after 5...d6

FISCHER

6 c3

溴e7

On 6...g6 7 Dbd2 (or Bronstein's 7 £g5) 7...£g7 8 Df1 0-0 9 h4 opens fresh vistas.

| 7 | 2bd2        | 0-0 |
|---|-------------|-----|
| 8 | <b>Of</b> 1 | *** |

One facet of White's strategy is to defer castling and possibly institute a K-side attack with h3, g4, etc. Furthermore, this Knight can be deployed to e3 or g3 immediately without having to waste a tempo (after having castled) with  $\Xi$ e1.

| 8 | ••• | <b>b</b> 5 |
|---|-----|------------|
| 9 | ⊈b3 | d5         |

Inconsistent, after having lost a tempo with ...d6. Right is 9...②a5 10 堂c2 c5 11 ②e3 罩e8 12 0-0 堂f8 with equal chances.

10 ₩e2 dxe4

Opens the position prematurely. No better would be 10...d4 11 ②g3 dxc3 12 bxc3 b4 13 ②d2. Black should keep tension in the center with 10...②e6 11 ②g3 (if 11 ②g5 ②g4 12 f3 ②gc8! 13 exd5 ②a5!) 11...h6.

I was surprised that Smyslov was prepared to saddle himself with doubled King Pawns, but surmised that it must be all right since he doesn't do such things lightly. Anyway Black's game, without this exchange, would remain permanently cramped.

This Knight is undeniably misplaced here, but White intends to castle and then regroup his pieces in order to bring maximum pressure to bear on the doubled Pawns.

Some annotators suggested the obvious 13... \$\delta\$d6 (followed by \$\tilde{\Pi}\$e7-g6, etc.) but Black has no time for such sophisticated strategy: e.g., 14 0-0 \$\tilde{\Pi}\$e7 15 c4! c6 16 \$\tilde{\Pi}\$d1 winning material (if 16... \$\tilde{\Pi}\$c7 17 \$\tilde{\Pi}\$g5).

During the game I was kicking myself for allowing the subsequent exchange of Queens. Sharper is 14 a4 \( \begin{array}{c} \ad8 \) (if 14...bxa4 15 \( \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \ad8 \) (16 b4) 15 axb5 axb5 16 \( \begin{array}{c} \ad8 \) b4 17 0-0 and Black can no longer ease his burden with ...\( \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \ad8 \) (3. So correct is 14...b4!

Suddenly Black's plan hit me! At first I thought he just wanted to control the d-file; but now I realized he was scheming to chop wood.


Of course! With the Queens gone, it's that much harder to strike at Black's weaknesses.

| 16 | ₩xd3        | <b>ℤxd3</b> |
|----|-------------|-------------|
| 17 | axb5        | axb5        |
| 18 | <b>ℤa6!</b> | ***         |

Forcing Black's reply, and thus preventing the freeing maneuver with ...\$c5. 18 \$\&extrm{2}\extrm{e}\extrm{e}\textrm{3}\$ would be met by ...\$\&\Delta\textrm{2}\extrm{g}\textrm{4}\$.

18

ãd6



**SMYSLOV** 

Position after 18... 国d6

**FISCHER** 

19 \$h1!

The threat was 19... 4d4 forcing a favorable series of exchanges.

19

②d7

19...b4 20 cxb4 ②xb4 21 罩a7 罩c6 22 ②xe5 罩c2 would give Black active play for the Pawn.

> 奠e3 20

罩d8

20...b4 is still playable. Neither of us realized at this stage how essential this move was. I didn't want to weaken my c3 and c4 squares by playing b4 to prevent it; and Smyslov didn't want to commit himself yet.

21

h3

More accurate is 21 b4, from which I abstained for the reasons already mentioned.

> 21 h6 22 罩fa1 4 db8 23 ≣a8 罩d1+ 會h2 24


On 24 \( \bar{z}\) xd1+ 25 \( \cdot{c}\) h2 \( \dagged\) d6 holds (26 \( \dagge\) a7? \( \bar{z}\) a1!).

24

≣xa1

25

**ℤxa1** 



**SMYSLOV** 

Position after 25 \( \bar{\bar{\bar{\pi}}} \) xa1

**FISCHER** 

25 ...

40d7?

When I spoke to Smyslov on the direct phone line immediately after the game, he congratulated me on a beautiful performance and attributed his loss to his reluctance to play ...b4 at some point – and this is his last chance. After 25...b4 26 cxb4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xb4 27 \(\frac{1}{2}\)fl Black obtains much more freedom than in the actual game, and eliminates a weakness (his b-pawn) as well. Perhaps Smyslov feared that in this line White could maneuver his Knight to c4; even so, this is hardly fatal.

26 **b4!** 

⊞**0.0.0** 

Smyslov confessed that he felt Black was probably lost after this riposte. But the win is far from easy, and Black might later have improved upon his defense.

| 26 |            | <b>\$17</b> |
|----|------------|-------------|
| 27 | ♠1         | <b>≜</b> d6 |
| 28 | <b>g</b> 3 | ***         |

Once and for all negating all possible combinations with ... 2d4.

| 28 | •••         | <b>包f6</b> |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 29 | <a>∅1d2</a> | <b>∲e7</b> |
| 30 | <b>ℤa6!</b> | 5)b8       |


Very uncomfortable is 30...曾d7 31 包e1 包b8 32 罩a5 當c6.

31 **Za5!** 

Now White strengthens his bind by forcing ...c6 which takes away another breathing space from Black's pieces.

| 31 | •••        | <b>c6</b> |
|----|------------|-----------|
| 32 | <b>∲g2</b> | ∅bd7      |
| 33 | <b>查f1</b> | ***       |

Preparing to bring the King to e2 where it can support the 2e1-d3 maneuver.



**SMYSLOV** 

Position after 33 曾f1

**FISCHER** 

33 ...

罩c8?

A surprise! I had expected the much stouter defense with 33...②e8! (intending to exchange Rooks with ...②c7 and ...罩a8). After 34 罩a6 罩c8 35 ②b3 c5 36 bxc5 黛xc5! Black can hold. And there is no time for 34 ②e1 ②c7 35 ②d3 罩a8 36 ②b3 罩xa5 37 ②xa5 ②b8 38 黛a7 ②ca6 39 c4 黛c7.

The main line is 33...②e8 34 ②b3! ②c7 35 罩a7 罩a8 36 ②a5 ②b8 37 罩xa8 (if 37 罩b7 含d7) 37...②xa8 38 鼻a7 含d7 39 ②b7. It looks bad, but Black has chances to survive in the absence of a forced win.

34 @e1!

2e8

9)c7

bxc4

Too late now.

36... a8? is refuted by 37 c5! winning a piece.

37 ②xc4

The ideal position! Finally White has ganged up on Black's venerable weakness – his Pawn on e5.

37 ...

2b5

On 37... **a**8 38 **a**xa8 **a**xa8 **a**xa8 **a**9 **a**a5 **a**b8 40 **a**a7 **a**d7 41 **a**c4 picks off the e-pawn.

ãa6 38

Keeping Black tied up some more.

38

**堂f6** 

38... ②b8 39 罩a8 ②c7 40 ②xd6 曾xd6 41 急c5+ wins.

**拿c1!** 39

**拿b8** 

**拿b2** 40

Threatening f4.

40

**c**5

A desperate bid for counterplay.

41

9)b6!

41 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 41 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 41 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{align outright.

41

2xb6


≅xb6 42

**c4** 

On 42... 2d4 43 2xc5 2a7 44 2d7+ eg5 45 h4+ eh5 46 2b7 2c2 47 罩xa7 罩xb2 48 毫xe5 罩xb4 49 罩xg7 is decisive.

> 43 ②c5

c3 and Black resigns



**SMYSLOV** 

Final Position after 43...c3

FISCHER

White can win with 44 **Qc1 Qd4** 45 **Qd7**+ **ee7** (if 45... **ef7** 46 **Zxb8** 国xb8 47 ②xb8 ②b3 48 鱼a3 c2 49 ②c6, etc.) 46 ②xb8 ②b3 47 国b7+ 會d8 48 罩d7+ 會e8 49 罩xg7!

## **52** Fischer - Rossolimo [U.S.A.]

### U.S.A. CHAMPIONSHIP 1965-6 FRENCH DEFENSE

### Peekaboo strategy

The MacCutcheon Variation gives rise to unusual positions where White is frequently obliged to forfeit the privilege of castling in order to try and wrest an advantage. After some slight but instructive opening inexactitudes on both sides, Rossolimo appears to achieve equality. Indeed, he is constantly on the brink of crashing through with a counter-attack against White's vulnerable King, although his own monarch is also stranded in the center. After 13...f5, which shores up his fortress, it's not clear just whose attack will come first.

In a theoretically important formation — a logical offshoot of this variation — Fischer unearths two fine moves (17 255 + and 19 2g) to sustain his flagging initiative. Still, he is forced to wage a running battle, no sooner landing a blow than having to duck. Consequently, the outcome is in doubt until the very last punch.

| 1 | e4         | <b>e6</b>   |
|---|------------|-------------|
| 2 | d4         | <b>d5</b>   |
| 3 | <b>②c3</b> | <b>⊘</b> f6 |
| 4 | <u> </u>   | <u> </u>    |

The MacCutcheon Variation, giving rise to immediate complications. 4...\$e7 or 4...dxe4 are tamer.

| 5 | e5         | h6  |
|---|------------|-----|
| 6 | <b>≜d2</b> | ••• |

6 exf6 hxg5 7 fxg7 \square g8 leads to nothing.


| 6 | •••  | ≜xc3 |
|---|------|------|
| 7 | bxc3 | •••  |

Against Petrosian, at Curação 1962, I tried the ridiculous 7 2xc3? 2e4 8 2a5? (if 8 2b4 c5 9 dxc5 <math>xf2! 10 xf2 h4+) 8...0-0 (weaker is 8...b6 9 2b4 c5 10 2a3 cxd4 11 xd4 2c6 12 2b5) 9 2d3 2c6 10 2c3 2xc3 11 bxc3 f6 and Black already had the initiative.

More risky is 8... 會f8 9 h4 c5 10 罩h3.

Producing a position well-known to theory, but never completely worked out. Not 10... \widetilde{\psi}g5+ 11 \widetilde{\psi}xg5 \text{ hxg5 } 12 \text{ g4!}

11 **公f3** ...



ROSSOLIMO

Position after 11 2f3

FISCHER

11 ... ②c6

According to Modern Chess Openings, 11... 27 is more accurate; the point being that 12 24 can be met by 12...f5!. 11... 2d7 12 dxc5 deserves testing.


*12* **≝f4** ...

Possibly better is 12 \( \beta\) ab1, restraining the development of Black's Q-side.

12 ...

₩c7

Better is the natural 12... 營a5 (if 12... g5 13 營f6! 營xf6 14 exf6 g4 15 ②e5 cxd4 16 cxd4 ②xd4 17 h3 with a better ending) 13 罩ab1 (if 13 罩hb1 b6 14 a4 兔a6 15 兔b5 罩c8 16 dxc5 bxc5 17 兔xc6+ 罩xc6 18 罩b8+ 罩c8 holds) 13... b6 14 dxc5 營xc5 15 ②d4 ②xd4 16 cxd4 營a5+ with equality.



ROSSOLIMO

Position after 12... 響c7

**FISCHER** 

*13* **h4** 

practically forced) 15 h5! gxh5 16 \(\beta\)xh5 exd4 17 \(\beta\)ah1 yielding good attacking prospects.

13 ...

f5!

Re-establishing parity.

14 **g4** 

cxd4


15 cxd4

②e7?

> 16 gxf5 17 &b5+!

exf5

•••



**ROSSOLIMO** 

FISCHER

17 ...

曾f8?

On 17...②c6 (if 17...逾d7 18 এxd7+ 營xd7 19 e6!) 18 鱼xc6+ bxc6 (18...營xc6 is again met by 19 e6! 鱼xe6 20 ②e5 營d6 21 ②xg6 營xf4+ 22 ②xf4 and the Knight beats the Bishop in the ending) 19 罩hg1, etc.

Black's best chance, however, is to try and reach sanctuary with 17... 當d8! 18 单d3 单e6. White undoubtedly has the initiative, but it's hard to get at the King.

*18* **≜d3** 


Mission accomplished. Now Black's King is pinioned to the K-side.

18 ... <u>≜</u>e6 19 ∮g1! ...

The key move. This Knight is headed for f4 where it can exert maximum pressure on the g-Pawn.

19 ... 當f7 20 包h3 罩ac8!?

Quite rightly. Rossolimo prefers active defense. After 20... ag8 White eventually triples on the g-file (bringing his Knight to f4) with a crushing bind.



ROSSOLIMO

Position after 21 罩hg1

**FISCHER** 

21 ...

**b6** 

This takes a5 away from the Queen, eliminating any possible defenses there with check.

But Black also loses after 21... 營c3+ 22 含e3 公c6 23 罩ab1 公b4 24 罩xb4! 營xb4 25 h5 罩cg8 26 hxg6+ 罩xg6 27 罩xg6 營e1+ 28 含f3 含xg6 29 營h4! 營d1+ 30 含g2 罩g8 31 含h2!

| 22 | h5! | <b>營c3</b> + |
|----|-----|--------------|
| 23 | ∳e2 | 6)c6         |

24 hxg6+ **\$\delta**g7

No better is 24...會e7 25 營h4+ 含d7 26 罩ad1! 營xd4 (26...公xd4+? 27 營xd4!) 27 公f4!

25 **□ad1!** □xd4+

On 25... 響xd4 26 會f1! 響xe5 27 罩e1 響xf4 28 氫xf4 負d7 29 氫h5+ wins.

26 當f1 罩he8 27 罩g3 ...


Overprotecting the Bishop. After the hasty 27 營h4 公f3! 28 營f6+ 會g8 29 拿xf5 公h2+ 30 會g2 營f3+ 31 會xh2 營xf5 holds!

| 27 | ••• | ©c6  |
|----|-----|------|
| 28 | ₩h4 | ②xe5 |

After 28... wxe5 29 of 4 contains too many threats.

| 29        | <b>€</b> )f4  | © <b>g4</b> |
|-----------|---------------|-------------|
| 30        | <b>②xe6+!</b> | <b>ℤxe6</b> |
| 31        | ⊈xf5          | ₩c4+        |
| <i>32</i> | <b>ġg1!</b>   | ***         |

No credit for other moves!



ROSSOLIMO

Final Position after 32 &g1!

**FISCHER** 

32 ...

Black resigns

If 32...公xf2 33 營xc4 罩xc4 34 含xf2 罩f4+ 35 罩f3, etc. A hard-fought game!

## 53 Portisch [Hungary] - Fischer

#### SANTA MONICA 1966

#### NIMZO INDIAN DEFENSE

### Black magic

Here is one of the few instances when Fischer does not employ the fianchetto of his King's Bishop as a defense to the QP. By ignoring White's gambit on move nine he lays the groundwork for the positional trap (11... #d7) into which Portisch falls (14 #xa8). Normally, two Rooks for the Queen is a good trade — better than good when it produces a setting in which the scope and power of the Rooks may be formidable. But Portisch's judgment is faulty, he fails to take into account the weakness of his Pawns. This is one of the rare occasions when the Queen can run rampant, and she does.

Still, the question remains: how did Black manage to weave his spell? To achieve a winning endgame within fifteen moves, against a specialist with White in this opening, is an almost unheard of feat.

| 1 | d4 | <b>②f6</b> |
|---|----|------------|
| 2 | c4 | e6!        |

To throw White off balance. I felt Portisch was just too well-versed in the K's Indian.

This has been fashionable for some time. Spassky's offbeat 4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g5 leads to no advantage after 4...h6 5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)h4 c5 6 d5 d6 7 e3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xc3+! 8 bxc3 e5, etc. The two Knights are better than the Bishops in such closed formations.

4 ... b6!


Other moves have been analyzed to death.

5 ∅ge2 ...

5 ... <u>\$a6</u>

Bronstein's active idea, trying to profit from White's last move. I had adopted it with success in the 1966 US Championship.

A very interesting try is 5...  $\triangle$ e4!? as in the 1967 USSR Championship. Taimanov-Levin continued  $6 \ \text{@c2} \ \text{\&b7} \ 7 \ f3 \ (7 \ a3 \ is better)$ , and now instead of 7... &xc3+ (as in the game) 7... &xc3!  $8 \ \text{\&xc3} \ (8 \ \text{bxc3} \ \text{\&d6!} \ 9 \ \text{e4} \ \text{\&c6} \ \text{with good play against White's doubled c-pawn})} \ 8...$   $\text{\&h4+} \ 9 \ \text{\&f2} \ \text{\&xc3+} \ 10 \ \text{bxc3} \ \text{\&xf2+} \ 11 \ \text{\&xf2}$  &a6! threatening ... &c6-a5 with at least equality.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 5... \( \mathbb{L} a6 \)

PORTISCH

Somewhat inconsistent. The whole point is to play 6 a3 so that after 6... \( \text{2} \times c3 + \) (if 6... \( \text{2} e7 \) \( \tilde c7 \) \( \tilde c4 \) 8 cxd5 \( \text{2} \times c1 \) exc1 exd5 \( 10 \) g4! gives White a slight edge, as demonstrated in the 1954 Botvinnik-Smyslov match) 7 \( \tilde cxc3 \) White can avoid doubling his c-Pawn. After 7...d5 8 b3 0-0 9 a4 \( \tilde c6 \) I reached this position, as Black, twice in the 1966 US Championship. Addison played \( 10 \) \( \tilde c5 \) 2? and got the worst of it after \( 10 \)...dxc4 \( 11 \) bxc4 \( \tilde c3 \) 5 \( 12 \) \( \tilde c5 \) 6 \( 6 \) 13 \( \tilde c3 \) \( \tilde c7 \) 14 \( \tilde c2 \) c5 \( 15 \) \( \tilde c2 \) (finally) \( 15 \)...cxd4 \( 16 \) exd4 \( \tilde c8 \) 17 \( 0-0 \) \( \tilde c6 \)! 18 \( \tilde c7 \) \( \tilde c7 \) 13 \( 0-0 \)? (\( 13 \) b5 \( \tilde c5 \) 14 \( 0-0 \) permits White to regain his Pawn with a tiny pull) \( 13 \)...\( \tilde cd5 \) 14 \( \tilde c1 \) c6! \( 15 \) \( \tilde c3 \) b5 \( 16 \) a5 \( \tilde c7 \) 17 \( \tilde c2 \) \( \tilde c3 \) 18 \( \tilde c5 \) 21 \( \tilde c5 \) 22 \( \tilde c5 \) 23 \( \tilde c5 \) 23 \( \tilde c5 \) 23 \( \tilde c5 \) 24 \( \tilde c5 \) 23 \( \tilde c5 \) 23 \( \tilde c5 \) 23 \( \tilde c5 \) 24 \( \tilde c5 \) 23 \( \tilde c5 \) 24 \( \tilde c5 \) 23 \( \tilde c5 \) 24 \( \tilde c5 \) 25 \

6 ... <u>\(\perp\)</u>xc3+!

Inferior is 6...0-0 (not 6...d5??  $7 \overset{\text{w}}{=} a4+$ )  $7 \text{ e4} \overset{\text{c}}{\triangle} c6$  (White keeps his initiative also after  $7...c5 \ 8 \ d5 \ d6 \ 9 \overset{\text{e}}{=} e2 \ exd5 \ 10 \ exd5 \overset{\text{e}}{=} xc3+ 11 \ bxc3 \overset{\text{c}}{\triangle} bd7 \ 12 \ 0-0 \overset{\text{c}}{=} e8 \ 13 \overset{\text{w}}{=} a4$ , etc. Portisch-Reshevsky, Santa Monica 1966)  $8 \overset{\text{e}}{=} d3! \ d5 \ (8...\overset{\text{c}}{\triangle} xd4? \ 9 \overset{\text{w}}{=} a4 \ wins \ a \ piece) \ 9 \ cxd5 \overset{\text{e}}{=} xd3 \ 10 \overset{\text{w}}{=} xd3 \ exd5 \ 11 \ e5 \overset{\text{c}}{\triangle} e4 \ 12 \ a3! \ with \ a \ clear \ advantage. Portisch-Spassky, Moscow 1967.$ 


7 bxc3 d5 8 營f3 ...

The whole idea is dubious. No better is 8 **a** a dxc4! 9 **b** d5 **b** d5 e4 **b** c6 and White hasn't got enough for the Pawn.

Simply 8 cxd5 leads to level play. It is White's insistence on seeking the initiative that lands him in trouble.

8 ... 0-0 9 e4!? ...

Right is 9 cxd5 exd5 (not 9... 2xf1? 10 dxe6!) 10 2xa6 2xa6 11 營e2 營c8 12 0-0 c5 13 dxc5 公xc5 14 c4=. The text involves a gambit which Portisch probably had expected me to accept.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 9 e4!?

PORTISCH

9 ...

dxe4!


An improvement over 9...dxc4!? which I had played against Saidy in the 1966 US Championship:  $10 \, \text{@g5} \, \text{h6} \, 11 \, \text{@d2}$ ? (right is  $11 \, \text{h4}! \, \text{@b7}!$   $12 \, \text{@xf6} \, \text{@xf6} \, 13 \, \text{@xf6} \, \text{gxf6} \, 14 \, \text{@xc4}$  or White might try to continue the attack with  $12 \, \text{@h5}!$ ? @bd7! - but not 12...hxg5?  $13 \, \text{hxg5} \, \text{@xe4}$   $14 \, \text{@f6}+!! \, \text{wins} - \text{Spassky}$ )  $11... \, \text{@bd7} \, 12 \, \text{e5} \, \text{@d5} \, 13 \, \text{@f5}$  (if  $13 \, \text{@h5} \, \text{@h4}!$ )  $13... \, \text{exf5} \, 14 \, \text{@xd5} \, \text{@e8}! \, 15 \, \text{@xc4}$  (or  $15 \, 0\text{-}0\text{-}0 \, \text{c5}$ )  $15... \, \text{@xe5}! \, 16 \, \text{@xd8} \, \text{@xc4} + 17 \, \text{@xe8} + \, \text{@xe8} + \, 18 \, \text{@d1} \, \text{@xd2} \, 19 \, \text{@xd2} \, \text{@e2} + \, \text{with}$  an easily won endgame.

| 10 | ©xe4        | ②xe4  |
|----|-------------|-------|
| 11 | <b>營xe4</b> | ₩d7!! |

The finest move in the game, far superior to the "natural" 11...②d7 12 单d3 ②f6 13 營h4 with two Bishops and a beautiful development despite the doubled Pawns.

Black can well afford to give up two Rooks for a Queen (after 12 \subseteq xa8? \overline{\infty}c6), as will soon become apparent. The text prepares ...\overline{\infty}c6-a5 hitting the "weakling," as Alekhine used to call that kind of a target.

White gets the worst of it after 12 ≜d3 f5 13 ¥e2 ②c6, etc. Still, this was a prudent choice.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 12...罩e8

PORTISCH

13 **Qd3** 

13 0-0-0 seems more consistent, making a real fight of it. Such double-edged lines, however, are not to Portisch's taste.

13 ... f5 14 豐xa8? ...

Very bad judgment, White should resist temptation and try to hold on with 14 We2. His doubled c-Pawn, though weak, is not fatal. As the game goes, however, it is.

| 14 | ***          | €Dc6        |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 15 | 豐xe8+        | <b>營xe8</b> |
| 16 | 0-0          | <b>②a5</b>  |
| 17 | <b>≅</b> ae1 | ≜xc4        |

18 **≜xc4** ...

White cannot hold the ending. If 20 d5? simply ...e5.

Preparing to expand on the K-side, which cannot be prevented.

22 **\( \beta\)e2** ...

If 22 h4 e5! 23 &xe5 ②xe5 24 f4 ②f3+! 25 gxf3 Wa4 and White's Pawns are too loose.


| 22 | • • •       | <b>g</b> 5 |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 23 | <u></u> ≜e5 | ₩d8        |
| 24 | <b>äfe1</b> | •••        |

On 24 f4 2d2! 25 Ife1 2e4 ties White up.

| 24 | ••• | 會f7        |
|----|-----|------------|
| 25 | h3  | <b>f</b> 4 |
| 26 | ∲h2 | a6         |

Taking care of details, so that the Pawn will not be within the Bishop's reach after 26... 學d5 27 逸b8, etc.

The Queen is boss.



**FISCHER** 

Position after 27... 当d5!

**PORTISCH** 

Black's superiority is obvious. He has some minor threats, and a major one which cannot be met. To the surprise of no one, *Sovietski Sport*, a Soviet magazine, reported that Portisch had blundered and thrown away a perfectly even endgame.

28 **h4** ...

After the comparatively better 28 \( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} 4e2, Black wins more slowly with 28... \( \begin{align\*} 3! \) 29 \( \text{gxf3} \) (or 29 \( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} 4e4 \) fxg2 followed by ... \( \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} 2d2 \) wins) \( 29... \begin{align\*} \begin{align\*} 2d2, \) etc.

28 ... Qe3!

Wins the exchange, as 29 f3 fails against 29... 營d2 30 罩g1 營f2.

| 29 | ℤ1xe3         | fxe3        |
|----|---------------|-------------|
| 30 | 罩xe3          | <b>營xa2</b> |
| 31 | <b>罩f3</b> +  | \$e8        |
| 32 | <u> </u>      | ₩c4         |
| 33 | hxg5          | hxg5        |
| 34 | 罩 <b>f8</b> + | • • •       |

A check before dying.

The ominous presence of Black's a-pawn is the deciding factor.

# 54 Fischer - Najdorf [Argentina]

SANTA MONICA 1966 SICILIAN DEFENSE

## Najdorf's night off from the Najdorf

This game follows a loss (with Black) to Najdorf earlier in the tournament. Here, Najdorf adopts the Sicilian but not his Variation — perhaps because he had lost with it previously. (See game 40.) White soon launches a sharp line, a curious violation of principle involving three consecutive Bishop sorties before his other men have been developed. In relatively uncharted terrain, both players miss their way on move twelve. It then becomes a question of whether Najdorf's doubled center Pawns are a mass or a mess. Fischer proceeds to exploit his slight advantage with restraint, gradually building up pressure against Black's uncastled King. At the right moment he offers a stunning Pawn sacrifice (26 c5). Najdorf is compelled to decline, whereupon he lands in a hopeless endgame.

This forceful and resourceful performance typified Fischer's surge throughout the last half of the 2nd Piatigorsky Cup.

| 1 | e4          | <b>c</b> 5 |
|---|-------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>9</b> f3 | © c6       |

Najdorf avoids the Najdorf Variation.

| 3 | d4   | cxd4      |
|---|------|-----------|
| 4 | ②xd4 | <b>e6</b> |

4... 0 f6 obliges 5 0c3, which precludes the Maroczy Bind by c4. Ever since ways of combatting the "Bind" have been found, it has become almost an obsession to abstain from 4... 0 f6, although the most that can be said for other moves is that some of them may be as good.

5 Ø**b**5 ...

Alekhine was of the opinion that 5 c4 is best, but it has since been discovered that White cannot maintain any advantage after 5...  $6 \, 2 \, 2 \, 4$ , etc.

Sharpest. Objectively speaking, it is probably best to establish an immediate Maroczy Bind with 6 c4.

6 ... e5


### 7 **拿e3 ②f6**

Black can avoid the doubling of his Pawns by 7...a6  $8 \ 25c3 \ 266$   $9 \ 26 \ 267$ . However, Najdorf may have been worried about  $9 \ 264$ ! Fischer-Badilles, Manila 1967, then continued:  $9...\ 267 \ 10 \ 265$ !  $265 \ 11 \ 265 \ 0-0 \ 12 \ 265$  with absolute control of d5. After the text,  $8 \ 264$  is met simply by  $8...\ 266$ ! (but not  $8...\ 267$ ) and  $867 \ 267$  (but not  $8...\ 267$ ) and wins)  $9 \ 267$  and  $867 \ 267$  (not  $10...\ 267$ )  $11 \ 267$ ).

### 8 **g5!?** ...

Another of Bronstein's ideas. The customary line was 8 21c 3 and after 8... a6 9 23 Black has 3 possibilities:

- A] 9...b5 10 包d5 包xd5 (or 10... 基b8 11 包xf6+ 豐xf6 12 包b1! with an edge for White) 11 exd5 包e7 12 c4 with advantage.
- B] Simagin gives 9... @e6 10 @d5 @xd5! 11 exd5 @e7 12 c4 @f5 with harmonious development for all of Black's pieces. Or 10 @c4 b5 11 @b6 @b8 12 @bd5 @xd5 13 exd5 @e7 with a good game. But 13 @xd5!? (instead of 13 exd5) launches a promising gambit (13... @xe4 14 @f3 @c5 15 0-0-0).
- c] Best is 9... 2... 2... 2... 3..



**NAJDORF** 

Position after 8 \(\mathbb{g}\)5!?

FISCHER

The third consecutive Bishop sortie is well-motivated since White is threatening to double Black's f-Pawn.

8 ... <u>\$e6?</u>

Also weak is 8...a6 9  $\$  xf6 gxf6 10  $\$  5c3 f5? 11  $\$  h5!  $\$  d4 12  $\$  c4  $\$  c7 13  $\$  d2  $\$  xc2+ 14  $\$  e2  $\$  xa1 (Bronstein-Polugayevsky, USSR Championship 1964) and now simply 15  $\$  xa1! must win out. Another try is 11... g7!? (instead of 11... d4) 12  $\$  c4 0-0 13 exf5  $\$  d4 14  $\$  d3  $\$  8e8 15  $\$  e4! (not 15 f6? as in Estrin-Tcherepkov, Leningrad 1964). For instance, 15... d5 16  $\$  xd5  $\$  xf5 17  $\$  xf5  $\$  xd5 18  $\$  c3  $\$  xg2? 19  $\$  e4  $\$  xc2+ 20  $\$  e2  $\$  d4+ 21  $\$  e3, etc.

But Black could equalize immediately with 8... @a5+! 9 @d2 (or 9 &d2 @d8 draws) 9... <math>@a5+! 9 @a5 @a5 11 &e3 (R.Byrne suggests 11 &c7+? &d7 12 @a8 @a5 13 &b5+, but after 13... &d8! 14 @c3 &d7 15 0-0-0 &e7 White's straying Knight is soon lost) 11... &d7 12 @a7 d5, etc.

9 ②1c3 ...

After 9 c4 h6! 10 axf6 gxf6 Black's position is excellent.


9 ... a6
10 \( \frac{1}{2}\) xf6 gxf6
11 \( \Quad \) a3 \( \Quad \) d4

Other possibilities (all favoring White) are:

- A] 11...b5 12 ad5!
- в] 11... ge7 12 gc4!
- C] 11...f5? 12 &c4 &xc4 13 @xc4 fxe4 14 @xe4 d5 15 @xd5!

#### 12 **Qc4**?

Correct is 12 公c4 and if 12...宣c8 13 公e3 食h6 (if 13...營b6 simply 14 罩b1) 14 食d3 罩g8 15 營h5! snuffs out Black's initiative.



**NAJDORF** 

Position after 12 臭c4?

**FISCHER** 

12 ...

**b**5

Sharper is 12...d5! 13 ②xd5 (if 13 exd5 এxa3 14 bxa3 營a5) 13... ②xa3 14 bxa3 營a5+ 15 當fl (or 15 c3 ②xd5 16 ②xd5 營xc3+ 17 當fl 冨c8! with advantage) 15...0-0-0 with active play: e.g., 16 c3, then ... ②b5, etc.

13 **Qxe6** 

Of course not the tempting 13 \(\exists d5?\) b4.

13 ...

fxe6

All in all this exchange benefits Black since it enables him to protect his weak squares (d5 and f5). However if (as in the sequence) his central Pawn mass can be restrained, then it becomes merely a fixed target subject to constant pressure.

14 De2

9)c6

Black should get some scope for his pieces by 14... 15 \(\vert\) xe2! 15 \(\vert\) xe2 d5. The check looming on h5 is not to be feared.

15 **②g3** 

15 c4 at once is met by 15... ₩a5+

15 ...

**營d7?** 

Dr. Kmoch recommends 15...d5! Or 15... 營a5+! 16 c3 b4 and if 17 公c4 營c5.

16 **c4** 17 **0-0** 

**②d4** b4

"Castling Q-side is a risk Black's insurance company would not permit him to take." (R.Byrne)

The text later enables White to use this b-Pawn to pry open the a-file (after a3). Better is 17...\(\doc{1}{2}g7\).

 18
 ②c2
 ②xc2

 19
 豐xc2
 h5

 20
 罩fd1
 h4

 21
 ②f1
 罩g8?


Better is 21...h3 22 g3 \u20accc c6 with reasonable play.

 22
 a3!
 h3

 23
 g3
 bxa3

 24
 基xa3
 豐c6

 25
 豐e2!
 f5



**NAJDORF** 

Position after 25...f5

**FISCHER** 

Hoping to trade his h-Pawn for the e-Pawn in the event of 26 \(\subsetent{\subset}\)h5+. But White now is ready to exploit Black's poor development.

26 c5! .

More than a glancing blow. Black can know nothing about the imminent destruction of his compact mass of center Pawns.

26 ... ₩xe4

26...dxc5 (if 26...豐xc5 27 豐h5+ followed by exf5, etc.) 27 豐h5+ 會e7 28 罩ad3 fxe4 29 罩3d2 is quite hopeless for Black.

Black's game is in ruins – note his pathetic triplets on the e-file. The rest is technique.

28 ... **h6** 

To prevent De3-c4.


 29
 罩a5
 堂d7

 30
 罩xe5
 臭g7

 31
 罩xe4
 臭xb2

 32
 ②e3
 a5

A last gasp. Different people feel differently about resigning.



**NAJDORF** 

Position after 37...a4

**FISCHER** 

#### 38 **②b6+**


Najdorf was probably hoping for 38 罩c8! 罩xc8 39 心b6+ 含c5 40 dxc8=營+? 罩xc8 41 心xc8 a3 with some practical chances. But we both overlooked the neat Zwischenzug 40 罩c1+! 含xb6 41 罩xc8! breaking all further resistance.

The text is good enough, but prolongs the game.

| 38 | *** | <b>≅xb6</b> |
|----|-----|-------------|
| 39 | ≅c8 |             |

The point: on 39... 罩bb8 the Pawn queens with check.

| 39 | •••         | <b>ℤd6</b>    |
|----|-------------|---------------|
| 40 | <b>ℤxa8</b> | <b>≝xd7</b>   |
| 41 | ≅xa4        | e5            |
| 42 | <b>\$f1</b> | <b>≝b7</b>    |
| 43 | f4!         | <b>\$e6</b>   |
| 44 | fxe5        | <b>≝f7</b> +  |
| 45 | <b>©e2</b>  | <b>≝f2</b> +  |
| 46 | <b>Ġd3</b>  | ≜xe5          |
| 47 | <b>≝e1!</b> | Black resigns |



**NAJDORF** 

Final Position after 47 \( \begin{aligned} \text{\$\infty} \] = 1!

**FISCHER** 

After 47... 宣f5 48 宣a5 (win by pin!) 48... 會f6 49 宣exe5 宣xe5 50 宣xe5 會xe5 51 會e3 會f5 52 會d4! (but not 52 會f3 會g5 53 g4?? 會h4! and draws) 52... 會g5 53 會e5 曾g4 54 曾e4 曾g5 55 曾f3 曾f5 56 g4+ followed by 曾g3 wins.

# 55 Fischer - Bednarsky [Poland]

## HAVANA OLYMPIC 1966 SICILIAN DEFENSE

## The price of incaution

Once more Fischer rehabilitates his pet move (6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)c4) against his favorite Najdorf Variation, and it is remarkable that he should continue to win with such ease. In fact, his opponents do not seem to offer serious resistance. Young Bednarsky apparently is caught napping, improvises, and loses in just 22 moves!

Seeking active counterplay, Bednarsky blunders through bravado. He takes a tainted Pawn (9... £\(\text{fxe4}\)) and impetuously pursues the attack only to find himself in an ambush which, ironically, he had helped to construct. By move 12 Fischer obtains a formation at which he had had success even as a child. Naturally he wins, but the economy with which he does so is delightful.

| 1 | e4          | c5           |
|---|-------------|--------------|
| 2 | <b>4</b> 13 | <b>d6</b>    |
| 3 | d4          | exd4         |
| 4 | ∅xd4        | <b>₫</b> )f6 |
| 5 | <b>©c3</b>  | a6           |
| 6 | <b>≜c4</b>  | •••          |

Here we go again!

6 ... e6


Probably best. White's Bishop is made to "bite on granite."

7 **gb3** ...

Too slow is Bronstein's idea 7 a3. E.g., Robatsch-Fischer, Havana 1965: 7... 鱼e7 8 鱼a2 0-0 9 0-0 b5 10 f4 鱼b7 11 f5 e5 (Black is healthy as long as White can't exploit his hole on d5) 12 ②de2 ②bd7 13 ②g3 国c8 14 鱼e3 (if 14 鱼g5 国xc3! 15 bxc3 ②xe4 with advantage —

Gligorich) 14...②b6 15 皇xb6 豐xb6+ 16 當h1 豐e3! (to prevent ②h5) with the better game for Black.

White would of course like to get in f4-f5 as swiftly as possible, but he must exercise some caution. The text is essentially a waiting move which narrows Black's options. After 7 f4 Black has a choice of 7...d5, 7...b5, or 7...\( \infty \text{xe4} & \infty \text{xe4} \) d5.



BEDNARSKY

Position after 7 臭b3

**FISCHER** 

7 ...

Dbd7

In order to reach c5 with an attack on the Bishop as well as the e-Pawn. But 7...b5! is better (see game 17). An example of static White play is Garcia-Fischer, Havana Olympic 1966: 8 a3 &e7 9 &e3 0-0 10 0-0 &b7 11 f3 ②bd7 12 營d2 (12 &xe6!? leads to rough equality) 12...②e5 13 營f2 營c7 14 Zac1 營h8! 15 ②ce2 Zg8! 16 營h1 g5! 17 h3 Zg6 18 ②g3 Zag8 (White is curiously helpless against the threat of ...h5 and ...g4. His normal break with f4 is restrained by the silent Bishop on b7) 19 ②xe6? fxe6 20 &xe6! 21 ③xe4 Zxe6 White resigns.

After 7...b5 recent analysis indicates that Black's best plan is rapid development on the Q-side: 8 f4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b7 9 f5 e5 10 \(\frac{1}{2}\)de2 \(\frac{1}{2}\)bd7 11 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e7. Now on 12 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g3? (Correct is 12 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xf6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xf6 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xf6 13 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)c8! even chances – Fischer-Zuckerman, US Championship 1966) 12...\(\frac{1}{2}\)c8! 13 0-0 h5! White's in trouble, as indicated by the following examples:

A] 14 h4 b4 15 奧xf6 奧xf6 16 ②d5 奧xh4 17 ②xh5!? 豐g5 18 f6 g6 19 ②g7+ 含d8 20 罩f3 魚g3 21 豐d3 魚h2+ 22 含f1 ②c5 23 罩h3!? 罩h4! 24 豐f3 ②xb3 25 axb3 罩xh3 26 豐xh3 魚xd5 27 exd5 豐xf6+ 28 含e1 豐f4 and since there's nothing left — but emptiness — White resigns. (R.Byrne-Fischer, Tunisia Interzonal, 1967)

B] 14 食xf6 ②xf6 15 ②d5 h4 16 ②xf6+ gxf6 17 ②e2 食xe4 18 食d5 營b6+ 19 含h1 食xd5 20 營xd5 罩xc2 21 營d3 營c6 22 罩ac1 h3! (Ciocaltea-Gheorghiu, Bucharest 1967.)

8 f4! \( \text{\Qc5!}?

Too passive is 8... 全e7 9 營f3 0-0 10 g4.

Bad is 8...b5 9 f5! e5 10 ©c6! \(\exists c7 11 \) \(\text{D}b4!\) and White is ready to sit on Black once he occupies the hole on d5.

9 f5! ...

Thematic. Bednarsky told me after the game he had reached this position before, as White, and he had continued 9 e5 dxe5 10 fxe5 approach is too tame.


9 ... ②fxe4!?

Playing with fire.

The question is whether 9...e5 is sufficient. Apparently not, after  $10 \, \text{ } \, \text{ } \, \text{de2} \, \text{ } \, \text{$ 

9...2e7 is steadier than the text (for 9...2xb3 10 axb3 see note to White's 7th move in game 58). But White stays on top after 10 2f3 0-0 11 2e3. Now on 11...d5 12 exd5 2xb3 13 2xb3! exf5 (if 13...2xd5? 14 0-0-0 wins a Pawn) 14 0-0-0, etc.

10 fxe6! ...



**BEDNARSKY** 

Position after 10 fxe6!

**FISCHER** 

Tempting, but suicidal. Black had two better tries:

A] 10... এxe6 11 ②xe4 ②xe4 12 ②xe6 fxe6 (not 12... 營h4+ 13 g3 ②xg3 14 鱼g5! 營e4+ 15 含d2 ②xh1 16 ②c7+ 含d7 17 ②xa8 wins) 13 營g4 ②c5 14 鱼e3! with a strong initiative.

B] 10...fxe6! 11 ②xe4 ②xe4 12 0-0  $ext{@e}$ 7! (weaker is 12... ②c5 13  $ext{@g}$ 4 - if 13... ②xb3 14 axb3 e5 15  $ext{@f}$ 3). White has good play for the Pawn, but no forced win in view.

This twist is well known: e.g., from the Vienna 1 e4 e5 2 ac3 af6 3 f4 d5 4 fxe5 axe4 5 d3 ah4+ 6 g3 axg3 7 af3, etc.

Only not 12 exf7+? 曾d8 13 包f3 豐e7+!


| 12 | ***        | <b>營h5</b>   |
|----|------------|--------------|
| 13 | exf7+      | <b>\$</b> d8 |
| 14 | <b>⊑g1</b> | <b>②f5</b>   |
| 15 | ☑d5!       | <b>豐xf7</b>  |

Black's attack has boomeranged. Now his King gets caught in a merciless crossfire.

On 15...h6 16 公f4! picks off the Queen. No better is 15...公xb3 16 皇g5+ 曾d7 (or 16...皇e7 17 公xe7! 公xe7 18 豐xd6+) 17 公e5+!

By now I was hunting for bigger game than the paltry win of a Queen after  $17 \ 26 \ 18 \ 2xf7+$ .

| 17 |              | <u> </u>   |
|----|--------------|------------|
| 18 | <b>∅</b> )f4 | <b>∲d7</b> |
| 19 | 0-0-0        | 460        |



**BEDNARSKY** 

Position after 19 0-0-0

**FISCHER** 

One threat of course is 20 \( \frac{1}{2}\)e5+.

19

₩e8

Black is helpless. After 19...公xb3+ 20 axb3 營e8 21 罩gel 皇g8 22 \displayd3 it's also quits. The only way for Black to last is to give up his Queen with 19... \( \Darkstyle xb3 \) 20 \( \Darkstyle c5 + \( \Darkstyle c7 \) 21 \( \Darkstyle xf7 \) \( \Darkstyle xf7. \)

> ≜xe6+ 20

2xe6

**營e4!** 21

Centralization with a vengeance!

21 22

②xe6

**g6** 

Black resigns

On 22... 營xe6 23 營xb7+ 含e8 24 罩ge1! wins everything.

# 56 Fischer - Gligorich [Yugoslavia]

HAVANA OLYMPIC 1966 RUY LOPEZ

### The Fischer continuation


Fischer's surprising 4 £xc6, a revival of Emanuel Lasker's Exchange Variation — the one he used at St. Petersburg in 1914 to defeat Alekhine and Capablanca, but which subsequently fell into desuetude because ways to equalize were rapidly discovered — drew from his opponent the obligatory response. However, Fischer's next move, regarded as inferior, and his sixth (the customary follow-up) prepared no one for the gambit which he introduced on move seven. Gligorich reacted with innocent appropriateness until move seventeen, then made a startling blunder that met with speedy retribution. Because, in the course of the tournament, Fischer had played and won two other games with this very same line (demonstrating in each case White's hitherto unsuspected potential), it was promptly dubbed "The Fischer Variation." Of course, sticklers will insist that it should be called the Fischer continuation of the Barendregt Variation.

| 1 | <b>e4</b>    | <b>e</b> 5 |
|---|--------------|------------|
| 2 | <b>∅</b> f3  | ©c6        |
| 3 | <b>≜b5</b>   | <b>a6</b>  |
| 4 | <b>拿xc6!</b> | ***        |

A surprise! I had introduced this in an earlier game against Portisch (see note to Black's 6th). After sizing up Gligorich over-the-board, I decided he was ripe for a repeat performance.

4 ... dxc6

This recapture is so automatic that most annotators fail to comment on it. After 4...bxc6 5 d4 exd4 6 營xd4 White maintains an enduring initiative, If 6...營f6 7 營d3! (but not 7 e5 營g6 8 0-0 急b7 9 e6? fxe6 10 公e5 營xg2+! 11 含xg2 c5+ – an old trap.)



**GLIGORICH** 

Position after 5 0-0!

**FISCHER** 

"The text poses more problems for Black than does an immediate 5 d4 and Nimzovich is once more proved right in his pronouncement that the threat is stronger than its execution. Though White has sold his strong Bishop for a Knight, a Bishop which is usually Black's main strategical problem in many variations of the Lopez, there is no basic flaw in White's tactics. He has gained a tempo for development, somewhat spoiled Black's Pawn structure and revived the threat on Black's e-Pawn." (GLIGORICH).

The text was favored by Emanuel Lasker, Bernstein and also, in recent years, by the Dutch master Barendregt. I had been pondering it for a long time before deciding to include it in my arsenal.

5 ... f6!

"This position has not been seen frequently in the modern grandmaster praxis and, thanks to imaginative Fischer, we have to go back to the 19th century to find the alternatives for Black. It is not clear, however, that Black has any better way of defending the e-Pawn." (GLIGORICH).

Black can defend his e-Pawn in numerous ways. Let's look at the lemons first.

- A] 5... ②e7? (played by Reshevsky) 6 ②xe5! 營d4 7 ②f3 營xe4 8 冨e1 (instead of 8 d3? as in Malesich-Reshevsky, Maribor 1967) and it's doubtful Black can get out of the opening with equality. One example, 8... 營f5 9 b3! ②f6 10 ②a3 (or 10 冨e5!) 10... ②e6 11 ②d4, etc.
- B] The ballet dancer Harmonist showed good sense by trying 5... 對f6 with the threat of ... 皇g4 (against Schallopp in Frankfurt 1887) but after 6 d4 exd4 7 皇g5! 劉g6 8 劉xd4 White can get a clear initiative.
- C] 5... \$\(\delta\)d6? 6 d4 exd4 (not 6...f6? 7 dxe5 fxe5 8 ②xe5! or 6... \$\delta\)g4 7 dxe5 \$\delta\xf3 8 \(\delta\)xf3 with a comfortable K-side Pawn majority, as in Schallopp-Blackburne, Frankfurt 1887) 7 \(\delta\)xd4 f6 8 \(\delta\)bd2! ②e7 9 ②c4, etc.


D] A reasonable try is Bronstein's 5... Wd6!? 6 d3 (6 包a3? works well against 6... 兔e6? 7 包g5 but 6... b5! strands the Knight) 6... f6 7 兔e3 c5 8 包bd2 兔e6 9 We2 0-0-0=. White has possibilities of breaking on the Q-side after a3 followed by 罩fb1 and b4, but Black can probably prevent this expansion.

So best is 5... \(\mathbb{\text{\dett}\text{\tind{\text{\tin}\exiting{\text{\texi}}\\ \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\texittt{\\texiti}}\tint{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\texit{\t

El The most ambitious continuation is 5...\(\hat{2}\)g4!? 6 h3 h5!? (Em. Lasker used to win such positions for White after 6... 2xf3 7 響xf3. Hort-Kolarov, Poland 1967, continued: 7... 響f6 8 響g3 息d6 9 d3 響g6 10 象e3!? 響xg3 11 fxg3 and White managed to grind out a win in the ensuing endgame) 7 d3! (On 7 c3 \delta d3! 8 hxg4 hxg4 9 \overline{\Omega} xe5 Qd6! 10 ②xd3 Qh2+ draws. A fantasy variation occurs after 8 ₩b3? 拿xf3 9 營xb7 含d7 10 營xa8 食xg2! 11 含xg2 罩h6! 12 罩g1 罩g6+ 13 含h2 星xg1 14 含xg1 含c5 with a winning attack) 7... 響f6 8 ②bd2! (Keres in his old book on the open games wrongly praises this whole line for Black, having considered only 8 hxg4? hxg4 9 2g5 Wh6 10 ②h3 營h4 11 含h2 g6 12 ②c3 gxh3 13 g3 營e7 with advantage) 8...②e7 (now 8...g5 is met by 9 ②c4! 鱼xf3 10 豐xf3 豐xf3 11 gxf3 f6 12 h4! gxh4 13 f4 with promising play for the Pawn. But not 9 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \alpha \ext{el} \ext{?} \ext{.} \ext{ ĝe6 10 d4 g4 11 ②xe5 gxh3 12 g3 h2+ 13 🕏 g2 h4 with initiative) 9 罩e1! (or 9 ②c4! 食xf3 10 營xf3 營xf3 11 gxf3 ②g6 12 鱼e3 c5 13 a4! White stands better and eventually won. Hort-Sliwa, Poland 1967) 9...②g6 10 d4! 臭d6 11 hxg4 hxg4 12 ②h2 罩xh2! 13 豐xg4! 罩h4 14 \modelsf5 and White is slightly better.

6 d4 \(\hat{g}q4\)!

Best. In our earlier game Portisch had tried 6...exd4 7 2xd4! c5 (Portisch played the more sensible 7...2d6 in a subsequent event but it's still inferior after 8 2h5+! g6 9 2xd2+? 10 2xd2 2xd4 11 2d1!) 8 3b3 2xd1 (now 8...2d6? is met by 9 2xc5!) 9 2xd1 2d6 (the queer-looking 9...b6 as a defensive try scored an unmerited success in a Soviet women's tournament due to White's passive play. But 10 2f4 2a7! 11 3c3 2e7 12 a4! followed by a5 is almost decisive. (12...a5? is impossible because of 13 3b5! Polugaievsky's 9...2d7 offers defensive prospects) 10 2a5! b5 (amusing is 10...2g4? 11 f3 0-0-0?? 12 e5! and Black resigns. Hort-Zelandinow, Havana 1967. Keres tried 10...3h6 but also failed to equalize after 11 2xh6 gxh6 12 2c4 2e7 13 2c3 2e6 14 3d5. Bagirov-Keres, Moscow 1967) 11 c4 2e7 12 2e3 f5 13 3c3 f4 14 e5! 2xe5 15 2xc5 and Black's disorganized position soon crumbled.



**GLIGORICH** 

Position after 6... 臭g4!

**FISCHER** 

7 c3!

The text involves a gambit.

Curiously, this was Gligorich's own published suggestion when he annotated his game against Lee at Hastings 1965-6, which had continued 7 dxe5 營xd1 8 萬xd1 食xf3! (Fischer-Smyslov, Monaco 1967, went 8...fxe5? 9 萬d3! 食xf3 10 萬xf3 ②f6 11 ②c3 食b4 12 食g5! 食xc3 13 bxc3! [was Black playing for the cheap trap 13 食xf6? 食xb2 14 食xg7?? 食xa1 15 食xh8 0-0-0!] 13...萬f8 14 食xf6 萬xf6 15 萬xf6 gxf6 16 萬d1! and White should have won the ending) 9 gxf3 fxe5 10 f4 ②f6 and now 11 ②c3! (instead of 11 fxe5? ②xe4 12 食e3 食c5 13 ②d2 ③xd2 14 食xc5 0-0-0 as in the game) 11...食d6 12 fxe5 食xe5 13 ②a4! gives White the better of a probable draw.

7 ... exd4

An alternative is 7...\$d6 holding the center.


Black dares not accept the Pawn. 8... 全xf3 9 營xf3 營xd4 10 罩d1 營c4 11 全f4, etc. However, Gligorich said (in *Chess Review*) he had completely forgotten his Hastings analysis, which indicated Black's best as 8...c5! 9 d5 全d6.

"Putting the question to the Bishop." Nimzovich, Steinitz, Evans, and other theoreticians have pointed out the enormous value of kicking this Bishop before the pin becomes really troublesome. Here, White must exercise care since his h-Pawn could easily become a potential target.

9 ... <u>\$e6</u>

This natural retreat, which releases the tension, gives White too free a hand and is the subsequent cause of Gligorich's difficulties. Better is 9.... \$\delta\$h5! as played against me by Jimenez in a later round. After \$10 \inc e5! \delta\$xd1 (bad is \$10... \delta\$xh3 \$11\$ gxh3 \delta\$xd1 \$12 \delta\$xd1 fxe5 \$13\$ dxe5 \delta\$c5 \$14 \delta\$g2 with a dangerous preponderance of center Pawns) \$11 \delta\$xd7 \delta\$xd7 \$12 \delta\$xd1 Black should hold the ending, although he found a way to lose: \$12... \delta\$e8 \$13\$ f3 (\$13 \delta\$c3 is more accurate) \$13... \delta\$e7 \$14 \delta\$c3 \delta\$c8 \$15 \delta\$e3 f5 \$16 \delta\$ac1 fxe4 \$17\$ fxe4 \$g6\$? (\$17... \delta\$g6 is correct) \$18 \delta\$f4! \delta\$g7 \$19\$ d5! \delta\$d8 \$20 \delta\$a4! \delta\$fh8 \$21\$ g3 g5\$? (cracking under the pressure \$-21... \delta\$f7 is more sensible) \$22 \delta\$xg5 \$\delta\$f7 \$23 \delta\$g2 cxd5 \$24\$ exd5 \$\delta\$b8 \$25 \$\delta\$e1 \$\delta\$f8 \$26 \$\delta\$f1! \$\delta\$g7 \$27 \delta\$f6 \$\delta\$g8 \$28 \$\delta\$ce1 \$\delta\$d7 \$29\$ d6! cxd6 \$30 \delta\$xe7 \$\delta\$xe7 \$31 \$\delta\$f7 resigns (if \$31... \$\delta\$e8 \$32 \delta\$b6 \$\delta\$c7 \$33 \$\delta\$d5).

10 ②c3 0-0-0
11 ②f4! ...



GLIGORICH

Position after 11 \(\hat{2}\)f4!

**FISCHER** 

11 ..

②e7?

More solid is 11... 2d6! 12 2xd6 ₩xd6.

The critical line is 11...g5!? 12 gg3 h5 13 d5! cxd5 14 gc1! and now: A] 14... gd6 15 Ga4! gb8 16 Gc5 ge7 17 Gxa6+! bxa6 18 Gd4 gd7 19 gb3+ ga7 20 gxc7+!! gxc7 21 gxc7 gb5 (if <math>21... gc5 22 ge3! is the simplest win) 22 Gc6+! (Palacio) 22... gxc6 23 gb6+ and mate next.

B] The fantastic win is 14...dxe4 15 ②a4! 曾b8 16 罩xc7!! 豐xd1 17 罩c8+!!! 曾a7 (or 17...曾xc8 18 ②b6 mate) 18 **\$\delta\$**b8+ 曾a8 19 ②b6 mate.

12 \( \begin{aligned} \Beta \cdot \beta \\ \ext{c1} \end{aligned} \)

∅g6

Black has lost time in order to reach this inferior square.

**≜d6 ≜xg3?** 

Yielding his c5 permanently to the Knight. Correct is 14... 查b8 15 公c5 營e7.


15 fxg3

**含b8** 

Bad is 15...b6 16 d5! 皇f7 (16...cxd5? 17 公xb6+) 17 營e2!, etc.

16 ②c5 17 響a4! **≝d6** 

•••



GLIGORICH

Position after 17 \alphaa4!

FISCHER

17 ...

會a7??

Catastrophic. After 17... **2**c8 18 **2**c3 (18... **2**g3? 19 **2**e5 **2**h4 20 **2**xc6+), Black might have hung on with 18... **2**f8!

The finishing stroke.

18 ... <u>\$\partial xh3</u>

Desperation! 18...bxa6 19 \( \bar{\subset} \) xc6 costs Black's Queen to prevent mate.

19 e5! ...

The most forceful method.

*19* ... ②xe5

Sheer desperation!! After 19...fxe5 20 位c5+ 當b8 21 罩c3! followed by 冨a3 is most persuasive.

20 dxe5 fxe5 21 位c5+ 全b8 22 gxh3 e4

Never say die!

According to a Havana newspaper, some casual spectators who had just wandered in thought White had merely won two pieces for a Rook. Nobody could believe that Gligorich was playing on two pieces behind! The rude awakening came when –

25 ... Black resigns

# 57 Larsen [Denmark] - Fischer

MONACO 1967


KING'S INDIAN DEFENSE

## Change of pace

Larsen, uncharacteristically, forces an early exchange of Queens so that he can spring a surprise in the resulting endgame. Fischer beats him to it (13...b6) and proceeds to defend with meticulous care. It looks as if a draw must ensue, but Larsen presses. He is rebuffed, and again a draw seems imminent. Larsen senses no danger and, as if by inertia, continues to play for a win. As the game simplifies, the self-inflicted dark square weaknesses in the Dane's position gradually reveal themselves. By move thirty it becomes Fischer's turn to assume the initiative, and he probes these flaws judiciously. Thrown on the defensive, Larsen makes one or two reckless moves out of which Fischer constructs elegant combinations. Thus, what begins as a barren endgame is transformed into an exhibition of chess sensibility and virtuosity.

| 1 | d4          | <b>₫</b> f6 |
|---|-------------|-------------|
| 2 | <b>c4</b>   | <b>g6</b>   |
| 3 | ©c3         | <b>≜g7</b>  |
| 4 | e4          | d6          |
| 5 | <u></u> ≜e2 | •••         |

| 5 | •••          | 0-0 |
|---|--------------|-----|
| 6 | <b>4</b> )13 | e5  |
| 7 | 0-0          | ©c6 |



**FISCHER** 

Position after 7...\$\omegac6

LARSEN

8 **ge3** 

A bit of a surprise. I had expected 8 d5 ②e7 9 ②e1 ②d7 10 ②d3 f5 11 ②d2. Now I had in mind 11...c5! 12 f3 f4! (but not 12...②f6? 13 g4! f4 14 h4! and Black's K-side counterplay is completely stymied) with active chances. Larsen-Najdorf, Santa Monica 1966, had continued 11...②f6? 12 f3 f4 13 c5! g5 14 〇c1 ②g6 15 cxd6 cxd6 16 ②b5 〇f7 17 〇c2! ②e8 18 a4 and White came first on the Q-side since Black's attack never got off the ground.

8 ... **罩e8!** 


The cleanest way to equalize. Najdorf found this move after some painful experiences with 8... ②g4 in his match vs. Reshevsky. The main point if that 9 d5 ②d4! levels.

9 dxe5 dxe5
10 ₩xd8 ②xd8

A dubious improvement over 10... \begin{align\*} & \text{Zxd8!} \text{ as played by Reshevsky in his match with Benko. After 11 \text{\pmu}g5 Black must not play 11... \begin{align\*} & \text{Zd7!} \text{ (after which Benko's 12 \text{\pmu}d1!! followed by \text{\pmu}a4 was very strong) but 11... \begin{align\*} & \text{Zf8!} & \text{ solves all his problems.} \end{align\*}

| 11 | <b>约b5</b> | ②e6        |
|----|------------|------------|
| 12 | <b>②g5</b> | <b>ℤe7</b> |
| 13 | ℤfd1       | ***        |

Larsen is attempting to improve on Reshevsky-Fischer, Santa Monica 1966, which continued: 13 ②xe6 ②xe6 14 f3 c6 15 ②c3 罩d7 16 罩fd1 ②f8 17 當f2 b6 18 b3 罩b7 19 ②a4 ②d7 20 ②b2 b5 with an eventual draw.



FISCHER

Position after 13 \$\mathbb{Z}fd1\$

LARSEN

13 ...

b6!

In my 9th match game with Reshevsky, 1961, I tried 13...c6!? Larsen told me he had intended 14 ② xa7!? (instead of 14 ② xe6 ② xe6 15 ② c3 ☐ d7=) 14...② d7 15 ② xe6 ③ xe6 16 f3. But after 16...☐ d7! (threatening ...☐ d4) Black has fair play for the Pawn, considering that the Knight is stranded on a7.

The book text was an improvement that I had hatched some time ago.

14 c5!?

Typically, Larsen adopts an enterprising continuation. He should settle for 14 axe6 xe6 15 f3 with a draw in view. By overestimating his chances, he gradually drifts into a losing position.

14 ... @xc5


15 **□d8**+ **≥**f8

16 @xa7

ℤxa7

On 16... \$\\_\$b7 17 \\_\$\\_xa8 \\_xa8 18 f3 White has a slight pull despite his misplaced Knight. After 18...c6 19 公內 \\_\$\\_\$c8 \\_\$\\_\$b7 20 \\_\$\\_\$d1 maintains some pressure.

White recovers his pawn with even chances.



FISCHER

Position after 17 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xc8

LARSEN

17 ...


**堂g7** 

Black wisely resists the temptation of 17...②cxe4?? 18 ②xe4 ②xe4 19 ②h6. But even more accurate than the text is 17...h6! 18 ②f3 ⑤g7 19 ②xc5 bxc5 20 ②d3 completely neutralizing any initiative for either side.

Larsen's reluctance to simplify will soon backfire. Correct is 19 \(\text{\pi}\xc5!\) bxc5 20 \(\text{\pi}\text{b8}\) with theoretical winning chances because of the passed a-Pawn. But it would be difficult to make headway because of the opposite colored Bishops.

Optimistic as ever! 20 罩b8 ②d7 21 罩d8 ②b7 22 罩c8 ②d6 would lead to a draw by repetition.

| 21 | <b>②h3</b> | ©e6  |
|----|------------|------|
| 22 | ≅b8        | ≣e8  |
| 23 | ℤxe8       | €xe8 |



FISCHER

Position after 23...\Dxe8

LARSEN

"Now White's initiative is over and the position is even but by no means drawish. There is a lot of play." (KMOCH)

White's dark squares, notably his d4, are weak. But it's still not too serious.

24 **gb5** ...

Pointless. White should start bringing his Knight into the game via f2. He can't prevent ... \(\exists c5\), gaining control of the dark squares. Of course not 24 b4? \(\exists xb4\).

| 24 | •••          | €)d6        |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 25 | <b>≜f1</b>   | ©b7!        |
| 26 | <b>∮</b> )f2 | <b>≜c5!</b> |
| 27 | ≗xc5         | Dbxc5       |
| 28 | ãd1          | h5!         |

To keep the Knight out of g4. This "prophylactic" thrust would have gladdened Nimzovich's heart. Not 28... 20d4? 29 20g4 f6 30 f4!

29 \( \beta \d d5 \) ...

Larsen still has illusions, but his game is fast deteriorating. More prudent is 29 and and 30 and and all after the probably should hold the ending despite Black's creeping pressure.

| 29 |     | <b>\$</b> f6 |
|----|-----|--------------|
| 30 | h4  | <b>堂e7!</b>  |
| 31 | ≜c4 | •••          |

The Pawn is poisoned: 31 \( \textit{Zxe5} \)? c6 followed by ...\( \textit{D}\)d7 (or ...f6). The mission of the Rook has failed, but no serious harm has been done.


Finally the Knight has gained this dominant outpost.

The more active 33 \( \times \) d3 is preferable. Now Black's tactical threats begin to proliferate.

Meets with a still sharper counter thrust. 34 \( \Delta \) d3 offered a better chance for survival. After the text White's a-Pawn is weakened.

Not 34 exf5  $\triangle \text{xf5}$  with the double threat of ... $\triangle \text{e}3+$  or  $\triangle \text{xh4}$  (and if  $35 \text{ } \boxed{\text{e}2?}$   $\triangle \text{g}3+$ ).

fxe4!



Fixing White with another weakness.

35


#### 36 fxe4

Not 36 bxc5 e3 37 罩xd4 (if 37 罩d3 exf2 38 當xf2 罩a8 39 鼻a2 b4 - or 37 罩a2? exf2 38 當xf2 當f8!) 37...exd4 38 包d3 罩xa3 39 當e2 罩c3, etc.

36 ... ②d7 37 罩d3 罩a6!

Threatening ②c2 which, if played immediately, could have been met by 38 罩c3.

38 **□c3** c5!



#### **FISCHER**

Position after 38...c5!

LARSEN

This surprising combination apparently confused Larsen, who was in time-pressure.

39 g4? ...

The last blunder. On 39 bxc5 b4! 40 罩c1! (not 40 axb4 罩a1+) there's still a lot of fight. If 40...罩xa3 (or 40...bxa3 41 兔a2) 41 c6 ②b6.

39 ... c4

This protected passed Pawn is just too strong. Not 39...如f6 40 罩xc5!

 40
 gxh5
 gxh5


 41
 急d5
 ②f6

 42
 區g3
 ②xd5

| 43 | exd5         | <b>I</b> f6 |
|----|--------------|-------------|
| 44 | <b>\$</b> g2 | •••         |

The sealed move. White is completely tied up. On 44 堂g1? ②e2+ wins. Or if 44 堂e1 罩f4 mops up.

| 44 | ***         | <b>②f5</b>    |
|----|-------------|---------------|
| 45 | 罩h3         | <b> ■g6</b> + |
| 46 | <b>曾</b> f3 | <b>⊘d4+</b>   |



#### **FISCHER**

Position after 46...\did4+

LARSEN

47 **\$e3** 


On 47 堂e4 堂d6 White is in zugzwang. If 48 罩h2 (to prevent ... 罩g2) 48... 罩g3.

| 47 | ***  | <b>ℤg2</b>    |
|----|------|---------------|
| 48 | 罩h1  | <b>\$</b> d6  |
| 49 | ©e4+ | <b>\$</b> xd5 |
| 50 | ©c3+ | <b>\$e6</b>   |
| 51 | 罩c1  |               |

White has to prevent ... \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \text{ \text{\$\sc i}} \\ \text{\$\sc i} \\ \text{

| 51 | 0.00        | 罩h2        |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 52 | a4          | ≅h3+       |
| 53 | <b>ġ</b> f2 | <b>②b3</b> |
| 54 | <b>ġg2</b>  | ②xc1       |
| 55 | ġxh3        | bxa4       |
| 56 | ♠xa4        | ©e2        |

| 57 | <b>b</b> 5   | <b>c</b> 3 |
|----|--------------|------------|
| 58 | <b>b6</b>    | c2         |
| 59 | <b>©c5</b> + | <b>ġd5</b> |



**FISCHER** 

Position after 59...\$d5

LARSEN

60 **Db3** 

White can choose his own end. If 60 2 d3 (or 60 b7 c1= 61 b8= 2 b7 mate) 60... 61 4 61 2 xf4+ exf4 62 b7 c1= 63 b8= 2 b7 mate.

60 ... \$\displays c6\$
61 \$\displays g2\$ \$\displays xb6\$
White resigns

# **58** Fischer - Geller [U.S.S.R.]

SKOPJE 1967 SICILIAN DEFENSE

## Flawed masterpiece


After Fischer dropped this miniature (his third loss in a row to Geller) Kurajica concluded: "He just cannot play against Geller." Another Yugoslav, Trifunovich, opined at greater length:

Geller is one of the best-prepared players in the world as to opening theory, and Fischer cannot be superior in that respect...Fischer [as White] chose a very sharp and modern variation...playing to win in the early stage of the game, as he usually does, and successfully, against weaker opponents. Fischer played better and attained a superior position, but it was very difficult to find the right solution over-the-board...There was his mistake...He has to impose a hard positional game, playing without pretensions for a win in the very opening.

Nowhere but in the notes that follow have the above errors been answered. Were it not for a momentary lapse (a3?), Fischer would have won this little gem on move twenty — despite his critics.

| 1 | e4         | <b>c</b> 5   |
|---|------------|--------------|
| 2 | <b>DB</b>  | d6           |
| 3 | <b>d4</b>  | cxd4         |
| 4 | ②xd4       | <b>€</b> )f6 |
| 5 | <b>②c3</b> | 2)c6         |
| 6 | ≜c4        | e6           |

There is no apparent refutation to Benko's roguish 6... \$\widetilde{\psi}b6!? Saidy ventured it against me in the 1967 US Championship. After 7 \$\widetilde{\psi}b3\$ e6 8 0-0 \$\widetilde{\psi}e7\$ 9 \$\widetilde{\psi}e3\$ \$\widetilde{\psi}c7\$ 10 f4 0-0 11 \$\widetilde{\psi}d3\$ it's a mutually hard game. Also see game 11.



**GELLER** 

Position after 6...e6

**FISCHER** 

7 **拿e3** 

7 \(\mathbb{2}\)b3 cuts down Black's options. Fischer-Dely, Skopje 1967, continued: 7...a6 8 f4! 響a5 (8...包a5 9 f5! 包xb3 10 axb3 急e7 11 響f3 0-0 12 ge3 gd7 13 g4 e5 14 acrush in sight: Fischer-Bielicki, Mar del Plata 1960. 8... 營c7 9 f5! 公xd4 10 營xd4 exf5 11 exf5 âxf5 12 0-0 yields a strong attack) 9 0-0! axd4? (a better try is 9...d5 but after 10 ②xc6! bxc6 11 f5! White's on top. If 11...d4? 12 ②e2 e5 either 13 2g3 or 13 2d3 retains the advantage. Also on 11... 2e7 12 e5 ②d7 13 fxe6 fxe6 [or 13...②xe5 14 息f4!] 14 豐g4. Finally, 11.... 2c5+ 12 \$\dipsi\hspace 10-0 may be tenable) 10 \dipsi\nd xd4 d5 (10...\dipsic5 11 \dipsic5 xc5 12 a4! puts Black in an excruciating bind) 11 皇e3! ②xe4 (if 11...②g4 12 曾h1! ②xe3 13 豐xe3 dxe4 14 豐xe4! 鱼e7 15 罩ae1 and mate is wins. Slightly more accurate, but still bad, is 11...dxe4 12 2xe4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e7 13 ②d6+, etc.) 12 ②xe4 dxe4 13 f5! 曾b4 (if 13...exf5 14 g4! 奠e6 17 營a4+! resigns. On 17...b5 18 營xe4 罩d8 19 營c6+! 罩d7 20 罩d1 豐e7 and now 21 2b6 (Dely). (About the only move that doesn't win is 21 **ag5?** 0-0!)


Too routine. Black should start quicker action on the Q-side. More reasonable is 7...a6 8 &b3 &c7 9 &e2 (or 9 f4) 9...b5 10 0-0-0 &a5 (10...&b7 is also possible, whereupon White might reply 11 f3).

8 **≜b3** 

Against Pascual, in a clock exhibition game at Davao (Philippines) 1967, I essayed 8 營e2 a6 9 0-0-0 營c7 10 兔b3 兔d7 11 g4 公xd4 12 兔xd4 (Fishy. Better is 12 冨xd4) 12...e5 13 g5 exd4 14 gxf6 dxc3 15 fxe7 cxb2+ 16 含b1 含xe7? (16...兔e6 equalizes) 17 營h5! g6 18 營h4+ f6 19 e5! dxe5 20 f4 e4 21 營h6 冨ae8 22 冨d4 含d8 23 冨hd1 含c8 (the beauty part is 23...畐e7 24 兔e6!! 冨xe6 25 營g7, mopping up) 24 冨xd7 營xd7 25 冨xd7 含xd7 26 營g7+ 含d6 27 營xb7 e3 28 營b6+ resigns.

8 ... 0-0 9 營e2 ...

Preparing Q-side castling and disallowing the reply ... ©g4 which would be the case after 9 \bigsup d2.



**GELLER** 

Position after 9 營e2

**FISCHER** 

Geller's attempt to improve on the customary 9...a6 10 0-0-0 豐c7 11 g4 ②xd4 12 罩xd4! b5 (Tal gives 12...e5 13 罩c4! 豐d8 14 g5 ②e8 15 罩xc8! 罩xc8 16 h4 ②c7 17 豐g4 followed by h5, with a terrific attack) 13 g5 ②d7 14 豐h5 ②e5 15 f4 ②c6 16 罩d3 ②b4 17 罩d2 罩d8 18 f5 g6 19 fxg6 hxg6 20 豐h4 ②c6 21 豐g3 ②e5 22 h4 臭b7 23 h5 b4 24 hxg6 ②xg6 25 罩dh2 bxc3 26 臭d4 e5 27 罩h8+!! ②xh8 28 g6! 臭f6 29 gxf7++ 曾f8 30 罩h7! and White wins (Velimirovich-Nikolich, Belgrade 1964.)

#### 10 0-0-0

10 0-0 also comes into consideration.

10 ...

€ xd4

Apparently Geller rejected 10... 全d7 11 ②db5! ②e8 12 全f4 a6 13 ②xd6 ②xd6 14 全xd6 全xd6 15 至xd6 營g5+ 16 營d2 營xg2 17 至hd1 全e8 18 營f4 with good pressure.

11 **拿xd4** 

**≜d7** 

Black cannot afford to go Pawn-snatching with 11...  $ext{@g5+?}$  12  $ext{@b1}$   $ext{@xg2?}$  13  $ext{@hg1!}$   $ext{@h3}$  (if 13...  $ext{@xh2}$  14  $ext{@h1}$   $ext{@f4}$  15  $ext{@dg1!}$  e5 [or 15...g6 16  $ext{@e3}$   $ext{@e5}$  17  $ext{@g5}$ ] 16  $ext{@e3}$   $ext{@g4}$  17  $ext{@e1}$   $ext{@f3}$  18  $ext{@g3}$  wins the Queen) 14 e5  $ext{@e8}$  (on 14...dxe5 15  $ext{@xe5}$  carries too many threats) 15 exd6  $ext{@xd6}$  16  $ext{@xg7!}$   $ext{@xg7}$  17  $ext{@xd6}$  and it's not a game any more. But interesting is 12...e5 (instead of 12...  $ext{@xg2}$ ) 13 h4  $ext{@xg2}$  14  $ext{@dg1}$   $ext{@g4}$  15  $ext{@xg2!}$   $ext{@xe2}$  16  $ext{@xe2}$  exd4 17  $ext{@xd4}$  with advantage (if 17...  $ext{@xe4}$  18 f3! followed by  $ext{@f5}$ ).

12 **\$b1** 



光 允 允 份

GELLER

Position after 12 \$\displays1\$

**FISCHER** 

A critical position. White's immediate threat is 13 \(\text{\(\text{\(\text{2}\)}}\) xf6.

12 ...

\$c6

In a later round Sofrevsky tried to improve against me with 12... Zad8, but got into trouble after 13 We3! Black now rejected a

dangerous Pawn sac which must be examined very carefully: 13...b5!? But 14 a3! (not 14 鱼xa7 罩a8 with active play) 14...b4 15 axb4 豐xb4 16 鱼xa7 豐b7 17 豐b6! 豐a8 18 f3 and Black has no good way to prosecute his attack. Consequently, Sofrevsky chose 13...b6 14 鱼xf6! gxf6? (Black should reconcile himself to the loss of a Pawn after 14...鱼xf6 15 罩xd6 鱼c8) 15 ②d5!! 罩fe8 (if 15...exd5 16 罩xd5 豐a6 17 罩h5! wins – 17...鱼g4 18 豐g3, etc.) 16 ②xe7+ (16 豐h6! is a quicker kill) 16...罩xe7 17 罩xd6 罩c8 18 豐d4 鱼e8? 19 豐xf6 resigns.

*13* **f4** 

**Zad8** 

14 **罩hf1** 

I already had in mind the ensuing sacrifice. Also strong is 14 g4 – not to mention Trifunovich's post-mortem suggestion 14 f5! exf5 (not 14...e5 15 皇f2 d5? 16 exd5 ②xd5 17 ②xd5 皇xd5 18 營xe5 wins a piece) 15 exf5 置fe8 16 營f2 with positional pressure.

14 ...

**b**5

On 14...d5 15 e5 2 e4 16 f5! maintains the initiative.

15 f5!!

The die is cast. I didn't want to lose a tempo playing it safe with 15 a3.

15 ... b4 16 fxe6! bxc3 17 exf7+ \$\delta\$h8

Not 17... \( \bar{2}xf7 \) 18 \( \bar{2}xf7 + \bar{2}xf7 \) 19 \( \bar{2}0 \) \( \bar{2}0 \) \( \bar{2}0 \) etc.

18 罩f5!

**豐b4** 


On 18...營c7 I had intended 19 罩dfl (threatening 罩xf6). If then 19...②d7 (or on 19...②xe4 20 營g4 is bitter) 20 罩h5! (threatening 罩xh7+) is decisive.

#### 19 **營f1!**

A hard move to find – it took around 45 minutes. The threat of \( \mathbb{Z} \)xf6 must be attended to.

*19* ... ∅xe4

A fighting defense. 19...  $\bigcirc$  d7 loses immediately to 20  $\square$ h5  $\bigcirc$ e5 21  $\square$ f5 h6 22  $\square$ g6!!  $\square$ xf7 (22...  $\bigcirc$ xg6 allows 23  $\square$ xh6 mate) 23  $\square$ xe5, etc. On 19...  $\square$ xf7 20  $\square$ xc3 wins. And 19...  $\square$ xe4 gives White the pleasant choice of 20  $\square$ xf6 or 20  $\square$ b5.



**GELLER** 

Position after 19... axe4

**FISCHER** 

*20* **a3?** 

Losing! A couple of hours after the game it occurred to me that White has a problem-like win after 20 \(\superstack{\subset}\)f4!! (with the threat of \(\superstack{\subset}\)has no adequate defense.


- A] 20...d5 21 營e5 公f6 22 罩xf6 臭xf6 23 營xf6!
- c] 20...cxb2 21  $\Xi$ h5! (threatening 2xg7+) 21...2c3+ (if 21...2f6 22 Gf5 h6 23 Gxh6+! gxh6 24 Gg6!! forces mate) 22 Gxb2 Gxd1+ (or 22...2xf7 23 Gxd1+ 24 Gb1!! Gxd4 25 Gxh7+!! Gxh7 26 Gh5 mate) 23 Gc1 Gxf7 (forced) 24 Gxf7! (24 Gxf7?? Gxg5+) and Black has no satisfactory answer to the threat of 25 Gxh7+ Gxh7 26 Gyf5+ and mates. If 24...2d7 25 Gxg7+ wins Black's Queen.

| 20 | ••• | ₩ <b>b</b> 7  |
|----|-----|---------------|
| 21 | ₩f4 | <u></u> ≜a4!! |

I didn't see it! Moreover, the strength of this resource didn't become fully apparent to me for another two moves.

Also futile is 22 Wh6 &f6 23 Zxf6 &xb3.

| 22 | •••  | <b>≜f6!</b> |
|----|------|-------------|
| 23 | ≅xf6 | ≜xb3!       |



**GELLER** 

Position after 23... \(\hat{g}xb3!\)

**FISCHER** 

At long last I saw the point of Geller's clever defense. As I was studying 24 \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \alpha & \exists & \exi

## White resigns

After 24 cxb3 🖾 xf6! is the quietus. It is not enough to be a good player, observed Dr Tarrasch; you must also play well.

# **59** Kholmov [*u.s.s.r.*] - Fischer

SKOPJE 1967

KING'S INDIAN DEFENSE

# The erring Bishop

In order to restrain Black from creating complications, Kholmov employs an unpretentious system. But he posts his Bishop prematurely on a3, then penetrates ambitiously with 11 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d6. Fischer, with the routine 11...\(\frac{1}{2}\)a5, promptly refutes. It is instructive to observe how, from now on, he creates an unhealthy climate wherever the Bishop seeks lodging. His Queen returns to a3 on no less than three separate occasions, prompting one annotator to inquire, dryly, whether he was perhaps inventing perpetual motion. As early as move twelve it became apparent to both players that White was lost. However, Kholmov did his best to avert the inevitable for another twenty moves.

Fischer (with White) had lost to Kholmov in their only previous encounter, played via telephone to Havana in '65. Here, Fischer's victory brought him first place, a half point ahead of Geller.

| 1 | d4           | <b>₫f</b> 6  |
|---|--------------|--------------|
| 2 | <b>2</b> f3  | <b>g</b> 6   |
| 3 | g3           | 皇 <b>g</b> 7 |
| 4 | <u>\$</u> g2 | 0-0          |
| 5 | 0-0          | d6           |
| 6 | €2c3         | •••          |

A straightforward but essentially passive development. The idea is to avoid creating a weakness with c4; however, a drawback is White can no longer dominate the center with a Pawn-wedge.

6 ... ②bd7

More flexible than 6...d5 which I adopted against Ivkov at the Piatigorsky Cup, 1966. That game continued 7 ②e5 c6 8 e4 and now Black could have equalized easily with 8...dxe4 (instead of 8...皇e6?) 9 ②xe4 ②xe4 10 ②xe4 ②h3 (not 10...c5? 11 營f3!) 11 罩e1 ②d7, etc.

7 **b3** ...

A normal continuation, although it is dubious that White's Bishop is effective once posted on b2 or a3. This system is characterized by Pawn symmetry and quiet play with drawing tendencies. But a draw is precisely what I could not afford in this crucial encounter.

7 e4 e5 also presents Black with no opening problems.

7 ... e5 8 dxe5 ...

Dissipating the central tension. Black has no trouble getting play after 8 e4 exd4 9 axd4 \( \mathbb{Z} \) xd4 \( \mathbb{Z} \) e8.

8 ... dxe5
9 e4 ...

"The turbulent complications of the normal K's Indian can hardly arise, and the position can already be evaluated as even." (TRIFUNOVICH).

9 ... <u>≅</u>e8
10 **≜**a3 ...

Better is 10 a4 a5 11 \(\mathref{L}\)a3; whereupon the Bishop will be immune from eventual attack after ...\(\mathref{W}\)a5.

"Even so early, White is on the wrong track. The Bishop has nothing to seek on the a3-f8 diagonal. Yet, while it is easy now to condemn this move, till now it has often been adopted by White with never a harsh word. The punishment which ensues, however ... is more severe than any this commentator has observed hitherto. 10 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b2 is correct." (TRIFUNOVICH).

10 ... c6


Black invites the Bishop to seize a strong position." (TRIFUNOVICH).

11 **åd6?** ...

Kholmov consumed over half an hour on this mistake. The idea is to keep Black bottled up while exerting pressure on the e-Pawn. The only trouble with the move, however, is that it loses. As Tarrasch wrote: "When you don't know what to do, wait for your opponent to get an idea – it's sure to be wrong!" 11 we2 was indicated.

This normal freeing maneuver is now devastating.

What else? 12 b4 \(\mathbb{@}\)a3 leaves White in the same predicament.



FISCHER

Position after 12 \mathbb{\equiv }d3

KHOLMOV

Black now has a shot which wins two pieces for a Rook; or, as it turns out, a lowly Pawn (which proves fatal).

12 ... \( \begin{align\*} \begin{alig

Springing the trap! White cannot avoid material loss. Geller, who was tied with me for the lead, had displayed great interest in my game – up to now. When he saw this position, he smiled wryly. I never noticed him looking at the game again.

13 **b4** ...

No matter how White wriggles and squirms, he cannot escape the fate in store for him. After 13 ©e2 Black has the pleasant choice of either ... ©xe4 or ... ©e8 – both of which win a Pawn.

13 ... 豐a3!

Renewing the ancient threat of ... \( \textstyle \textstyle xd6. \)

14 **2c7** ...

The wandering Bishop hopes to receive succor. But, in so doing, it must abandon protection of the b-pawn.

14 ... 響xb4

Perhaps White was hoping for 14...②e8 15 **a** 5 b 6 16 **a** a b 1! b x a 5 17 **a** b 3 **a** c 5! 18 b x c 5 **a** x c 5 19 **a** f b 1 where Black's technical difficulties are great.

15 **罩ab1 豐e7!** 

A cute tactical point. 15... § 18? loses the exchange after  $16 \, \bigcirc g5$  (if the Rook retreats, then White's Bishop returns to d6). Now  $16 \, \bigcirc g5$  is refuted by  $16... \bigcirc c5$ . For all practical purposes the game is over.

No rest for the weary.

 17
 ...
 三d6

 18
 營e2
 三xd1+

 19
 資xd1
 資f8

 20
 分d2
 ...

Bad – as is everything else. 20 **Qb4 Yf6** 21 **Qxf8 Qxf8** leaves White a Pawn behind with his weak squares still showing.

20 ... ₩a3!

Winning even more material.


21 ②c4 豐c5 22 臭fl b5 23 ②d2 ...

23 \(\daggerb4 drops a piece to 23...\(\delta\)d4.

This curious shuttle has proved White's undoing.

Desperation. After 25 \( \) \(

25 ... cxb5 26 ②xb5 豐a4



FISCHER

Position after 26... Wa4

KHOLMOV

27 ②xc5

Perhaps White had intended 27 \delta d5, but 27...\delta xe4! spells finis.

 27
 ...
 豐xa5

 28
 豐d5
 墨b8

 29
 a4
 臭h3!

Quickest.

30 響xe5 置c8 31 公d3 響xa4 32 公e1 a6 White resigns

The Knight has no good square. If 33 ②d4 臭g7. Or 33 ②c3 豐c4. Finally, 33 ②a7 罩c7 34 罩a1 豐d7 35 罩xa6 罩xa7 36 罩xa7 豐xa7 37 豐xe8 豐a1 delivers the mate.

Afterwards, Geller tried to offer my opponent some sympathy. I overheard a dismayed Kholmov telling him that I had "seen everything!" This game was particularly sweet because it was my first win against a Russian in almost a dozen tries (since game 52) – and my first with Black since 1962 (Korchnoi at Curação).

# **60** Fischer - Stein [U.S.S.R.]

INTERZONAL, SOUSSE 1967 RUY LOPEZ

# When champions meet

On his ninth turn Black varies the routine sparring but the game proceeds innocuously until Fischer veers with 14 b4, intensifying the struggle. If, in the ensuing slugfest, Stein can be said to have made an error, it is the strategic one of so pressing on the Q-side as to allow White to become entrenched on the opposite wing. Fischer's prosecution of the attack is crowned by a brilliant offer of a piece (29 £xf5) which the Soviet champion declines. Had Fischer then renewed the sacrifice, the end would have come sooner. In his detailed notes Fischer refers to this oversight, reveals some important thoughts on the Ruy, pinpoints "the losing move" (21...\(\int\)b6), criticizes a second subtle mistake of his own (26 \int\)f3), and offers a possible defense for Stein (28...\(\int\)f6), which other commentators have failed to note.

It is unfortunate that this interesting and most instructive game was expunged from the official records due to Fischer's withdrawal before having completed half his playing schedule.

1 e4 ...

I have never opened with the d-pawn – on principle.

1 ... e5

I had expected the Sicilian, with Stein's favorite accelerated Dragon (2...g6). I suspect that the Russians "group-think" before important games to decide which openings will upset their opponents psychologically.

2 ②f3 ②c6 3 ②b5 a6

Possibly Stein was braced for 4 &xc6, as in game 56.

Relieving the suspense.


| 4 | •••        | <b>€</b> 166 |
|---|------------|--------------|
| 5 | 0-0        | в̂е7         |
| 6 | ≌e1        | <b>b</b> 5   |
| 7 | <b>≜b3</b> | <b>d6</b>    |

In the event the reader is interested in what I may have had in mind against the Marshall Attack, he is referred to my game against Spassky at the Piatigorsky Cup, 1966, which continued: 7...0-0 8 c3 d5 9 exd5 \( \tilde{2}\)xd5 \( \tilde{10}\)\( \tilde{2}\)xe5 \( \tilde{2}\)xe5 \( \tilde{1}\)\( \tilde{2}\)xe5 \( \tilde{6}\) 11 \( \tilde{2}\)xe5 \( \tilde{6}\) 12 \( \tilde{2}\)3!? \( \tilde{2}\)d6 \( 13\)\( \tilde{2}\)e1 \( \tilde{0}\)f6 \( 14\) d4 \( \tilde{2}\)g4 \( 15\)\( \tilde{0}\)d3 \( (15\) f3 \( \tilde{1}\) f3 \( \tilde{0}\) to better) \( 15...\)c5 \( \tilde{0}\) and \( \tilde{0}\) and \( \tilde{0}\) f3 \( \tilde{0}\) instead of \( 16\) dxc5?) allows Black insufficient compensation for his Pawn.

| 8 | c3 | 0-0 |
|---|----|-----|
| 9 | h3 | ••• |

For 9 d4 see game 36.

9



A rare side line. 9... 2a5 10 2c2 c5 is a better-known sequence. The text is somewhat passive and commits the Bishop perhaps prematurely. Usually Stein continues 9... 2d7 10 d4 2f6; then 11 a4 is slightly better for White.

**夏b7** 

The line chosen in the game comes to resemble Breyer's Defense (9...公b8 10 d4 公bd7 11 公bd2 鱼b7 12 鱼c2! 星e8 13 b4 exd4 14 cxd4 a5 15 bxa5 c5) — see note to White's 17th move.

*10* **d4** 

2a5

Believe it or not, this Knight is headed for d7! Black may prefer the shorter route with 10...\(\Delta\)b8; but experience has shown that after 11 dxe5 dxe5 12 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)xd8, Black is obliged to recapture with his Bishop, which interferes with his development and produces endgame difficulties.

11 **ac2** 

2c4

Unsound is 11...exd4 12 cxd4 d5 13 e5 2e4 14 2c3 f5 15 exf6 e.p. 2xf6 16 2xe4 dxe4 17 2xe4 2xe4 18 2xe4 c5 19 d5 and Black remains a Pawn down.

Another possibility is 11...exd4 12 cxd4 c5 but White holds the edge with 13 5bd2. On 11...c5 immediately, White replies 12 5bd2, retaining the option of d5, locking in Black's Bishop on b7.

12 **b3** 

②**b6** 

*13* **∅bd2** 

400

Not 13 dxe5 dxe5 14 \(\exists xd8 \) \(\textsize xd8 \) 15 \(\textsize xe5 \) \(\textsize xe4!=.

13 ..


⊕bd7

Black's 5th move with this Knight! 13...exd4 14 cxd4 c5 seems more active.

Stein-Lutikov, Moscow 1966 continued 13... Ze8? 14 ②f1? and Black equalized easily. However, White should vary with 14 dxe5 dxe5 15 ②xe5 \$\(\delta\) d6 16 ②ef3 \$\(\delta\) xe4 (16... ③xe4 17 ③xe4 \$\(\delta\) xe4 18 \$\(\delta\) g5! busts Black) 17 ③xe4 ④xe4 18  $(\delta\)$  d3! (White can't win a piece because his Queen hangs at the end after ... \$\(\delta\) h2+), with initiative.

14 **b**4!

Prevents ...c5 and prepares a dominating build-up with 15 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b2 followed by c4. The routine continuation 14 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b2 (Keres-Gligorich, Zurich 1959) gives nothing.



STEIN

Position after 14 b4!

**FISCHER** 

14 ...

exd4

Stein makes his bid for active counterplay even though it involves abandoning his "strong point" (e5-Pawn). If 14...a5 15 53! and Black might find himself in straightened circumstances after the Knight reaches a5.

15 cxd4

a5

On 15...c5 16 bxc5 dxc5 17 d5 White's steamroller in the center is more formidable than Black's Q-side majority.

16 bxa5

c5

Inferior would be 16... \( \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \aligned \begin{aligned} \begin{ali

17 e5!

...

This identical position was reached by transposition, with Black's Rook on e8, in Cirich-Robatsch, Beverwijk 1967, which continued: 17 单b2 豐xa5 18 a4 b4 19 ②c4 豐c7 20 e5 dxe5 21 dxe5 ②d5 22 ②fd2 ②7b6 and now Spassky's recommendation of 23 e6! is unpleasant for Black. (See note to Black's 9th move.)

17 ...

dxe5

Another line of defense is 17... © e8 with the idea of eliminating both of White's center Pawns. "The consequences are very ramified, and


there is some danger that Black may fail to recover White's Pawn on its a5 or may lose his own on b5, or both. The text is more active but also more dangerous for Black's King." (KMOCH).

| 18 | dxe5 | ₫ <b>d</b> 5 |
|----|------|--------------|
| 19 | ©e4  | ②b4!         |

The idea is to force the Bishop to retreat and thereby hem in White's QR. On 19... 基xa5 20 包eg5! h6 21 營d3! g6 22 包e6! wins.

| 20 | <b>≜b1</b> | ≅xa5 |
|----|------------|------|
| 21 | ₩e2!       | •••  |

Increasing the pressure. Not 21 e6 fxe6 22 ②eg5? (or 22 ②fg5 &d5 23 ②xh7 罩f5! holds) 22... &xf3! 23 ②xf3 &f6 wins.



STEIN

Position after 21 We2!

FISCHER

One can sense the storm looming against Black's King.

21 ... \@b6?

Quite possibly "the losing move." It is better to reserve this Knight for the defense of the K-side. More prudent is 21... 28! with ... 18 in the offing. 22 2d1 27 leads to nought. And 22 e6 leads to no demonstrable advantage after 22... fxe6 23 2eg5 \$\text{xg5} 24 2xg5 2f8 25 36, etc.

22 ∅fg5! ...

Now the threats are beginning to jell.

22 ... <u>\$xe4!</u>

Forced, because if 22...h6 23 ②h7!! stands Black up. On 23...宣8 (23...曾xh7 24 ②xc5 dis.+ followed by ②xb7 leads to a small fork) 24 ②hf6+! ②xf6 (24...gxf6 25 營g4+ 當h8 26 ②d6! ②xd6 27 營f5! 當g7 28 ③xh6+ leads to mate) 25 ②xf6+ 營xf6 (again if 25...gxf6 26 營g4+ 當f8 27 ②xh6+ 當e7 28 e6! 當d6 29 營g3+ 當c6 30 ②e4+ ②4d5 31 exf7 圖h8 32 ③xd5+ wins) 26 exf6 wins the exchange.

Also insufficient is 22...g6 23 e6! f5 24 \$\overline{1}\$f7! followed by \$\overline{1}\$b2 with a crushing attack.

| 23 | ₩xe4        | <b>g</b> 6 |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 24 | <b>營h4</b>  | h5         |
| 25 | <b>幽g3!</b> | •••        |

Now White threatens 26 ②e6! 鱼h4! 27 ②xd8 鱼xg3 28 ②b7 罩a7 29 ②xc5. After Black's next move, this variation fails against 29...鱼xe5.

Impetuous would be 25 g4?? ₩d4.


| 25 | ***          | ②c4! |
|----|--------------|------|
| 26 | <b>2</b> f3? | ***  |

More forcing is 26 e6! f5 27 包f3 (not 27 包f7 罩xf7! 28 exf7+ 含xf7 29 食xf5! gxf5 30 營f3 含g6 31 g4 營d5 and a draw appears likely) 27...含g7 28 營f4 富h8 transposing into the game (but not 27...富f6 28 食g5 含h7 29 食xf6 食xf6 30 食xf5! gxf5 31 冨ad1 包d5 32 e7! 食xe7 33 冨xd5 is decisive.). This order of moves would prohibit the defense mentioned in the note to Black's 28th; after being forced to play 26...f5, Black loses his options.

At this stage the power failed. In the dark I began to worry about 26... 2

| 26 | ***        | <b>ġg7</b> |
|----|------------|------------|
| 27 | <b>≝f4</b> | <b>≣h8</b> |
| 28 | e6!        | •••        |

"This blow rocks the remnants of the tower around the Black King." (GLIGORICH).



STEIN

Position after 28 e6!

**FISCHER** 

28 ...

f5

#### 


**警f8** 

Kmoch suggests that "Leonidas might even have better taken a chance and faced the storm by playing 29...gxf5." But the Bishop is tabu, for White wins quickly with 30 \(\mathbb{\mathba\mathbb{\mathbb

A] 30...當f8 31 豐g6 豐e8 (if 31...包d6 32 包e5!) 32 息h6+ 罩xh6 33 豐xh6+ 當g8 34 包g5.

B] 30...會h7 31 ②g5+! 鱼xg5 32 鱼xg5 營d3 (if 32...營b8 33 營h4! 含g6 34 鱼f6 – or 32...營e8 33 區ad1 區a7 34 區d8! 營xd8 35 鱼xd8 區xd8

36 e7 罩e8 37 罩e6! 罩exe7 38 彎g6+ 含h8 39 彎f6+ 罩g7 40 營h6+ and mates) 33 營c7+ 含g6 34 營f7+! 含xg5 35 營g7+ 含f4 36 罩ad1!, etc.



STEIN

Position after 29... 響f8

FISCHER

30 **≜e4?** 

Littlewood indicates 30 ②h4! as a quick win for White. He's right. The main line is 30.... 2xh4 31 營xh4 營xf5 (if 31... 營f6 32 營g3! — or 31...gxf5 32 營g5+ 含h7 33 e7 營e8 34 ဩe6!) 32 營e7+ 含g8 33 營d8+ 含g7 34 營c7+ 含g8 35 e7, etc.

| 30 | •••  | <b>豐xf4</b> |
|----|------|-------------|
| 31 | ≜xf4 | ≌e8?        |

Stein's post-mortem suggestion of 31...\(\beta\)a6 is met by 32 \(\beta\)ad1 \(\beta\)xe6 33 \(\beta\)d7 (threatening \(\Delta\)g5), etc.

But the best try is 31... \( \) \( \

Black, however, was in extreme time-pressure.

| 32 | <b>≝ad1</b> | <b></b> a6 |
|----|-------------|------------|
| 33 | <b>≝d7</b>  | •••        |

Even more convincing is 33 &b7! 罩a7 34 罩d7.

| 33 | ***        | <b>≅</b> xe6 |
|----|------------|--------------|
| 34 | <b>②g5</b> | <b>罩f6</b>   |

Costs the exchange. But no better is 34... **Z**a6 35 **A**b1 **A**f6 36 **A**e4+ **A**f7 37 **A**xc5, etc.


35 **≜f3!** 

罩xf4

Of course 35... \$\delta f8\$ is refuted by 36 \$\overline{\Omega} h7+.

| 36 | ©e6+         | <b>\$</b> f6 |
|----|--------------|--------------|
| 37 | ☑xf4         | ©e5          |
| 38 | <b>罩b7</b>   | <b>≜d6</b>   |
| 39 | <b>\$</b> f1 | •••          |

Puts an end to all effective resistance. White's material superiority must tell.



STEIN

Position after 39 \$\frac{1}{2}f1

FISCHER

39 ..

②c2

| 40 | ≌e4          | €)d4         |
|----|--------------|--------------|
| 41 | <b>≝</b> b6  | <b>≝d8</b>   |
| 42 | <b>②d5</b> + | <b>\$</b> f5 |
| 43 | ©e3+         | ***          |

The sealed move seals Black's fate. Not only is White an exchange ahead, but his attack still rages.

43 ...

**\$e6** 

Equally hopeless is 43...當f6 44 兔e2 b4 45 f4 followed by 兔c4.

| 44 | ***         | <b>Ġd7</b>  |
|----|-------------|-------------|
| 45 | ≜xb5+       | ②xb5        |
| 46 | 罩xb5        | <b>\$c6</b> |
| 47 | a4          | ₫c7         |
| 48 | <b>∳e2</b>  | <b>g</b> 5  |
| 49 | g3          | ℤa8         |
| 50 | 罩 <b>b2</b> | <b>ℤf8</b>  |
| 51 | f4          | •••         |

The beginning of the end.

| 51 | ***          | gxf4       |
|----|--------------|------------|
| 52 | gxf4         | <b>约f7</b> |
| 53 | <b>□</b> e6+ | €)d6       |

If 53.... ad6 54 罩f6! is powerful.

| 54 | f5   | <b>ℤa8</b>    |
|----|------|---------------|
| 55 | 罩d2! | <b>≝xa4</b>   |
| 56 | f6   | Black resigns |

On 56... 宣f4 57 包d5 wins the house. A stubborn fight!

# BOBBY FISCHER'S TOURNAMENT AND MATCH RECORD

(BORN: MARCH 9, 1943)

| Event                                     | Year   | Place                              |
|---|--------|------------------------------------|
| Brooklyn Chess Club Championship          | 1955   | 3 <sup>rd</sup> -5 <sup>th</sup>   |
| USA Amateur Championship, New Jersey      | 1955 r | ninus score                        |
| USA Junior Championship, Nebraska         | 1955   | 10 <sup>th</sup> -20 <sup>th</sup> |
| Greater New York City Championship        | 1956   | 5 <sup>th</sup> -7 <sup>th</sup>   |
| Manhattan Chess Club, "A" Reserve         | 1956   | 1 <sup>st</sup>                    |
| USA Amateur Championship, New Jersey      | 1956   | 21 <sup>st</sup>                   |
| USA Junior Championship, Philadelphia     | 1956   | 1 <sup>st</sup>                    |
| USA Open Championship, Oklahoma           | 1956   | 4th-8th                            |
| Canadian Open Championship, Montreal      | 1956   | 8th-12th                           |
| Eastern States Championship, Washington   | 1956   | $2^{nd}$                           |
| Rosenwald Trophy Tournament, New York     | 1956-7 | $8^{th}$                           |
| Log Cabin Open Championship, New Jersey   | 1957   | $6^{th}$                           |
| Western Open Championship, Milwaukee      | 1957   | $7^{\text{th}}$                    |
| USA Junior Championship, San Francisco    | 1957   | 1 <sup>st</sup>                    |
| USA Open Championship, Cleveland          | 1957   | 1 <sup>st</sup>                    |
| Eight-game match with Cardoso, New York   | 1957   | 6-2 (won)                          |
| New Jersey Open Championship              | 1957   | 1 <sup>st</sup>                    |
| North Central Championship, Milwaukee     | 1957   | $6^{ m th}$                        |
| USA Championship, New York                | 1957-8 | $1^{st}$                           |
| Interzonal, Portoroz                      | 1958   | 5 <sup>th</sup> -6 <sup>th</sup>   |
| Four-game match with Matulovich, Belgrade | 1958   | 2½-1½ (won)                        |
| USA Championship, New York                | 1958-9 | 1 <sup>st</sup>                    |
| Mar del Plata, Argentina                  | 1959   | 3 <sup>rd</sup> -4 <sup>th</sup>   |
| Santiago, Chile                           | 1959   | 4 <sup>th</sup> -7 <sup>th</sup>   |
| Zurich, Switzerland                       | 1959   | 3 <sup>rd</sup> -4 <sup>th</sup>   |
| Candidates' Tournament, Yugoslavia        | 1959   | $5^{th}$ - $6^{th}$                |

| 1959-60 | 1 <sup>st</sup>  |
|---------|--|
| 1960    | $1^{st}$   |
| 1960    | 13 <sup>th</sup>   |
| 1960    | 1 <sup>st</sup>  |
| 1960    | high scorer  |
|         | (finals)   |
| 1960-1  | 1 <sup>st</sup>  |
|         |  |
| 1961    | 51/2-51/2  |
| 1961    | $2^{\text{nd}}$  |
| 1962    | 1 <sup>st</sup>  |
| 1962    | 4 <sup>th</sup>  |
| 1962    | high scorer  |
|         | (prelims)  |
| 1962-3  | $1^{st}$   |
| 1963    | 1 <sup>st</sup>  |
| 1963    | $1^{\rm st}$   |
| 1963-4  | $1^{st}$   |
| 1965    | $2^{nd}$ - $4^{th}$  |
| 1965-6  | 1 <sup>st</sup>  |
| 1966    | $2^{\rm nd}$   |
| 1966    | $2^{nd}$   |
|         | high scorer  |
| 1966-7  | 1 <sup>st</sup>  |
| 1967    | 1 <sup>st</sup>  |
| 1967    | 1 <sup>st</sup>  |
| 1967    | withdrew   |
|         | while  |
|         | leading  |
| 1968    | 1 <sup>st</sup>  |
| 1968    | 1 <sup>st</sup>  |
|         | 1960<br>1960<br>1960<br>1960<br>1960-1<br>1961<br>1961<br>1962<br>1962<br>1962<br>1963<br>1963<br>1963<br>1963-4<br>1965<br>1965-6<br>1966<br>1966<br>1967<br>1967<br>1967 |

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# Reissued in celebration of a chess genius

A rare window into the mind of a chess icon, *My* 60 Memorable Games is perhaps the most inspirational and influential chess book ever written. First published in 1969, it contains Bobby Fischer's objective, honest and self-critical annotations to games he had won, drawn and even lost in the period from 1957 to 1967 – but from which he had also learned valuable lessons. Reading Fischer's intensely personal commentaries is like going back in time and watching live coverage of his over-the-board battles with the leading players of his day. Soon he would become the greatest of them all.

In contrast with the previous edition of this book, no alterations have been made to the text other than the conversion of moves into algebraic notation, making this an updated yet accurate reflection of the original book.

American-born chess grandmaster **Bobby Fischer** became famous as a teenager for his phenomenal chess-playing ability. In 1972, at the height of the Cold War, he won the world title from the Russian Boris Spassky in a gripping match that generated worldwide media interest. He died in 2008. Fischer not only played brilliant chess but raised the game to new levels of professionalism and his influence is still felt strongly today.

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